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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Need for a New 
Religion Paradigm in International 
Relations and the Potential 
Contribution of  the Amsterdam School 
of  Philosophy
1.1. Statement of  the Problem 
It was during the Second World War, in 1943, that the renowned theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr wrote a prayer for a church service. This prayer, which has become known 
as the Serenity Prayer, decorates many walls all over the world until today: ’God, give 
us grace to accept with serenity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change 
the things that should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the 
other.’1 It is an example of how religion, even prayer, can have an impact on the world. 
Niebuhr made an impact through his writings on religion and international affairs, but 
also through his prayers. What should we think of this? 
Since the last decade of the twentieth century, many scholars have begun to see 
religion play an increasingly important role in the world.2 A clear landmark of this 
1 Elisabeth Sifton, The Serenity Prayer: Faith and Politics in Times of Peace and War (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
2 Attention has been paid to religion and international relations in the past, but not as extensively as since the 1990s. 
This is especially true of the relationship between religion and international relations theory. A counterexample is the 
organization that preceded the current Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, called the Council on 
Religion and International Affairs (CRIA). It was founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1914, who held ‘that the ethical 
principles of the major religions are relevant for the world’s political, economic and social problems’. Kenneth W. 
Thompson, Jerald C. Brauer and Hans J. Morgenthau, U.S. Policy in the Far East: Ideology, Religion & Superstition (New 
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development is Samuel Huntington’s article ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, which 
appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1993.3 In this article, Huntington posited that the world 
was moving out of a Western-dominated phase based on Westphalian assumptions.4 
He argued that civilizations that are strongly shaped by religion would more and more 
come to influence international relations.5 Although Huntington’s controversial thesis 
was strongly debated and criticized, he can nonetheless be considered the first to have 
highlighted the role of religion in world affairs and its consequences for International 
Relations (IR) theorizing. When I say ‘the first’, I do not mean to suggest that religion 
has always been absent from IR theorizing (I will demonstrate the opposite later on in 
this dissertation) but that it has been perceived that way by mainstream IR.6 With the 
latter, I also do not neglect the fact that there are attempts to engage with post-Western 
of post-American ways of IR.7 
In the wake of Huntington, many other scholars have written about religion, 
international relations, and international relations theory, a trend that continues 
today. The result is that religion has almost become a field of study in its own right 
within IR or a sub-section like International Political Economy.8 A clear example of 
this is the founding of a special section Religion and International Relations at the 
York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1968), back cover. The CRIA published a monthly journal devoted 
to religion and international affairs, called Worldview, from 1958 until 1985. The search engine of the archive can 
be found online. http://worldview.carnegiecouncil.org/archive/worldview/archive.html (accessed December 28, 2020). 
Other examples of attention to religion and international relations are the following publications: William C. Fletcher, 
Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Max Hayward and William C. 
Fletcher, eds., Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power (New York, Washington and London: Preager, 1969); 
Eric O. Hanson, The Catholic Church in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Kenneth W. 
Thompson, Religion and International Relations (New York: Council for Christian Social Action, 1964); Jeffrey Rose 
and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Religion and International Affairs (Toronto: Anansi, 1968); Yaacov Ro’i, ed., The USSR and 
the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984) This is not an exhaustive list, 
but an indication that the topic of religion and world affairs was not completely nonexistent before the 1990s. For a 
systematic overview and a bibliography on religion and IR. Gregorio Bettiza, “Religion and International Relations,” 
Oxford Bibliographies (2016); Vendulka Kubálková, “A ‘Turn to Religion’ in International Relations?” Perspectives: Review 
of International Affairs 17, no. 2 (2009): 28-41.
3 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993). In 1996, the article resulted in a book. 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
4 For a more detailed account of the Westphalian assumptions, see the introduction of Chapter 3.
5 Ibid., 38, 54. 
6 The fact that IR was/is to a large extent an American social science, as Hofman already showed in the 1970s also 
determines what is mainstream IR. Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 
106, no. 3 (1977): 41-60.
7 E.g. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); N. Deugd, M. E. Drent and P. M. E. Volten, eds., Towards an Autonomous European IR Approach 
- Relevance and Strategy (Groningen; Conference Proceedings; 4 and 5 October 2007).
8 Thomas F. Farr, World of Faith and Freedom: Why International Religious Liberty is Vital to American National Security (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34. In this dissertation, the study of international relations will follow the scholarly 
convention, in which the events taking place in the world will use the lower case (ir) or international relations, and the 
upper case (IR), or International Relations will refer to the scholarly study of the kinds of events, actors, activities, processes. 
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International Studies Association in 2013. There are scholars that aim at studying and 
explaining religion in international relations, but there are also scholars that want to 
explain international relations by including religious factors. Of course, the first can 
be a stepping stone to the second goal, but that is not guaranteed. As long as the latter 
has not taken place, it could not be argued that religion has become part of IR, because 
religion has not been taken into consideration to explain international relations. In fact, 
it seems that the greatest challenge is not whether religion in international relations 
is accepted as an interesting, insightful topic to study, but to what extent IR theory 
should incorporate the factor religion. Many scholars have criticized the discipline 
of International Relations for ignoring the role of religion in international relations. 
These scholars claim that inadequate theories lead to inadequate policies, which may 
have dramatic consequences. For example, if the United States had taken the role and 
significance of religion more seriously, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 would not have 
come as a complete surprise. This group of scholars, whom I call ‘religionists’, ‘paradigm 
challengers’ or ‘religion scholars’ for convenience, therefore urges that within IR more 
attention should be paid to the role of religion. Existing theories will have to be replaced 
or modified. Religionists is not a usual term in International Relations. It is, however, 
an existing word. Most dictionaries define a religionist as someone who adheres to a 
religion, but also as a devoted or a zealous person. This is not the way I would like to 
define the term religionists. I use the term to denote a group of scholars who advocate 
for more attention to religion in IR.
Two books that illustrate this development are Scott Thomas’s The Global Resurgence 
of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations (2005), and Nukhet Sandal 
and Jonathan Fox’s Religion and International Relations Theory (2013). Thomas’s book can 
be considered emblematic of the development of the field of religion and IR.9 Thomas 
starts his book by describing three events: the Iranian Revolution, the Polish Revolution, 
and September 11. He shows that in each case, policymakers and practitioners were 
informed and guided by secular explanations. As a result, they overlooked religious 
aspects of international affairs and failed to address them adequately. For Thomas, this 
demonstrates the marginalization of religion and culture in international relations, with 
the return of religion therefore raising the following question:10
Does religion need to be brought into the existing concepts, theories, or paradigms of international 
relations or are new ones required? A more disquieting suggestion is that what is required is a new 
concept of theory and what it is supposed to do in international relations.11 
9 Thomas’s book was preceded by an article in 2000. Scott M. Thomas, “Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism 
Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 815-841.
10 Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the 
Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1-12.
11 Ibid., 12.
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Sandal and Fox’s book tries to accommodate the multiple ways in which religion and 
world affairs interact by adapting IR to religion’s role in the world. Their approach is, 
to first develop a comprehensive list of ways in which religion can potentially influence international 
relations, then to take this list and examine whether and how each item can be integrated into an 
existing international relations paradigm. (...) It maintains the insights contained in the existing 
paradigm.12 
The works of Huntington, Thomas, Sandal and Fox have two things in common: all 
draw attention to religion’s presence in the world and maintain that existing theories 
and concepts are unable to grasp this phenomenon adequately and satisfactorily. They 
are concerned that mainstream IR overlooks religious factors in world affairs and argue 
that religion should be taken into account in IR.13 In the next section, I will set out the 
position of the religionists in more detail. 
1.2. The Religionist Challenge: An Introduction
In IR, competing paradigms are frequently discussed. It is often used to describe the 
opposition between idealism and realism or the distinctions between realism, pluralism, 
and structuralism. These are different paradigms, because the various theories hold different 
starting points, worldviews, and understandings of what evidence is, and therefore they can 
hardly be compared or tested against each other. Each of the theories operates as a kind of self-
contained intellectual community with its own journals, meetings and leaders. Discussions 
between the various paradigms are rare and often result in predictable outcomes.14 
In the past, there have been various paradigm challengers in IR. Realism was a 
reaction to idealism, and social constructivism was an attack on neorealism, because it 
12 Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 5. In an earlier article Fox made it even more explicit: ‘the basic theories of international 
relations, like realism, liberalism, constructivism, the English School and Marxism retain their explanatory power and 
describe important, and even dominant aspects of international relations, but unless they take religion into account 
they cannot provide a complete explanation for international politics and events.’ Jonathan Fox, “Integrating Religion 
into International Relations Theory,” in Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 273. In their book, Sandal and Fox admit that religion has been acknowledged in some strands 
of classical realist thought, but their main position is that religion deserves more attention. Sandal and Fox, Religion in 
International Relations Theory, 30.
13 Within the confines of this research, only scholars or theorists who deal with religion and international relations and/
or religion and IR theory are considered as ‘religionist’. Scholars who write about religion in closely related fields such as 
the social and political sciences and not in International Relations per se are therefore excluded. E.g. Kenneth D. Wald 
and Clyde Wilcox, “Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?” The American Political Science 
Review 100, no. 4 (2006).
14 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
75, 76.
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thought that important elements were left out.15 Critical theory, feminism, and green 
perspectives were not exactly distinct theories, but they challenged existing theories and 
the IR paradigm for the lack of attention to capitalist power structures, gender, and 
environmental issues.16  
Since the 1990s, the scholars I call religionists have added a new topic to this 
list: religion.17 They argue that current mainstream IR is characterized by a set of 
institutional rules and practices as well as theoretical assumptions that are shaped by 
group commitments and controlled by the discipline, which prevents new insights from 
being taken into account, in this case regarding the role of religion. They challenge the 
IR paradigm on several fronts and hope to create a revolution within IR so that religion 
will be taken seriously. The religionists maintain that IR theories should be far more 
attentive to religious factors, because religion is ‘out there’ in the real world and dealing 
with it is crucial to make sense of world affairs. They are convinced that IR theories 
are much better suited to empirically understand international affairs if they include 
religion. The following quotation from Thomas reflects this position clearly: 
15 There has been some criticism on the use of the term idealism. Lucian M. Ashworth, “Where are the Idealists in 
Interwar International Relations,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2006). Also, there is increasing unease with 
the view that the development of IR took place through debates. Schmidt states that: ‘This story of the field’s evolution is, 
in turn, often but tressed by the closely related account of the field evolving through a series of “great debates”, beginning 
with the disciplinary defining “great debate” between “idealists” and “realists” and extending perhaps to the latest debate 
today between “rationalists” and “reflectivists”. This particular construction of the field’s history tends to have the effect 
of making the present debate a matter that all serious students of IR must focus on while rel egating previous debates 
to obscurity.’ Brian C. Schmidt, “On the History and Historiography of International Relations,” in Handbook of 
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE, 2013), 2.
16 Jill Steans and others, An Introduction to International Relations Theory. Perspectives and Themes, third ed. (Harlow etc.: 
Pearson, 2010), 103-228.
17 Representative religionist scholars are: Bassam Tibi, Michael Barnett, Emily Cochran Bech, John A. Bernbaum, 
Stanton Burnett, Jonathan Chaplin, Il Hyun Cho, Wade Clark Roof, Ken R. Dark, Michael C. Desch, Thomas F. Farr, 
Timothy Fitzgerald, Jonathan Fox, Ludwig Gelot, Rebecca A. Glazier, Eric. O. Hanson, Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Jeffrey 
Haynes, Kirstin Hasler, J. Bryan Hehir, Samuel Huntington, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Patrick James, Robert Joustra, 
Peter J. Katzenstein, Berma Klein Goldewijk, Vendulka Kubálková, Carsten Bagge Laustsen, Mika Luoma-aho, Cecelia 
Lynch, Walter McDougall, Eric Patterson, Fabio Petito, Ralph Pettman, Daniel Philpott, John A. Rees, Susanne Hoeber 
Rudolph, Nukhet A. Sandal, Shmuel Sandler, Harold H. Saunders, Timothy Samuel Shah, Giorgi Shani, Mona Kanwal 
Sheikh, Megan Shore, James W. Skillen, Jack Snyder, John F. Stack, John D. Stempel, Scott Thomas, J. Ann Tickner, 
Monica Duffy Toft, Ole Waever, Erin Wilson and Robert Wuthnow. Some religionists have criticized Huntington’s ‘clash 
of civilizations’, but that does not negate his agreement with the religionist position. E.g. Michael Barnett, “Another 
Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion,” in Religion and International Relations Theory, ed. Jack 
L. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 5; Jonathan Fox, “Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Religions: 
Which is a More Important Determinant of Ethnic Conflict?” Ethnicities 1, no. 3 (2001): 295; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel 
Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York, etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 115-135; Jonathan 
Fox, “Lessons on Religion and Conflict Resolution Based on Empirical Studies of Religion and Conflict,” Proceedings of 
Conference Religion and Conflict Resolution (2002): 34-36; Jeffrey Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and 
Religion (Harlow etc: Longman, 2007), 4-7; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 24; Megan Shore, “Religious Conflict Resolution and the Case of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ed. Megan Shore (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 13.
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Using the wrong conceptual map – or theory or paradigm – can be just as misleading (and maybe 
even more dangerous for your security) than using the wrong geographical map (…). The point is 
not only that such maps indicate inappropriate routes, but that they can hide or distract a researcher 
from observing those features of the religious and political landscape that do require attention.18
The way in which the religionists want to consider religion varies. There are religionists who 
do not offer alternatives, but other religionists either develop a new theoretical framework 
or propose to integrate religious factors into existing IR theories because they appreciate 
the value of current IR theory.19 However, the common ground can then be presented in 
the following main thesis that virtually always goes together with one or more subtheses. 
Main thesis: IR has to consider the role of religion in the world.20 
Subthesis I: Religion is everywhere in the world and IR should not ignore it. 
Subthesis II: IR has a bias against acknowledging the significance of religion, because 
its study of international relations has been heavily influenced by Westphalian 
assumptions.
18 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 48.
19 Religionists who propose an alternative are, for example: Michael Barnett, Jonathan Fox, Patrick James, Peter Katzenstein, 
Vendulka Kubálková, Ralph Pettman, John Rees, Nukhet Sandal, Jack Snyder and Scott Thomas. Examples of religionists 
that want to integrate it in existing approaches are Bech, Cho, Huntington, Katzenstein, Sandal, and Snyder. Emily 
Cochran Bech and Jack L. Snyder, “Conclusion: Religion’s Contribution to International Relations Theory,” in Religion 
and International Relations Theory, ed. Jack L. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 204; Il Hyun Cho 
and Peter J. Katzenstein, “In the Service of State and Nation: Religion in East Asia,” in Religion and International Relations 
Theory, ed. Jack L. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 190; Jonathan Fox and Nukhet A. Sandal, 
“Toward Integrating Religion into International Relations Theory,” Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen 17, no. 1 
(2010): 157; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 33-35, 37. I consider attempts that 
only focus on the integration of religion in IR theory without discussing the deficiencies of existing approaches also as 
religionist, because in all cases it is assumed that religion is currently not sufficiently dealt with in IR. Barnett, Another 
Great Awakening?, 105-110; Fox and Sandal, Toward Integrating Religion into International Relations Theory, 1-23; Peter 
J. Katzenstein, “Civilizational States, Secularisms, and Religions,” in Rethinking Secularism, eds. Craig Calhoun, Marc 
Jurgensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (Oxford, New York, etc: Oxford University Press, 2011), 145-162; Vendulka 
Kubálková, “Towards an International Political Theology,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 
675-704; Ralph Pettman, Reason, Culture, Religion: The Metaphysics of World Politics (New York, N.Y., etc.: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), 157-161; John A. Rees, Religion in International Politics and Development: The World Bank and Faith 
Institutions (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011); Nukhet A. Sandal and Patrick James, “Religion and International 
Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 3 (2011); 3-25; 
Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory Jack L. Snyder, “Introduction,” in Religion and International 
Relations Theory, ed. Jack L. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 7-20.
20 The sequence of the main thesis and the three subtheses is important. For example, Hanson is a religionist, but the 
larger part of his writings on religion is intended to show the applicability of his theoretical framework and not the 
validity of the main thesis. Eric O. Hanson, Religion and Politics in the International System Today (Cambridge, UK; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 123.
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Subthesis III: The ‘old paradigm’ suffers from philosophical limitations that make it 
difficult to take religion into account. 
These three subtheses correspond with the three levels I will set out later, namely the 
empirical level (subthesis I), the domain-specific level (subthesis II), and the level of 
philosophy of science (subthesis III). Although these subtheses each stand on their own, 
there is a relationship between them. Assumptions made on a philosophy of science level 
do influence the assumptions held on the level of IR, and ultimately what people see on 
the empirical level. Of course, this influence may also take place in the reverse direction. 
Though the religionists subscribe to the main thesis, they may differ in the extent to 
which they support the subtheses.
As indicated earlier, this group of religionist thinkers is not entirely homogeneous 
and united; there is significant diversity among them. In the first place, the degree to 
which they contribute to the main claim differs. Some of the religionists belong to the 
group that is leading and dominating the debate, which includes Farr, Fox, Haynes, 
Patterson, Philpott, Thomas, Sandal, Sandler and Snyder.21 By ‘leading’ and ‘dominating’ 
I mean that these scholars were the first in dealing with the topic, that the vast amount 
of literature comes from them and that others refer to them: you cannot discuss the 
topic without mentioning them. Other participants in the debate on religion and IR, 
whom I call the middle group, build upon the first set of scholars. I am thinking of 
Barnett, Chaplin, Gelot, Glazier, Hatzopoulos, Joustra, Kubálková, Luoma-aho, Petitio, 
Saunders, Tibi and Wilson. Finally, there are those who primarily draw on the arguments 
provided by the others and try to make their own points based on the renewed attention 
for religion, for example by advocating a certain theoretical approach. Scholars in this 
group are Bernbaum, Cho, Fitzgerald, Hanson, Hehir, Katzenstein, Laustsen, Lynch, 
Pettman, Skillen and Waever. 
In the second place, the religion scholars have different views about the way in 
which religion should have a place in IR. Vendulka Kubálková advocates a radically 
alternative approach, namely International Political Theology, whereas Fox and Sandal 
try to integrate religion into the existing theories.22 Most members of this religion group 
are located between these two extreme positions. The differences among the religionists 
often have to do with ontological and epistemological assumptions. Fox and Shmuel 
Sandler are more positivist-oriented. They expect that the integration of religion into 
international relations will follow in the manner in which nationalism and ethnicity 
have become accepted and, to a more or lesser extent, integrated as factors of importance 
21 Huntington is also a religionist. As I stated earlier, the religious element of Huntington’s argument about the clash 
of civilization has barely been taken seriously in earlier debates. That is why his role as a leader in the debate regarding 
religion in IR has been limited, even though he was one of the first. Categorizing him among the group of followers or 
copyists would therefore not do him justice. Instead, one could say that he holds an individual position. 
22 Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology.
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in IR theories since the early 1990s. They expect that given the fact that global terrorism 
is so intertwined with religion, students of international relations will be compelled to 
study the impact of religion in the international arena. They consider religion’s influence 
on international relations not a primary causal factor, but ‘among the most important, 
and perhaps the most important, of intervening variables’. They also describe how 
religion could be integrated in constructivism, realism, and liberalism.23 For Thomas, 
who wants to go beyond positivism and prefers an interpretivist approach, it would not 
help to add the religious factor to existing concepts of theories of international relations, 
because it easily leads to misclassification of religion as a variable like ideology or belief 
systems.24
Similar epistemological and ontological differences play a role when it comes to the 
understanding of what religion itself is. Most of the religionists, which includes some of 
the most prominent ones, justify their attention for religion based on religion’s distinctive 
nature. These scholars see religion as sui generis, which means that religion is seen as an 
essentially distinct type among other human endeavors, such as politics, economics, and 
art. However, there is also a minority of religionists who do not see religion as sui generis. 
They argue that what should be scrutinized by IR is not religion as simply ‘something 
out there’ in the world, but the political impact of (using) religion.25 This group finds 
it important to study history to avoid talking about religion as a fixed and universal 
phenomenon. The first group, however, is worried that historical work will dissolve the 
category of religion as if religion does not exist, because it is ultimately a construction. 
These two approaches seem to oppose each other, which would make it less plausible to 
present the religionists as a coherent group. However, as William Cavanaugh, who is not 
a religionist, points out elsewhere with respect to opposing approaches to the study of 
religion: ‘[W]e need not take such an approach. Religion does exist, but as a constructed 
category.’26 In other words, it is possible to combine the two approaches. In that case, 
it is taken for granted that religion can be distinguished from other human endeavors, 
while considering that the category religion itself is constructed whether or not as a 
23 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 166, 169, 170-172, 178, 179.
24 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 76.
25 I base this distinction partly on William T. Cavanaugh, “What is Religion?” in Religion and International Relations: 
A Primer for Research (University of Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 56-67. 
Two typical examples of religionists who critically describe the way religion has been constructed are Hurd and Thomas. 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “A Suspension of (Dis)Belief: The Secular-Religous Binary and the Study of International 
Relations,” in Rethinking Secularism, eds. Craig Calhoun, Marc Jurgensmeyer and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (Oxford, 
New York, etc: Oxord University Press, 2011), 166-184. Thomas takes the definition of Alasdair MacIntyre as his starting 
point, meaning that religion should be seen as a type of social tradition that is part of a broader debate about the nature 
of the good within a particular community and that this debate cannot be separated from the specific cultural and social 
context, because it is part of that context. This definition differs from, for example, Weber and Geertz’s understanding 
of religion, because it acknowledges that religious ideas, rules, norms, principles, and moral judgments are dependent on 
social life. They are not statements with which rational individuals can agree or disagree. Thomas, The Global Resurgence 
of Religion, 88, 89.
26 Cavanaugh, What is Religion?, 66.
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result of political motives. 
The assumption that religion, even though it is constructed, can be distinguished 
from other human activities is important for the claim that religion should be taken 
into account by IR theories. For that reason, quite a few religionists argue for religion’s 
distinctiveness. This idea is primarily based on their conviction that religion concerns 
the ultimate, transcendent, or supernatural.27 I will discuss this in more detail in Section 
1.6. below.
The academic output of the religionists are mainly volumes and books. However, 
they have also published in major journals such as Foreign Affairs, Annual Review of 
Political Science, World Politics, and the European Journal of International Relations.28 
Other journals that have published articles are Terrorism and Political Violence, 
International Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, and Third World 
Quarterly. Since 2003, there is also a special multidisciplinary and policy-oriented 
journal in which many religionists publish, called The Review of Faith and International 
Affairs, although the official impact of this journal, the so-called ‘impact factor’, in the 
overall academic literature is low. Its worldwide impact is however impressive. In 2018, 
according to the Annual Report of the Institute of Global Engagement, over 80.000 
full-text articles were downloaded from the online archives.29 Based on a search on the 
internet, it also seems that the religionists have been successful in introducing religion 
in the curricula of many universities in the United States, United Kingdom and, to a 
lesser extent, continental Europe. They have also been able to establish various centers 
that are devoted to religion and international affairs. Besides that, they have been able to 
found a section Religion and International Relations (REL) at the International Studies 
Association, and the Standing Group Religion and Politics at the European Consortium 
for Political Research (ECPR).30
1.3. Research Questions and Aims 
This dissertation addresses the concern of the religionists by investigating in detail what 
their position entails and to what extent their statements are plausible. It does so by 
means of the following main research question: To what extent could the claims of the 
27 For example: ’The unique explanatory power of religion comes from the distinctive relationship people have with 
religion and the otherworldly perspective it provides.’ Rebecca A. Glazier, Bringing Religion into International Relations: 
The Effects of Providential Beliefs on US Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: Proquest, 2011), 3
28 These journals belong to the top 10 out of 161 journals in the category ‘Political Science’ and out of 85 journals in the 
category ‘International Relations’.
29 The Institute of Global Engagement, 2018 Annual Report, 25.
30 This overview is limited to the academic output that is strictly religionist. There is much more literature on religion 
and IR in general and much more information about centers and websites on religion and international affair. Bettiza, 
Religion and International Relations.
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religionists be substantiated and what would be the implications for IR theory if their claims 
are plausible indeed? To answer this question in Part I, I first critically reconstruct the 
arguments and assumptions of these scholars by answering the first sub-question: what 
does the position of the so-called religion scholars within IR exactly entail? In Part II, I 
answer the second sub-question: To what extent is this new group of scholars right in their 
criticism of two dominant theories, namely Hans Morgenthau’s (1904-1980) classical realism 
and Kenneth Waltz’s (1924-2013) neorealism, and do they have to be revised? Do these 
theories in fact ignore religion and do they do so because of the reasons the advocates 
of religion in IR bring up? Moving over to Part III, I examine the implications for IR 
in my third sub-question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of both positions, and to 
what extent could a so-called practice approach do justice to the challenge of the adherents 
of religion, while at the same time upholding insights of the realist school? When answering 
each of these sub-questions, I will use insights derived from the Amsterdam School 
of Philosophy, also called Neo-Calvinist or Reformational Philosophy (more about it 
follows soon hereafter).
Thus this dissertation’s twofold aim is: the critical reconstruction and evaluation of 
the debate between the religionists and mainstream IR and, secondly, furthering the 
debate by developing contours of an alternative approach. 
1.4. Scientific and Societal Relevance
There is a range of arguments that indicate the urgency of this research project. In the first 
place, the religionist criticism has the potential to change IR. The religion scholars make 
a strong statement in the sense that they criticize the adequacy of existing mainstream 
IR theories.31 If true, their criticism could lead to a revision of prominent and influential 
theories. Until now, as far as I am aware, none of the IR theorists the religionists criticize 
have answered the critique.32 Secondly, with more than fifty religionist scholars writing 
31 Eric Patterson even speaks of the fourth debate in IR. Eric Patterson, Politics in a Religious World: Building a Religiously 
Informed Foreign Policy (New York: Continuum, 2011), 15-34.
32 IR theorist Robert Keohane is an exception when he says that ‘the attacks of September 11 reveal that all mainstream 
theories of world politics are relentlessly secular with respect to motivation’. According to Keohane, these theories ignore 
the impact of religion, despite the fact that world-shaking political movements have so often been fueled by religious 
fervor. In the same article, he also writes: ‘My argument is that our theories provide important components of an adequate 
post-September 11 conceptualization of world politics, but that we need to alter some of our assumptions in order to 
rearrange these components into a viable theoretical framework.’ Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 272-273. Cf. Ibid., 7. Keohane does not respond directly to 
the religionist complaint that IR neglects religion and also does also not have the ambition to proceed with researching 
religion: ‘However, since I have few insights into religious motivations in world politics, I will leave this subject to those 
who are more qualified to address it.’ Ibid., 272. Another exception to the rule that none of the mainstream IR theorists 
have responded to the criticism, is the interview with ‘soft’ realist Robert Gilpin. In that interview, he says that religion 
‘is obviously extraordinarily important’ today, because it relates to important aspects of the identity of individual and 
groups. He says that ‘religion is certainly not extraneous; indeed, religion is becoming much more important’. Ken Booth 
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today, it would be irresponsible to neglect their arguments and position any longer. 
My unique contribution to this debate is that I reconstruct the religionist position and 
present them as one group that provides three arguments (the three subtheses) to change 
current IR theory on religion. Thirdly, academics in the field of IR might have a bias 
against religion and this could lead to partiality with respect to religion. This bias could 
be the result of the societal context of IR as a discipline, because this context is very 
Western and characterized by the separation and privatization of religion as distinct 
from politics. This should at least make Western academics cautious not to close the 
religionist point too quickly and easily. 
The fourth reason to execute this research is that it adds a European or continental 
element to the current debate, because of my academic context as a researcher. This 
is important, because the debate on religion and IR is mainly an American debate, 
which is not surprising since IR as a discipline itself is still dominated by the United 
States. An illustration of the latter point is the article in the Handbook of International 
Relations in which Monica Duffy Toft writes on religion and IR. Most of it is American 
scholarship.33 A European perspective has the potential to contribute to this debate, 
because Europe has a longer and different history than the United States in dealing 
with religious diversity. It has come from a time in history when it dominated many 
areas in the world and has moved to a postcolonial era, which has left it with clearly 
less direct influence. This development has affected the foreign policies of the various 
European countries. Mixed instruments, soft and normative power, instead of a mere 
reliance on military power, characterize its policies. The experience with religious 
diversity is also expressed in the different domestic arrangements of religion and politics 
in various European countries. There are state churches, privileged churches, and there 
are countries with a strict separation of church and state (laicité). 
In the fifth place, I have chosen to examine and evaluate the debate between the 
religionists and mainstream IR from the perspective of the Amsterdam School of 
Philosophy, which adds a new perspective. I have been influenced to do so, because of 
an article by Thomas, who has pointed out that neo-Calvinism provides fruitful insights 
to further the discussion on religion and IR theory. He states that neo-Calvinism with 
its early criticism on the Enlightenment project comes close to many post-positivist 
approaches. According to Thomas, it emphasizes the impossibility of the separation 
between facts and values. It argues that there is no objective conception of reality, but 
that we are always faced with competing world-and-life views through which people 
interact with the world. He also maintains that the attention of neo-Calvinism for theory 
and others, “Conversations in International Relations: Interview with Robert Gilpin,” International Relations 19, no. 3 
(2005): 361, 362.
33 Monica Duffy Toft, “Religion and International Relations Theory,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE, 2013), 673-691.
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as everyday social practice opens the door for new ways of theorizing religion in IR.34 
In many ways, the current religion-international relations debate appears to be a 
repetition of previous debates. Whereas those previous debates for example concerned 
economics or ethnicity, the debate today is centered on religion. The debates therefore 
often share a similar character, as they ultimately always lead to discussions about 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Aided by some insights from the Amsterdam 
School of Philosophy, I would like to show how to further the debate on religion and IR. 
Finally, existing attempts to deal with the challenge of the emergence of the religion 
paradigm are, in my view, not very successful or satisfactory. To illustrate my point, I will 
give two examples of such serious attempts. The approaches I have in mind are Sandal 
and Fox’s book Religion and International Relations (2013), which I already mentioned, 
and Emily Cochran Bech and Jack Snyder’s conclusion in the volume Religion and 
International Relations Theory (2013).35 In order to demonstrate the shortcomings of 
these two approaches, I will discuss them in more detail.
Sandal and Fox aim to integrate the manifold manifestations of religion in the world 
into existing IR theories. They argue that religion plays a role in international affairs, 
but is still wrongly neglected in IR theories for various reasons, such as secularization 
theory, the Westphalian system, and positivist interpretations.36 They continue with 
a comprehensive list of ways in which religion can potentially influence international 
relations. This list includes religious legitimacy, religious worldviews, religious states, 
non-state religious actors, transnational religious movements (including religious 
fundamentalist movements), transnational issues which intersect with religion (including 
human rights, proselytizing, holy places, family planning, and stem cell research), and 
religious identity.37 From there, they try to integrate and accommodate religion in 
existing IR theories, which they feel should not be dismissed, even though they fail to 
adequately account for religion.38  
Bech and Snyder’s aim is to further the debate on religion and international relations 
(theory), because, for them, the focus on religion poses a challenge to conventional ways 
of thinking about international politics and to the theoretical debates in that field. The 
issues they put forward are whether religion is distinct from other belief systems, the 
relationship of religion with the state, and whether religion poses a challenge to traditional 
IR theories. They conclude in response to the first issue that theories that analyze secular 
and religious movements in a common framework have a greater explanatory potential 
than theoretical frameworks that focus solely on religious movements. In response to the 
34 Scott M. Thomas, “Living Critically and Living Faithfully in the Global World of the Twenty-First Century,” in 
Christian Faith, Philosophy & International Relations: The Lamb and the Wolf, eds. Simon Polinder and Govert J. Buijs 
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 73, 78, 79. 
35 Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory; Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution.
36 Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 2, 3.
37 Ibid., 6.
38 Ibid., 1, 4, 5, 11, 182.
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second point, Bech and Snyder doubt whether religion’s influence on states or impact 
through transnational channels warrants a reconsideration of existing IR approaches. 
Finally, they argue that despite the theoretical challenges that religion poses to IR 
theories, ‘incorporating religion would in each case enhance the subtlety, accuracy, and 
power of these approaches rather than undermine them’.39
My criticism of the two approaches as described above is that they suffer from the 
same two flaws. In the first place, both fail to address the question of the criteria for 
expanding existing IR theories. They both tend to put the importance of religion first 
and adapt IR to it. Sandal and Fox take the significance and relevance of religious actors 
for granted. Bech and Snyder similarly take the so-called ‘global resurgence of religion’ 
to be a fact IR has to deal with. The following quotation from Sandal and Fox illustrates 
very clearly how IR’s assumptions have to conform to the supposed importance of 
religion:
Whether in our efforts to account for religion’s influence we remain true to the core of existing 
theories or have in effect created new ones is to our eyes a subjective question. It is also one that in 
our minds proves insignificant next to the imperative of providing a better understanding of what 
we believe to be a vitally important aspect of international relations.40
Secondly, both approaches assume that IR has to incorporate religion, but they fail 
to demonstrate whether, how and why IR theories currently neglect religion. Sandal 
and Fox, for example, mention some reasons for the neglect of religion, such as the 
Peace of Westphalia, positivism and secularization theory, but they do not illustrate how 
and in which cases these reasons actually explain the neglect of religion.41 Snyder also 
assumes that IR neglects religion, but he mentions only one reason: that religion does 
not fit into the logic of the existing IR paradigms.42 My reconstruction will not only 
explain in detail the reasons various religionists put forward to account for the neglect of 
religion in IR, but it also systematically reviews the various religious phenomena that the 
religionists put forward to draw attention to the role of religion in world affairs. This will 
allow my examination to be more comprehensive. In a sense, my research is also more 
exhaustive, because Fox, Sandal, and Bech and Snyder do not consider the possibility 
that IR does pay attention to religion after all. They fail to consider the probability that 
IR theories might have good reasons not to involve religion. My research looks into 
specific IR theories and tries to find out how they actually deal with religion, and what 
their considerations are with respect to religion and theory. More specifically, I will 
investigate the possibility that there are other considerations or reasons that explain the 
39 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 208.
40 Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 181.
41 Ibid. 2.
42 Snyder, Introduction, 2.
28
dealings of these IR theorists with religion. How I will do so and where I will start is 
described below.
1.5. Methodology  
According to Jonathon Moses and Torbjørn Knutsen, ‘[u]nderneath any given research 
design and choice of methods lies a researcher’s (often implicit) understanding of 
the nature of the world and how it should be studied.’43 Moses and Knutsen take 
methodology as something that is more basic, fundamental and comprehensive than 
method. Moses and Knutsen explain the difference between methodology and method 
as if methods are the tools and methodologies the well-equipped toolboxes. Take 
for example two different approaches to human health: the practice of the ‘medical 
profession’ and the ‘homeopathic practitioners’. It is not difficult to understand that the 
two approaches imply different ways of understanding (and hence promoting) human 
health. It would be a problem when the medical bags of the scientific and homeopathic 
healers would be inadvertently switched. At the same time, there are tools that both of 
them use, although in different ways and for different objectives.44 Method refers to 
certain research techniques or technical procedures in a discipline, while methodology 
denotes an investigation of the concepts, theories, and basic principles of reasoning 
on a subject. It functions on the level of philosophy of science.45 In the sections on 
methodology and method, I make use of this distinction to set out how I executed my 
research. I will start with the methodological part. 
1.5.1. A Critical Reconstruction 
The first part of my research is a critical reconstruction of the religionist position. It 
summarizes, synthesizes and reconstructs the literature on religion and international 
relations (theory) of approximately the past two decades and presents it in an ordered 
fashion. That is necessary, because part of the reason why mainstream theorists do 
not respond to the criticism might be that there are too many different voices and 
arguments. Reading all the literature on religion and international relations (theory) 
leaves the reader confused, because there is no systematic and coherent argument, which 
makes it difficult to discuss the issue. In order to be able to analyze the religionists, I 
distinguish four levels: (1) the empirical level; (2) the level of a specific domain; (3) the 
level of philosophy of science; and (4) the worldview level (I discuss this extensively 
in the section Constructive Insights of the Amsterdam School). Within the third level, I 
43 Jonathon W. Moses and Torbjørn L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing. Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research 
(Basingstoke etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.
44 Ibid., 4.
45 Ibid., 5, 6.
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distinguish between four sub-levels, called (a) the social and cultural embeddedness; 




Level 3. Philosophy of Science





To reconstruct the religionist position, I will make use of level one, two and three. In 
order to analyze the religionist position, I will also look at the possible role of worldview 
assumptions that influence the other levels. The same applies to my analysis of the IR 
theorists. It is important to keep in mind that these four levels can be distinguished but 
cannot be separated. Assumptions made on the worldview (fourth level) or the level of 
philosophy of science (third level) have an influence on the second and first levels, but 
they cannot be reduced to each other. Sometimes, it is not clear if a certain assumption 
in a theory is of philosophical or a worldview nature. The fact that these levels cannot 
be separated also means that it is often helpful to involve this worldview level in order 
to understand a scholarly theory fully and adequately. However, it is important to 
distinguish the worldview level from the other three, because most theories in general 
and in IR in particular consist of the three levels mentioned. In other words, when I use 
the term ‘theory’, I refer to the three levels without the worldview level. 
I take the distinction between the first, second, and the third level from Alexander 
Wendt. He argues that the first level, the empirical, is necessary to decide which theoretical 
concepts are best. He calls the second level the level of substantive or domain-specific 
questions. It plays a more direct role in explaining a specific domain, like international 
politics, identifying the relevant actors and how they are constructed, and developing 
propositions about what is going on. The third level is about social theory: how we 
can explain or understand what is going on in the world. It addresses the fundamental 
assumptions of social inquiry: the nature of human agency and its relationship to social 
structures, the role of ideas and material forces in social life, and the proper form of 
social explanation.46 The third level deals with the social embeddedness, ontology, 
epistemology and methodology.47  
46 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4-7.
47 The idea that the third level is not only about ontology and epistemology, but also about methodology is taken from 
Victor van den Bersselaar. He also distinguishes a fourth one which he calls social philosophy and ethics, but that 
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The social and cultural embeddedness raises the question of the influence of the 
cultural and social context on academic research. For example, what are the beliefs at 
a certain time in history and how do they influence certain academic disciplines or 
research areas? Ontology discusses the nature of the subject matter. Is it observable 
with the senses? Is it a general phenomenon or a unique event? Epistemology deals 
with the question how to understand the subject matter? Under what conditions can 
researchers, given the nature of the object, acquire knowledge about it? Should they act 
as an observer or as a participant? Should they engage in the object or leave it alone? 
Methodology addresses the questions: how is the object of inquiry to be investigated?48
With respect to the four levels as introduced above, I would like to underline the 
individual character of the different levels and, at the same time, their coherence. In 
other words, none of the levels can be reduced to any of the other levels and none of 
them can be viewed separately. To illustrate this, the worldview level concerns an overall 
vision on reality. Religious, secular, quasi-religious or ideological convictions play a role 
here. These convictions influence the philosophy of science level, but philosophy of 
science itself is concerned with the conditions under which science can be conducted, 
which is therefore a distinct level. It is one of the modes to look at reality. It is therefore 
important to keep in mind that the influence between the different levels is mutual. In 
other words, worldview convictions can influence the philosophy of science, but the 
same is true the other way around. Naturally, this is also true for the other levels.
Through my reconstruction of the religionist position and its stance regarding IR, I 
am able to discuss its arguments and respond to it from the perspective of IR. I reconstruct 
this debate in terms of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science as a ‘paradigm challenge’. 
I am aware that Kuhn’s work has met a lot of criticism. Kuhn has been criticized for 
not doing justice to the development of science, and because of his incommensurability 
thesis.49 As I merely employ Kuhn’s concept of paradigms to illustrate the dynamics of 
the debate, I will not discuss this criticism any further.50 
I do not literally follow Kuhn, but I use his concept of a paradigm to frame the 
debate between current mainstream IR and the religionists, especially since Kuhn did 
not deem it possible to apply his ideas to the social sciences.51 Kuhn initially used the 
term ‘paradigm’ in many different ways, but later he re-defined it as a ‘network of shared 
conceptual assumptions’ or a ‘disciplinary matrix’, the ‘entire constellation of beliefs, 
category is not relevant to my research, which is why I refer to the fourth category as social and cultural embeddedness. 
Victor van den Bersselaar, Wetenschapsfilosofie in veelvoud (Bussum: Coutinho, 2003), 17.
48 Ibid., 17.
49 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry ‘Thomas Kuhn’, online available at https://plato.stanford.edu (accessed 
December 28, 2020).
50 It is for that same reason that I also will not discuss how his ideas differ from Karl Popper’s (1902-1994) and the 
attempt made by Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) to align Popper’s vision with Kuhn’s.
51 Schmidt, History, 10.
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values, techniques, and so on, shared by the members of a given community’.52 The 
thinking of a scientific community takes place within a ‘paradigm’ that governs what 
scientists are to make of recalcitrant experiences. It consists of a set of institutional 
practices that governs the conduct of science. It is based on deep commitments 
to a set of very broad assumptions whose falsity is almost unthinkable. When these 
assumptions are challenged, this will be seen either as a counter-example that demands 
amendment of the theory, or as an anomaly.53 However, sometimes anomalies occur 
so often that a revolution begins and the old paradigm is replaced. My question is, 
rather straightforward: is this the case now within IR or can – and perhaps should – the 
anomalies still be accommodated within the old framework? 
In order to do justice to the paradigm challengers and the IR theorists in reconstructing 
their respective positions, a hermeneutical approach is used. The main characteristic of 
a hermeneutical approach is that it tries to understand the subject of study from within, 
which is exactly what I do in reconstructing the position of the religionists: I present the 
arguments of the various religion scholars as much as possible in one coherent position 
trying to do justice to each of them individually. Similarly, my approach to the IR 
theorists is hermeneutical, because I try to understand the IR theorists from within. 
What I do concerning the IR theorists comes close to what Campbell Craig says, referring 
to Quentin Skinner, ‘to understand Realist works by trying “to characterize what their 
authors were doing in writing them.”’54 This approach is necessary, because I attempt to 
respond to the religionist criticism on their behalf. In being hermeneutical, I use various 
constructive ideas from the Amsterdam School of Philosophy, which I consider to be of 
great heuristic value. It provides tools for reflecting on the religious factor while at the 
same time acknowledging and accounting for its own religious Sitz im Leben. Especially 
the latter point distinguishes it from Critical Theory in IR, which draws attention to 
the presuppositions of scholars, their contexts and interests, but ignores the religious 
engagement or commitment that might be playing a role.55 
Throughout the dissertation key insights from the Amsterdam School will be 
brought into the discussion. These ideas help to unravel and evaluate the various 
positions in the debate and they draw attention to dimensions that might otherwise 
have been overlooked. By addressing these ideas from the beginning, I pave the way for 
the introduction of an alternative approach from the Amsterdam School in Part III.   
52 Moses and Knutsen, Ways of Knowing, 177; Peter K. Smith, “Philosophy of Science and Its Relevance for the Social 
Sciences,” in Research Training for Social Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers, ed. Dawn Burton (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2000), 16.
53 Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 59.
54 Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), xiii, xiv.
55 Cf. Chris Brown, “’Turtles all the Way Down’: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23, no. 2 (1994): 213-236.
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1.5.2. Constructive Insights From the Amsterdam School of  Philosophy
The analysis of the reconstruction of the religionists, and the confrontation with 
the realist school, will also take place from the perspective of what can be called the 
Amsterdam School of Philosophy, developed by a group of philosophers who since the 
late 1920s have aimed to find a new integration of Christian faith and academic inquiry.56 
As characterized by Bas Hengstmengel, this is a Christian philosophical approach in 
the tradition of Aurelius Augustine (354-430) and John Calvin (1509-1564).57 In this 
dissertation, I will be using insights from the Amsterdam School of Philosophy to assess 
the debate on IR and religion.58 This school emerged when scholars became dissatisfied 
on the one hand with the claim to ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ in modern science, and 
on the other hand with what they saw as cheap ‘biblicistic’ and often suffocating ways of 
bringing Christianity to bear on academic work. In contrast with both viewpoints, this 
school suggests to conduct academic analysis based on the idea of ‘intrinsic meaning’. 
This implies that reality itself, physical, human and social reality, can only be understood 
in terms of certain distinctive teloi, certain intrinsic qualities that humans have to discern, 
respect and bring to fruition – also in their academic analyses. The most influential 
figure in this school was the philosopher of law Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), 
who, in turn, was inspired by Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920).  
The Amsterdam School is able to contribute to the debate on religion and 
international relations, because it has an open but critical perspective on what is going on 
in the empirical world, while offering the possibility to involve religion in a constructive, 
ordered fashion as an aspect of reality. In recent years, representatives of this school have 
developed what is called a ‘Normative Practice Approach’, which attempts to analyze 
human (professional) practices in terms of their qualifying telos, while at the same time 
taking full account of the material, economic, organizational, and political conditions 
and contexts of these practices. Moreover, according to this approach, the way people 
determine and embody the telos, worldviews and religions plays a very important role. In 
this way, structural and contextual analyses are combined with cultural and worldview 
analyses. It is this perspective that I will be using throughout the dissertation, and which 
56 The term ‘Amsterdam School’ was coined by Nicolas Wolterstorff (1932-) who belongs to the same Kuyperian tradition 
as the Amsterdam School. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Until Justice and Peace Embrace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 
1983), 69, 72.
57 Bas Hengstmengel, Denken met het hart. Christelijke filosofie in de traditie van Augustinus en Calvijn (Amsterdam: 
Buijten & Schipperheijn, 2015).
58 There have been earlier attempts to reflect on IR from the perspective of the Amsterdam School of Philosophy. A 
very early article is from James W. Skillen, “Unity and Diversity Among States. A Critique of Assumptions in the Study 
of International Relations,” Pro Rege 8, no. 1 (1979). A less explicit contribution is the book by Jonathan Chaplin 
and Robert Joustra, eds., God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy (Waco, Texas: Baylor 
University Press, 2010). More recently Govert Buijs and I have published a volume which contains a variety of articles 
that relates the Amsterdam School of Philosophy to international affairs. Topics include the role of faith and religion in 
Abraham Kuyper’s foreign politics, the nature of the EU, religious freedom, security studies. Simon Polinder and Govert 
J. Buijs, Christian Faith, Philosophy & International Relations: The Lamb and the Wolf (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020).
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will result into the contours of an alternative approach to religion and international 
relations. This approach furthers the debate, because it provides a framework that brings 
the various parties in the discussion together.
A major contribution of the Amsterdam School to discussions about science and 
its neutrality is its attention for the worldview level. The worldview level concerns the 
way in which people, and therefore scholars too, respond and relate to reality. Earlier on 
Govert Buijs and I wrote about this: ‘No human being can escape from making, whether 
reflectedly or unreflectedly, fundamental choices about how they will relate to the world 
based on certain ideas about how and what the world is, about meaning. Humans 
have their Archimedean point, their anchor point of ultimate trust.’59 Fox and Sandler 
state that people almost universally possess a coherent, overarching, and articulated 
‘Weltanschauung’, ‘worldview’, ‘perspective’, ‘frame of reference’, ‘value orientation’ or 
‘meaning system’ that influences their behavior. Policymakers are not only influenced 
by their personal belief system, but also by the religious affiliation of the people they 
represent and the political and cultural context they belong to.60 The Amsterdam School 
considers the worldview level important, as it relates to people’s overall vision on reality, 
which is nearly always of great influence on the way they conduct science. 
The religionists often blame the political realists for ignoring public religion due to 
their secularist-coloured glasses, and present arguments to support this on the empirical, 
domain-specific, and philosophy of science level. By including the worldview level, I 
show that the religionists themselves are not free of bias regarding their worldview, and 
I demonstrate that Morgenthau and Waltz’s political realism is built upon political-
theological ideas which make them cautious to involve religion in theorizing international 
relations.  
Including the worldview level in the analysis of academic debates is of great heuristic 
value, as it uncovers important assumptions that are often held back, because they 
would not be regarded as ‘scientific’. This thought is derived from the conviction of the 
Amsterdam School that science is one of the modes through which human beings can 
acquire knowledge of the world. Scientific knowledge is absolutely taken seriously by 
the Amsterdam School, but this knowledge always needs to be related to the fullness of 
human experience. Scientific knowledge and theory can be compared to a country map, 
which can never be used to identify a landscape. In other words, theories and science 
offer clarification, but scientists always need to ask themselves how this relates to the 
everyday experience. A state leader could be well-versed in every theory on international 
politics, but the success of his policy ultimately depends on the degree to which he is 
59 Buijs and Polinder, “Christian Philosophical Reflections and Shalom-Searching Wisdom,” in Christian Faith, Philosophy & 
International Relations: The Lamb and the Wolf, eds. Simon Polinder and Govert J. Buijs (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 
314.
60 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 57-59. See also, Sandal and Fox, Religion in International 
Relations Theory, 13, 14.
34
able to align these theories and insights to the everyday experience of international 
politics. 
The consequence of this assumption is that religious beliefs in doing science, but also 
in doing politics, cannot be dismissed out of hand for a lack of ‘scientific evidence’. The 
Amsterdam School is more likely to plead with the scientific community for more care 
in their statements regarding faith, religion, and the existence of unobservables which 
can only be seen in their effects, because everyday experience shows that a majority of the 
world population adheres to a religion. The consequences of assuming that only science 
using the natural science methods can gather reliable knowledge regarding the role of 
religion in IR are evident. If science is considered the only reliable objective source of 
reality, while religion belongs to the subjective realm, the possibility that religion is 
denied or overlooked in the study of international politics is seriously present. However, 
if one pleads for science to relate to the fullness of human experience, as the Amsterdam 
School does, and it appears that the majority of the world adheres to a religion, it is 
reasonable to expect that IR theories at the very least clarify the manner in which they 
regard religion. 
1.6. Definition of  Concepts
Worldview
In this dissertation, I define a worldview as: an anchor, a more or less conceptual ultimate 
point of trust. A worldview consists of two parts: personal, ultimate commitments 
(sometimes also referred to as faith or trust commitments) and beliefs. This ultimate 
commitment is a disposition of the human heart that transcends or precedes rationality. 
Beliefs can be argued for rationally.61 The two are related because adhering to certain 
beliefs without having faith or trust is incomplete and vice versa. A worldview comprises 
both: it is a set of beliefs, which can be rationally argued for, but this is grounded in an 
ultimate commitment.62 The Amsterdam School assumes that human beings, scholars 
and state leaders included, have a worldview, how inarticulated or unconscious it might 
be.63 The consequence is that many IR theories are influenced by worldview elements of 
these scholars and international politics and policies by the worldviews of states leaders. 
A worldview is similar to a paradigm or an image. A worldview can influence and shape a 
paradigm or image, but distinguishes itself because of the ultimate trust that is involved. 
61 Willem J. Ouweneel, Wijs met de wetenschap. Inleiding tot een christelijke wetenschapsleer (Heerenveen: Jongbloed, 
1997), 21.
62 Ibid., 69.
63 Ibid., 69, 70. 
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Religion
In this dissertation, various parties are given the stage: the religionists, the realists 
Morgenthau and Waltz, and myself as author using the insights of the Amsterdam 
School. These parties all use terms that may be subject to different interpretations. That 
is why I want to elaborate on the concept of religion.64 Besides that, I will pay attention 
to what the religionists consider distinctive about religion.  
My definition of religion is a working definition, and of a pragmatic nature, which 
implies that it does not look for ‘the truth’, but is functional in the context of this 
dissertation with a view to the people that will be confronted with it: IR theorists and 
the religionists.65 The working definition that I take as a starting point comes from 
Daniel Philpott, who defines religion as: 
A set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, that which is unconditioned, not itself 
created or caused, and the communities and practices that form around these beliefs.66
On the basis of some ideas from the Amsterdam School, I would like to amplify and 
modify this definition.67 I do this in two respects: (1) that of personal commitment (2) 
and of the transcendent references.
64 In this dissertation, I do not engage in the debate on a general definition of religion. An impression of these debates 
can be found in the following literature: James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 12-29; Windson L. King, “Religion,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones, 
Second ed., Vol. 11 (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005), 7692-7695; Gregory Alles D., “Religion,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, 
ed. Lindsay Jones, Second ed., Vol. 11 (Detroit: Macmillan, 2005), 7702-7705; Yme Kuiper, “Debatten en definities. 
Antropologen en sociologen over religie,” in Handboek Religie in Nederland: Perspectief - Overzicht - Debat, ed. Meerten 
Borg ter (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), 26-48; Jan Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk, eds., The Pragmatics of Defining 
Religion: Contexts, Concepts, and Contests (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999).
65 Arie L. Molendijk, “Introduction,” in The Pragmatics of Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts, and Contests, eds. Jan 
Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999), 10. Yme Kuiper states that for present-day anthropologists 
and sociologists, the choice for a substantial or functional approach of religion is determined by the theoretical or 
explanatory goals of a certain research. In his view, definitions are meant to create a certain focus in research. Definitions 
are not judged by their truthfulness, but by their usefulness. Kuiper, Debatten en definities, 34. Cf. Molendijk, Introduction, 
9. Kuiper refers to the sociologist of religion Danièle Hervieu-Leger who states that a definition of religion is a tool 
and that searching for a definition of religion outside a specific research domain is barely relevant. Kuiper, Debatten 
en definities, 45, 46. This also agrees with Hurd, Klein Goldewijk and Thomas’s statement that there is no universal 
definition of religion that can be applied to all cultures. Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 33-37; 
Berma Klein Goldewijk, “Resurgence of Religion, International Relations and Development Cooperation,” in Religion, 
International Relations and Development Cooperation, ed. Berma Klein Goldewijk (Wageningen: Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, 2007), 32, 33; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 24.
66 Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations,” World Politics 55, no. 
1 (2002): 68. Philpott has been inspired by Roy Clouser for this definition. He defines religious belief as ‘a belief in 
something as divine per se no matter how that is further described, where ‘divine per se’ means having unconditionally 
non-dependent reality’. Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Belief in 
Theories, rev. ed. (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 23.
67 I am inspired here by Andrew Basden who writes about religion at the website Dooyeweerd Pages, online available at 
http://kgsvr.net/dooy/religion.html (accessed December 28, 2020) His interpretation of Dooyeweerd might be open to 
discussion, but his distinctions are useful here. 
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As I set out above, the Amsterdam School believes that all human beings have, 
sometimes unconsciously, a worldview and that this includes a personal, existential 
commitment. Philpott’s definition lacks the personal commitment or the ultimate 
trust element that is involved. If this is left out, religion becomes easily reduced to a 
set of beliefs. The definition rightfully acknowledges that religious people act, behave 
and live on the basis of their worldview. Religion is about religious activities, prayer, 
meditation, worship, rituals, etc. These beliefs and activities can be studied, debated 
and its relevance for international relations can be discussed. This means that religion 
can be studied as an independent human activity that distinguishes itself from other 
activities. However, Philpott’s definition does not take sufficiently into account religion’s 
possible pervasiveness and omnipresence in other spheres of life. Religion often – though 
not necessarily – influences everything in life. Including this, prevents religion from 
becoming an isolated human activity with respect to other spheres of life, like the social, 
economic, ethical or moral ánd political.
I, therefore, suggest to add: ‘to which someone is personally committed’ and ‘and 
follow from’.68 In order to avoid extensive discussion about philosophy of religion or 
theology, I also propose to remove the phrase: ’that which is unconditioned, not itself 
created’. That leads to the following ‘first amendment’ of the Philpott-definition: 
The personal commitment to a set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, and the 
communities and practices that form around and follow from these beliefs.69
A second problem refers to the term ‘ultimate’. Philpott understands ‘the ultimate 
ground of existence’ as characteristic of religion. For him this also implies a reference 
to transcendence. Regarding ideologies, he states that ideologies are not primarily 
concerned with the ultimate ground of existence. Elsewhere, he states that: ‘Political 
ideologies – Marxism, fascism, nationalism, and liberalism – channel loyalties toward 
an object other than God.’70 This leads, however, to confusion, because it eliminates 
the useful distinction I made earlier in reference to the concept of ‘worldview’ which 
can be either religious or secular. In Philpott’s definition this is somehow obliterated. 
As a result, the definition of religion as introduced has to be modified again. I make 
the distinction between ultimate and transcendence despite the fact that religionists 
often use the two terms in one breath. Thomas Farr speaks about religion as ‘a thirst for 
transcendence’, and suggests that people naturally seek to know ultimate, transcendent 
68 The element of the personal or existential involvement of the human heart also comes to the fore in the definition 
of Robert Crawford. He proposed this definition after studying the major religions and reviewing other definitions: 
‘Religion is a belief in God, who is the unconditioned ground of all things, and in spiritual beings, resulting in personal 
experience of salvation or enlightenment, communities, scriptures, rituals, and a way of life.’ Robert Crawford, What is 
Religion? (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 201.
69 Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 68.
70 Ibid., 69.
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truths about the origin, meaning, and destiny of their lives. Walter McDougall writes 
about transcendent religious motivations, ‘divine providence’, and the ‘mandate of 
heaven’ as characteristics of religion. Jeffrey Haynes mentions ultimate beings, beliefs 
and practices, transcendence and the supernatural when he discusses a definition of 
religion. John Bernbaum states that ignoring religion means ignoring spiritual and moral 
dimensions and transcendental values. Eric Patterson defines religion as ‘an organized, 
shared set of beliefs and practices founded on reverence for a supernatural power(s) or 
in the teachings of a spiritual leader’.71 All these definitions show that the religionists 
variously use the terms transcendence, ultimate and supernatural without making much 
distinction. In order to make clear that religion concerns a transcendent reference point, 
I have added that to the definition. 
The personal commitment to a set of beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence, a transcendent 
reference point, and the communities and practices that form around and follow from these 
beliefs.72 
In my opinion, this definition is useful for this dissertation because it is sufficiently 
representative for the religionists and the way IR theorists Morgenthau and Waltz 
understand religion. When Morgenthau writes about religion in international politics, 
his understanding of religion agrees with it, because he refers to religion as a human 
attitude that is guided by a transcendent or supernatural reality or the belief in another 
world. Religion differs from ideology because of this transcendent or supernatural 
reference point, according to Morgenthau.73 Waltz does not define religion, but the way 
he writes about religion comes close to Morgenthau’s. He refers to religion as something 
that deals with primary and ultimate causes and infinite aspirations. Most of Waltz’s 
descriptions are about the Christian religion. These two considerations clarify that 
Waltz’s writings about religion correspond to the definition I propose, so the definition 
can be used to deal with Waltz as well.  
I consider this definition representative of the religionists as a group for various 
reasons. In the first place, this definition takes a center position. Its emphasis on a 
set of beliefs leans towards a sui generis approach to religion, while its reference to the 
communities and practices that are formed around these beliefs acknowledges the 
constructed side of religion. Secondly, the definition includes religionist descriptions 
of religion that are limited to one or more primary world religions, which together 
71 John A. Bernbaum, “Getting Russia Right,” in God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign 
Policy, eds. Jonathan Chaplin and Robert Joustra (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2010), 130-134; Farr, World of 
Faith and Freedom, 21, 22; Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conflict or Co-
Operation?” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2006): 538; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 
12; Walter A. McDougall, “Introduction,” Orbis 42, no. 2 (1998): 160; Patterson, Politics in a Religious World, 5.
72 Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 68.
73 I discuss this in more detail in Section 6.1.
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comprise about 77 percent of the world’s population. Next, the definition includes 
religionist definitions that characterize religion by faith, because it emphasizes the 
personal or existential commitment to religion, its practices and beliefs.74 In the fourth 
place, the definition distinguishes between religion as a perspective or life orientation 
and religion as an institution, community or practice. That complies with a religionist 
distinction between religion and religions, which implies that religion is an alternative 
way of looking at the world – also called spirituality –, while religions are materially 
existing institutions and practices. Believers would often argue that their institutional 
religion is in accordance with the design as revealed to them, but this does not exclude 
the possibility that religions are also socially constructed and shaped by human action. 
This point largely agrees with another one, namely that this definition recognizes that 
religion is not only a set of beliefs, but also a community of believers formed around 
these beliefs, as some religionists emphasize.75 
Above, I presented a working definition of religion. That means that whenever 
religionists state that IR theory should incorporate religion, they actually refer to 
religion as defined above. When I write that political realists pay attention to religion 
on an empirical level, I refer to religion as defined above. However, that does not mean 
that all elements from the definition are given equal consideration. When religionists 
state that certain religious ideas are followed on an international level, they talk about 
a different aspect of religion than when they describe the role of religious NGOs. I do 
not use the term religion when it comes to the religious worldviews of political leaders 
or IR theorists. At that moment, I make us of the term worldview. When Morgenthau 
distinguishes between religiosity and religion, then both fall under the definition as 
proposed above. The same goes for the use of terms like transcendence and metaphysics. 
When Morgenthau pleads for openness regarding the transcendence, I interpret that as 
74 Stanton Burnett, “Implications for the Foreign Policy Community,” in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, 
eds. Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 286; Jonathan Chaplin and 
Robert Joustra, “Introduction,” in God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy, eds. Jonathan 
Chaplin and Robert Joustra (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2010), 12, 13; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into 
International Relations, 2, 176; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 12-18; J. Bryan Hehir, 
“The Old Church and the New Europe: Charting the Changes,” in Religion in an Expanding Europe, eds. Timothy A. 
Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 92-116; Huntington, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 682, 
694-696; Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Waever, “In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” 
in Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York, N.Y., 
etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 152-154; Rees, Religion in International Politics and Development: The World Bank and 
Faith Institutions, xv-xviii; Harold H. Saunders, “Relational Realism: Toward a New Political Paradigm,” in Religion and 
Security. The New Nexus in International Relations, eds. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis Hoover (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004), 165, 166; James W. Skillen, “Three Zionisms in the Shaping of American Foreign Policy,” in God and 
Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy, eds. Jonathan Chaplin and Robert Joustra (Waco, Texas: 
Baylor University Press, 2010), 87-109; Bassam Tibi, “Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicised Islam,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 843, 844.
75 Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 694, 695; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 22-24.
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the presence of religion in his ideas. 
Religion’s Distinctiveness 
As I already stated, the religionists are convinced that the transcendent aspect of 
religion is the basis of its distinctiveness. According to them, this is expressed in three 
different ways: (1) religion is an autonomous social organization; (2) religion is a specific 
motivator; and (3) there is a difference between religion and ideology.  
The first way in which religion’s distinctiveness manifests itself in the modern political 
system, according to the paradigm challengers, is through its autonomous position in 
comparison to other social organizations that political scientists study, such as political 
parties, legislatures, courts, unions, nationalist movements, lobbies, nongovernmental 
organizations and international organizations. This follows from the fact that religion’s 
right to exist is distinct from the political order. While politics is primarily defined by 
its principles of legitimacy, structure, policies or pursuits, religions are communities 
and practices oriented around beliefs regarding the ultimate ground of existence. The 
idea that religion’s right to exist is derived from the ultimate ground of existence and 
not from ‘earthly’ institutions makes its involvement in politics conditional. It does not 
have to justify its legitimacy and authority within the existing political structures. In 
international relations, this conditionality of religion is strengthened by the fact that 
religion predates the Westphalian system of nation-states and that its organization is 
often transnational.76 
The religion scholars maintain that the second characteristic of religion’s distinctive 
nature is its motivational power. They argue that religion, more than any other belief 
system, is able to encourage its adherents to look beyond the physical world. The 
religionists state that people who believe that their goals are divinely inspired can be less 
susceptible to earthly discouragements than people who strive for temporal goals. It can 
lead, for example, to an attitude in which the promise of eternal life outweighs earthly 
consequences like prison or death.77 Religion’s motivational power is also the product 
of religious leaders’ and organizations’ often long-standing and influential presence on 
the ground, as well as a well-developed infrastructure that often includes sophisticated 
communication networks with local, national, and international offices. These thinkers 
point out that as a result, religions can effectively bestow legitimacy on particular 
speakers and provide messages that resonate with their followers.78 
76 Daniel Philpott, “Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 192, 
193. Stack also holds this view and explains the difference between ethnicity and religion. John F. Stack, “The Religious 
Challenge to International Relations Theory,” in Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence and Practice, 
ed. Patrick James (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 29, 30.
77 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 204; Glazier, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 3; Monica Duffy 
Toft, “Religion and Civil Wars: Next Steps?” in Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research (University of 
Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 142, 143.
78 Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 162; Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 24. For the 
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The third distinctive characteristic of religion is, according to the religionists, that 
religion differs from ideology. In the past it was common to analyze conflicts as a clash 
of ideologies, but that no longer suffices. Since the end of the Cold War, the roots of 
conflicts are increasingly related to culture and identity, deep human grievances are often 
expressed in the language of religious extremism, and religious freedom is sometimes used 
to cloak an agenda that is harmful towards others.79 The existing theoretical frameworks 
require amendments in order to comprehend this new situation. It is no longer sufficient 
to analyze this new situation from a framework that only considers ideologies. Religion is 
different from political ideology according to these religionists, because religion is about 
the transcendent or ultimate ground of existence, while political ideologies, ‘though 
they surely inspire people to worship, kill, die, idolize, and genuflect, do not in their 
essential forms encompass beliefs about the ultimate ground of existence’.80 According 
to these religionists, religion, as distinct from ideology, focuses on questions regarding 
life and meaning, including transcendence and life beyond the natural realm.81 I will 
discuss this further shortly hereafter. 
Religious, Secular, Quasi-Religious Worldviews 
A worldview can be religious, secular or quasi-religious. A religious worldview is a 
worldview (beliefs plus personal commitment) based on a transcendent reference point. 
A (religious) worldview can remain private, but it can also become public which means 
that it leaves the private sphere and that it thrusts itself into the public arena of moral 
and political contestations, the public sphere. José Casanova calls this public religion.82 
When the religionists state that religion is everywhere, they mostly refer to public 
religion. The global resurgence of religion in that sense is a global resurgence of public 
religion, or more adequately, religions becoming public globally. In the dissertation, I 
do not use the adjective ‘public’ or the distinction between private and public. If I use 
it, it is to clarify a specific meaning. A secular worldview is a worldview without any 
transcendent reference point. It is a naturalistic worldview. It assumes a self-enclosed, 
immanent reality in which something is considered as ultimate reality. Often the term 
‘naturalism’ is used as a synonym, where the processes that are studied by the natural 
sciences are seen as ultimate.83 A quasi-religious worldview is a worldview with similar 
role of faith-based actors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and 
Religion, 178-186.
79 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 35; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 52; Laustsen and 
Waever, In Defense of Religion, 147; Saunders, Relational Realism, 163.
80 Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 68; John D. Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System (Leicester: 
University of Leicester, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000), 8; Scott M. Thomas, “Religion and International 
Conflict,” in Religion and International Relations, ed. Ken R. Dark (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 1-3.
81 McDougall, Introduction, 160; Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 68; Erin K. Wilson, After Secularism: Rethinking 
Religion in Global Politics (Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 70.
82 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
83 Cf. D. M. Armstrong , “Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy,” Philosophia Reformata 8 (1978): 261-276.
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characteristics as a religious worldview. There might be references to a transcendent 
reality, but its ultimate goal is this immanent world. The ultimate reality can seem to be 
transcendent but at closer inspection is rather immanent and the personal commitment 
is geared toward immanent realities.
Political Religion and Ideology
A political religion is a quasi-religious worldview with public aspirations which aims 
at the transformation of society as a whole.84 It is similar to an ideology.85 An ideology 
or political religion and religion can overlap quite a lot. Their goals can align and 
encompass all of life. At the same time, religious characteristics can be identified in 
secular ideologies, and religions can play an ideological role as well. The prayers and 
rituals of religion might be different from a substantial point of view, but in a functional 
sense, secular ideologies can have activities or rituals that resemble religious ones.86 But 
does that mean that we can conclude that when ideologies or political religions influence 
international relations, religion influences them as well? No, because these are not the 
same. Yes, because ‘it reminds us that religion does not allow itself to be easily banished 
from society, and that, where this is tried, it returns in unpredictable and perverted 
forms’.87 
Theology
There are many definitions of theology and also discussion about the proper definition 
of it. In this dissertation the term also plays a role, but it is beyond the scope of this book 
to offer an extensive discussion of the perfect definition. I define theology as thinking 
about faith in God.88 Theology is different from religious studies in the sense that it 
presupposes a participatory perspective and that the theologian is a believer.89 Theology 
differs from a religious worldview in the sense that theology thinks about the beliefs 
and commitments of people that hold a certain worldview. When political science uses 
or relies on theology, it becomes political theology. As said, political theology does not 
require a personal commitment.
84 Hans Maier, “Political Religion: A Concept and its Limitations,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 8, no. 
1 (2007): 5-12.
85 I am aware that the term ‘ideology’ can be used in a much more ‘neutral’ way, as just any framework of political 
ideas. I follow here the more weighty usage that originates in Marx, and refers to a more or less distorted idea of reality 
with repressive or even totalitarian implications. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry ‘Law and Ideology’, online 
available at https://plato.stanford.edu (accessed December 28, 2020).
86 A functionalist approach of religion differs from a substantivist approach, because the former emphasizes what religions 
do, while the latter is more interested in the content (the beliefs) of religion. William H. Swatos, ed., Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Society (Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, 1998), 130, 131.
87 Maier, Political Religion, 15.





Political theology is about sets of beliefs that emerge from either a religious worldview 
or theology concerning the political sphere. Political theology comes close to a religious 
worldview, because it consists of religious beliefs or sets of ideas meaning that these 
beliefs are related to a transcendent reference point. It differs from a religious worldview, 
because it does not necessarily involve a personal commitment. It has a public face 
though, because it holds ideas about the political, or more specifically in this context, 
the (international) political sphere.90 It plays a role on the worldview level, but it has an 
impact on the other levels: the philosophical, domain-specific and empirical.  
Sociotheology
A concept that combines religious worldviews and public religion in its analysis is the 
so-called sociotheological approach. Sociotheology is an approach which takes the 
theologically informed or religious worldviews of people or groups seriously as factor in 
explaining behavior and developments in international relations (without the researcher 
committing himself to a religious or theological point of view).91
Sacred
The religionists and political realists often equate the term ‘sacred’ with religion and 
they use it over against ‘secular’. There are, however, also instances when they use it 
to describe ‘sacred’ elements in secular or quasi-religious worldviews. I use the term 
‘sacred’ similarly, because religious as well as secular or quasi-religious worldviews can 
hold certain things sacred.
Secularization
In this dissertation, I use the term secularization quite often. Broadly speaking, there 
are four usages of the term.92 The religionists understand it – and this agrees with the 
way it is commonly used – as a diminishing influence of religion. This can be the result 
of declining religious practice and communities, the differentiation between religion 
and other spheres of society (political, cultural, economic), or the intentional efforts of 
90 According to Guilhot, political theology can be defined as ‘a challenge, on the basis of the idea of revelation, to 
rationalist pretenses to the self-justification, self-foundation and teleological meaning of the political’. Nicolas Guilhot, 
“American Katechon: When Political Theology Became International Relations Theory,” Constellations 17, no. 2 (2010): 
225. Guilhot uses a specific definition of political theology. A more general definition would be Lila’s definition that 
political theology it is the ‘discourse about political authority based on a revealed divine nexus’. Michael Kessler, 
“Introduction: Political Theology in a Plural Context,” in Political Theology for a Plural Age (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 1. Kessler gives a nice overview of various definitions. Ibid., 1-4.
91 Marc Jurgensmeyer and Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “A Sociotheological Approach to Understanding Religious Violence,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence, eds. Michael Jerryson, Marc Jurgensmeyer and Margo Kitts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 620-643.
92 I make use of Philpott’s various descriptions of the secular and secularization. Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics 
Found Religion?, 183.
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regimes to suppress or to marginalize religion (often called secularism). The second use 
of the term is – as Morgenthau sees it – secularization as the differentiation between the 
religious and other spheres of life. This does not mean a decline of religion’s influence. 
Others (a.o. Ludwig Gelot) have described this as a kind of secularization within 
Christianity, for example what happened during the Protestant Reformation.93 It is 
therefore secularization within a theological discourse and legitimized by it. The third 
way secularization is used is as the denial of the necessity of a transcendent reference 
point for politics, science and ethics. This is the kind of secularization that Morgenthau 
finds worrisome. The fourth one, which I find in Waltz’s theory, is secularization like 
Marin Terpstra defines it, namely that theology continues by other means (he partly bases 
this on Carl Schmitt).94 For example, theological frameworks or concepts are applied 
to immanent realms (e.g. the political) without necessarily referring to its theological 
origin. 
Science
Thus far I have used the term science without clarifying it, so I will define it here. This 
is not easy, however, given the following observation. 
“[S]cience” remains a notion to conjure with in the field of IR; it is a veritable “rhetorical 
commonplace”, which is available for deployment within all kinds of controversies. And a 
powerful resource it is, too: charging that a piece of work is not “scientific” carries immensely 
negative connotations, both because of the field-specific history I have sketched here and because 
of the broader cultural prestige enjoyed by “science”. 95
Science, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, is often understood as knowledge about 
the natural world that is the result of systematic experiments and tests. I use the term 
science in a broader sense meaning that it also includes the acquirement of knowledge 
about the social world. The methodologies and methods may vary. Some scholars might 
attempt to develop theories according to the standards of the natural sciences, while 
others are content with, as Hedley Bull’s calls it, science understood as a ‘coherent, 
precise, and orderly body of knowledge, and (...) consistent with the philosophical 
foundations of modern science.’96 Or in the words of Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 
there are scholars who aim at explanation and scholars who favour understanding.97 
The difference between the two, according to Patrick Jackson, is that the latter assumes 
93 See Section 3.4.
94 Marin Terpstra, Democratie als cultus. Over politiek en religie (Amsterdam: Boom, 2011), 11.
95 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for 
the Study of World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011), 9.
96 Ibid., 6.
97 Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
44
that the objects of knowledge have the capacity for self-reflection.98 In line with the 
Amsterdam School, I consider science one of the modes to acquire knowledge about the 
world. Intuition, religion, philosophy and the arts are also sources of knowledge. Scientific 
knowledge is not a superior, but another kind of knowledge and the acquirement and 
valuation of this knowledge cannot be separated, though distinguished, from other kinds 
of knowledge.99 When I use the term science without further explanation it is meant as 
set out above. I will indicate when I refer to a narrow understanding of science meaning 
that it is modeled after the natural sciences. I will do so only when this difference is 
relevant for a proper understanding of the text.
International Relations  
Another term that needs clarification within the context of this research is the term 
‘international relations’, because many religionists use the term without defining it. 
Besides that, the term ‘international’ implies that world politics is simply or primarily 
about relations among nation-states, but that is not what the religionists want to say, 
especially because religion is so prominent at the transnational level. In this dissertation, 
I define ‘international relations’ as all political, social, economic, cultural and other 
interactions between states and non-state actors.100 As the definition shows international 
relations comprises different spheres, like economics, law, culture and politics. It is 
remarkable that religion is not mentioned separately. There are two possible explanations 
for this: either religion is taken as part of social or cultural relations or it is taken as 
irrelevant.
Some IR theorists make a distinction between theories of foreign policy and 
theories of international relations, or limit their theory of international relations to 
international politics. Given that foreign policy and international politics are, strictly 
speaking, subfields of IR, I assume that both fields are included when the religionists 
use the term international relations.101 Also, many scholars do not always distinguish 
between international politics and international relations, while the latter has a much 
broader meaning. In this dissertation, I only distinguish between these two terms if the 
distinction is relevant. 
When it comes to the term ‘international relations theory’, it appears that many 
religionists use this without specifying which theories they are referring to. My 
conclusion is that the religionists’ main target is IR as it has been constructed since 
the Second World War. I base this, on the one hand, on the few religion scholars that 
make this explicit in their writing. On the other hand, it is quite common to refer to 
98 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 158.
99 Cf. Ibid., 23.
100 I take this mainly from Viotti and Kauppi. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 5th ed. 
(Boston etc.: Allyn and Bacon, 2012), 454.
101 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 
1998), 274, 275.
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International Relations as a field of study in its own right as it emerged in the period 
after the Second World War.102 For that reason, I focus exclusively on the theories that 
have been developed since then.
• Worldview: an anchor, a more or less conceptual ultimate point of trust. A  
 worldview consists of two parts: personal, ultimate commitments (sometimes  
 also referred to as faith or trust commitments) and beliefs. 
• Religion: The personal commitment to a set of beliefs about the ultimate  
 ground of existence, a transcendent reference point, and the communities and  
 practices that form around and follow from these beliefs. 
• Religious worldview: a worldview (beliefs about an ultimate reality and 
  personal commitment) based on a transcendent reference point. 
• Secular worldview: a worldview (beliefs about an ultimate reality and personal  
 commitment) without any transcendent reference point. It assumes a self- 
 enclosed, immanent reality in which something is considered as ultimate reality. 
 Often the term ‘naturalism’ is used as a synonym.
• Quasi-religious worldview: a worldview with similar characteristics as a  
 religious worldview, but where the ultimate reality seems to be transcendent  
 but at closer inspection is rather immanent and the personal commitment  
 is geared toward immanent realities.
• Political religion: is a quasi-religious worldview with public aspirations which  
 aims at the transformation of society as a whole.
• Ideology: see ‘Political religion’
• Theology: systematic, often academic, thinking about the belief in God and its  
 implications as done by representatives of religious communities (who usually  
 consider themselves as believer), so it involves an insider perspective.
102 The emergence of International Relations as a field of study in its own right is often dated in the aftermath of the 
First World War. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 16; Torbjørn L. Knutsen, A 
History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 211; 
Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary, 275; Steans and others, An Introduction to International Relations Theory, 
1. I think it is accurate to regard the publication of Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations in 1948 as the landmark for the 
beginning of IR. In the second edition that appeared shortly after the Second World War in 1954, Morgenthau wrote: 
‘This book purports to present a theory of international politics’. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York etc.: Knopf, 1985), 3.
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• Political theology: sets of beliefs and/or (academic) ideas about the political  
 which take into account viewpoints that emerge from either a religious  
 worldview or from theology, without the political theologian necessarily  
 committing himself to the transcendent beliefs of the religious worldview or  
 theology (though this may be the case).
• Sociotheology: an approach which takes the theologically informed or religious 
 worldviews of people or groups seriously as explanatory factor in explaining  
 behavior and developments in international relations.
• Sacred: refers to the religious realm or to religious elements in secular or quasi- 
 religious worldviews, ideologies or political religions.
• Secularization: (1) the diminishing influence of religion; (2) the  
 differentiation between the religious and other spheres of life; (3) the denial  
 of the necessity to refer to religion or revelation; and (4) the continuation  
 of theology by other means.
• Science: a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge about the (social  
 and natural) world. 
• International relations: all political, social, economic, cultural and other    
 interactions between states and non-state actors.
1.7. Method
Since I make a distinction between methodology and method, I would like to proceed 
by discussing the more technical part of my research and the ‘tools’ I have used to 
execute my research. In order to assess the validity of the religion scholars in IR, I 
had to select a few theories and find out to what extent the religionists are correct 
or not. I decided to confront their position with key mainstream IR thinkers, the 
already mentioned Morgenthau and Waltz, through an in-depth investigation of their 
writings and theorizing. More precisely, I decided to find out to what extent these 
thinkers actually neglect religion and whether this can be explained by the reasons the 
religionists bring up. I have selected these theorists, because they represent a mainstream 
school of thought in IR: realism (neorealism and classical realism).103 I have chosen 
Hans Morgenthau as the main representative of classical realism and Kenneth Waltz 
103 I use the term ‘school of thought’ for the realist tradition, but I use the term ‘theory’ – though the term is essentially 
contested – when I refer to the individual theories of Morgenthau and Waltz.
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as the main neorealist thinker.104 My choice for the realist school is primarily based on 
the fact that most religionist criticism is targeted at classical realism and neorealism. 
Other schools of thought are either barely a topic of discussion or object of criticism, 
or this criticism mirrors that of classical realism and neorealism. For example, Thomas 
states that pluralists of the English School emphasize the changing nature of military 
and economic power, which requires a broader concept of international security. He 
concludes that this includes human rights, energy, and natural resources, but that culture 
and religion are not taken into account. He also contends that pluralists’ emphasis 
on the state as the main actor in international relations, globalization, and economic 
interdependence makes it difficult to include religious non-state actors.105 Another 
example is the way Fox and Sandler write about Marxism. They state: ‘It goes without 
saying that Marxism and neo-Marxism, a family of paradigms that competed with the 
others discussed here, also assumed religion to be irrelevant.’ And ‘[T]his body of theory 
recognizes economics as the only motivating force in politics, including international 
relations. Marxists consider it [religion, SP] a false consciousness and the opiate of the 
masses.’106 Another reason to choose for the realist school of thought is that dealing 
104 The difference with Sandal and Fox is that they deal with more than one representative per school, which makes their 
conclusion more representative. My investigation of Morgenthau and Waltz is more in-depth and thorough.
105 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 58.
106 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 30, 170. In their treatment of world-systems theory, 
the religionists limit themselves to general statements. Stempel, for example, limits his judgment to the statement that 
world-system theories have been alienated from the importance of religion, because of their focus on the material aspects 
of life. They leave no room for the spiritual and charismatic elements, and favor rational choice theories in order to create 
a predictable universe. Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System, 2. Roof and Robert Wuthnow write about 
epistemological assumptions, a distinct Marxist bias, which implies that economic, political, and material explanations 
are favored, while cultural and religious institutions, beliefs and considerations are ignored and seen as epiphenomenal. 
Wade Clark Roof, “Introduction,” in World Order and Religion, ed. Wade Clark Roof (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 3; 
Robert Wuthnow, “International Realities: Bringing the Global Picture into Focus,” in World Order and Religion, ed. 
Wade Clark Roof (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 21; Robert Wuthnow, “Understanding Religion 
and Politics,” Daedalus 120, no. 3 (1991): 6. Wuthnow asserts that world-system theory has often focused on the question 
of how short-term changes in the world-economy may affect the stability of religious institutions. Ibid., 6. Again, these 
examples show that, in the few instances that liberal and Marxist theories are addressed, the criticism is very general and 
shallow. I did not include neoliberalism explicitly because insofar as the religionists criticize neoliberalism, their criticism 
mirrors that of neorealism, which is understandable because neoliberalism shares the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of neorealism. In the few instances that liberalism is discussed, it often equates or confuses neoliberalism 
and neorealism. Thomas states, for example, that the absence of religion can also be explained by the rationalist principles 
that are independent from social and historical context and provide the basis for the positivist approaches in international 
relations theory, namely neorealism and neoliberalism. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 59; Thomas, Taking 
Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously, 825, 826. At another place, Thomas maintains that neoliberalism shares the 
statist view and the materialist conception of state interests with neorealism, but it focuses on a different aspect of 
international anarchy. Its concern is how international anarchy influences the possibility of states to reach and keep 
agreements on issues of common interests. The reason that neoliberals neglect religion and culture is because economic 
interdependence and globalization are the main determinants and these factors are taken as a top-down explanation for 
the behavior of states. The fact that people share a common culture or civilization does not make much difference in 
the explanation of states, because they react in a rational, functional way. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 66. 
Philpott, another prominent religionist, writes: ‘Liberalism, whether classical or contemporary, has deservedly come to 
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with classical realism and neorealism conveniently illustrates the general development 
of mainstream IR during the second half of the twentieth century. I deal with classical 
realism and neorealism separately, because both theories are mostly treated and criticized 
separately by the religion scholars. Besides that, as I will set out in the chapter on Waltz, 
neorealism and classical realism differ on various points, which affects the way they deal 
with religion. 
The reconstruction of the religionists took place in the following way. After collecting 
the available literature on religion, international relations and IR, I started to search for 
explicit references or writings on religion and international relations. I did this on the 
three levels as indicated: What is the role of religion (empirical level), how can that 
role be explained (subject-specific level of IR), and what are the deeper assumptions 
about religion, science, God, and theory that play a role (philosophical level)? In order 
to discover the empirical role of religion, I scanned the religionist documents and 
books on specific terms and notions that could reveal more about the way they see 
religion. The most central were explicit religious notions such as: ‘religion’, ‘god’, ‘faith’, 
‘transcendence’, ‘belief ’, and ‘metaphysics’. But I also looked for words I knew (or came to 
know during my reading) that could be related to the topic of religion and international 
relations, like ‘ethics’, ‘morality’, ‘secularity’, ‘culture’, ‘conflict’, ‘ideology’, ‘peace-
making’, ‘social justice’, ‘political leaders’, ‘ideas’, ‘civil religion’, ‘church-state relations’, 
‘non-governmental organizations’, ‘human rights’, ‘faith-based diplomacy’, ‘religious 
terrorism’, ‘theocratic states’ and ‘fundamentalism’. To find out what role religion 
plays in IR theory, I looked for terms like ‘Westphalia’, ‘modernity’, ‘Enlightenment’, 
‘modernization theory’, ‘positivism’, ‘materialism’, ‘nation-state’, ‘invention of religion’, 
‘complexity of religion’, ‘dominance of (neo)realism’, ‘religiosity of political scientists’. 
In order to map the ideas religionists have regarding the philosophy of science level, 
I searched for keywords like ‘theory’, ‘religion’, ‘science’, ‘God’. Similarly, to the list 
that was given earlier, this list with words developed gradually, because there was a 
constant motion between the list of concepts, the literature I studied and the distinction 
of the three levels. Some terms recurred on a frequent basis, while other terms were 
enjoy great prestige, as has realism, as an explanation of war, trade, and diverse forms of conflict and cooperation. But it 
does not help us to understand events seemingly wrought by religion.’ Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 80, 81. 
There are clear differences between neorealism and neoliberalism regarding the possibilities for international cooperation 
under anarchy, but the question is whether that is relevant for the selection of theories. Waltz, for example, argues that 
liberal institutionalism is not a distinct theory. Lamy, Keohane and Nye argue that neorealists and neoliberals share a 
great deal of their epistemology and ontology, and claim that institutional theory is a ‘half-sibling of neorealism’. David 
A. Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, 
ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 4-8; Keohane, Power and Governance, 6; Steven 
L. Lamy, “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (Oxford etc.: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 133, 134; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusion and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics 
and Society 15, no. 1 (2004): 5. Despite the differences between neorealism and neoliberalism, I consider it conclusive to 
focus on the theoretical core of neoliberalism as present in neorealism. 
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only mentioned once by an author, sometimes not even specifically related to IR. 
There were also terms such as ‘positivism’, ‘Enlightenment’, ‘materialism’, ‘modernity’, 
‘modernization theory’, which ultimately fit the third level better than the second. In 
short, I have changed the classification on more than one occasion in order to represent 
the position of the religionists as robust and accurately as possible, the results of which 
are described below. 
I have studied the primary literature of Morgenthau and Waltz for their thoughts, 
ideas, or other matters that could reveal their position regarding religion. In doing 
so, I often used the same search terms as mentioned above. Many articles or books 
were subjected to an integral study to comprehend and represent, where possible, their 
theories in their entirety. When necessary, I used secondary literature, but my focus was 
on the primary works and my understanding of them. 
1.8. Schematic Outline of  the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of an introduction and three parts. Below, I present a diagram 
of the topics in every part and a very brief summary of their conclusions (see Figure 1.1). 
I provide this overview to make it easier for the reader to understand the structure and 
argumentation of the dissertation. In Chapter 9, a much more elaborate diagram can be 
found that summarizes the entire dissertation. Decisive in this are the three parts of the 
dissertation that are dedicated to, respectively, the religionists, the political realists, and 
a concluding part in which I present an alternative approach: the Normative Practice 
Approach. Also, the entire dissertation follows the line of the four different levels: the 
empirical, the domain-specific, the philosophy of science, and the worldview level.
In Part I, I present the position of the religionists. I dedicate a chapter to every 
statement. Chapter 2 concerns the empirical statement, Chapter 3 the domain-specific 
statement, and Chapter 4 the philosophy of science subthesis. My goal is to present 
the religionists as accurately as possible. Naturally, I will give my own perspective on 
their position and what I think could be improved. I will use separate sections and the 
conclusions for this. I also evaluate the religionist position in the conclusion of Part I.
Then, in Part II, I will check whether the claim of the religionists as presented in 
Part I is correct. I start with Morgenthau’s classical realism. In Chapter 5, I elaborate on 
what exactly his classical realist theory entails and I will show that his theory can only 
be understood properly when accounting for the worldview level. This is because there 
are all sorts of Augustinian political-theological convictions at play on this level that 
color his theory. In Chapter 6, I will then systematically address every statement of the 
religionists to see to which degree they are right.
I approach Waltz in a similar manner. In Chapter 7, I will explain what his neorealism 
entails exactly and I will show that he too is strongly influenced by political-theological 
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ideas. In Chapter 8, I will then assess the religionists’ criticism. In the concluding part 
of Part II, I will then evaluate the input of the political realists.
Part III contains two chapters. In Chapter 9, I will draw up the balance, evaluate the 
religionist and political realist positions, and diagnose the debate. From that diagnosis, 
I present an alternative in Chapter 10, namely the Normative Practice Approach as 
developed by the Amsterdam School of Philosophy. Since this approach combines 
insights from the religionists, the Amsterdam School, Waltz and Morgenthau’s realism 
and Niebuhr’s Christian realism, I call this a new Christian realism.107 It stands in 
the tradition of Morgenthau’s classical realism and Waltz’s neorealism. It accepts the 
demand for theory, but it is critical of the rigidity of neorealism. It is called a Christian 
realism, because it agrees with the worldview of Christian realism and the Amsterdam 
School.  
107 I became inspired by this, because of a review of Patterson on the volume Buijs and I edited. Eric Patterson, “New 
Christian Realism from the Amsterdam School,” Providence (March 2, 2020).
51

















Empirical Religion is 
everywhere in 
the world and IR 
should not ignore 
it (Ch. 2)
Perceives the 
role of religion, 
is aware of the 
varieties found 
within religion, 
but he does not 
explicitly strive for 
incorporating it 
(Ch. 6)
Notices role of 
religion, but 
limited to Christian 
religion
(Ch. 8)
All of them are 
more or less 
aware of religion 
in the world, 
but relevance 
of religion is 
unclear (Ch. 9)











because its study 
of international 





Deals with religion 
as a possible factor, 
but does not grant 
it a significant 
place, because of 
an ideal-typical 
theory and 
autonomy of the 
political (Ch. 5, 6)
Only allows a few 
factors to play a 
role in his theory 
and this causes 
religion to be left 
out and holds on 











that: object of 
explanation is 
not always clear 
(Ch. 9)

















make it difficult to 







Is open to the 
fact that in theory 
formation, pre-
scientific intuitions 
or theological ideas 
play a role (Ch. 
7, 8)



































ideas have been 













Figure 1.1. Schematic overview of  dissertation 
Part I
A Critical Reconstruction of  the 
Paradigm Challenge
54
Part I: A Critical Reconstruction of  the Paradigm Challenge  
Ever since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, religion has been a familiar theme 
in international politics. It is partly due to terrorist attacks and the actions by IS that 
religion re-emerged as a relevant factor. Other developments also strengthened this re-
emergence. For example, think of the international actions and statements by former 
Presidents Bush and Ahmadinejad. Bush openly acknowledged that Jesus was his favorite 
philosopher, and that prayer and faith were deciding factors during his presidency.108 
President Ahmadinejad from Iran concluded his United Nations speech in 2005 by 
asking God to hasten the appearance of the twelfth imam Mahdi (ninth century), as he 
would rid the world of injustice.109 In 2008, Ahmadinejad claimed that imam Mahdi 
supported the daily operations of his government.110 The fact that Ahmadinejad reserved 
funds for the return of the twelfth imam shows that he was willing to turn his religious 
ideas into actions. More recent examples are the way in which President Trump’s policies 
are shaped. He openly acknowledges that some of his decisions are ‘for the evangelicals’, 
he regularly prays with and consults evangelical advisers and he uses religious symbols 
(Trump holding a Bible in front of St. John’s Episcopal Church) to make political 
statements.111
Still, taking religion seriously was not an obvious mindset for years. It was not until 
the 1990s that attention was finally paid to religion, international politics and IR theory. 
In prior years, events occurred that could not be explained due to the lack of attention 
for religion. Recurring examples are the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Polish 
Revolution in the late 1980s. Religion played such a key role in these events that people 
slowly started to open their eyes to the meaning of religion in international politics. 
Since then, politicians, policymakers have become convinced that the role of religion 
in international affairs cannot and should not be ignored. As was brought forward by 
former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright:
Since the terror attacks of 9/11, I have come to realize that it may have been I who was stuck in 
an earlier time. Like many other foreign policy professionals, I have had to adjust the lens through 
which I view the world, comprehending something that seemed to be a new reality but that had 
actually been evident for some time. The 1990s had been a decade of globalization and spectacular 
technological gains; the information revolution altered our lifestyle, transformed the workplace, 
and fostered the development of a whole new vocabulary. There was, however, another force at 
work. Almost everywhere, religious movements are thriving. 112
108 Carter M. Yang, “Religion Plays Big Role in Bush Presidency,” ABC News (January 7, 2006).
109 Ibid.
110 Greg Bruno, “Religion and Politics in Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations (June 19, 2008).
111 Jack Jenkins, “How Has Religion Played a Role in Trump’s Presidency?,” America: The Jesuit Review (August 24, 2020)
112 Madeleine Korbel Albright, The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2006), 9, 10.
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Scholars too started to discover that the role of religion in international affairs could not 
be underestimated. As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, one of the first people 
who wrote on this topic was Huntington in his 1993 article ‘The clash of civilizations’, 
which he later turned into a best-selling book.113 According to Huntington, international 
politics would be increasingly defined by clashing civilizations, and noteworthy in 
his argument was that he primarily defined these civilizations along the lines of the 
dominant religions.
After Huntington, numerous other books from both policymakers and scholars 
appeared on the topic of religion and international affairs. The undertone in every one of 
these publications was astonishment: how could we have collectively overlooked religion? 
The role of the IR domain also became a topic of discussion. In most cases, the answer 
was discouraging. The overall opinion was that IR strongly contributed to the structural 
disregard of religion. So something had to change, that is, the lenses through which we 
view the world needed adjustment. The representatives of the existing paradigm were 
challenged to critically examine its validity and legitimacy. It is this paradigm challenge 
that is at the core of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, I will describe how religion made 
some sort of worldwide comeback since the 1960s. The pivotal question is whether 
these religious phenomena arose overnight or had been there for a longer time and then 
suddenly became visible? Can we indeed speak of a worldwide revival of religion and if 
so, what does this mean and how did it occur? In the same chapter, I will also show where 
and how religion manifests itself in present times. I will discuss how, according to the 
religionists, religiously inspired individuals exert influence on public and political life. 
Because religion directly influences the state, and more indirectly, the political sphere 
and civil society organizations, I will also describe how religion exerts influence on a 
national level. Traditionally, religion has had a unique role in the transnational domain 
and therefore posed a challenge to states, and I will describe this in detail. Finally, the 
international perspective enters the discussion. This section considers, for example, the 
influence of religion as the origin of a state’s identity. However, it also focuses on the 
fact that religion could start as a domestic phenomenon and then suddenly turn into an 
international issue. 
In Chapter 3, I will illustrate how, on the domain-specific level, the so-called 
Westphalian system with its assumptions of the central role of the state and power as a 
national interest, the neglect of the domestic domain, and the privatization of religion, 
ensured that IR became ‘blind’ to religion. I will also discuss the religion advocates’ 
proposal for an alternative interpretation of the Westphalian model based on so-called 
neosecularization theory, which considers the Westphalian model to be a reconfirmation 
of Augustine’s distinction between the religious and the political. This makes the 
Westphalian model an expression of a political theology on its own.
113 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 22-49; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order.
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Chapter 4 elaborates on the philosophical and scientific obstacles of IR that resulted 
in religion’s fading away. Topics of discussion in this chapter are the influence of the 
Enlightenment and the theory of modernization and secularization, materialism, 
positivism, and reductionism. I consciously decided on this order, because the arguments 
on the empirical and domain-specific levels are the most accurate and easiest to verify. 
The philosophy of science critique is of a more general nature, which makes it harder 
to ‘test’, as I will do in the second part of this dissertation. Whether the empirical or 
domain-specific arguments hold up or whether it will be more about the philosophical 
and scientific presuppositions should become apparent in part two of this dissertation. 
The chapter layout as illustrated above is based on three separate yet related lines of 
argumentation. The first entails the view that religion plays such an important role in the 
world that IR cannot ignore it (subthesis 1). This is the central theme of Chapter 2. The 
second line of argument asserts that IR as a discipline has a bias against acknowledging 
the significance of religion because of its self-selected object of study, which is heavily 
influenced by the Westphalian system (subthesis 2). As mentioned, Chapter 3 will deal 
with this argument. The third line of argument claims that the ‘old paradigm’ suffers 
from methodological and philosophical limitations making it difficult to take religion 
into account. This charge will lead us, in Chapter 4, to discussing the methodological 
and philosophical framework implied in mainstream IR theories (subthesis 3).   
After this reconstruction of the so-called religion paradigm, I will end this first 
part taking stock of the religionist position and offering a diagnosis. For this, I will 
use the different insights I derived from the Amsterdam School of Philosophy. After 
this clarification phase, I will conclude with a sketch of the contours of the alternative 
religion paradigm that the religionists seem to propose. I will illustrate that they 
strive for a religion-sensitive approach, which is more of an understanding than an 
explanatory nature, and leaves room for non-state actors, normative considerations, and 
an understanding of religion in its cultural broadness and variety. It remains to be seen 
whether these contours require a completely new paradigm, as suggested by Kubálková 
(see Chapter 1), or that a revision of the current paradigm will suffice, as Fox and Sandal 
have claimed. The answer to that question should become apparent in the conclusions 
of the second part of this book. 
 It is important for the reader to take note of the fact that I try to present the 
religionist position as convincingly and representative as possible. To achieve that goal, 
I have written this Part I from the perspective of a religionist whom, while engaged in 
a conversation with his fellow-religionists, describes what exactly it is that they stand 
for. I am therefore describing the position of the religionists from the inside out. This 
means that every person I reference is a religionist. Whenever this is not the case, I will 
say so explicitly. In some cases, I have chosen to mention religionists explicitly, because 
they take a crucial standpoint in certain matters. Now and again, I will take off my 
religionist hat and contemplate on the material presented thus far in an evaluating and 
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assessing manner. This happens in special sections entitled ‘evaluative comments’ or 
‘critical comments’ and in the conclusions of each chapter.
Chapter 2
The Empirical Base of  the Paradigm 
Challenge: A Global Resurgence of  
Religion
Introduction
In this chapter I set out the nature of the comeback of religion in the 1990s, also known 
as the so-called ‘global resurgence of religion’. Whether there really has been a resurgence 
of religion or if it merely seemed that way because scholars started paying attention to it, 
is a topic of current debates. I will contend that, ultimately, both options are true. There 
has been an actual change in the world and scholars have adapted their perception, 
making religion more visible. 
Naturally, the global resurgence of religion did not happen overnight and can be 
seen as the result of other developments, in which the process of globalization has 
played a key role. Worldwide modernization made it possible for religions to manifest 
themselves all over the world. On the other hand, other religious groups resisted 
this modernization and looked for alternative ways to modernize and develop, while 
maintaining their cultural and religious identity. This is because modernization brought 
disappointment as well, as it did not come close to solving all problems. On top of that, 
the influence of modernity is often regarded as subversive to the dominant cultural and 
religious norms and values. As a result, people searched for alternative, more indigenous 
types of modernization. In many cases, this also led to fundamentalist movements that 
attempted to raise barriers against the harmful influences of modernity. All of these 
developments contributed to the increasingly visible and tangible presence of religion 
from the 1960s until the present day.  
Another question concerns the presence of religion in international affairs. To 
describe this, I make use of the various levels of analysis as common in IR: the individual, 
national, transnational and international level. The description of the global resurgence 
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of religion as well as the role of religion on the various levels, together support the first 
subthesis that religion is present everywhere and needs to be taken into consideration by 
IR.  
2.1. The Global Resurgence of  Religion Further Defined
Thomas, one of most prominent representatives of the paradigm challenge, defines the 
global resurgence of religion as follows:
[T]he growing salience and persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious 
beliefs, practices and discourses in personal and public life, and the growing role of religious 
or religiously-related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, and communities, and 
organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring in ways that have significant implications 
for international politics.114 
Other writings show, however, that this definition should be made more specific. In 
the first place, it has to include a more specific timeline of the resurgence. Secondly, it 
is exclusively qualitative and makes no mention of a change in the number of believers 
worldwide. Thirdly, it should include the notion that the visibility of the resurgence 
mainly concerns Islam. I will discuss each of these points in order to come up with a 
more representative definition of the global resurgence.
Regarding the first issue, there are scholars who argue that during the heyday of 
modernization theory, up until the late 1960s, religion was dormant, marginal and not 
an observable part of people’s lives. There is also a chart in one of their articles that 
describes the chronology of the religious resurgence that starts in the 1960s. Moreover, 
one article explicitly states that the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt in 1967 
signifies the resurgence of religion.115 Finally, scholars mention quite a few events that 
indicate that the global resurgence of religion took place from the 1960s onwards. They 
refer to the secular nationalism among Arab Muslims and Hindu nationalist parties 
during the 1960s; the Second Vatican Council of 1962-1965, which yielded a new 
vision for social and political engagement in the Catholic Church and led to the ‘third 
wave’ of worldwide democratization; the Islamic resurgence during the 1970s and the 
1980s, which was marked by the Iranian revolution of 1979; the emergence of Protestant 
fundamentalism and evangelicalism into the political arena of the United States in the 
early 1980s; developments in Brazil, Chile, and Central America in the 1970s and 1980s, 
114 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 26.
115 Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?, 190; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 27; Scott M. 
Thomas, “Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and the Global Resurgence of Religion,” Journal 
of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 25.
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where religious leaders and communities, often supported by the Roman Catholic 
Church, opposed authoritarian regimes; the South African Council of Churches led by 
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu in their confrontation with apartheid during the 
1980s; the local religious leaders and communities in the Philippines and South Korea 
which clashed with authoritarian regimes; and the emergence of many ethnoreligious 
conflicts after the break-up of the Soviet Union.116 
It seems accurate to date the start of the resurgence of religion in the 1960s. This 
does not imply that religion was absent before that time, only that its visibility and 
salience in world affairs has increased markedly since then. It is also important to keep 
in mind that although the resurgence of religion started in the 1960s, it was not until 
the 1990s that religion was picked up within IR.
With respect to the second point, it is possible to argue that the resurgence of 
religion is also about an increase of religious people. Farr, for example, quotes two 
leading demographers of religion who state that, ‘Demographic trends, coupled with 
conservative estimates of conversions and defections envision over 80 percent of the 
world’s populations will continue to be affiliated to religions 200 years into the future.’117 
Others show that data on religious belief and practice support an increase of religion. 
They contend that religious people have a demographic advantage in terms of higher 
birthrates in comparison to secular people. They also write that ‘[t]he proportion of 
people attached to the world’s four biggest religions (Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and 
Hinduism) rose from 67 percent in 1900 to 73 percent in 2005 and may reach 80 
percent by 2050.’118 
The third issue concerns the role of the rise of radical Islam in the resurgence.119 
116 Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and International Relations: What are the Issues?” International Politics 41 (2004): 457, 458; 
Haynes, Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century, 539; J. Bryan Hehir, “Why Religion? Why Now?” in 
Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, eds. Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan and Monica Duffy Toft (Oxford, New 
York, etc: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15, 19; Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?, 190, 191; 
Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 83; Stack, Religious Challenge, 20.
117 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 38. See also, Pew Research Center, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth 
Projections 2010-2050, (2 April, 2015).
118 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 38; Patterson, Politics in a Religious World, 6; Philpott, Has the Study of Global 
Politics Found Religion?, 191, 192; Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 81, 82; Scott M. Thomas, “Living Critically 
and ‘Living Faithfully’ in a Global Age: Justice, Emancipation and the Political Theology of International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 2 (2010): 508. There are other, also non-religionist, sources that 
present evidence in favor of a global resurgence of religion as an increase of the number of believers. Gary D. Bouma, 
“Religious Resurgence, Conflict and the Transformation of Boundaries,” in Religion, Globalization and Culture, eds. Peter 
Beyer and Lori G. Beaman (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 187-202; Todd M. Johnson and Brian J. Grim, The World’s 
Religions in Figures: An Introduction to International Religious Demography (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 11, 12; 
Eric P. Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (London: 
Profile, 2011); Assaf Moghadam, A Global Resurgence of Religion (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs: Harvard 
University, 2003); Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott and Timothy Samuel Shah, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and 
Global Politics (New York: Norton, 2011); Johnson and Grim, The World’s Religions in Figures, 11, 12.
119 Klein Goldewijk, Resurgence of Religion, 26, 27; Scott M. Thomas, “Review Section: Religion and International 
Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 894; Thomas, Living Critically and ‘Living 
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Huntington states that the intensity and pervasiveness of the resurgence is stronger in 
Islamic communities. He sees the Islamic resurgence as a turning to Islam as a source of 
identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power and hope. This resurgence 
includes, in his view, increased attention to religious observance, proliferation of 
religious programming and publications; more emphasis on Islamic dress and values; 
the revitalization of Sufism (mysticism); an increase of Islam-oriented governments, 
organizations, laws, banks, social welfare services and educational institutions; opposition 
to secular governments; and expanding efforts to create international solidarity among 
Islamic states and societies. The resurgence in Islam is, Huntington states, an attempt 
to modernize without Westernizing. As a result of this resurgence, most rulers and 
governments have become aware of the strength of Islam and more sensitive and anxious 
about Islamic issues.120
Thus, an adequate definition of the global resurgence of religion takes the 1960s 
as a starting date, accounts for the resurgence in the number of believers as well as the 
strength of their belief, and incorporates the specific character of Islamic resurgence. In 
order to do justice to these three points, I have amplified Thomas’s definition of global 
resurgence of religion with which I started this section:
[T]he growing salience and persuasiveness of religion since the 1960s, i.e. the increasing 
importance of religious beliefs, practices and discourses in personal and public life; the increasing 
number of religious or religiously-related individuals; and the growing role of non-state groups, 
political parties, communities, and organizations in domestic politics – most observably in Islamic 
countries –, and all this occurring in ways that have significant implications for international 
politics.121 
Although I inserted the sentence ‘most observably in Islamic countries’, I do not 
equate the global resurgence to a rise of religious (Islamic) fundamentalism.122 It is 
Faithfully’ in a Global Age, 507-509. For an overview of Islamic, Christian, Jewish and Hindu fundamentalism. Haynes, 
An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 203-220.
120 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 109-111. Huntington even goes so far 
to compare the Islamic resurgence with the Reformation, because both movements aimed at a fundamental and 
comprehensive reform of all parts of society. 
121 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 26.
122 It is important to define religious fundamentalism and to distinguish between the popular and academic use of the 
term. Haynes gives an extensive treatment of this phenomenon in his book, Haynes, An Introduction to International 
Relations and Religion, 197-201. He defines religious fundamentalists as follows: (1) fundamentalists fear that their 
religious way of life is threatened by secular or alien influences; (2) they want to create traditional and less modern(ized) 
societies; (3) as a result, they advocate changing laws, morality, social norms and, in some cases, domestic and/or 
international political configurations based on their religious principles; (4) many are willing to compete with ruling 
regimes when these regimes appear to intrude and harm education, gender relations and employment policy that are 
fundamental to a religiously appropriate society; and (5) in some cases, they might actively oppose co-religionists believed 
to be excessively lax in upholding their religious duties. This also applies to followers of rival or opposing religions when 
they are considered to be misguided, evil, or even satanic. 
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not without meaning that Thomas argues that ‘the global resurgence of religion is also 
taking place throughout the world in countries with different religious and cultural 
traditions, including the non-Christian world religions – Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, 
and Buddhism.’123  
2.2. Different Lenses or a Different World?
Whereas some religionists see religion increasing in a numerical sense, others are critical 
of this statement and emphasize that religion appears to be back because scholars have 
started paying attention to it.124 They often refer to the sociologist Peter Berger, one of 
the most famous advocates of secularization theory in the 1960s, to illustrate this process. 
Berger stated, in 1999, that the world was ‘as furiously religious as it ever was and in 
some places more so than ever.’125 Based on that, some religionist thinkers maintain 
that religion has always been part of politics and society in developing countries, but 
that social scientists and IR scholars are just now beginning to grapple with it. As they 
argue, the current resurgence of religion is not something new, but just a moment in 
a cycle of religious manifestations. Their conclusion is that, using the words of Berger, 
the phenomenon to be explained ‘is not Iranian mullahs, but American university 
professors’.126 As a result of this, some scholars tend to use the newfound academic 
123 Scott M. Thomas, “Religion and Global Security,” Quaderni Di Relazioni Internazionali. Semestrale Dell’Istito Per Gli 
Studi Di Politica Internazionale, no. 12 (2010): 5.
124 In a review of various books on religion and IR, Haynes critically examines the term resurgence of religion. He refers 
to Norris and Inglehart’s thesis that secularization is still occurring, because religion is losing its social and political 
significance as a consequence of modernization, except where there is a lack of existential security as is often the case in 
developing countries. Given the fact that the population growth rates in most developing countries are higher than in 
most developed countries, the absolute number of people who look primarily to religion to deal with their existential 
problems is growing. Haynes, Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century, 536. For examples of similar 
religious ‘resurgences’. Haynes, Religion and International Relations: What are the Issues?, 452; Haynes, Religion and 
International Relations in the 21st Century, 539-541. Thomas strongly disagrees with the existential security thesis of 
Norris and Inglehart and makes that very clear in his article. Thomas, Outwitting the Developed Countries? For more views 
and arguments on the interpretation of the ‘resurgence of religion’. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and 
Religion, 19-23; Cecelia Lynch, “Religion, Identity, and the ‘War on Terror’: Insights from Religious Humanitarianism,” 
in Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, ed. Patrick James (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2011), 108; Emile F. Sahliyeh, ed., Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1990), 1-44. In a more recent article Inglehart argues that research indicates that 
religion is declining since 2007. Ronald F. Inglehart, “Giving Up on God. The Global Decline of Religion,” Foreign 
Affairs, (September/October, 2020).
125 Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington, DC: Ethics and 
Public Policy Center, 1999), 2.
126 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 34; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 20; Fox, Integrating 
Religion into International Relations Theory, 276; Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?, 190, 191; 
Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 83; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 27, 28. There are good reasons to 
believe that religion was already present, but was only recently discovered by academics, if we look at recent literature that 
draws attention to the role of religion in the past. E.g. John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and 
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interest in religion to discredit an actual increase of religion in the world since the 
1960s. I think, however, that it would prove helpful to the understanding of the global 
resurgence of religion to consider both approaches as complementary. It is reasonable 
to assume that the awakening of scholars from their secularist slumber has ‘made’ the 
resurgence to a certain degree. However, the resurgence cannot solely be explained by 
the awakening of scholars: something must have woken them in the first place. 
The ‘contradiction’ illustrated above shows that the religionists have a variety of 
ontological and epistemological starting points. In Chapter 1, I described this as the 
difference between the more positivist religionists and the more interpretivist scholars – 
a difference which becomes clear once again regarding the following points.
In their attempt to explain the resurgence of religion, Thomas and Hurd posit that 
the return of religion indicates that states and faith communities are refashioning and 
renegotiating the social boundaries between the sacred and the secular, or religion and 
politics. It is a controversy over how metaphysics, ethics, politics, and the state relate 
to each other. They also call it a ‘restructuring of religion’.127 In this vision, the return 
of religion is primarily a readjustment of the existing relations between the religious 
and the secular. Although there are scholars who suggest that this description tends 
to explain away the idea that there is ‘more’ religion, I think it is very plausible to 
maintain both visions. Most scholars appear to agree that both processes are compatible 
and interrelated: the restructuring of religion might lead to ‘more’ religion, and ‘more’ 
religion might evoke the renegotiation of the boundaries between religion and politics. 
The fact that the global resurgence is both a matter of shifting perceptions and actual 
changes is also apparent in the next phenomenon. As some scholars point out, the global 
resurgence is also a ‘creation’ of the political theology of radical Islam, which receives a lot 
of attention making it more visible. It is important to realize that the revival of political 
Islam receives a lot of attention, yet it concerns Muslims who are in a minority position 
along the spectrum of Muslim political theology. Their political theology contains 
two crucial elements. In the first place, divine law is superior to secular law and might 
supersede it. This means that it lacks the typical separation of church and state prevalent 
in the Western world, although this may vary in reality for pragmatic reasons. Secondly, 
this political theology contains a mythic longing for the supranational ideal of a pan-
Successor States (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge University Press, 1994); William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign 
Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Dianne Kirby, 
Religion and the Cold War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2003); Philip E. Muehlenbeck, 
ed., Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012); Andrew Preston, Sword 
of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). 
127 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 135-137; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 26, 27. 
An example of this situation is China where religious devotion is expanding among Chinese Protestants and Catholics, 
and religious beliefs are tenaciously hold among Buddhists of Tibet and the Uighur Muslims of Xingjian Province on the 
country’s northwest borders. Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 36. In her recent book Hurd further explains why it can 
be harmful to treat religion as a self-evident category in foreign policymaking. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious 
Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion (New Jersey and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017).
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Islamic unity among the faithful as it existed in the glorious past. Many Islamists even 
go a step further and envision a single Islamic state encompassing the Islamic world and 
eventually the entire world. This means in practice that Islamists cross national borders 
to bring Islamic societies under the authority of divine law, sharia, because they believe 
Islamic states are corrupt, inefficient and influenced by Western secular ideologies. The 
result of this political theology is the clash of two transnational ideologies: on the one 
hand, the secular Western Westphalian system; on the other, radical Islamic revivalists 
who oppose the Westphalian order and attempt to replace secular order with divine 
order, the nation-state with an Islamic system, and democracy with an Islamic notion 
of consultation.128 As I will demonstrate later the two opposite ideologies might be less 
a matter of ‘secular’ versus ‘religious’, because the ‘secular’ order is itself partly the result 
of certain political-theological ideas.129
A consequence of this clash is that religion suddenly becomes a lot more visible, 
which contributes to the idea that there is a resurgence of religion. In the words of 
Casanova, religion went public and gained, thereby, publicity.130 Apparently, there is a 
tangible motivation to pay more attention to religion, that is to say, religion manifests 
itself more emphatically. I would like to conclude that the world is not only viewed 
through different lenses, but that the world itself has changed just as well.  
2.3. Globalization Facilitated the Global Resurgence of  Religion
The resurgence of religion could become a global phenomenon because of the globalization 
process since the 1960s. Jan Aart Scholte, who does not belong to the paradigm 
challengers, maintains that globalization started around the 1960s: ‘Globalization did 
not figure continually, comprehensively, intensely, and with rapidly increasing frequency 
in the lives of a large proportion of humanity until around the 1960s.’ This matches the 
starting date identified by the religionists for the global resurgence of religion.131
128 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 90-104; Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and 
the Remaking of World Order, 109, 110; Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 83-86, 89; Klein Goldewijk, Resurgence 
of Religion, 23; Giorgio Shani, “Transnational Religious Actors and International Relations,” in Routledge Handbook of 
Religion and Politics, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 310; Toft, Philpott and Shah, God’s 
Century, 9, 27; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 15, 16, 18, 20; Tibi, Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis, 843-859. 
Gelot nuances the description of the global resurgence in terms of nostalgia and traditionalism. He points out that it 
also could be seen as purely religious return to the essentials of the Islamic teachings or, in the words of Peter Berger, ‘an 
impressive revival of emphatically religious commitment’. Ludwig M. Gelot, Religion and International Politics: Beyond 
Westphalia and the Clash of Civilizations (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009), 36, 37 Philpott gives more 
examples of radical revivalists and also provides more information on the theological background and the emergence of 
this phenomenon. Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 86-92.
129 See Section 3.4 and Chapter 5 and 6.
130 Casanova, Public Religions, 3.
131 Jan Aart Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics,” in The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to 
International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2nd ed. (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17; 
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It is possible to discern a series of processes through which globalization facilitated 
the global resurgence of religion: liberalization, deterritorialization, internationalization, 
universalization, and modernization.132 The first, liberalization, means that government-
imposed restrictions on the movement of people and goods between countries are 
removed in order to create an open world economy. In the case of religion, this implies 
that globalization has reduced the relative power of the secular state – especially via 
economic restructuring programs which often necessitated less expenditure money on 
public services in developing countries. The undermining of the capacity of the state to 
impose its secular view on the nation, to the exclusion of other identities, allowed for the 
(re)emergence of pre-national identities based on religion or ethnicity.133 
Deterritorialization, then, describes a process whereby territorial place, distances 
and borders lose some of their previously overriding influence. This process has forced 
policymakers to deal with external and domestic developments simultaneously, because 
porous national borders have created space for the reassertion of transnational religious 
identities.134
The third process is internationalization, which describes an intensification of cross-
border activities and interdependence between countries. This aspect of globalization 
has helped to create and expand ethnic and religious diaspora communities around the 
world. Religious diaspora communities are one of the most significant types of non-state 
groups in world politics in the twenty-first century. Another example of this kind of 
globalization is al-Qaeda using informal networks of Islamic finance (called the hawala 
network) to move money around the world.135
The fourth phenomenon that facilitated the global resurgence of religion is 
universalization, which implies that objects and experiences are spread to people in all 
corners of the world. In the case of religion this means the global proliferation of various, 
and sometimes competing, religious ideas, which makes religious and social differences 
increasingly visible and leads to more cultural and religious pluralism. Examples of the 
growing cultural and religious pluralism are new religious movements like the Falun 
Gong and Pentecostalism, which have millions of followers over the world and shape 
global cultural, religious and political landscapes, and missionaries from Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam and Christianity who are coming from the South to the North and aim 
at the re-evangelization of Europe and America. The result of this increasing cultural and 
Shani, Religious Actors, 311. Gelot also takes globalization as a process that spread from the 1960s onwards. Ludwig M. 
Gelot, On the Theological Origins of International Politics (Saarbrücken: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2013), 127.
132 Scholte distinguishes five usages of the term globalization, which I employ to describe the various ways in which the 
religionists notice the influence of globalization on religion. Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, 14. For a more 
extensive overview of the different kinds of globalization (political, economic, cultural, technological) and a discussion 
about the moment it started. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 65-77.
133 Shani, Religious Actors, 311.
134 Ibid., 311.
135 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 30, 31.
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religious pluralism is that many people live in communities with mosques, synagogues 
and temples, being friends, colleagues or classmates of the worshippers. The process 
of universalization is facilitated by the revolution in information and communication 
technology. The internet has allowed more religious people and groups to publish and 
publicize more widely, organize more effectively, and maintain contact with fellow 
believers (including displaced ones) across boundaries in new and important ways.136 
The next process is modernization, or phrased differently, the global diffusion of 
modernity. Modernity is here defined as the commitment to a new and ‘scientific’ way 
of thinking which broke with traditional ideas and doctrines, and aimed for a more 
rational method to deal with the problems of nature, human life and society. Stephen 
Toulmin, who is not a religionist, says that this process started around the 1630s, when 
scientific inquiries became ‘rational’ thanks to Galileo in astronomy and mechanics, and 
to Descartes in logic and epistemology. Thirty years later this commitment to rationality 
was extended into the practical realm, when European political and diplomatic systems 
were reorganized on the basis of nations. From then on, the warrant for the exercise of 
power by a sovereign monarch was based less on an inherited feudal title than on the 
will of the people who consented to his rule. Toulmin reasons that when this became the 
acknowledged basis of state authority, politics could also be analyzed in more ‘rational’ 
terms.137 
The global diffusion of modernity enabled the resurgence of religion in various 
ways.138 Modernization, for example, has allowed both the state and religious institutions 
to increase their spheres of influence, because modern political means can mobilize the 
masses, which leads to more clashes between religious and secular groups. In addition 
to that, modern communications technology has helped religious groups to export their 
136 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 201; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 80, 81; 
Shani, Religious Actors, 311, 312; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 30, 31.
137 Gelot, Religion and International Politics: Beyond Westphalia and the Clash of Civilizations, 4; Pettman, Reason, Culture, 
Religion, 2, 15. I have used Stephen Toulmin’s take on modernity to amplify the somewhat poor definitions of modernity 
by the religionists. Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York, N.Y.: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 9, 10.
138 From here to the end of Section 2.4 (except my concluding remarks), the text is based on Fox and Sandler, Bringing 
Religion into International Relations, 2, 12-14, 38, 84-86, 110-113. It can, however, also be found in the following 
literature. Barnett, Another Great Awakening?, 2, 3; Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 201; Farr, World of Faith and 
Freedom, 34, 35; Jonathan Fox, “The Multiple Impacts of Religion on International Relations: Perceptions and Reality.” 
Politique Étrangerè, no. 4 (2006): 6, 7, online available at https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2006-
4-page-1059.htm (accessed December 28, 2020); Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 2, 12; 
Gelot, Theological Origins, 129, 135, 146; Haynes, What are the Issues?, 461; Haynes, Religion and International Relations 
in the 21st Century, 538, 539; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 23, 24, 160, 161, 195-198; 
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Introduction: Religion, States, and Transnational Civil Society,” in Transnational Religion 
and Fading States, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James P. Piscatori (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 1; 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 116; Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 
147; Patterson, Politics in a Religious World, 8; Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 22; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of 
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views over the globe and enabled them to mobilize and organize themselves through 
the media and internet, political lobby, use of the courts, and links with political 
parties. Many religious fundamentalists use modern communications, propaganda and 
organizational techniques to resist secularism. Sometimes they also mobilize women in 
order to further their cause, which shows that it is incorrect to perceive fundamentalism 
simply as a return to the past. The global diffusion of modernity also made the resurgence 
possible, because the freedom, in many modern society’s, to select one’s own religion 
led to an increase of religiosity. The demolition of religious monopolies led to a ‘free 
market’ of religions and made it easier and more attractive for people to make a choice 
for religion. 
2.4. Globalization Enabled the Global Diffusion of  Modernity 
Which ‘Caused’ a Religious Backlash 
In this section, I depict how the process of modernization ‘caused’ a religious backlash 
and as a result created a resurgence of religion.139 This does not mean that the religious 
resurgence can be equated to the religious backlash. The global diffusion of modernity, 
includes the spread of Western cultural norms and values, such as equal rights for 
women, which are often, for example, contrary to the prevailing mores in Islamic 
states. The incorporation of those norms in international law through the UN and 
Western states presents a challenge to societies and individuals who disagree with them 
on religious grounds - which makes religion more visible. Though an official common 
definition of the religious backlash is lacking, it seems that it best can be described as 
a countermovement which provides an alternative home to people who feel deserted 
because of the secularizing influence of Western modernity.  
There are six possible ways to account for this religious backlash. The first is that it 
results from people who have become disillusioned by the failure of the modernization 
process in the Third World, which was based on the assumption that universal progress 
and reason would solve all human problems. A second viewpoint addresses the fact 
that modernization promotes economic development, urbanization, modern social 
institutions, pluralism, growing rates of literacy and education as well as advancements in 
science and technology. These phenomena are based on secular ideologies which reduce 
the world to rational, scientific and technological manifestations, while leaving out or 
139 Fox and Sandler speak of a causal relationship, whereas Haynes is more cautious about a direct causal relationship. He 
says that although clearly societies do not necessarily secularize as they modernize, there is no simple explanation for all 
extant examples. On the other hand, Haynes argues, processes of modernization around the world conjoined a second 
development, namely that many people lost their faith in secular ideologies of progressive change, such as socialism 
and communism, and even perhaps secular democracy itself and the belief that the state will be able to deliver on the 
proclaimed developmental goals. Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 2, 12; Haynes, What are 
the Issues?, 460, 46.
69
privatizing religion. This leads to a fragmentation of people’s worldview, creates a sense of 
insecurity and sometimes also socio-economic marginalization, undermining traditional 
communities, traditional lifestyles, community values and morality, and replacing the 
authority of religion with a modern society based on secular principles. Many people 
rejected these foreign ideologies and embraced their indigenous, and therefore more 
legitimate traditions, which has led to a revival of religion. A good example of the latter 
is the pressure of international institutions like the United Nations and Western states 
regarding family planning. When this implies the use of contraceptives and abortion, 
several religions will oppose this. This opposition not only concerns states, but also actors 
such as the Catholic Church, factions within U.S. politics and Islamic organizations.
According to a third viewpoint, modern state-building in developing countries created 
ethnically exclusive governments and ethnic-based policies which often overlapped 
with religious ones and reinforced the religious identity. Fourthly, mainstream religious 
organizations became more secular when they, through their elites, became intertwined 
with the establishment. The latter wanted to partake in religion, but without too many 
restrictions. In response to that development, more religious organizations emerged. 
Then, fifthly, many non-Western countries have found an alternative to the dominant 
secular narrative of modernity. They embrace the idea of multiple modernities, that 
is, multiple paths for being modern appropriate to the different cultural and religious 
traditions in the developing world seeking to gain economic prosperity without losing 
their own cultural and moral values. 
The final factor considering the backlash is that religious fundamentalist groups 
became motivated to support religious educational institutions to preserve religious 
values, identities and communities in the face of modernity. They reject modern 
distinctions between the private and the public and try to base the morality of more 
intimate zones like marriage, child rearing and sex on their religion. They often use 
charity work with the poor and disadvantaged to gain goodwill. These fundamentalist 
movements are especially successful in so-called failed states because they provide an 
answer to the failures of modernity and therefore attract people who feel deserted by the 
modern political and economic system.140  
2.4.1. Evaluative Comments 
In the preceding sections, I have discussed the global resurgence of religion. I also 
presented a definition that does justice to the various interpretations and encompasses a 
qualitative and quantitative understanding of the resurgence. There remains, however, a 
weak spot in the definition, implied in the sentence ‘all this occurring in ways that have 
significant implications for international politics’. Religion scholars do not make clear 
what they mean by ‘significant’. When is religion considered to be significantly present 
140 For a more detailed overview of the causes and characteristics of failed states. Haynes, An Introduction to International 
Relations and Religion, 175-178.
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enough to be taken seriously? The answer to this question depends on the framework 
used to assess the significance of particular events. As it stands now, the significance of 
religion becomes a rather subjective matter, which may be strongly influenced by both 
academic and pre-scientific presuppositions. 
I also discussed whether the resurgence of religion is a result of the fact that academics 
are paying more attention to it, thereby ‘creating’ the very resurgence. Likewise, I have 
discussed whether the resurgence is not ‘merely’ a matter of increased visibility, as 
opposed to an actual resurgence of religion. Eventually, I argued that these viewpoints 
are not mutually exclusive, and that, ultimately, it does not matter whether religion has 
actually increased or has become more visible: in both cases, the new visibility of religion 
calls for IR theory to take it seriously. 
I have also elucidated that globalization, the global diffusion of modernity, and 
the religious backlash have ‘caused’ the global resurgence of religion. Each of these 
developments partly explains what the global resurgence of religion is about, and 
together they provide a clear overview of which processes have contributed to it. 
2.5. The Empirical Base of  the Paradigm Challenge: ‘Religion Is 
Ubiquitous’
Religion’s revival since the 1960s should have rung a bell among IR theorists. However, 
it was not until the 1990s that religion became a topic of interest for academic IR 
theorists and policymakers. Since then, a lot of scholars have tried to demonstrate or 
‘prove’ the overall presence of religion in world affairs. This section will provide an 
overview of religion’s presence in the world by using different levels: the individual 
level (for instance, government leaders, policymakers, and diplomats who are directly 
or indirectly influenced by religious considerations); the national or state and societal 
level (religiously inspired social organizations or political parties, or governments 
related to a particular religion); the transnational level, (missionary activities, religious 
terrorism, non-governmental organizations such as World Vision, World Conference of 
Religion and Peace or Opus Dei); and the international, or also called world or global, 
level (the Holy See with established diplomatic relations in 168 countries).141 In IR 
141 I follow Viotti and Kauppi here. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 9, 10 Thomas also discusses religion 
on various levels, but I do not find the distinctions he makes satisfactory. Many issues that he discusses on the global level 
are transnational phenomena. For that reason, I have included the transnational level and not the global level. Thomas, 
The Global Resurgence of Religion, 28-37. The religionist IR scholar Vendulka Kubálková also makes the distinction 
between different levels. Although I describe the individual level, I do not distinguish between the public domain and 
the private domain, as Kubálková does. By the latter she means the religiosity or spirituality of individuals. Kubálková, 
Towards an International Political Theology, 679. This distinction would not be very helpful for a description of religion 
in international affairs, because it is a very Western distinction; the assumption that someone can be religious in private 
without any public expression would be hard to understand from a non-Western perspective. Haynes offers an overview 
of the relationship between religion and international relations by focusing on countries and regions. The disadvantage of 
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the international level is often called the international system. As with the distinction 
between the empirical, domain-specific and the philosophical, these levels can be 
distinguished from each other theoretically, but in practice they cannot be separated. 
This extensive and varied presence of religion in the world forms the empirical evidence 
for the religionists’ insistence that religion’s role in the world should be taken seriously 
by IR. In other word, it describes the empirical basis of the paradigm challenge and 
supports the first subthesis that religion is actually everywhere.
2.5.1. Individual Level: People’s Worldviews, Norms and Beliefs Influence 
Public and Political Life
Religion plays a role on the individual level, influencing the behavior and life of 
individual human beings, and through them of groups, as a source of values, worldviews, 
identities, belief systems, norms or (providential) beliefs. When important individuals, 
such as politicians, foreign policy officials, state leaders, religious leaders, diplomats and 
terrorists are being influenced by religion and act through institutions or groups, religion 
may become part of public and political life. Besides this, religion can bring together 
groups of people with similar convictions or religious identities. This can have a twofold 
effect: A shared identity can produce a sense of psychological affinity and feelings of 
responsibility for other members of the same religion. However, it can also produce a 
sense of psychological distance towards members of other religions. As a result, different 
religious identities can become a source of international conflict.142 
The norms and beliefs influencing individuals may be of a religious nature in an either 
direct or indirect manner. Some norms and beliefs are explicitly religious or theological 
and others ‘just’ have a religious background or origin. In practice, it is often difficult 
that approach is that it does not provide general descriptions that are also applicable outside that specific region or case. 
Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 233-427. For the same reason, I do not include historical 
examples showing the importance of religion, because it would be difficult to generalize them. Some scholars would argue 
that the international level does not exist anymore, but that it has been replaced by an interconnected global system in 
which states and nations are only one of the actors. I do not want to go into that discussion here, because I do not use 
the levels of analysis to explain religion, but as a tool to order the manifold manifestations of religion in the world as the 
religionists describe them.
142 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 205; Bernbaum, Getting Russia Right, 132; Burnett, Implications for the 
Foreign Policy Community, 299; Ken R. Dark, Religion and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), vii; 
Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 35, Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 17; Jonathan Fox and 
Shmuel Sandler, “The Question of Religion and World Politics,” in Religion in World Conflict (London etc.: Routledge, 
2006), 2, 8; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 160; Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and Foreign 
Policy,” in Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, ed. Jeffrey Haynes (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 194; 
Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 28, 29; Stack, Religious Challenge, 26, 28; Stempel, Faith, 
Diplomacy and the International System, 6; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 1, 4, 5, 10; Thomas, The Global 
Resurgence of Religion, 36. Providential beliefs are based on the belief in a divine plan and the idea that believers have a role 
to play in carrying out the plan. Glazier, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 21, 22. Glazier extensively describes 
how providential beliefs influence American Presidents and their foreign policy. She also gives examples of influential 
individuals or groups who were religiously inspired and ‘made’ history. Ibid., 5-8. Wilson has analyzed six State of the 
Union addresses of American Presidents and observed numerous religious references. Wilson, After Secularism, 147-179.
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to distinguish between the one from the other. Religion can have a direct influence in 
the form of doctrine or theology, because religious doctrines can be used either to justify 
actions or to seek guidance for a proper way to deal with a given situation. An example 
of direct influence is when religious ideas like holy war and cosmic or religious warfare 
are used by religious terrorists who seek a cosmic or transcendent justification rather 
than only political, social, or economic objectives.143 Religion has an indirect influence 
when Western countries regard certain values, like life and human rights, as sacred 
when they intervene on humanitarian grounds, a conception of what is sacred that is, 
in fact, constituted in a religious way. Another example of indirect influence are the 
Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which are the foundation 
of international law today and were influenced by religious considerations from the 
Reformation. The same kind of indirect influence is visible in the present-day criteria 
for just war which were originally developed by the Christian thinker Augustine. Finally, 
the fact that several United Nations documents include the right of freedom to worship 
and assembly, and freedom to maintain places of worship, is also the result of indirect 
religious influence.144  
2.5.2. National Level: Religion Influences the State, Political Society, and 
Civil Society 
To set out how religion plays a role at the national level, I use the distinction between 
the state, political society, and civil society: the state can be affiliated with a religious 
institution; religious organizations seek to ally themselves with political parties or 
movements; and religious actors try to change the status quo through their influence in 
civil society.145 Not always as clear-cut as they seem, these distinctions nevertheless give 
an impression of the various degrees in which religion exerts influence. 
Examples of the influence of religion on the state are the intermingling of the 
Muslim authorities with state power in Iran and the domination of powerful political 
forces in other Muslim majority countries, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Pakistan 
and Indonesia. There is also a study on 177 states which shows that, between 1990 and 
2008, of these states 23.1 percent had an official religion and 24.8 percent supported 
one religion more than others. Examples of the influence of religion on the political 
society are the Christian Democratic parties that have dominated much of the political 
landscape in Western Europe since the Second World War; the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which pushes for state intolerance towards foreign Protestant missionaries; the 
143 Fox and Sandler, The Question of Religion, 2, 3; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 142, 147.
144 Barnett, Another Great Awakening?, 96-102; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 54, 55, 
109; Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 174; Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of Modern IR,” World 
Politics 52, no. January (2000): 206-245.
145 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 205; Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 679. Haynes just 
makes a distinction between non-state actors which can operate nationally and internationally and state-related actors 
which are closely linked to governments. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 34, 35.
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rise of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, or Indian People’s Party) since 1990 and 
its attempt to control the Indian government.146 
Indications of the increasing influence of religious actors on civil society are: Islamic 
groups playing an important role in the shaping of Iraq’s future; the influence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church on the democracy in Russia; the fact that in Asian countries 
like Vietnam, Laos and North Korea, the ruling elite see religion as a threat; increasing 
conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the way in which 
Pentecostal movements are challenging the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Latin America.147 
Religious actors that influence civil society are often called sub-state or subnational 
actors. Many religious sub-state actors belong to larger umbrella organizations 
representing certain denominations or national religious institutions. Depending on 
the church-state relationship in a country, these organizations are sometimes funded 
by the state. Examples of umbrella organizations are the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the Pentecostal 
Fellowship of Nigeria, the Muslim Council of Great Britain, and the French Protestant 
Federation.148  
Religionist scholars differ about the impact of religion on the various levels. Some 
argue that the greatest influence of religion on international politics is through domestic 
politics, the national level (for instance, religion’s influence on decisions to intervene in 
domestic conflicts in other states). Others warn against ascribing too much influence to 
religion in the formation of foreign policy. Because national interest and security are still 
dominant objectives in foreign politics, it is difficult to assess the impact of the religious 
factor. Foreign policies of all countries are also influenced by the interaction between 
their overall power and the prevailing international environment.149  
146 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 205; Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 36; Sandal and Fox, Religion in 
International Relations Theory, 17; Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System, 8. I do not locate the influence 
of Christian Democratic parties in Europe at the international level, but at the national level. Although all Christian 
Democratic parties share basic principles, their specific and practical political standpoints and electoral bases are still 
national. For more information on Christian Democracy and its influence on the formation of the European Union. Farr, 
World of Faith and Freedom, 35-37; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 167-171; Scott M. Thomas, “Response: 
Reading Religion Rightly: The “Clash of Apostasies” Amidst the Global Resurgence of Religion,” in God and Global Order: The 
Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy, eds. Jonathan Chaplin and Robert Joustra (Waco, Texas: Baylor University 
Press, 2010), 190.
147 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 36, 37. 
148 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 99, 100. Thomas writes that religious organizations that influence 
civil society can have various names: civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary 
organizations (PVOs) or nonprofit organizations. These actors can be domestic interest groups or pressure groups that 
want to influence the domestic or foreign policy of the state. They all belong to the so-called third sector, a place between 
the first sector (the state) and the second sector (the market). Ibid., 99.
149 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 168; Haynes, Religion and Foreign Policy, 295.
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2.5.3. Transnational Level: Religion Influences Transnational Relations 
Studying religious manifestations at a non-state level also includes the transnational 
level. The transnational is about the: ‘Interactions and coalitions across state boundaries 
that involve such diverse nongovernmental actors as multinational corporations and 
banks, church groups, and terrorist networks.’150 It is an important level, because here 
religion traditionally plays a role and presents an implicit challenge to state borders due 
to the increase of the number of secular and religious transnational non-state actors 
from a few thousand in the early 1970s to an estimated 25.000 active organizations 
in the early 2000s. Another element is that transnational religious actors often have 
their origins outside traditional state policymaking circles. Islam and Christianity 
were geographically extensive transnational religious communities before the modern 
international system came into being.151  
There are many examples of religious manifestations at the transnational level. 
The first distinction highlighted here is between religion: (1) in transnational religious 
activities; and religion (2) as ideas, soft power, and nongovernmental organizations. There 
are three transnational activities that are specifically religious: religious fundamentalism, 
religious terrorism, and proselytizing. The first tries to take over states to further its agenda 
which is often transnational. Fundamentalists’ most successful strategy is exercising 
influence on the belief systems of policymakers who are influential on the government. 
Ultimately, the influence of religious fundamentalists depends on their ability to convert 
the population, and they thrive especially when the masses are dislocated by a rapid 
and uneven economic and cultural modernization and disillusioned with its outcome. 
The success of fundamentalists does, however, in general not last for long, because after 
having exploited the unease they often fail to deliver solutions to the problems.152  
The second transnational activity is religious terrorism, which has become the 
dominant form of terrorism since the early 1980s. Many of these (mostly Islamist) 
terrorist groups challenge the state and want to remake the world around them.153 And 
thirdly, there is proselytizing. Religions such as Christianity, Islam and Buddhism have 
universalistic aspirations and sometimes are competing for converts. This proselytizing 
could lead to clashes between transnational movements and in some cases also to revolts 
against the influence of foreigners in order to protect the indigenous culture. In response 
to such activities, states create rules or laws to control proselytizing.154  
As I have indicated, religion also plays a role in transnational relations through ideas, 
as soft power, and nongovernmental organizations. Transnational religious ideas, actors 
150 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd ed. 
(Boston etc.: Allyn and Bacon, 1998), 498.
151 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 83, 84; Haynes, An Introduction to International 
Relations and Religion, 44, 129.
152 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 87-89.
153 Ibid., 104, 105. 
154 Ibid., 108, 109.
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or institutions can challenge the position of the state and become a source of conflict. 
This is especially true in post-colonial states with borders that do not correspond with 
pre-existing ethnic or clan boundaries. As a result, the societies in these states continue 
to see religion as an important basis of social identity which leads to strong religions in 
weak states, which can threaten the stability of domestic and international order. 
The issue of ideas in international relations – also described as transnational ideas 
or transnational belief systems – applies to people in different countries who hold the 
same worldview, belief system, or conception of morality, or who believe in particular 
international laws or norms, in which religion’s influence can be rather strong. Examples 
of religious and secular transnational ideas or belief systems are: feminism, Marxism, 
secularist views of modernization, radical Islamist views of the West, as well as the support 
of human rights and anti-slavery. Some transnational ideas aim at the establishment 
of multi-ethnic or multinational states, such as Pan-Islamism or Pan-Africanism. 
Transnational ideas are often embodied by transnational actors or institutions that try to 
find acceptance for these ideas in international relations. Examples are the Anti-Slavery 
Society, the Catholic Church and the Muslim Brotherhood.155  
Another manifestation of religion in transnational relations, is through soft power. 
Soft power refers to the capability of a political body to influence other entities, directly 
or indirectly, through cultural or ideological influence and encouragement.156 So-called 
transnational ideational communities are a form of soft power. These communities 
are inspired by religion and culture as a transnational idea for the development of 
transnational civil society. The deep commitment of these communities to the well-being 
of their members is a form of power, because in conflicts the strength of communities 
will depend on the attractiveness of the ideas that bind people together. Examples of 
religious ideational communities are Muslims, Roman Catholics, Jews, and Eastern 
religions.157
Finally, religion is present in the transnational domain through non-state or 
nongovernmental actors. For most people, this is perhaps the first thing that comes to 
mind when transnational affairs are at issue. Non-state actors can be categorized as: sub-
state actors, transnational actors, and Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs). Since 
the sub-state actor has been described in the previous section on the national level, here 
the categories of transnational actors and Inter-Governmental Organizations will be 
discussed respectively.  
Of the large variety of transnational actors only International Non-Governmental 
Organizations (INGO) will be treated, by way of illustration. INGOs can be divided 
155 Ibid., 45-47; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 45; Skillen, Three Zionisms, 94-107; 
Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System, 6; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 106, 107.
156 Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 40-46; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 7.
157 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 37, 38; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 130-132; 
Stack, Religious Challenge, 20; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 11, 12.
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into advocacy, service-providing, and pastoral INGOs. To start with the latter, pastoral 
INGOs fulfil the more spiritual functions of religion. Examples are the Sufi Brotherhood, 
Opus Dei, Focolare, Campus Crusade for Christ and the Muslim Brotherhood. Service 
providing INGOs are involved in disaster relief and development assistance. Examples 
are CARE, World Vision and Save the Children. Advocacy INGOs promote particular 
causes on a global level like peace, human rights, environmentalism and international 
development. Examples of advocacy INGO’s are the World Conference of Religion 
and Peace, the Parliament of World’s Religions, The World Council of Churches, Hans 
Küng’s Global Ethics Foundation, Pax Christi, the International Network of Engaged 
Buddhists (INEB), Christian Solidarity International, the International Justice Mission, 
the Tikkun Community, and the Council on Faith and International Affairs.158  
Inter-Governmental Organizations, then, are characterized by the fact that their 
members are national governments. There is only one IGO that could be called religious, 
which is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly called Organisation 
of Islamic Conference). This organization represents the idea of the ummah – the unity 
of the Islamic world, which transcends the nation-state. The OIC sometimes conceives 
of the British Commonwealth and the European Union as Christian clubs. The OIC 
makes an impact, because it shapes the interactions between states, and influences 
world opinion by providing a platform for and coalitions of national and transnational 
actors.159 
2.5.4. International Level: Religion Impacts International Relations 
Most religionist scholars appear to assume that religion ultimately has the most impact 
on international relations through the national level. However, this is difficult to analyze, 
as opinions regarding this are quite indistinct and may have been influenced by a state-
centric approach to international affairs. In order to be able to say something about 
the degree of impact that makes sense, it is important to have a clear idea of the way 
in which religion manifests itself on the international level, also called the relations 
between states in the international system. That is the aim of this section.  
The presence of religion in international politics is almost as varied as it is at the 
transnational level. The following classification to elucidate religion’s role in international 
politics is used: (1) religion as an intermestic policy issue; (2) as an international actor; 
(3) as a form of legitimacy; and (4) as a defining element of clashing civilizations.
When religion’s role in domestic society or on a national level starts to affect 
international relations too, it becomes an ‘intermestic’ policy issue, that is, it symbolizes 
the merger of domestic and international politics. This happens, for example, when 
social, economic or political actors influence the domestic and foreign policy of the state 
158 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 100-102. Today the Council on Faith and International Affairs is called the 
Center on Faith and International Affairs. 
159 Ibid., 104. 
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and the wider context in which they operate. This is often the case when global religious 
communities and subcultures start complicating multifaith relations in the West. One 
could think of the uproar among British Muslims when the fatwa on Salman Rushdie 
was pronounced, as well as other controversies about freedom of speech, religious 
tolerance and blasphemy.160  
Religion is an international actor when it acts like a state in international relations 
with a clear religious purpose. The most well-known example of course is the Roman 
Catholic Church, which is both a transnational actor, because of its transnational 
organization, and an international actor, since the Holy See has diplomatic relations 
with about 168 countries.161 Because of the sovereign status of the Vatican city-state, the 
Catholic Church can also legitimately participate in UN conferences on human rights, 
women and population policy, and influence the deliberations and final resolutions 
more than other, non-state, actors.162 One could say that no other religion has reached a 
higher level of effectiveness in diplomatic relations than the Roman Catholic Church.163 
The third aspect of religion’s role in international affairs is the legitimacy actors 
derive from it. Religious legitimacy is here to be understood as ‘the normative belief by 
an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’.164 Such legitimacy can be used 
by the state, elites, and nongovernmental organizations to convince policymakers and 
populations both in their own country and in foreign nations that a specific cause is 
legitimate. Religious legitimacy is a different policy tool than military and economic 
power, because the state does not have a monopoly on its use (e.g. the World Council of 
Churches in the fall of South Africa’s apartheid government).165  
Religion has always functioned as a source of legitimacy. Kings and rulers in the 
past tried to use religion as a social and political power to integrate and implement 
their policies and to legitimate their reign.166 This easily led to politicized religion and 
religionized politics.167 Even today religion is often, though not exclusively, used as a 
source of legitimacy for the state and its policymakers. A survey of 177 states points out 
160 Ibid., 34. 
161 The Review of Faith & International Affairs devoted a special issue to the Catholic Church as an international actor. 
Mariano Barbato and Robert Joustra, “Popes on the Rise: The Modern Papacy in World Affairs,” The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 15, no. 4 (2017).
162 Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously, 104, 105; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 
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Relations and Religion, 45. For a discussion on the Catholic Church and its role on a systemic, international, national and 
local level. Hehir, The Old Church and the New Europe, 93-116.
163 Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System, 7, 8 For more information on how the Catholic Church as 
transnational actor challenges the state-centric Westphalian order. Shani, Religious Actors, 312-315. For a more extensive 
description of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and 
Religion, 136-143.
164 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 35.
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that most of these states engage in religious issues and legislate religion. Although this 
does not necessarily imply that states control or explicitly support religion, it nevertheless 
reveals that all states use religion to legitimize state policies or fear religion’s power and 
influence.168 When states encourage nationalism, democracy, and humanitarian values 
such as peace and justice, they often legitimate this on the basis of religious values.169 
Another example is the religious imagery of America as the ‘new Israel’ or ‘new Jerusalem’, 
together with the idea that the US functions as a ‘city on the hill’ and as a beacon for 
other countries.170  
It is important to distinguish between religion as a legitimizing factor, used for other 
goals, and actions that are primarily religious and have a religious goal, although it is 
often very difficult to see the difference. This is not to say that religion could be reduced 
to something else and is ‘just’ functioning as a kind of window dressing. Even when 
politicians ‘play the religion card’, because involving religion finds resonance among 
the masses they are targeting, it does still play a role.171 It is not unlikely, moreover, that 
religion and secular motivations sometimes go hand in hand. States can have realpolitik 
reasons for giving aid to people in need, but this does not alter the fact that most 
religions consider charity a virtue.172 
Religion, fourthly, plays a role at the international level when it functions as the 
principal defining characteristic of civilizations. Huntington uses various arguments 
to support this point. When civilizations clash, religion comes to dominate as the 
most meaningful identity of civilizations. Practically speaking, religion is the broadest 
community to which a group in a conflict can appeal. From a psychological perspective, 
religion provides the strongest justification for a struggle against outside threats.173 Further, 
millennia of human history have shown that religion may divide people profoundly and 
reinforce the frequency, intensity and violence of fault-line wars.174 Concrete examples 
of the latter mechanism are conflicts portrayed by Islamic fundamentalist groups as 
genuine wars between civilizations: they called Western troops that invaded Iraq 
‘crusaders’ and ‘Zionists’, and named the war ‘a war of the West’ against Islam. The 
168 Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 16.
169 Thomas, Response: Reading Religion Rightly, 190; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 35, 
43, 50, 51, 176.
170 Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the International System, 6.
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172 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 163.
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latter was reinforced by President Bush’s rhetorical invocation of God, which suggested 
that this was a religious war.175 And finally, Huntington underlines that the frictions 
between Islam and the West, for various reasons, have increased markedly in the late 
twentieth century. He believes these frictions will only increase in the future, whereas 
the conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is ‘only a fleeting and 
superficial historical phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual 
relation between Islam and Christianity.’176 And he underpins this with telling parallels: 
both are monotheistic, universalistic, and missionary religions claiming to possess the 
true faith; they cherish parallel concepts of ‘jihad’ and ‘crusade’; and, together with 
Judaism, they have a teleological view of history.177 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented the empirical reasons why the religionists claim that 
there has been a global resurgence of religion since the 1960s, especially in Islamic 
countries. My conclusion is that this resurgence is partly brought about by some real 
changes in the world, yet is also ‘caused’ by the attention that academics have paid to it. 
In both cases, the global resurgence of religion challenges IR to review its theories. To 
strengthen the challenge, I have introduced an empirical viewpoint to depict the role 
religion plays at the individual, national, transnational, and international level – an eye-
opener indeed to the manifold ways in which religion is present in the world. 
The fact that the global resurgence can be seen as partly the result of the academics’ 
awakening from their secular slumber while the resurgence, at the same time, also 
involves a restructuring of religion’s position in society, cautions us to exaggerate neither 
the global resurgence nor the secularization of IR. The religionists think that religion’s 
presence at all levels challenges IR, because the latter neglects religion altogether. 
However, stating that religion is present at all levels does not indicate how much impact 
religion precisely has. Even after the presentation of all the empirical evidence it remains 
difficult to assess how much actual weight should be ascribed to religion in comparison 
to other factors. It simply shows that religion is actually out there, but does not provide 
sufficient theoretical interpretation. Besides that, the impact religion has might vary 
according to the level on which it plays a role and also to what extent it has a public 
significance. Proselytizing, for example, definitely leads to ‘more’ religion, but it only 
becomes relevant for international relations if the ‘converts’ start to apply their religion 
to public and political affairs. The fact that some states have a (in)formal state religion, 





when politicians and political parties do not act on the basis of it. Religion is everywhere, 
but in the context of the field of study not all religion is of relevance. 
In my view, this lack of clarity unfortunately weakens the claim of the paradigm 
challengers. This is further complicated by the fact that most of the religionists seem 
to assume that religion is something that can be studied as an isolated phenomenon 
which can be distinguished from ‘secular’ or non-religious activities. In practice, 
however, religion often overlaps with many so-called secular activities which makes the 
distinction less clear cut or even blurred. Also, the question what is secular and religious 
is often object of discussion and the outcome often a reflection of the existing power 
configurations.178  
The religionists are not very outspoken on this point, but they appear to believe that 
religion has the greatest impact on the national level, while it challenges IR most on 
the transnational level. Religion at the national level is often intertwined with national 
interests and security issues which are shaped by the international power configuration. 
The possible consequence is that religion becomes a legitimizing factor. This makes it 
difficult to specify the exact impact of religion, but it potentially remains the greatest 
on the national level. Though the impact of religion might be strongest at the national 
level, the religionists challenge IR most at the transnational level. In the first place, this 
is because mainstream IR tends to take the state within the international system as its 
starting point and therefore sidelines or neglects the transnational level, and, secondly, 
religion organizes itself often transnationally and therefore challenges existing state 
borders which it often predates. 
In the second part of this book, it will be my task to find out whether the IR theorists 
were aware of the global resurgence of religion at all, and if so, in what terms they would 
write about it. Were they aware of the greater visibility of the political theology of radical 
Islam? Did they relate the globalization process to a resurgence of religion? Have they 
been aware of a religious backlash that contributed to the resurgence? 
It will also be my task to examine to what extent the IR theorists actually pay 
attention to religion at the individual, national, transnational, and international level. 
With respect to the individual level, I will especially look into the influence of religious 
norms and beliefs and identities. Norms and beliefs influence individuals directly in 
the form of doctrines or theology (e.g. holy war) or indirectly when individuals are 
influenced by religiously constituted ideas (e.g. just war, principle of non-intervention, 
Westphalian sovereignty, religious freedom as presented in UN documents). Identities 
can be shaped through values and worldviews and affect important individuals, groups 
and institutions. 
When it comes to the national level, I will in particular focus on the influence of 
religion on the state level, political society (e.g. religious political parties), and civil 
178 Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, “What’s so ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Terrorism’?” Critical Studies on Terrorism 
4, no. 3 (2011): 369-388.
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society (religious civil society actors). Regarding the transnational level, I will examine to 
what extent the IR theorists pay attention to religious transnational activities (religious 
fundamentalism, religious terrorism, and proselytizing) and the transnational role of 
religion in the form of ideas, soft power and non-governmental organizations. The 
international level will be addressed by assessing to what extent IR theorists are aware of 
religion’s role as intermestic policy issue, international actor, provider of legitimacy, and 
a defining aspect of civilizations. 
Based on the outcome of my assessment, I will be able to define to what extent the 
claim that IR has to consider religion’s role in the world can be supported by the first 
subthesis that religion is ubiquitous. 
For many scholars and policymakers, learning about the overwhelming amount of 
religious expressions leads to the question of why IR has ignored them for so long. What 
is going on with IR that religion has systematically landed outside its field of view? There 
are numerous possible answers to this question. Some point to countless domain-specific 
assumptions within IR that could explain why religion is being ignored. Others take it 
a step further and attribute it to the effect of IR’s secular philosophical and scientific 
presuppositions. I will discuss this topic in more detail in the following chapters. 
Chapter 3
The ‘Religion-Blindness’ of  the Old 
Paradigm: The Dominance of  the 
Westphalian System
Introduction 
The story as told by most of the religionists and the one that is still common in IR is 
that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 was a major turning point in Western history and 
the Christian unity that was present until then.179 Before 1648, the Catholic Church 
influenced many matters which we would now describe as secular. Even though the Holy 
Roman Emperor also exercised authority over the affairs of the church, the prevailing 
view is that during the Investiture Controversy of the late eleventh and early twelfth 
centuries the balance had shifted in favor of the pope. The Peace of Westphalia broke 
with this situation as a result of two developments: the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ 
War. The Reformation not only led to a division between Protestants and Catholics, but 
also to changes in social structures, political organization, trade, and technological and 
military power. Protestantism further contributed to a social, economic and political 
order based on rationality, progress, and individualism, and thus paved the way for 
capitalism, liberalism, modern science, and religious pluralism. The Thirty Years’ War is 
very often seen as the last and most devastating of the great wars of religion in Europe 
prior to 1648. The Peace of Westphalia responded to these religious wars with two 
important principles, namely cujus regio, ejus religio (the ruler determines the religion 
of his realm), and the principle rex est imperator in regno suo (the king rules in his own 
realm). 
In the view of the religionists, IR theories such as realism and neorealism interpret 
179 This story has become contested more recently. Benjamin de Carvalho, Harvard Leira and John M. Hobson, “The Big 
Bangs of IR: The Myths that Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 39, no. 3 (2011): 735–758.
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these principles as the state’s right to discipline, marginalize, nationalize or privatize 
religion in domestic and international affairs, and to ‘secularize’ the international order. 
This is based on the idea that peace, social order and cohesion, religious freedom, and 
pluralism only could exist if religion was disciplined by the state to be fundamentally 
liberal and Protestant. Realists and neorealists often echo Thomas Hobbes’s (1588-
1679) phrasing that God gave way to the great Leviathan (the sovereign state), to which 
modern man owes his peace and security. The state can play this role, because secular 
nationalism and national identity transcend religion and religious identity. In this view, 
politics with reference to religion is seen as the biggest threat to the security of the 
state. Realists and neorealists claim that the privatization or marginalization of religion 
required that it be separated from, and then subordinated to, the affairs of state.180 
They assume that the secular is the norm which should not be disturbed by religious 
considerations. Consequently, as (neo)realists see it, states give primacy to military and 
security power interests and downplay the role of ideas and non-material interests as 
secondary and therefore negligible. It is no surprise that these ideas allowed realism and 
neorealism to develop a bias regarding the role of contemporary religion. As a result 
of the increasing role of the United States as a superpower, IR has been dominated by 
scholars from Northern America and the assumptions of realism and neorealism became 
widespread.181 
However, the Peace of Westphalia also allows for an alternative interpretation, 
that is to say, as an accommodation between religion and the state with regard to 
their respective spheres of influence, namely the spiritual realm of the church and the 
temporal order of society. According to the dominant interpretation in (neo)realism, 
religion was marginalized and controlled by political power; the second interpretation 
sees the Westphalian system as opening the way to religious freedom and hence to a new, 
even public (if not strictly political) role.182 In this chapter I will compare both visions. 
180 The subordination of religion to politics also has to do with a changing understanding of the meaning of ‘the religious’ 
and the ‘secular’. Wilson refers to Charles Taylor and José Casanova to describe this process: ‘To begin with, the dyad is 
merely descriptive, highlighting two ‘dimensions of existence’. Over time, however, the ‘secular’ half of the dyad shifts. 
The ‘secular’ comes to refer to the ‘immanent sphere’ while the religious refers to the transcendental realm. From there, 
the ‘secular’ comes to refer to what is ’real’ and the ‘religious’ to what is invented or imagined until finally the ‘secular’ 
refers to the institutions we really require to live in ‘this world’, and the ‘religious’ or ‘ecclesial’ to optional extras that often 
disturb the course of this-worldly life. Through this series of historical shifts in meaning, religion becomes subordinated 
to the secular. It is thus an exclusionary dualism, a dualism that establishes ‘antagonistic bipolar opposites’ and then 
elevates one unit while excluding the other.’ Wilson, After Secularism, 31.
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I will start by presenting the subject-specific assumptions that have led to the 
disregard of religion, as distinct from the empirical (Chapter 2) and the philosophy of 
science level (Chapter 4). The subject-specific level deals with the two assumptions that 
have become part of IR theories and apply primarily to the social domain of international 
relations. I will illustrate how, according to the religionists, the dominant interpretation 
of Westphalia has influenced the perception of the formation and development of these 
two assumptions, namely the national interest and the role of the state. This will clarify 
how the interpretation of the Westphalian system influences the interpretation of the 
subsequent history. I will then present an alternative interpretation of the Westphalian 
settlement, but before doing so, I briefly elucidate the terms ‘Peace of Westphalia’, 
‘Westphalian system’ or ‘Westphalian settlement’.183  
According to Philpott, the Westphalian system is based on five characteristics: (1) 
the supreme authority of the sovereign state within a territory; (2) the proscription 
of intervention to change relations between religion and politics in other countries; 
(3) separation between religious and political power, or more specifically church and 
state, which implies that governments do not promote the welfare of religion in general 
and also not the preferential treatment of one religion over another; (4) subordination 
of religion to the authority of the state; (5) and the rise of nationality as a source of 
identity.184 This Westphalian settlement expanded to the non-Western world through 
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184 This means in practice that Westphalia also marked the decrease of religious authorities’ temporal prerogatives, such 
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imperialism, colonialism, and decolonization. Later, the Westphalian system became 
embodied in the United Nations and formed an embryonic international society. As a 
result, the Westphalian system became the basis of IR theories after the Second World 
War. 
This chapter will feature an examination of realism and neorealism, two theories, 
as stated before, that have largely influenced International Relations. I will outline the 
Westphalian assumptions that have been adopted by realism and neorealism and are said 
to have specifically led to the neglect of religion: the overemphasis of the role of the state 
and the national interest of the state is power. It might look that the sections hereafter 
reflect my own position, but that is not the case. I just present the religionist position.
3.1. The Overemphasis on the State 
In religionist literature, one of the recurring criticisms of (neo)realism is that realism and 
neorealism overemphasize the role of the state. This is expressed in two ways. In the first 
place, realism and neorealism assume that states are autonomous and independent units 
that are not under any higher authority, and that they are the highest and most central 
actor in the world. The assumption that the state is the central actor in international 
relations seems to lead to the neglect of religion for a number of reasons. To begin with, 
it denies the existence of the transnational level, even though IR scholars have been 
arguing for transnational relations since the 1970s.185 As I have shown in the preceding 
chapter, the transnational level often turns out to be the level where religious and also 
non-religious actors play important roles, especially in the twentieth century. Besides 
that, some developing countries do not have a well-developed nation-state. It is then 
wrongly assumed that there is a state that represents a particular nation while, in fact, 
there are several nations with different interests that often run along religious lines. 
Finally, by looking at the role of states, realism and neorealism ignore the influence of its 
important leaders, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, the Pope or U.S. Presidents, and their 
religious values. 
Besides the fact that state centrality leads to the neglect of religion, the assumption 
that the state is the central actor appears no longer adequate. Nowadays the influence of 
the state mainly concerns politics and the military. In economy and communications, 
multinational corporations determine what should be done. In addition, since the 
end of the Cold War, the governmental impact on the distribution of money, ideas, 
technology, goods, and people has decreased. At the same time, however, the influence 
of religion only increased. Harold Saunders therefore states with respect to the role of 
as holding temporal office, raising taxes, or controlling large tracts of land. 
185 Markus Thiel and Jeffrey Maslanik, “Transnational Actors,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.
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religion: ’Until we get our basic assumptions about how the world works – our paradigm 
– straight, we will not meet the challenges of this new century.’186
In the second place, realism and neorealism’s overemphasis of the state is expressed 
in the fact that they ignore the domestic domain and treat the state like a black box. 
Realists do not view the domestic circumstances of other states and the internal 
policies of their governments as a major factor in foreign policy decisions. Internal 
developments, realists have traditionally argued, are poor guides to the external behavior 
of governments. For that reason, realists only consider the beliefs and actions of religious 
individuals and communities relevant if they drive the policy decisions of governments 
or help to understand the levers of power.  
As a result of this stance, realists and neorealists overlook important and influential 
phenomena. For example, realists tend to view the Cold War as a great power struggle and 
not so much as an ideological struggle between communism and freedom or capitalism. 
They also overlook that U.S. internationalism and hegemony after the Second World 
War was very much based on domestic attitudes, religious beliefs, civil religion and 
political ideology. For example, the so-called ‘Christian realists’ were very influential 
in articulating and implementing a type of ecumenical Protestantism that shaped U.S. 
foreign policy after the Second World War.
The two assumptions – state centrality and the state as a black box – are strengthened 
in neorealism, because of its holism. In this context, this refers to a top-down or structural 
approach to social inquiry that seeks to explain individual actors by a larger whole or by the 
structural and material forces of the system. The religionists observe this holism in neorealism, 
because this theory characteristically explains international politics through the structure of 
the international system – and it does not see religion as a part of that system.187
Neorealism emphasizes the rationality of states as unitary actors in making policy 
choices, and it provides a functional and structural explanation of international behavior 
primarily based on balance-of-power calculations. Neorealists focus on how the 
distribution of hard power affects the decisions of states; they explain states’ decisions 
to join alliances or international organizations as rational and functional responses to 
threats. Such an approach does not leave room for any kind of spirituality in international 
politics, because the structure of the international system is largely defined by the 
distribution of (state) power. Neorealists maintain that religious groups, movements, 
186 Saunders, Relational Realism, 165.
187 Thomas has another interpretation of neorealism. He sees neorealism as a methodological individualist approach. He 
defines methodological individualism as a bottom-up approach. It takes individuals or social units as the determiners of 
the structure of relations in the social system, the social structure of domestic society, or the basic structure of relations 
between states. The choices that these units or individuals make are considered to be rational. This methodological 
individualism leads to the assumption that the objective and external conditions of international relations create like 
units that become more homogeneous in their interests and behavior regarding security, which neorealists consider 
the primary interest of all states. As a result, religionists conclude, neorealists consider issues of identity (e.g. ethnicity, 
religion or gender) unimportant in international relations. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 67, 68. I will come 
back to this in Part II of this dissertation.
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ideas and beliefs, international regimes, and international institutions play no role in 
achieving order at the international level.  
3.2. The National Interest of  the State Is Power
Realism and neorealism do not merely assume that the state is a central actor in 
international relations, they also assume the state to be focused on power. By centralizing 
power, the role of religion is disregarded. This assumption is a consequence of the idea 
that there is no higher authority than the state, and that states are in an overall anarchic 
situation, because an overarching authority is lacking. Realism also assumes that states 
are rationally self-interested and pursue material interests in order to prevail in anarchic 
competition. In this self-help situation, power – understood as military and economic 
capability – and national security are understood to be the chief rational interests of 
states. International politics, in this perspective, is an arena of power politics in which 
the major powers (the United States, European Union, Russia, China) and well-armed 
potential spoilers (North Korea, Iran) are the main analytical units. Foreign policies are 
therefore based on analyses of military strength, technological capacity, possession of 
weapons of mass destruction, and economic robustness.
As a result, it does not matter to realism and neorealism whether or not individual 
humans and groups identify with a religious faith, because for realists the struggle for 
power, prestige, and resources remains constant, and therefore ideational factors like 
religion, culture, and ideology generally do not matter for foreign policy analysis. 
So realism and neorealism tend to not give much attention to important forces 
in international politics, such as the role of spirituality, culture, and institutions; the 
norms, needs, aspirations, values, and interests of individuals; religiously derived norms 
enshrined in international law; religiously motivated humanitarian action; and diaspora 
groups (for example, the Israel lobby in the U.S.). They tend to overlook that states have 
the ability to export their religious ideals and thus may attempt to influence international 
(moral) standards, for example, regarding gender issues, blasphemy or apostasy. Some 
states find it blasphemous to subordinate their religious ideals to power considerations, 
which makes cooperation with such states difficult. All these aspects are overlooked 
when power is considered leading for the national interest. 
3.3. Westphalia as the Starting Point of  the Privatization of  Re-
ligion
In the preceding I have argued that adhering to these two Westphalian assumptions 
may lead to a neglect of religion. However, these domain-specific assumptions do not 
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by definition lead to the neglect of religion on their own merit. Nevertheless this may 
happen as a result of the dominant idea that the Westphalian system goes hand in hand 
with marginalization and privatization of religion.188 More specifically, this interpretation 
of Westphalia are the reason that these two major IR theories, realism and neorealism 
subsequently identify the emergence of the Westphalian state and the development of 
the national interest defined as power with the decline of religion. In the pages hereafter, 
I set out each of these developments in more detail.  
3.3.1. The Rise of  the State Implies Secularization of  the State
Fox and Sandler aptly describe how (neo)realism sees the state formation process. The 
overall picture is that the state formation process since the Peace of Westphalia went 
together with the decline of religious influence. In this process four developments can be 
distinguished, according to the (neo)realists. The first step is that the divine legitimacy 
of the monarch’s right to rule shifted to a situation in which the monarch became 
considered the highest secular authority within the state. These sovereign monarchs 
became identified with their ability to protect the security of the state against enemies 
from without and disorder from within. Both Hobbes and Jean Bodin (1530-1596) 
provided the theoretical underpinning for these processes. 
Next we see the emergence of popular sovereignty, based on the thought of John 
Locke (1632-1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), which circumscribed 
monarchical powers by the will of the people. As a result, monarchs could no longer 
claim absolute or divinely-ordained legitimacy; the resultant marginalization of religion 
continued to increase with the gradual democratization of the state. A new relationship 
between state and church emerged, and the state became more powerful both internally 
and externally, because security and not a shared religion increasingly formed the basis 
for alliances. 
In the nineteenth century, nationalism and ethnicity became issues of concern, due 
to the decline of the monarchical system, the rise of self-rule, and the coexistence of 
multiple ethnic groups within individual states. Even though the identities of many 
ethnic groups were based on religious heritage, international norms required states to 
be founded on a national basis, and not on a religious one. Religionists refer to this as 
the secularization of the international order, and note that it intensified with the formal 
acceptance of the right to self-determination at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919.
Finally, the emergence of the nation-state as a polity paved the way for a new 
dimension of the concept of national interest. The nation-state transformed ethno-
religious cultural communities (nations) into new political-territorial constructs 
(states). Statehood became the basis of a nation’s ability to control its territory and to 
188 Some scholars only state that realism and/or neorealism subscribe to an extreme interpretation of Westphalia, while in 
other cases they refer to IR in general. I limit myself to realism and neorealism, and do not want to extend their claims 
to IR in general, though I am aware that other IR theories sometimes follow realism in this interpretation of Westphalia.
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act internationally. These systems of authority were considered secular, because national 
legitimacy was now based on the sovereignty of the people and not God. However, that 
does not mean that religion was completely gone, because American and European states 
still developed religious features in their systems, respectively civil religion and a linkage 
of religion with ethno-national heritage and identity. This led to a certain ambiguity, 
because the ‘national interest’ acquired a new meaning, namely to provide security, 
while the nation also had to take into account the fulfillment of historical aspirations 
which were often influenced by its religious identity. The way in which states dealt with 
this varied among states. For example, Christianity and Islam in the Middle Ages and, 
later, the French revolutionaries, the Nazis, and the Bolsheviks all defined their foreign 
policies in missionary terms. The school of realism hardly saw any difference between 
religious or ideological missionaries.189 
This picture of the history of the state Fox and Sandler present emphasizes that each 
step in the state’s growth marked a corresponding decline in the influence of religion. 
It shows that the state-centrism in realism and neorealism is interwoven with the idea 
that the influence of religion has disappeared, and explains that they do not see any 
difference between religious and ideology. 
3.3.2. The Narrative of  the Secularization of  the National Interest 
A similar development has taken place regarding the understanding of the national 
interest defined as power, although religionists seem to have different opinions about 
this issue. I will first present the majority’s point of view by illustrating Philpott and 
Stack’s stance. I will then show how Fox and Sandal add some nuance to the debate. 
According to Philpott and John Stack, thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-
1527), Hobbes, and to some extent Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) rejected traditional 
Christianity as the foundation for political order. In that vein, realists approach the 
state as a distinct political entity with its own logic or reason (raison d’état). Its telos 
was no longer Thomas Aquinas’s (1225-1274) common good, a state of justice and 
peace in which a whole array of virtues were safeguarded, but the mere security of the 
body. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, exemplars of this strain of realist thought 
Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) and the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck 
(1815-1898) acted upon the political realist assumption that the state aims at security, 
and that the balance of power is the primary – if not the only – way to overcome power 
struggles in international politics.
This political realism was reaffirmed as the foundation of modern international 
relations during the Cold War era by the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, political theorist 
Hans Morgenthau, and realist diplomat Henry Kissinger. Even Niebuhr, who was 
called a Christian realist, was skeptical that state action could be properly understood 
as motivated by deep religious concerns. He observed that any attempt by states to 
189 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 22-26.
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seriously pursue a religious or transcendent ideal in a world of power would come to 
naught. Niebuhr therefore counseled leaders to act according to a calculation of the 
lesser of two evils. Eventually, Philpott maintains, almost every realist subscribes to the 
statement that states should place their own security and survival first, even when this 
conflicts with an obligation that is rooted in a rationally discernible common morality.190 
Characteristic of Morgenthau is his realist principle that states want to preserve 
their security and therefore strive for relative military power. He sharply distinguishes 
between personal morality and the higher moral duty of the statesman to safeguard the 
state from competing interests of other states. The development of successful foreign 
policies demands, in this view, that decision makers set personal moral and religious 
beliefs aside in their formulation and execution of policy.191 Morgenthau sees morality 
as something that disturbs the normal flow of international politics and the balance 
of power. Morality in international relations, Morgenthau states, tends to become 
universalistic, because each nation sees its own morality as binding for all humanity. 
Morgenthau considered this a reversion to the politics and morality of tribalism and 
religious wars: 
[C]arrying their idols before them, the nationalistic masses of our time meet in the international 
arena, each group convinced that it executes the mandate of history, (...) and that it fulfills a sacred 
mission ordained by Providence, however defined. Little do they know that they meet under an 
empty sky from which the gods have departed.192
On the basis of this narrative, Philpott and most other religionists think that realism 
and neorealism are too secular to really understand what role religion plays in the world 
since September 11. 
Philpott’s representation differs from Sandal and Fox’s view. They state that, 
historically, realism was less hostile towards religion than Philpott claims. They point 
out that Machiavelli certainly did pay attention to the (instrumental) role of religion, 
and considered Christianity to be of key importance for the stability and progress of 
society. According to him, religion required scrupulous attention, but eventually had to 
be judged for the ‘impact on the causes of men’s actions, not from its truth’.193 According 
to Sandal and Fox, Machiavelli thought that ‘politics should not be guided by pure 
moral considerations’.194 He recognized the importance of religion, but also warned for 
its interference in the political sphere. Sandal and Fox call this pragmatic secularism. 
Hobbes later joined Machiavelli’s line of thought, in that realism did not want to 
190 Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 78-80; Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?, 190; Stack, 
Religious Challenge, 26.
191 Stack, Religious Challenge, 25, 26.
192 Glazier, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 3. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 274.
193 Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 31.
194 Ibid., 31.
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prescribe a purely religious or moral order, though it acknowledged religion as a force 
capable of influencing the anarchic world.195 Theories such as realism and neorealism 
also adhere to this way of thinking. In these theories, religion is often seen as an aspect 
of state power, a set of superstitions useful to states for strengthening national morale, 
maintaining order, and acquiring legitimacy.196 As a result, realists and neorealists tend 
to neglect the role of religion, because the political sphere has freed itself from religion 
over time.  
Philpott, along with most religionists, refers to this process as secularization, and 
does not appear to welcome it, as it could lead to biased theories regarding the role of 
religion in today’s world. As I mentioned earlier, there are also religionists who claim that 
realists like Machiavelli, Hobbes and Morgenthau were not necessarily hostile towards 
religion, but, instead, thought that a proper explanation of politics could not benefit 
from religion’s interference. This adds nuance to Philpott’s position to some degree, but 
the bottom line remains that religionists are of the opinion that religion was not given 
the consideration it required.
3.4. An Alternative Reading: Westphalia as the Birth of  Reli-
gious Freedom 
The religionists state that the general interpretation of the Westphalian within IR is not 
only disputable, but also dangerous, because it leads to binary and superior thinking 
based on Western categories that fail to do justice to the reality in many non-Western 
countries. On top of that, there is a possible alternative interpretation of Westphalia. 
In this interpretation, Westphalia is regarded as the birth of religious freedom and 
therefore does not herald the privatization and marginalization of religion. To the 
contrary, religious freedom has been safeguarded ever since. When history is examined 
through this perspective, it could provide a different perspective regarding the state and 
the definition of national interest. 
The common interpretation of Westphalia in (neo)realism promotes a kind of 
secularism with an either/or model and a dialectical way of thinking: something is either 
religious or secular, but cannot be both. For example, the public sphere is secular and 
cannot be religious, and religious ideas are irreconcilable with the secular aspirations 
of the state. By clearly distinguishing what is secular from what is religious, it becomes 
easier to separate the sacred from (secular) politics, and subordinate it.197 However, the 
secular is definitely not a neutral concept but in fact structures the way scholars perceive 
the role of religion in world affairs. It leads, for example, to the view that the West 
195 Ibid., 31, 32.
196 Gelot, Theological Origins, 18.
197 Wilson, After Secularism, 64; McDougall, Introduction, 162, 163.
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is superior to the rest of the world, because it builds its policies on ‘neutral’ reason 
and not on religion. It could lead to foreign policymaking in which secular democracy 
and religious theocracy are considered as the only two forms of political order, and 
in which case Islam is seen as the representative of the non-secular and the irrational. 
Examples of these mechanisms mentioned by the religionists are the possible accession 
of Turkey to the EU or the relationship between the United States and Iran.198 For the 
religionists, the prevailing interpretation of Westphalia within IR – in practice, within 
realism and neorealism – relies on the anti-religious and anticlerical assumptions of the 
secularization thesis as first developed by eighteenth-century thinkers such as Voltaire 
and David Hume.199
The alternative interpretation disagrees with realism and neorealism’s interpretation 
that Westphalia marks the moment that Europe separated church and state, religion 
became marginalized or privatized, and a prosperous new era began. Instead, it states 
that modernity was not atheistic or anti-religious. It claims that modernity sought 
not to eliminate religion, but rather to support and develop a new view on religion 
and its place in human life.200 For that reason, the Westphalian settlement is seen as 
an accommodation between religion and the state that grants the liberty to practice 
religion as constitutive of human dignity and fosters religious freedom.201 The influence 
of religion was reconfigured, but it did not decline.  
For that reason, the religionists argue that there is a more accurate interpretation 
of secularization called the neosecularization theory. According to this approach, 
secularization is a process which transfers the latent and manifest functions of institutions 
or social structures in which legitimacy is based on a supernaturalist frame of reference, to 
(often new) institutions operating according to empirical, rational, and pragmatic criteria. 
It is a shift in the institutional location of religion.202 Patterson describes this shift, referring 
to Casanova, as the end of the notion of a mono-religious Europe, binding governments 
to new national churches: Catholic France, Anglican England, Lutheran Sweden, and the 
like.203 During this process the secular was theologically legitimized and gained autonomy, 
since the natural became separated from the supernatural from the twelfth century 
onwards. At the same time, however, the secular was sacralized, because it remained part 
of God’s plan. This is also what happened with the Protestant Reformation, during which 
Christian prelates continued to affirm the divine legitimacy of rulers, even as they set 
198 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 49, 141, 149.
199 Gelot, Theological Origins, 11, 12.
200 Ibid., 151.
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about firmly grounding politics in secular terms. In other words, the secular foundation of 
politics was made possible by the political theology of the Reformation: ‘no Reformation, 
no Westphalia’.204 This political theology revived and strengthened Augustine’s distinction 
between the ‘city of God’ and the ‘city of man’. Augustine’s theology distinguished 
between two separate spheres of influence: the spiritual realm, which is the site of the 
relationship between Christ and the believer’s soul led by the church; and the temporal 
order of secular society, which is governed by state-appointed civil magistrates and which 
prescribes sovereignty to the state. Contrary to what is thought in realism and neorealism, 
the secular did not develop as an independent, universal and objective sphere distinct from 
religion. Instead, the secular emerged from the sacred core of Christianity. It was based 
on Western historical and philosophical traditions which were instigated by passages in 
Christian scripture and Christian theology.205 
On the basis of this secularization within Christianity, two other variants developed 
over time.206 In the first case secular politics became modeled after the church and 
secularized theological dogmas became the basis of political theories. Hobbes’s Leviathan 
is a perfect illustration of this secularization process, because it replaced God as the 
ultimate condition, and the origin of its own existence, with the state. In other words, 
the modern state was modeled after previous religious practices and theological concepts. 
This is what I described in Chapter 1 as theology that is continued by other means 
and theological ideas that are applied to politics without necessarily referring to its 
theological origin. The second variant is that religious themes and symbols are reviving 
within the modern political order. They manifest themselves as immanent religions or 
quasi-religious worldviews. Here the religionists refer to the German-born American 
political philosopher Eric Voegelin’s reasoning that the modern state’s subversion of 
the bond between God and secular authority had not led to the disappearance of the 
transcendental-divine idea of the corpus mysticum Christi. They cite Voegelin that ‘when 
God has become invisible behind the world, then the things of the world become 
new gods’, or, as Voegelin also has it, ‘[t]he state (…) is at the same time a Church, 
with the sovereign as head of the Church, immediately under God’.207 Philosophers 
began to sacralize the world on immanent and secular grounds, while a new kind of 
secular eschatology emerged. Humankind and nature were both infused with attributes 
204 Philpott, The Religious Roots of Modern IR, 206.
205 Gelot, Theological Origins, 7, 32, 151; Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 25, 30, 31, 33, 39, 
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(University of Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 207.
206 Gelot describes this as three secularization acts entitled respectively as ‘Medieval Origins’, ‘Hobbes’ Sacred Politics’ and 
‘The Enlightenment’. Gelot, Theological Origins, 41-123.
207 Mika Luoma-aho, “Political Theology, Anthropomorphism, and Person-hood of the State: The Religion of IR,” 
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and powers that were previously ascribed to God. Through the use of reason and the 
experimental method, justification, redemption and even heaven could be realized. 
This whole process of secularization turned the emerging secularism into a ‘theological 
discourse in its own right’, as the religionists frame it.208 
This interpretation of Western history is fundamentally different from the 
interpretation of classical realism and neorealism. The latter consider religion and secular 
politics to be two opposing movements, according to the religionists. The alternative 
interpretation of Westphalia emphasizes that the appearance of religion is changing, and 
that ‘secular’ politics exists by virtue of a religious or theological embedding.  
The two opposite interpretations strongly resemble the two types of secularization 
of Elizabeth Hurd. She distinguishes between two forms of secularism: laicism and 
Judeo-Christian secularism. According to her analysis, the first assumes that religious 
belief and practice will decline or be even eliminated. Laicism sees itself as free from 
ideology and neutral with respect to the religion-politics melee. This form of secularism 
structures the perception of religion in the world conceptualizing each manifestation of 
religion as fundamentalism: a negative social force directed against science, rationality, 
and secularism – in short, a force against modernity itself. The resurgence of religion, 
Hurd writes, is seen as a manifestation of deeper social, economic or political grievances. 
The other form of secularism she distinguishes sees the Judeo-Christian tradition as the 
unique and inimitable foundation of secular public order. Although it differentiates 
between the temporal and the religious spheres, it does not assume or promote a decline 
or privatization of religion. Representatives of this position, such as Bernard Lewis 
and Huntington, defend the separation of the religious and the political as profoundly 
Christian. Hurd quotes Lewis:
Separation of church and state was derided in the past by Muslims when they said this is a Christian remedy 
for a Christian disease. It doesn’t apply to us or to our world. Lately, I think some of them are beginning to 
reconsider that, and to concede that perhaps they may have caught a Christian disease and would therefore be 
well advised to try a Christian remedy.209
As Hurd claims, Judeo-Christian secularism perceives the resurgence of religion as a 
demonstration of the moral, religious and political incommensurability of different 
civilizations, and the natural relationship between Judeo-Christianity and secular 
democracy.210 It is clear that current IR, according to this divide, is based on laicism, 
whereas religionists and their neosecularization theory are closer to Judeo-Christian 
secularism.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have illustrated how, according to the religion scholars, the Westphalian 
system promoted a systematic disregard of religion in the domain of International 
Relations. I have discussed the two domain-specific assumptions that contribute to this. 
The religion proponents strengthen their position by not only criticizing the Westphalian 
presuppositions regarding the state and the national interest, but also by arguing that 
these assumptions are no longer valid on their own. 
I then argued that the interpretation of Westphalia largely determines how the 
formation of state-centrism and the national interest defined as power is perceived, 
namely as an increasing secularization and marginalization of religion. According to 
the religionists, the role of the state and the national interest are considered completely 
secular in IR. In other words, religion does not play a role in the formation of the 
state, and does not influence the definition of the national interest. Religion has become 
a private affair, inferior to the state, because it threatens public peace. Secularization 
equals privatization, but also implies the subjugation of religion to the state. This does 
not necessarily mean that the number of believers is declining; it is merely concerned 
with the public influence of religion.
The religion proponents have presented an alternative, called the neosecularization 
theory. In this theory, secularization is regarded as a shift of the institutional position 
of religion. It does not mean that there are fewer believers, nor does it suggest that the 
public significance of religion has declined, except in its traditional forms. It means that 
religion occurs in a different way. Whereas previously the legitimacy of certain social 
institutions was determined by a supernatural framework, nowadays empirical, rational 
criteria apply. However, these criteria were formed within a religious, theological, or 
Christian background, and in that sense, they are still dependent on that background. 
The ‘secular’ is therefore a domain in which concepts and language are used that no 
longer refer to religion, without a hostile stance towards religion is being taken. 
As I indicated above, the two views of secularization strongly resemble the two 
opposite forms of secularism presented by Hurd: laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism. 
The first form of secularism assumes that religious belief and practice will decline or be 
eliminated. It sees itself as neutral and free from ideology, and understands religion as 
a threat to science, rationality and secularism. Judeo-Christian secularism, in contrast, 
emphasizes that the secular cannot be thought separate from the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, because it is its foundation. It sees the separation of the religious and the 
political as profoundly Christian. 
It is a pity, in my understanding, that the followers of the alternative approach to 
Westphalia have not elaborated on its consequences for the way in which they perceive 
the role of the state and define the national interest of the state. This is partly due to 
the fact that the alternative reading of Westphalia is not a broadly shared idea among 
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the religionists yet. I think this is also because religionists inherently struggle with the 
assumptions of realism, as these assumptions leave no room for religion and cannot be 
valid in light of the developments in the world. If neosecularization theory, I imagine, 
would be applied to classical realism religionists struggle with, this could lead to a positive 
recognition; now it is given a place in the privatization story of Westphalia. For example, 
it could clarify that the definition of the national interest as power entails a separation of 
the political and religious spheres, with the latter being mainly Christian and embodied 
in the church. These are political processes of emancipation from religious influence, 
not an anti-religious and hostile reaction to religion or the church per se. In this vision, 
religion is recognized as implicitly present in many different ways and on different levels 
in political institutions and arrangements. 
In the above representation of current realism, religion and politics are presented as 
two competing realms which should not interfere with one another. Instead of thinking 
in contradictions, though, it might be beneficial to think in terms of simultaneous 
developments. For example, one could recognize that although the pursuit of power 
is a deciding factor in the political domain, ultimately politics should strive for higher, 
moral goals. The Amsterdam School distinguishes between conditioning, qualifying, and 
founding matters. So IR theory that would take religion seriously might acknowledge 
that striving for power is a foundational principle for the national interest, but that 
this search for power should be qualified by moral goals. Similarly, and perfectly in line 
with previous statements about historical political traditions, one could acknowledge 
religion’s conditioning role in helping to resist brutal striving for power and contribute 
to peace and stability in international relations. I will elaborate on this in the third part 
of this dissertation. 
In Part II, I will examine the degree to which the presented assumptions regarding 
the Westphalian can explain the disregard of religion, specifically in the case of 
Morgenthau and Waltz. I will investigate whether both Morgenthau and Waltz support 
the two assumptions (the assumption regarding ‘holism’ will only be tested in Waltz’s 
case), and I will seek to determine which Westphalian interpretation forms the basis of 
their theorizing. But, I will first set out in more detail what philosophy of science issues 
play a role in IR, according to the religionists, and how this affects the view of (neo)
realism on religion. That is what the next chapter is about. 
Chapter 4
The Dominance of  Naturalism in the 
Genesis of  the Old Paradigm
Introduction
There are good reasons to claim that historically religion or theology has had a huge 
influence on the emergence and development of IR as a discipline. However, as IR 
developed it was remarkably successful in hiding this background and becoming 
more and more secular, and even naturalistic; meaning that IR became increasingly 
modelled after the natural sciences. Apart from the factors analyzed in earlier chapters, 
this development in itself may have been a major factor in the neglect of religion as an 
element of human, social and political reality, the religionists claim. This development 
already started with the Enlightenment, and impacted the vision that religion would 
eventually disappear, as the modernization and secularization theory states.
In this chapter, I will be discussing these themes extensively, on the basis of the 
four levels introduced in Chapter 1: the social and cultural embeddedness, ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. When it comes to social and cultural embeddedness, 
religionists state that IR as a discipline is strongly stamped by the Western context. 
Both the Enlightenment with its emphasis on the separation of faith and reason, and 
the restriction of reason to the rationality of the natural sciences, and the resulting 
modernization and secularization theory caused religion to disappear from the scholars’ 
radar. With respect to the ontological and epistemological levels, the religion scholars 
find that IR often uses a materialistic ontology as a starting point, together with a 
positivist epistemology, with corresponding consequences. A scientific theory based on 
the assumption that the world is ultimately composed of material matters, and that 
religion is nothing more than a reflection of this, forms a receptive soil for a bias against 
religion. The same applies to the positivist view that social reality can be approached 
as the natural world, and that explanatory power is the determining factor for proper 
theory formation. Similar to the case of Westphalia, a different perspective is possible 
100
here. As I described earlier, the religionists emphasize that in the early period of the field 
of IR, attention indeed was paid to religion and ethics when contemplating international 
politics.
With regard to the methodology of IR, the advocates of the religion paradigm 
criticize the tendency for reductionism of religion. This creates a one-sided picture of 
religion as something irrational, individual, and institutional, while other important 
aspects of religion are overlooked. 
In the following sections, I will elaborate on these four aspects more or less in 
sync with the religionist discourse, and providing intermediate evaluations and critical 
comments where necessary
4.1. Social and Cultural Embeddedness: Influence of  Enlightenment 
Thinking 
For the sake of clarity, I start this section with a general definition of the Enlightenment. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy characterizes the Enlightenment as a ‘tremendous 
intellectual and scientific progress of the age (…) also because of the expectation of the 
age that philosophy (in the broad sense of the time, which includes the natural and 
social sciences) would dramatically improve human life’.211 The encyclopedia sees the 
Enlightenment as: 
[H]aving its primary origin in the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries, because the 
rise of the new science progressively undermines not only the ancient geocentric conception of the 
cosmos, but also the set of presuppositions that had served to constrain and guide philosophical 
inquiry in the earlier times. The dramatic success of the new science in explaining the natural 
world promotes philosophy from a handmaiden of theology, constrained by its purposes and 
methods, to an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct 
the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles.212 
The religionists claim that the Enlightenment had a major impact on IR, and caused 
religion to currently be ignored in IR theories. The religionist Farr emphasizes that it has 
been the French Enlightenment, in combination with the Scientific Revolution, which 
radically transformed the relationship between faith and reason. Farr and the religionists 
in general refer to so-called more radical Enlightenment thinking and they do not 
address more moderate lines of thought (e.g. Scottish Enlightenment), which were also 
religion critical but sought reform and renewal of the Christian faith. This somehow one-
211 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry ‘Enlightenment’, online available at https://plato.stanford.edu (accessed 
December 28, 2020).
212 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry ‘Enlightenment’.
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sided and ‘dark’ representation of the Enlightenment nevertheless helps to get a sharp 
picture of the religionist view. Before the Enlightenment, Farr states, the prevailing view 
was Augustine’s: ‘No one believes anything unless one first thought it believable (…) 
Everything that is believed is believed after being preceded by thought.’213 In short, faith 
preceded the empirical observation. The Enlightenment broke with this long marriage 
between faith and reason, relegating faith to the realm of (private) superstition. This was 
the result of the growing confidence in the empirical methods of science, which fed a 
conviction among elites that the claims of religion were not only unprovable but entirely 
subjective. 
The Scientific Revolution and the French Enlightenment not only subordinated faith 
to reason; they also transformed the meaning of reason and rationality. Largely due to 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), modern reason became identified with mathematics and 
the scientific method, implying that only truths that are the result of empirical research 
are knowable. This was a radical break with the past: from the ancient Greeks onward, 
philosophers had sought truths that were knowable despite not being scientifically 
verifiable. With the Enlightenment, human rationality became the sole arbiter of truth, 
and knowledge based on faith and intuition became to be seen as inferior.
From this perspective, one can understand Peter Gay’s claim, not a religionist 
himself, that the core meaning of the Enlightenment is the rise of modern paganism, 
because French Enlightenment philosophers believed that ‘[Christianity’s] central 
myth was incredible, its dogma a conflation of rustic superstitions, its sacred book an 
incoherent collection of primitive tales, its church a cohort of servile fanatics as long as 
they were out of power and of despotic fanatics once they had gained control.’214 As a 
result, many Western intellectuals considered the separation of religion and rationality, 
and the privatization of religion complete by the twentieth century.215 
 As a result of Enlightenment thinking, IR primarily views religion as dangerous, 
violent, intolerant, and properly kept private. The darkest representation even views 
believers as psychologically disturbed and primed to be intolerant and violent. Religious 
leaders influence the masses and institutionalize their beliefs so that they are able to treat 
non-believers as heretics who have to be either submitted or eliminated. That is what 
makes religion inherently dangerous. Religion is equally dangerous when it makes people 
patient and passive in cases of injustice, or into romanticists, ignorant and backward in 
the face of knowledge and progress. It is against the background of these ideas that IR 
213 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 49.
214 Ibid., 50, 51.
215 Ibid., 49-51; Gelot, Religion and International Politics: Beyond Westphalia and the Clash of Civilizations, 41; Stack, 
Religious Challenge, 22, 23. Cf. Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 12. It should be noted that Ulrich Lehner states 
that this picture of Gay has changed dramatically. Today, historians recognize that the overwhelming majority of the 
Enlightenment thinkers was interested in finding a balanced relationship between reasons an faith and that only a small 
fraction was anti-religious. Ulrich L. Lehner, Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 22.
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theories have been developed and applied. 
Another way in which the Enlightenment has influenced IR is that religious knowledge 
is undervalued and considered as of secondary importance. This can be illustrated by 
the influence exerted within IR by Max Weber’s (1864-1920) categorization of different 
forms of rationality. Weber considered religion a form of value rationality, which leads 
to action for ethical, aesthetical, and religious purposes. This form of knowledge differs 
from procedural knowledge, or in Weber’s words ‘formal rationality’, which is based 
on a rational calculation of the best ways to achieve preferred objectives. In IR terms, 
this means that religion is at most a form of soft power and therefore inferior to ‘hard’ 
military or economic power. The realists’ predilection for hard power leads them to 
relegate religion to, at best, a secondary role in their analysis of international affairs.216
In addition, the influence of the Enlightenment becomes visible in IR in that religion 
is often reduced to a set of rules and replaced by morality. This started with Kant, who 
anchored rational religion in the law of morality rather than in ecclesiastical faith. He 
did this by combining the Augustinian command model of morality with a shift from 
the Christian God to the individual moral subject. Kant thus paved the way for laicist 
and Judeo-Christian secularism, which are both present in IR. 
Laicism bases its public morality upon a singular conception of reason, which 
considers theology in public life as dangerous sectarianism. It emphasizes the distinctions 
between public and private, secular and sacred, mundane and metaphysical. Judeo-
Christian secularism, meanwhile, takes from Kant the idea that Christianity comes 
closest to his version of ‘universal rational religion’.217 In both forms of secularism, 
religion is understood as a set of rules and largely replaced by morality. The problem 
is that a definition of religion as a set of beliefs or rules does not do justice to the 
communal aspect of religion, which makes it a distorted approach to religion. 
In summary, the replacement of religion by morality, the idea that religion is 
dangerous, and that religion is of secondary importance are the result of the changing 
views, in the Enlightenment, on the relationship between faith and reason, and the 
meaning and reach of reason. On these views, religion was something that should 
remain private, because it could become violent, intolerant and dangerous if it played a 
role in the public and political realm. 
4.1.1. The Dominance of  Modernization and Secularization Theory
The Enlightenment ideas about religion strongly influenced the modernization and 
secularization theory. The founding generation of sociologists were mostly European, 
216 Gelot, Religion and International Politics: Beyond Westphalia and the Clash of Civilizations, 15; Cecelia Lynch, “Dogma, 
Praxis, and Religious Perspectives on Multiculturalism,” in Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, 
eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York, N.Y., etc.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 56; Thomas, The Global 
Resurgence of Religion, 108-110.
217 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 25-27, 36. Cf. Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 13.
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and thus intellectual heirs of Enlightenment ideas such as that religion is standing in the 
way of progress, that new social arrangements compete with the status quo, including 
traditional religions, and that reason and science challenge the authority of religion’s 
influence on people’s minds and consciousness.  
The majority of the most important Western social thinkers shared the belief that 
an age of enlightenment would replace religion as the basis for understanding the 
world. This assumption was not limited to academic scholarship because most (if not 
all) Westerners, especially those from the United States, were socialized with the idea 
that church and state are separate and that it is wrong for governments to endorse any 
religion. The fact that IR is the most Western (that is, Enlightenment-informed) variant 
of the social sciences – Kubálková explicitly uses the indication American or North-
American – explains why the subscription of IR to modernization and secularization 
theory has led to the neglect of religion. 
Before I move on, I would like to highlight the religionists’ understanding 
of modernization and secularization theory. Although modernization theory is 
different from secularization theory, I will follow the religionists in their use of the 
term ‘modernization and secularization theory’ indicating that it comprises both. 
The modernization theory was the dominant paradigm among Western political 
scientists from the later 1950s through the mid-1970s. The sociological analogue, 
called secularization theory, focuses exclusively on religion and remained dominant in 
sociology until the early 1990s. Modernization theory posits that modern processes like 
economic development, urbanization, modern social institutions, pluralism, growing 
rates of literacy and education, as well as advancements in science and technology in 
Western and non-Western societies, would inevitably lead to the diminishing of pre-
modern factors like ethnicity and religion in politics and society. Modernization theory 
assumes that secularization is an inherent part of modernization; this secularization 
could either be a decline or a rationalization of religion. An example of the latter is 
Enlightenment deism, with its belief in a supreme being whose existence can be known 
not by Scripture but by reason. 
The societal consequences of modernization are, according to modernization theory, 
that secular institutions take over functions that were traditionally executed by religious 
ones, and that religion is no longer necessary to maintain social order in society. Religious 
social norms are replaced by technical, rational and empirical criteria; psychiatrists, 
psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists replace priests and ministers; and the 
state wants to base its policies on rational and scientific principles.218
218 Michael C. Desch, “The Coming Reformation of Religion in International Affairs? the Demise of the Secularization 
Thesis and the Rise of New Thinking about Religion,” in Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research 
(University of Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 17-19; Farr, World of Faith 
and Freedom, 47, 48; Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20, 163; Gelot, 
Theological Origins, 11, 12; Haynes, Religion and Foreign Policy, 193; Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations 
and Religion, 7-10; Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 700; Vendulka Kubálková, “International 
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According to the religionists, IR subscribes to modernization and secularization 
theory, even though in political science and sociology a reassessment took place.219 
This reassessment would have been well-justified for IR too, because the applicability 
and validity of modernization and secularization theory has turned out to be flawed. 
Its applicability can be questioned because, as scholars of non-Western societies have 
objected, what modernization theory considers ‘modern’ now appears conspicuously 
Western. The theory’s validity can also be questioned: contrary to its predictions, the 
number of religious people is increasing, while the number of non-religious people is 
decreasing. Besides that, religion has recently been more at issue in wars than it has been 
in the past.220  
That IR still reasons from the assumptions of modernization and secularization 
theory appears from various facts. Even after Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations most 
debates did not touch upon his argument about the role of religion, which demonstrates 
IR’s commitment to modernization and secularization theory. IR still accepts the secular 
liberal and laicist beliefs that modernization and economic development will diminish 
the appeal of religion. It assumes that religion is an impediment to the scientific 
management of domestic and international affairs according to the Westphalian system. 
It believes that neorealist theory is right in its assumption that anarchy creates like units 
and that all states will become liberal states. Realists expand the liberal assumption that 
modernity will create a global culture of tolerance and respect, limiting the possibility of 
war and providing the basis for international order.221
4.1.2. Evaluative Comments
The religionists argue that the Enlightenment ideas induced the neglect of religion. In 
my view, however, the fact that religion is of secondary importance, that it is reduced to 
a set of rules and considered dangerous, does not have to lead to discard of the study of 
religion, or to negligence of religion within IR. After all, one can still try to understand 
something ‘irrational’ by means of rational theories, not least because religion plays 
such an important role in everyday life. I want to stress the latter, as it highlights that 
the Enlightenment not only entailed a changing scientific worldview, but just as well 
involved cultural, social, and philosophical and ethical components. The Enlightenment 
contains worldview elements, because many radical thinkers during the Enlightenment 
Political Theology,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 2 (2006): 140; Stack, Religious Challenge, 25; Thomas, The 
Global Resurgence of Religion, 51-53.
219 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 15.
220 Ibid., 10, 18, 19; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 51, 53.
221 Barnett, Another Great Awakening?, 95; Cho and Katzenstein, In the Service of State and Nation, 171; Desch, The 
Coming Reformation?, 21-23; Gelot, Theological Origins, 12; Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 
32; Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 148; Sheikh and Waever, Western Secularisms, 275; Scott M. Thomas, 
“Religious Resurgence, Postmodernism, and World Politics,” in Religion and Global Order, eds. John L. Esposito and 
Michael Watson (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 52, 53; Wilson, After Secularism, 3. See also, Shore, Religious 
Conflict Resolution, 22.
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were influenced by their own ideological preferences: they ‘believed’ that religion, 
certain forms at least, was harmful and should be privatized. This can be detected in the 
modernization and secularization theory, because not only the facts played a role, but 
also the ‘belief ’ (and wish) that religion would disappear. This is why it took a long time 
before it was widely accepted that the secularization theory only partly applied. 
Pairing the Enlightenment style of thinking with a great ‘faith’ in the modernization 
and secularization theory has engendered a situation in which religion is seen as the 
irrational pendant of reason, likely to disappear over time. In that context, it becomes 
understandable – though not necessarily justified – that IR scholars no longer take 
religion seriously into account. 
4.2. Ontological Consequences: Materialism 
The consequences of the worldview of the Enlightenment as described above becomes 
visible in the way in which IR theory deals with religion on an ontological level. According 
to the religionists, IR is based on the ontological assumption of materialism, which 
means that observable reality is seen as a reflection of material causes. Religion, ideas 
and ideology are epiphenomenal factors that are the result of basic material, economic 
or technological forces in society, and therefore have no independent explanatory 
power.222  
The consequences of the scientific-philosophical view on the subject-specific level 
are – as was illustrated in the former chapter – that realism and neorealism assume that 
states have fixed interests, and that the international structure is defined by material 
attributes, distribution of power, military capability, natural resources, technology and 
geography. (Religious) rules and norms are seen by realism and neorealism as contingent 
and reducible to material factors, so religion is not taken into account.223 As a result 
of materialist premises, realism and neorealism also ascribe little explanatory power to 
religion. They consider religions epiphenomenal, while material factors like states and 
the distribution of power are easier to theorize about. This is not the same as stating 
that power should be measured in a material sense only, as some scholars argue, because 
Morgenthau clearly admitted that the content of power and the manner of its use are 
determined by the political and cultural environment. This conception of power by 
Morgenthau also includes charismatic or psychological power. This shows that softer 
notions of power are not excluded, though (neo)realists prefer material factors to theorize 
about.224 The bottom line is that, from a theoretical point of view, preference is given to 
222 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 62.
223 Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, 40-42, 428, 429; Hurd, The Politics of Secularism, 38, 
39; Katzenstein, Civilizational States, 146, 147.
224 Barnett, Another Great Awakening?, 94; Sandal and Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory, 37, 41.
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material causes. This is also because it is easier to work with quantifiable material factors. 
The result is that non-material issues, like religion, are taken into account insofar as they 
contribute to the realization of material factors.
4.2.1. Critical Comments 
The religionists suggest that IR theory assumes that reality is made up of matter, and 
that as a result IR theories do not deal with religion. This would mean that IR theorists 
are making claims about reality as a whole, which is more than science can warrant. This 
is called ontological naturalism, which refers to a philosophical position that contains a 
pre-scientific assumption or belief about the totality of reality that does not follow from 
scientific research as such. One could say that IR theorists are not that philosophical, 
and just ‘work’ from the assumption that reality is made up of matter. Yet even this 
methodological naturalism is not neutral, as the American philosopher of religion of 
the Amsterdam School, Alvin Plantinga, has argued. He refers to Augustine in a similar 
way as the religionists do, as explained in the section on the Enlightenment, by saying 
that science is not religiously neutral. Plantinga argues in favor of a ‘level playing field’ 
meaning that a so-called Augustinian science is considered as valid as a science based on 
methodological naturalism, because neither of them is neutral.225  
4.3. The Impact of  Positivist Epistemology 
The Enlightenment’s limiting of the realm of reason to what can be known according 
to the scientific method is reflected in the epistemological assumptions of realism and 
neorealism, which are all strongly positivist. This implies that a maximum of explanatory 
power is to be pursued, primarily and preferably in mathematically framed hypotheses; 
rationality exists independently of context; and the applied scientific concepts must 
be secular. Before I discuss each of these points in more detail, I first set out which 
definition of positivism is used in the context of this research.  
I derive this definition from Thomas, who identifies positivism by the following 
characteristics. First, positivism holds that there is a unity of science and a single logic 
of explanation. There is only one reality in the physical and social worlds, and therefore 
the methodology of scientific investigation is the same for both worlds. Second, facts 
can be separated from values because, as with the physical world, there exists something 
external and independent from theories or interpretations in the social world. Third, 
positivism assumes that, like the physical world, the social world is governed by general 
laws and patterns that can be discovered empirically.226 
225 Alvin Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism? Philosophical Analysis,” Origins and Design 18, no. 1 (1996); Alvin 
Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism? Part 2: Philosophical Analysis,” Origins and Design 18, no. 2 (1997).
226 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 60, 61. Thomas’s definition agrees with Steve Smith’s definition. Smith 
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4.3.1. Positivism’s Longing for Explanatory Power and Belief  in Context-
Independent Rationality
IR scholars are often frustrated by interpretative theories’ lack of predictive power. In 
order to overcome this, and because of the influence of the Enlightenment and especially 
19th and 20th century positivism, realism does not make a distinction between studying 
an unconscious world of atoms, a range of mountains or the conscious world of human 
beings. Realism tries to imitate the physical sciences in ‘the building of theoretical and 
manageable machines’ – and to match the physical sciences’ levels of certitude and social 
prestige. As a consequence, Waltz’s neorealism leaves culture (and therefore religion) out 
of his theory of neorealism for the sake of parsimony. Religion simply does not strike 
him as being sufficiently relevant as to merit inclusion in a universal predictive theory 
of IR.227
As a result of the desire for theory and explanation, there has emerged a gap 
between the practice of international politics and what realism as a theory says about 
it. This discrepancy between theory and practice is particularly apparent in relation 
to the question whether power is the ultimate aim and whether states are the most 
central actors in international politics. Morgenthau, apparently, pays lip service to the 
acknowledgement that there are ultimate aims in international politics beyond the 
immediate aim of power, because, in his theory, power has become the ultimate aim 
and religion does not play a role in it. This shows that realism is not realistic – it does 
not describe the world as it actually is, including religion’s continuing important role. 
As a result, American diplomats raised in the Enlightenment secularism of the realist 
school are unprepared to see spiritual aspects of problems and solutions. As regards the 
centrality of the state, it seems that this assumption does not fit the nation-states as we 
know them outside the theoretical machine. Though Morgenthau saw this problem, he 
ultimately dismissed it.228 
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The supranational forces, such as universal religion, humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and 
all the other personal ties, institutions, and organizations that bind individuals together across 
national boundaries, are infinitely weaker today than the forces that unite peoples within a 
particular national boundary and separate them from the rest of humanity.229  
The foregoing reasoning makes clear that realism and neorealism want to develop theories 
with great explanatory power. This is the result of positivism, which does not make a 
clear distinction between the social world and the world of physics. Unfortunately, the 
application of this positivist idea to IR leads to a gap between the theory (which omits 
religion) and the world (in which religion plays an important role).
Besides the fact that positivism longs for explanatory power, it also believes in a 
rationality that exists independent of context. Neorealism subscribes to this view. 
Neorealism understands rationality as independent of social and historical context, 
as well as any specific understanding of human nature or purpose (or ‘flourishing’). 
This has limited the idea of what good theories are in the first place, and restricted the 
attention paid to ideational factors like ideas, passions, aspirations, ideals, ideologies, 
belief systems, norms and collective identities.230
4.3.2. The Secularizing Impact of  Positivism and Behavioralism
Positivism led to the secularization of the impact of religion on IR, because religious 
concepts in IR became detached from the rest, sometimes suppressed, or replaced by 
new areligious concepts.231 Religion and ethics in fact did play a role in the field of 
International Relations. This changed, however, when positivism and behavioralism 
made their impact on the study of political science in the United States.232 This was 
driven, among other reasons, by the United States’ search for the most reliable knowledge 
to defeat the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In this context, positivism became 
applied to the study of world affairs, thus ‘scientizing’ the discipline. This process led to 
the behavioral revolution, and the application of concepts, theories and techniques of 
the social sciences to world politics.233 The disappearance of the initial religious influence 
and the dominance of positivism have resulted in a difference between classical and 
current rationalist IR, in that the latter is much more optimistic about the possibilities 
Foreign Policy in an Unjust World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 14; Burnett, Implications for 
the Foreign Policy Community, 293, 297-298. Burnett draws attention to the fact that Morgenthau revised many other 
elements of this chapter in later editions, but that he left this passage without change. Ibid., 305 fn. 25.
229 Ibid., 297-298. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 350.
230 Skillen, Three Zionisms, 88; Thomas, Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously, 825, 826; Thomas, The Global 
Resurgence of Religion, 59, 60, 158.
231 Barnett, Another Great Awakening?, 105; Hatzopoulos and Petito, The Return from Exile, 6, 12-14.
232 Behavioralism is a quantified approach to explain and predict political behavior which emerged in the 1930s. It is 
modelled after the natural sciences and claims to be objective and neutral.
233 Pettman, Reason, Culture, Religion, 2.
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of knowledge and the rationality of practice.234 
The original religious influence on IR can be described from a functional and a 
substantial perspective. From a functional perspective, it could be argued that the 
existing view in IR closely resembles the way in which religion, anthropologically 
defined, perceives and understands the world. For example, most representations of 
the state in history personify the state with bodily metaphors (cf. Paul’s Epistle to the 
Ephesians). Another example is the way in which the models and myths common to IR, 
such as the Westphalian system, resemble myths and models that are utilized by religion. 
With regard to substance, there are two ways in which religion has impacted IR: 
internally, through theology, and externally, through the application of various ethical 
traditions. The external, and most familiar, influence of religion on IR took place when 
various ethical traditions were applied to international relations issues. The fact that 
the application of ethical traditions from the outside was their most common way to 
relate religion and international affairs further demonstrates the generally assumed 
a-religiosity of IR.
The internal influence through theology – also called the religiosity, theology of IR – 
still pervades the existing discourse of IR, and explains why many present-day concepts 
have a religious connotation. As one of the religionists argues, in the history of ideas, the 
‘modern’ is only a recent concept. Until two hundred years ago, religions provided the 
dominant way of thinking, so many (postmodern) concepts and ideas have their roots 
in religious thinking. The stress on identity, for instance, the ‘insider’s perspective’, and 
the distinction between the inside and the outside have always been central to religion. 
Another example is the focus on consciousness instead of the outward appearances 
in phenomenology, which it derives from the preoccupation of religion with inner 
meaning. The same applies to hermeneutics, which originated in the schools of theology. 
Most tellingly for IR, so-called secular political systems represent themselves as identical 
to God’s omnipotence over humankind. In modern times, this happened when the 
doctrine of state sovereignty became sacrosanct, and the political world was seen as 
a pantheon of states. This refers to Carl Schmitt that the concept of state sovereignty 
shares similarity with belief in God.
Another more specific influence of theology on IR took place when the Protestant 
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr introduced the ideas of Augustine – and his interpretation 
of it – into IR. The theological ideas from Augustine included the idea of sin, the limits 
of human nature, human knowledge and politics, and the likelihood of irony or tragedy 
in political outcomes. These Augustinian ideas have also influenced Morgenthau. 
The tragic element of human action comes back in Morgenthau’s argument that the 
constellation of interests among actors and the drive for power will inevitably lead to sin. 
The idea that human knowledge is limited, which is derived from the belief that only 
God has full knowledge, can be found in the basic separation of the transcendent and 
234 Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 171.
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the actual in Morgenthau’s thinking. Niebuhr’s Christian-inspired realism influenced 
not only Morgenthau, but a whole postwar generation of scholars and politicians.235
The fact that this religious influence disappeared is the result of the fact that a 
religious and a positivist view were considered as irreconcilable on ontological grounds, 
namely in what each view acknowledges as ‘real’. While a religious view assumes the 
existence of a transcendental reality, this is difficult to accept for positivists, because 
this reality cannot be described in ordinary or scholarly language or subjected to 
scientific tests. Positivism holds religion in contrast with reason and not to be taken 
seriously. IR in the United States is still committed to this positivist scientific course. 
Even when Keohane wrote that the attacks of September 11 revealed the secular bias 
of mainstream theories of world politics, he did not overcome his positivism – for he 
suggested studying religion within a synthesis of existing approaches such as classical 
realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Approaches which the religionists 
often label as positivist and rationalist frameworks. As such, these theories cannot do 
more than de-legitimize ‘irrational’ religion by forcing it into their secular categories, 
even if they treat it as culture or identity.236  
There are religionists who admit that Waltz, in his book Man, The State and War, 
acknowledges the historical relevance of religion. They argue, however, that Waltz’s 
emphasis on the development of religion into secular values leads to the neglect of 
religion in the analysis of contemporary international politics.237 The religionists, 
in conclusion, consider it ironic that the influence of religion on realism led to the 
separation of religion and politics and the neglect of religion’s role in the pursuit of 
power and survival in the international system. This happened not because of religion’s 
irrelevance to IR, but because of a secularist bias within realist theory.238
4.3.3. Evaluative Comments
In the preceding section I presented the religionist assessment of positivism’s impact on 
how theories should look like, the meaning of rationality, and the impact of theological 
and religious ideas on concepts and theories within IR. Positivism not only disregards 
235 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 33; Kubálková, Towards an International Political 
Theology, 681; Luoma-aho, Political Theology, 298, 306; Luoma-aho, God and International Relations, x, 2, 51, 88; 
Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 170, 171; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 57. See also Nicholas 
Rengger, “On Theology and International Relations: World Politics Beyond the Empty Sky,” International Relations 27, 
no. 2 (2013): 141-144.
236 Barnett, Another Great Awakening?; 95; Wilson, After Secularism, 59; Kubálková, Towards an International Political 
Theology, 677, 680-683, 685; Kubálková, International Political Theology, 141, 142; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of 
Religion, 93-96; Tickner, On Taking Religious Worldviews Seriously, 224; Wilson, After Secularism, 59. It seems that the 
religionists sometimes extend the definition of positivism I presented at the beginning of this section by including more 
logical positivist elements, such as the strict belief that only statements that could be falsified or verified are cognitively 
meaningful. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 40.
237 Wilson, After Secularism, 69.
238 Ibid., 32, 54-56.
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interpretative theorizing, but it also neglects the significance of the context in which 
so-called rational actors operate. It therefore pushes IR to overlook the constitutive and 
formative role of religion on the behavior of actors. This tendency is strengthened by the 
fact that positivism disregards religious or theological explanations in favor of secular 
ones. And neglecting the influence of religion results in IR’s bias against the role of 
religion in the world.
It is striking that the religionists with respect to positivism, represent Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau as less secular than as discussed in Chapter 3. This is partly caused by 
the fact that some religionists are more critical about Niebuhr and Morgenthau than 
others. Nevertheless, the relatively arbitrary dealing with Niebuhr and Morgenthau is 
a good additional incentive to extensively discuss these thinkers in the next part of this 
dissertation.
Furthermore, I have drawn attention to the irony the religionists detected in the 
fact that the influence of realism led to the separation of religion and politics and the 
neglect of religion’s role in the pursuit of power and survival in the international system. 
They attribute this to ‘a secularist bias within realist theory’. It seems as if the religionists 
find it impossible that a decision is made on religious grounds to separate the influence 
of the political sphere from the religious sphere. Yet this is the case here. I mentioned 
this earlier as well, when discussing the Westphalian assumptions such as the role of 
the state and power as the national interest. According to the neosecularization theory, 
it is possible that secularization is not an anti-religious movement but a movement 
within religion, in this case Christian religion. Of course it is still possible to disagree 
with it, but this would require religious arguments, or in this case political-theological 
arguments. If one leaves the rhetoric ‘secular-versus-religious’ aside, this could lead to a 
more positive valuation of the emancipation of the political aspect in realism than the 
religionists adhere to.
4.4. Reductionist Tendencies  
In the rare cases that (neo)realists discuss religion, it is often not dealt with appropriately, 
because classical realists and neorealists tend to diminish the significance of religion. 
According to the religionists, this is because realism and neorealism reduce religion. 
This happens in two ways. In the first place, religion in IR is framed in a dualistic 
way. The result is that the institutional, individual, and irrational aspects of religion are 
privileged, while religion’s ideational, communal, and rational aspects are subordinated. 
In the second place, religion is reduced to ideology. 
To start with the first kind of reductionism, this is the result of secularism, which 
promotes a dualistic model in which religion is either institutional or ideational, rational 
or irrational, individual or communal. The use of this either/or model enables the 
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separation, subordination and exclusion of the communal, rational and ideational aspects 
of religion and the characterization of religion as primarily institutional, individual and 
irrational.239 
Religion is reduced to its institutional aspect when it is treated as a non-state 
actor, epistemic community, civilization, part of the societal or political sector, or a 
nongovernmental or transnational movement such as terrorism. From the perspective of 
rational choice, religion appears exclusively as an organization rather than a significantly 
different Weltanschauung. The institutional approach could be ascribed to the Judeo-
Christian experience that has influenced Western secularism, because institutions play a 
less prominent role in other religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. 
The reduction of religion to its irrational elements occurs when religion is addressed 
as a fundamentalist, extreme, radical or militant phenomenon instead of a normal 
part of the political process. Depicting religion as something irrational reinforces the 
necessity of separating religion and politics, because irrational influences disturb political 
stability and could create chaos in public life. That means that religion must be relegated 
to the private sphere for the sake of social cohesion. This understanding of religion, 
however, is inadequate, because not all public religions can be reduced to anti-modern 
fundamentalism. There are some forms of public religions that are, in Casanova’s words, 
‘counterfactual normative critiques of dominant historical trends, in many respects 
similar to the classical, republican, and feminist critiques.’240 
The reduction of religion to its ideational and individual aspects happens when 
religion is not defined as a community of believers, but as a body of ideas. In the ‘political 
myth of liberalism’, this redefinition of religion is necessary in order to legitimate the 
transfer of ultimate loyalty from religion to the state. The ‘political myth of liberalism’ 
implies that, over time, religion has become the value-laden domain of the affective, the 
irrational, of violence and intolerance, the unnatural, and the non-democratic, while 
laicism represents what is public, neutral and value-free. It is the modern secular state 
that has to save people from the horrors of modern wars of religion.241 When religion 
239 Ibid., 61, 63, 64. The religionists also mention the functionalist approach to religion as a form of reductionism, 
because it posits that any manifestation of religion in society is, in reality, some other force using religion. The Marxist 
argument that ‘religion is the opiate of the masses’ is a classic example of this way of thinking, Fox and Sandler maintain. 
Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 178. Another form of reductionism that the religionists 
discuss is simplification. This often happens in quantitative studies, if they do not leave out religion entirely. An important 
reason for this simplification is that scholars find religion hard to measure. This can be the result of lack of expertise, 
because there are seldom people that are experts in IR and religion, or because a truly accurate measure of religion would 
involve reading the minds of political actors to know their motivations. While this is impossible, most researchers choose 
not to measure religion at all, or include religion in a simplistic and therefore reductionist way. Ibid., 32; McDougall, 
Introduction, 160. Fox and Sandler discuss a quantitative approach to religion and international relations. Fox and 
Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 172-176.
240 Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 23; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 44.
241 Thomas wonders why killing to defend religion is categorically worse than killing to defend the modern state. He poses 
this question, on the one hand to draw attention to the commonly accepted hegemony of the state and on the other hand 
to make the point that the (alleged) ‘religious wars’ of early modern Europe were no more violent than the ‘secular wars’ 
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is redefined as an individual phenomenon, it becomes easier to separate politics and 
religion. This separation easily becomes privatization, because politics is exclusively 
concerned with public goods. Hugo Grotius played an important role in the creation of 
this myth, because he shifted from a social understanding of religion to a definition of 
religion as a set of privately-held beliefs. Thus Grotius insulated ethics from theology, 
which helped to overcome the conflicts resulting from religious pluralism among the 
states in Europe.
Approaching religion as a set of beliefs is reductionist, and does not describe the 
way religion has been lived in non-Western countries. In addition, the liberal definition 
is historically contingent, because it defines religion from the perspective of the secular 
and the secular is not a universal phenomenon. Finally, the liberal definition does not 
do justice to the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, in which 
people defended a sacred notion of community (as defined by religion), not a set of 
beliefs. Defining religion as a set of beliefs, religionists argue, is a typically modern – and 
historically inaccurate – reading of religion.242
Realism and neorealism reduce religion to an irrational, individual, and institutional 
phenomenon. In realism, all three forms of reduction are present in the work of 
Morgenthau, especially the assumption that religion is inherently irrational, as in his 
assertion that: ’[t]he passions of the religious wars yielded to the rationalism and the 
skeptical moderation of the Enlightenment.’243 Elsewhere, Morgenthau also seems to 
emphasize religion’s irrationality when he argues that traditional religions have been made 
obsolete by people’s ability to rely on themselves rather than on divine intervention. This 
realism considers religion inherently irrational and ordinarily productive of ‘passion’, 
and little else explains why realism only takes religion into account as a lever of power 
or as an ideology similar to fascism, communism, liberalism or capitalism. In this view, 
actors use such ideologies to conceal the reality of the power struggle that is the basis of 
international politics.244
The same reductionist thought has been adopted by neorealism. Neorealist theory 
of modern Europe. Thomas, Response: Reading Religion Rightly, 195.
242 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 9; Jonathan Fox, “Religious Discrimination: A World 
Survey,” Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 47; Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 
33, 36, 37; Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 682, 683; Kubálková, International Political Theology, 
141, 142; Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 151, 169; Shore, Religious Conflict Resolution, 23; Thomas, Taking 
Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously, 838; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 22-26; Wilson, After Secularism, 
64, 65. See also, Ron E. Hassner, “Religion as a Variable,” in Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research 
(University of Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 73. Religious communities, 
Laustsen and Waever argue, cannot be equated with other identity-based communities, because religious discourse does 
not defend identity or community, but the true faith and the ability to worship the right gods in the right way for the 
purpose of salvation. Laustsen and Waever, In Defense of Religion, 151, 152.
243 Wilson, After Secularism, 71.
244 Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 61; Farr, The Intellectual Sources of Diplomacy’s Religion Deficit, 279, 280; Wilson, 
After Secularism, 70, 71.
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also has the underlying assumption that religion, though it is considered historically 
significant, is a private, irrational and individual matter, and not relevant for the analysis 
of contemporary international politics.245
The tendency within IR to reduce religion to ideology is the result of the influence 
of the Cold War paradigm. During the Cold War, the two secular ideologies of 
liberalism (capitalism plus democracy) and communism competed with each other. 
Within this paradigm, international politics and the associated conflicts were analyzed 
and interpreted as a competition between these two secular ideologies. Because religious 
conflicts or symptoms were analyzed within this framework, the role of religion was 
overlooked. This is ironic, because IR claims to account for the whole world, but in fact 
it appears very much a product of its Western origins and perspective.246
According to the religionists, the reductionism of IR makes a significant impact 
when religion is seen as something irrational, individual or institutional. Although 
many religions have irrational, individual and institutional aspects, reducing religion to 
these aspects does not do justice to other elements, such as the communal, the rational 
and ideational. When the latter elements of religion are overlooked, it will lead to a 
distorted picture of religion in the world. That is also the case when religion is reduced 
to ideology as was the case during the Cold War, and is still the case to the extent that 
IR is stamped by this paradigm. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained that, according to the religionists, the ‘old paradigm’ 
suffers from philosophical limitations that make it difficult to take religion into account. 
I demonstrated that this relates to the paradigm’s social and cultural embeddedness 
(Enlightenment and modernization and secularization theory), ontology (materialism), 
epistemology (positivism), and methodology (reductionism).
It is striking that the religion scholars appear less critical on the paradigm’s 
assumptions than I found them to be in the previous chapter. Most presuppositions are 
criticized because they lead to ignoring religion. The religionists, in fact, only criticize 
the influence of the modernization and secularization theory because this in itself can 
no longer be maintained. In other cases, they only criticize the assumptions because they 
lead to a bias against religion. This creates the impression that the religionists mostly 
245 Ibid., 69.
246 Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, 20, 21; Tibi, Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis, 843. Religion 
was not completely absent from this conflict; for example, President Eisenhower saw and employed religion as a 
strong force against communism. Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy, 257-309; Sandal and Fox, Religion in 
International Relations Theory, 49. Thomas points out that Martin Wight gave a theological interpretation of the Cold 
War by depicting it as a conflict between two apostasies: liberalism as the apostasy of Christianity and Communism as 
the apostasy of Russian Orthodox Christianity. Thomas, Response: Reading Religion Rightly, 199-201.
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disagree with certain assumptions because they are not satisfied with their consequences 
for religion in IR theory. As I contended in the previous chapter, this weakens the stance 
of the religionists. As a result, the complete burden of proof lies with the question why 
religion is so important (first subthesis) that this should lead to the alteration of IR’s 
domain-specific assumptions (second subthesis) and philosophical starting points (third 
subthesis). I stated before that I believe the religionists did not succeed in convincingly 
showing that religion is important and distinctive to such an extent that it should lead 
to an alteration of IR theories.
A second notable matter is the religionist perception of the Christian realist Niebuhr 
and the classical realist Morgenthau. In the previous chapter, I observed that they were 
both classified as IR theorists who would consider Westphalia as the privatization of 
religion. In short, as advocates of the secular Westphalian system. However, in the 
present chapter, I found out that Morgenthau and Niebuhr were being described as IR 
theorists who, in the past, influenced IR theories from religious or theological starting 
points. The religion scholars find this ironic, and attribute the fact that religion is being 
ignored in the current IR to a secular bias. So there is a remarkable ambivalence with 
respect to their valuation of Niebuhr and Morgenthau. As I suggested before, it would 
be helpful to view Niebuhr and Morgenthau from the viewpoint of neosecularization 
theory, because it could show that their secularism is a theologically prompted secularism, 
and not necessarily an expression of animosity against religion. In the second part of 
this dissertation, I will aim at demonstrating that this perspective does more justice to 
Niebuhr and Morgenthau. 
Noteworthy, furthermore, is the ‘irreconcilable ontological difference’ the religionists 
see between positivism and religion. This seems to imply that one cannot simultaneously 
have a religious belief and be a positivist – in my view, a rather strange idea. I propose to 
make a distinction between positivism as a scientific position and the possible worldview 
related to it. This would mean that people can adhere to a positivist view on theory and 
at the same time acknowledge the fact that science is not the only source of access to 
knowledge about reality. For that reason, the religion scholars need arguments of a more 
philosophy of science nature to dismiss positivism.
The distinction between a scientific theory or stance and a worldview also clarifies 
the description of the influence of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment opinion that 
religion is something irrational does not mean that you cannot or should not study it. 
If such a conclusion would nonetheless be drawn (as is the case in modernization and 
secularization theory), it shows that the Enlightenment was not only a changing view 
on reason, but also a new conception of reality of a more ideological nature. If the 
Enlightenment as a worldview is distinguished from its views on religion, religion can 
still be taken seriously in a scientific way and be studied. In that case the Enlightenment 
need not lead to ignoring religion.
In the next part of this book, I will examine whether the issues I outlined in the 
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previous chapters apply to the cases of Morgenthau and Waltz. I will study their work, 
and ask the question of whether they were actually influenced by the Enlightenment and 
the modernization and secularization theory. In addition, I will research to what extent 
they subscribe to the materialist and positivist assumptions outlined above (in case of 
the assumption about the context-independent rationality this is only ‘tested’ on Waltz 
because the religionists do not accuse Morgenthau of this), and conclude by discussing 
possible reductionist tendencies regarding religion. All this will result in my assessment 
of the religion scholars’ critique of IR, and Morgenthau and Waltz in particular.
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Conclusion Part I: Contours of  a New Paradigm? 
What has the reconstruction of the critique of the old religion paradigm brought us so 
far? And do we already observe the contours of a new paradigm?
I aimed to display the position of the religionist scholars as convincingly as possible, 
and in such a way that their claim would effectively stand a chance in the field of current 
IR theories. This was a sometimes difficult task, because the religion scholars are not 
always accurate when referring to IR theories, and tend to formulate their criticism 
in a quite general manner. I have shown that differences between religionists can be 
detected, but rather as a unity in diversity. Ultimately, the differences between the 
religion scholars and mainstream IR are greater than the differences between religionists. 
But how convincing is the position of the religionists if we take the whole picture in 
consideration? I will evaluate this on different levels.
When it comes to the main thesis that IR should consider religion’s role in the world, 
it is important to realize that the religionists argue that IR theories should take religion 
more seriously and that it would be helpful to study the role of religion in international 
relations more thoroughly to support this integration. In other words, they do not only 
maintain that the establishment of religion and IR as a new subfield in IR is necessary, 
but also that this subfield should be instrumental to bringing religion in IR theory. 
Some religionists argue more strongly for the emergence of the subfield, while others 
are more focused on the integration in IR theory. In the latter case, most religionists 
want to add religion as a factor to explain international relations better, but sometimes 
there are also religionists that want to look at international relations through a religious 
perspective. This sometimes leads to a confusion what role religion is allowed to play in 
a scientific theory. I will discuss this more extensively in Chapter 9. In this dissertation 
I have drawn attention to the religious perspective through the introduction of the 
worldview level. Scholars have a worldview and this can be of a religious, quasi-religious 
or secular nature. In the next part, I will demonstrate that Morgenthau and Waltz’s 
worldview contains certain political-theological views that influence their theorizing. 
When looking at the empirical level, I come to the conclusion that the religion 
scholars assume a strong position, since they use numerous examples to show that 
religion plays a role in the world, which cannot be ignored by IR theory. They show 
they have an eye for the fact that religion is an undeniable aspect of reality, which also 
applies to international affairs. Their position simultaneously possesses a weakness. At an 
empirical level, the religion scholars are unable to explain why religion, in comparison 
with other factors, such as economy, power, military, demography, nationalism, etc., 
should be incorporated into IR theories. Their main point is to make clear that religion 
is present almost everywhere, but, in my opinion, they do not succeed in clarifying 
what exactly sets religion apart, other than that it concerns the transcendental. They 
are also unable to clarify to what extent religion should be integrated in IR. For that 
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reason, I have inserted a table of the various degrees in which the integration can take 
place at the end of this section. Also, some religion scholars want to add religion to 
the existing ‘variables’, whereas others strive for a completely new theory. In short, the 
religion scholars definitely have a point on the empirical level, but they are lacking 
persuasive power when talking about the theoretical relevance of religion if they want to 
convince current IR theory. If adding religion as a variable is not sufficient and a whole 
new theory is needed, the religionists involve so many potential points of disagreement 
that a long, very long debate is waiting and the result of it (for foreign policymakers) 
uncertain.
On the subject-specific level, I notice that the religion scholars do not just criticize 
the Westphalian assumptions because they lead to ignoring religion, but also because 
these assumptions themselves are not, or no longer, sustainable. They even propose an 
alternative interpretation of the assertion that Westphalia entails the privatization of 
religion. This double form of criticism strengthens their position, since it avoids the 
impression that they only criticize the sustainability of certain assumptions because of 
disregarding religion. 
The image is tilting on the philosophy of science level. The religion scholars come up 
with interesting points that could explain why religion is being ignored, but they only 
assess the modernization and secularization theory as no longer valid in itself. This makes 
their argumentation vulnerable, because why would certain assumptions have to be 
modified? That is only possible if the empirical necessity is convincingly shown, and, for 
instance, if certain assumptions on the subject-specific level that result from philosophy 
of science standpoints are no longer sustainable. The religionists, unfortunately, do not 
really clarify how subject-specific assumptions necessarily result from philosophy of 
science assumptions. In short, the religion scholars could significantly strengthen their 
stance. Nevertheless, I believe that currently sufficient material is present, partly because 
of my reconstruction, to examine to which extent their position holds up with respect 
to realism and neorealism. 
On the worldview level, I pointed out that the religionists reproach IR theory to be 
led by pre-scientific assumptions, but they are not free from this either. The religionists 
seem to refer to the influence of pre-scientific religious, and political assumptions when 
criticizing mainstream IR for its one-sided emphasis on religion’s irrational and individual 
aspects. They attribute this to the ‘political myth’ of liberalism which approaches religion 
as the domain of the emotional, irrational, violent, and intolerant where the state has 
to intervene to ensure peace and prevent religious violence. The term ‘myth’ can either 
refer to something that is not based on science-backed facts or to a larger story that is 
used to give meaning and coherence to a society. In both cases, the political myth serves 
as a worldview or pre-scientific belief, conviction or goal, the religionists make clear. The 
religionist Thomas points out that there is not only a liberal ‘creation myth’ present in IR 
theory, but also a liberal secular eschatology. In his view, (neo)realism believes and hopes 
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that anarchy creates like unites and that all states will become liberal states. As a result, 
a global culture of tolerance and respect will emerge limiting the possibility of war.247
On the other hand, I see indications for the influence of worldview preferences with 
the religion scholars themselves too. They seem to display a certain a priori enthusiasm 
about the resurgence of religion, using this to address the secularity of the IR field. It 
is known that many religion scholars have a Christian background. Sometimes I have 
the impression that this makes them negligent when it comes to criticism on certain 
theories, and makes them inclined to generalize theories and forgo distinctions between 
theories such as classical realism and neorealism.
Worldview assumptions also seem to play a role in the discussion about the 
definition of religion and the global resurgence of religion. When it comes to defining 
religion, there are scholars who hesitate to accept the fact that there is something like a 
supernatural being which exists independently of human beings. To what extent do they 
reject this because of theological or even personal convictions? And why do others stick 
to this notion in defining religion and make the supernatural so important? Do they 
want to be able to distinguish religion from ideology? Another issue is the definition of 
the global resurgence of religion. The fact that scholars suggest that the resurgence of 
religion is not empirically verifiable – it being primarily the result of scholars’ awakening 
–  reveals an ontological or epistemological position that remains implicit in the debate. 
Is religion something that only exists in the minds of people, or does it also involve beliefs 
or behavior which can be mapped out? When we look at the term resurgence itself, there 
are various cases in which it seems to be equated with the return of God in some way.248 
It should be noted here that this confusion is also inherent to the phenomenon religion 
itself, because as I set out in Chapter 1 religion is often a matter of personal conviction. 
Nevertheless, it would reinforce the position of the religionist scholars if they not only 
uncovered the worldview assumptions in IR theory, but also would be conscious and 
explicit about their own starting points. This could definitely further the debate. I am 
aware that this is not very easy. Scholars would possibly deny that they have deeper 
commitments, let alone that these commitments influence their academic work. This 
247 I take the idea of liberal eschatology from Thomas. Personal correspondence in 2018. 
248 I take this from Fitzgerald. Lecture of James L. Cox, ‘Religion without God: Methodological Agnosticism and the 
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177-184, 207-232. See also, Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (New York [NY]: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 54-71. There are a few book titles that give the impression that some religionists confuse religion with 
God. Chaplin and Joustra, God and Global Order: The Power of Religion in American Foreign Policy; Luoma-aho, God and 
International Relations; Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft, “God is Winning: Religion in Global Politics,” 
in Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion, eds. Paul A. Marshall, Lela Gilbert and Roberta Green (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Toft, Philpott and Shah, God’s Century.
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can definitely be the case. I think that, in particular when the topic is religion, exploring 
this worldview dimension might be helpful. The statement that someone does not have 
ultimate commitments or does not have pre-scientific assumptions that influence his or 
her work, is itself already worthy to discuss. 
Based on my evaluation of the four levels mentioned above, I believe that the 
religionists have a strong position, which is mainly because the sum of the different 
levels leads to an integral form of criticism. At the same time, the religionists, in my 
perception, have shortcomings on two crucial points: first, they have no clear view 
on theory and consequently how to ‘measure’ religion, and second, they are unable to 
deal with the fact that a Christian thinker like Niebuhr emphasizes the separation of 
religion and international politics, while they strive for integration. This latter point 
demonstrates that the religionists assume that if someone is religious, he or she would 
be in favor of religion’s involvement in politics or in favor of ‘more’ religion. That is, 
however, not necessarily the case. It can also be that someone is reluctant to involve 
religion, because of political-theological reasons, as we will see in the next part. I will 
first discuss the integral criticism and then the two points of critique.  
Establishing that religionists provide integral criticism was mainly due to my 
reconstruction; yet it was present in their thinking in principle. The religion scholars 
themselves do not clearly distinguish the philosophical, the domain-specific and 
empirical levels in their argument, let alone that they identify the correlations between 
these three levels. However, as I have indicated, the various levels are related to each 
other, because decisions on the philosophy of science level often influence assumptions 
within the specific field of IR. There is a strong link between, for example, a positivist 
conception of theory and materialism on the one hand, and state centrism on the 
other hand. When the ideal is to develop the simplest possible theory with maximum 
explanatory power, and at the same time it is assumed that, in the end, everything is a 
reflection of material factors, then it is understandable that this leads to a kind of realism 
in which non-state actors are ignored, let alone their ideological or religious motives.
In short, the criticism of the religion scholars relates to different interconnected 
levels. They show that ideally no contrast exists between the empirical experience and 
the scientific view, nor between the domain-specific assumptions and the philosophy 
of science. For example, the religion advocates criticize the positivist assumption that 
rationality exists independently of context, and that theories should have a maximum 
of explanatory power. They argue that theories are flawed if the historical appearance of 
certain factors is not taken into account. They criticize striving for maximum explanatory 
power because it creates a gap between theory and practice, as in for instance, the 
assumption that the state is the central actor. This simply does not match the image 
of the nation-state as we have it outside the theoretical ‘machine’. In other words, 
the religionists bring in the concrete and direct, that is, historical and policymaking 
experience which contradicts the theoretical way mainstream IR deals with international 
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affairs. According to the religion scholars, an ideal theory would avoid a gap between 
the direct experience and the theoretical assumption. The fact that the religionists not 
only criticize the lack of religion and what causes religion to be ignored, but that they 
also criticize these assumptions itself, makes their criticism a strong, integral form of 
criticism. 
My criticism is that religionists lack a clear view on theory, which becomes apparent 
when it concerns religion. According to the Amsterdam School of Philosophy, it is 
important to seriously acknowledge the fact that reality is diverse, and that, in order 
avoid reductionism, one has to account for multiple factors. The religion paradigm 
scholars, in fact, follow this in the extreme. As the encyclopedic presentation of religion’s 
role highlighted, religion is almost everywhere. The challenge is to make sense of all this 
in a theoretical way, because if religion is everywhere, it can easily be nowhere. 
This brings me to my other point, which is that the religionists do not know how 
to handle the fact that there is little attention for religion in the field of International 
Relations, despite the influence of religion and theology. They call it ironic that a 
Christian realist and theologian like Reinhold Niebuhr is reluctant to pay much 
attention to religion in politics. This is an understandable reaction, as they must see 
Niebuhr as a kindred spirit, since he is a Christian and a theologian, someone, therefore, 
you could expect to be ‘enthusiastic’ about religion. Niebuhr, however, reaches different 
conclusions than they do. His religious worldview, or political theology as I call it, 
makes him cautious to connect religion and international politics. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this evaluative section, I would also like to address 
the question: what are the contours of the new paradigm that the religion adherents have 
in mind? Yet the problem is that the religionists are not very clear in this respect. Some 
do have clear ideas about this, but they all differ in various ways. As I already illustrated 
in Chapter 1, the spectrum varies from Fox and Sandal who pursue the integration 
of religion in existing theories, to Kubálková who advocates a new subdomain called 
International Political Theology. Nevertheless, on the basis of the analyses given above, 
it seems to be possible to give a tentative outline of the new paradigm as they have it in 
mind. I see the following key elements:
Empirical level:
 (a)  As the name suggests, the religion paradigm explicitly wants to give attention to 
  the role of religion on different levels, namely the individual, transnational, 
  national, and international level. 
 (b)  It can be expected that they will include the fact that religion is often about 
  groups of people and communities of faith, especially in non-Western religions.
125
Domain-specific level:
 (c)  It will do so by asking attention in theorizing for more factors than the state.
 (d)  Because it advocates a different interpretation of Westphalia, it will seek a less 
  secular definition of the national interest. 
Philosophy of science level:
 (e)  The new paradigm will be based on a more interpretive theory, in which there is 
  room for the historical context (epistemological issue).
 (f )  This also includes a different approach to religion, in which the binary oppositions 
  as outlined above will be transcended (methodological issue).
 (g)  In addition, they will argue that the role of religion in the public debate is often 
  rational, and rather similar to the contributions of other beliefs (methodological 
  matter). 
 (h)  Finally, they will emphasize that religion is often not about institutions, but about 
  practices and supporting ideas to which people of faith adhere (methodological 
  issue).
Whether this, ultimately, will result in a whole new paradigm, a revision of the existing 
paradigm, or still something else remains to be seen. Religionists have reached no 
conclusion on this. In addition, it is helpful to also take note of the arguments of 
thinkers from the ‘old’ paradigm, as I will do in the next part. I would like to maintain 
the possibility that no adjustment is needed, or that there is enough room within the 
existing theories to take religion seriously. It may also well be that the Amsterdam School 
of Philosophy provides important elements for an approach which does justice to both 
paradigms.
Since I will assess the plausibility of the religionist position in the next section, it 
is important to know what I will be assessing, because the religionists sometimes have 
different views on what it means to incorporate religion or to what extent Westphalia leads 
to the neglect of religion. Besides that, the outcome of the assessment of Morgenthau 
and Waltz might not simply be a matter of ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but more ‘to what extent’. For 
that reason, I have set out below what are the options with respect to the outcomes of 
the assessment (see Figure I.1). 
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View on IR Minimum Medium Maximum
Empirical Religion is not perceived 
or not taken seriously 
enough
Religion is not 
consciously ignored
Religion is perceived Religion is observed 
in all its variety
Domain-specific Westphalian 





Religion is considered 
as a factor 




Social and cultural 
context, ontology, 
epistemology, and 







to religious or 
theological influence
Among others, 
based on religious 
or theological 
presuppositions
Worldview Secularism influences 




on influence of 
worldview 
Openness to the 
influence of one’s 
worldview
Active involvement of 
worldviews
Figure I.1. Assessment outcomes
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Part II: In Defense of  the Old Paradigm: ‘Augustinian Moments’ 
in IR
In the preceding part, I have set out what has been called the ‘religious turn’ in IR.249
Now the claims, statements, and underlying arguments that form the basis for the 
paradigm challenge have been made clear; the question is to what extent are they valid? 
Examining that is the aim of this second part. It answers the second research question: 
To what extent is this new group of scholars right in their criticism of two dominant 
theories, namely classical realism and neorealism? The answer to this question will be 
presented with respect to Morgenthau (Chapter 6) and Waltz (Chapter 8). My conclusion 
will be that the position of the religionists is based on insufficient argumentation. A 
majority of the arguments put forward by religionists to support the empirical, domain-
specific and philosophical subtheses do not apply to Morgenthau’s case, and a slightly 
smaller section of the arguments do not apply to Waltz’s neorealism. There are various 
reasons for this, but the most important one is that they overlook the influence of 
the fourth level, the worldview level. It appears that Morgenthau and Waltz subscribe 
to important Augustinian political-theological ideas and that their theories cannot be 
properly understood if these ideas are ignored. In other words, I ‘test’ Morgenthau’s and 
Waltz’s dealing with the ‘religious turn’ by tapping into the ‘theological turn’ in IR.250
What are these so-called Augustinian political-theological ideas, or ‘Augustinian 
moments’? What I mean is that the theological ideas of Augustine have affected the way 
Morgenthau and Waltz look at the world. This influence is caused by the way in which 
Reinhold Niebuhr rejuvenated the central ideas of Augustine and applied them to social and 
(international) political issues. In 1953, Niebuhr published an essay in which he described 
the distinctiveness of Augustine’s realism.251 In his intellectual autobiography, he stated:
I am, however, surprised to note in retrospect how late I was in studying the thought of Augustine 
carefully. The matter is surprising because the thought of this theologian was to answer so many of 
my unanswered questions and to emancipate me finally from the notion that the Christian faith 
was in some way identical with the moral idealism of the past century.252
249 I take this from Scott M. Thomas, “The Religious Turn Reconsidered,” Critical Studies on Security 4, no. 3 (2016): 
319-326.
250 See William Bain, “Anarchical Society as Christian Political Theology,” in Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary 
Challenges and Prospects, eds. Hidemi Suganami, Madeline Carr and Adam R. C. Humphreys (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 59-74; Gelot, Theological Origins; Vassilios Paipais, “Political Theologies of the International: The Continued 
Relevance of Theology in International Relations,” Journal of International Relations and Development 22, no. 2 (2019); 
Seán Molloy, Kant’s International Relations: The Political Theology of Perpetual Peace. (Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press, 2019); Jodok Troy, ed., Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory 
and Back (London; New York: Routledge, 2014).
251 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Augustine’s Political Realism,” in Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings, eds. Dennis 
Hoover and Douglas Johnston (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012), 97-108.
252 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Intellectual Autobiography,” in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. 
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Niebuhr considered Augustine ‘by universal acknowledgement, the first great realist in 
western history’.253 
There are scholars who see a comparable influence of Augustine on Morgenthau, 
although I think this probably went mainly through Niebuhr.254 Torbjørn Knutsen 
writes that ‘Morgenthau drew out the International Relations implications of Niebuhr’s 
writings.255 There are also differences regarding the manner in which Niebuhr processes 
Augustine’s ideas and the way in which Morgenthau and Waltz do, because it seems that 
Niebuhr’s Christian realism is quite different from that of Morgenthau.256 In Chapter 9, 
I will shortly discuss some differences between Morgenthau and Niebuhr in more detail. 
A lot less has been written regarding the influence of Niebuhr on Waltz, in contrast 
to the relationship between Morgenthau and Waltz. An exception is an article by Menno 
Kamminga, in which he argues that Niebuhr’s influence on Waltz is much larger than 
he himself claims and is usually assumed in IR theory.257 In Chapter 7, I will elaborate 
on this, because I believe that the continuity between classical political realism and 
neorealism is much larger than the discontinuity. Moreover, Waltz cannot be properly 
understood if the Augustinian moments are not taken into consideration. To give an 
example. If one reads the following paraphrase from Augustine from his major work The 
City of God, it is not difficult to see the similarities with Waltz’s way of reasoning.
The city of man, for all the width of its expansion throughout the world and for all the depth of 
its differences in this place and that, is a single community. The simple truth is that the bond of a 
common nature makes all human beings one. Nevertheless, each individual in this community is 
driven by his passions to pursue his private purposes. Unfortunately, the objects of these purposes 
are such that no one person (let alone, the world community) can ever be wholly satisfied. The 
Charles W. Kegley (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2009), 9. 
253 Niebuhr, Augustine’s Political Realism, 98. I came across this quote, and the preceding one, here. Gianni Dessi, “Reinhold 
Niebuhr and the Political Realism of Saint Augustine,” 30Days, no. 4 (2003), online available http://www.30giorni.it/
articoli_id_779_l3.htm (accessed December 28, 2020).
254 Willem Boerma, “Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971),” in The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine, 
eds. Karla Pollmann and Willemien Otten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1448-1450; Roger I. Epp, The 
Augustinian Moment in International Politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the Reclaiming of a Tradition (Aberystwyth: 
University College of Wales, 1991), 13; Alastair J. H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau,” The Review of 
Politics 58, no. 1 (1996): 81-107; Alastair J. H. Murray, Reconstructing Realism. Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan 
Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), 47-69; Daniel Rice, “Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A 
Friendship with Contrasting Shades of Realism,” Journal of American Studies 42, no. 2 (2008): 255-265; Bettina Dahl 
Soendergaard, “The Political Realism of Augustine and Morgenthau: Issues of Man, God and Just War,” Turkish Journal 
of International Relations 7, no. 4 (2008).
255 Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 241.
256 Soendergaard, The Political Realism of Augustine and Morgenthau; Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, 266-
289.
257 Menno R. Kamminga, “Structure and Sin: The Niebuhrian Roots of Waltz’s Neorealist Theory of International 
Politics,” Philica, no. 109 (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/11370/a3b12640-fd67-40a7-885e-c2505a9ae6af
(accessed December 28, 2020).
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reason for this is that nothing but Absolute being can satisfy human nature. The result is that the 
city of man remains in a chronic condition of civil war.258 
Epp argues that there are three themes in which Augustine’s influence can be found in 
political realism: history, human nature and ethics.259 I will shortly discuss these three 
themes, because it illustrates the manner in which Augustinian moments are visible in 
political realism.260 The fact that this Augustinian influence is generally unrecognized is 
caused by the often one-sided interpretation of political realism after the Second World 
War through the lens of the political realism of Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, 
as Alastair Murray notes, an Augustinian reading next to existing interpretations of 
Morgenthau offer the necessary missing pieces of the puzzle.261 
I have chosen to describe these three themes of history, human nature and ethics 
based on Niebuhr’s statements on the topic, because he translated Augustine’s ideas to 
International Relations. That means that I follow Niebuhr’s interpretation of Augustine 
and his translation of Augustine’s political realism to international politics. I do not 
discuss or assess to what extent Niebuhr does fully justice to Augustine.262 In the following 
chapters, I will describe the Augustinian themes in relation to Morgenthau and Waltz, 
who themselves do not account for their theological inspiration. Morgenthau once said 
in a faculty-club conversation that he did not need all the ‘metaphysical’ stuff ‘Reinie’ 
needed to come to a similar point.263 
According to Roger Epp, Augustinian political realism views history in a classical 
Christian way. In that vision, the concept eschaton plays a large role, which is an 
anticipated moment when the full meaning of life and history will be disclosed and 
presumptive human attempts at utopian culmination brought down. The telos of history 
lies beyond the temporal process. The consequence of this for politics is that for human 
problems no more than proximate solutions are available.264 
When it comes to human nature, the notion of sin plays an important role. 
Sin in the Augustinian tradition is not a defect of human nature, but a theological 
category, a rebellion against God in the form of inordinate love of self which has social 
implications.265 As a result of this, political power is ambiguous because it can be a 
remedy or an occasion for sin. According to Epp, the Augustinian notion of sin has a 
258 Aurelius Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Modern Library, 1950), Book XVIII, Chapter 
2. I took this from Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, 1. It should be noted that Epp gives quite a 
loose paraphrase of Augustine here.
259 Ibid. Epp also shows the influence on Augustine on the English School.
260 Ibid., 1.
261 Murray, The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau, 106. Murray also shows why other works fall short. Ibid., 81-83. Epp 
even talks about the reclaiming of a tradition. Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, front page.
262 I point at some different interpretations of Augustine in Section 9.3.5.
263 Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, 266 fn. 40.
264 Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, 9.
265 Ibid., 11, 12.
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critical purpose, because it challenges all signs of self-righteousness. Besides that, it also 
leads to realism, because a sense of the universality of sin and the partiality of human 
vision could enable a ‘decent justice’ to emerge.266
Ethics in an Augustinian sense as introduced by Niebuhr has everything to do 
with justice, order, and love. Love is the impossible possibility which was most fully 
exemplified in Jesus Christ. This sacrificial, non-resistant love is the principle of criticism 
under which every scheme of justice stands. Justice is the approximation of brotherhood 
under the conditions of sin which takes various forms in different times and places and 
requires some sort of balance of power. This would, however, always be in a dialectical 
tension with the ideal of love, because justice without the pull of love would degenerate 
into mere order. This does not mean that order is not important because order is needed 
to approximate justice, but order without justice could not long endure.267 
I started this section with the claim that Augustinian elements can be found in 
Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s political realism which bring to light that their theories build 
on theological concepts. This does not mean, however, that the following chapters will 
primarily deal with this theological influence. The main purpose of Part II is to analyze 
the degree to which religionists are correct in claiming that realism has ignored religion, 
and to map the ways in which religion plays a role in political realism. As illustrated 
above, to explain realism’s dealing with religion a few political-theological notes inspired 
by Augustine should be taken into account. That is why Part II has the following 
structure. I will start with a chapter in which I describe Morgenthau’s classical realism 
as I view it, based on his works. Naturally, I will also converse with other scholars, but 
my primary source is Morgenthau’s own work (Chapter 5). I present my interpretation 
of his theory in a separate chapter before I describe the degree to which he takes religion 
seriously in the subsequent chapter (Chapter 6). I will do the same regarding Waltz 
(Chapter 7 and 8). In these chapters, I will also show how the theological influence of 
Augustine, as already introduced briefly above, becomes apparent in their theorizing.
266 Ibid., 15.
267 Ibid., 16, 17.
Chapter 5
The Hidden Theology of  Morgenthau’s 
Classical Realism
Introduction
Theology and Morgenthau. That is not a very obvious combination. In my view, however, 
Morgenthau cannot be understood correctly without taking theology seriously. This is 
because Morgenthau’s classical realism is strongly influenced by theological ideas, and 
one needs to take these ideas into account to understand his theory of international 
politics. Not in the least because it appears that Morgenthau’s hidden theology accounts 
for the way he deals with religion.268 Because of the important role that theology plays in 
Morgenthau’s theory, I start this chapter with a section in which I describe his political 
theology.  
To what extent do religionists justice to Morgenthau’s classical realism? The 
religionist’s references to Morgenthau are often very general, using terms like ‘realism’ or 
‘realists’, and they seldom refer to specific books or literature. They do not provide a clear 
picture of their understanding of Morgenthau’s theory. Because of this, I pay extensive 
attention to the way I understand Morgenthau’s classical realism and the sources I use. 
I interpret Morgenthau’s theorizing through the lens of his six principles of political 
realism. My starting point is that Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, more specifically 
his six realist principles in Chapter 1, can be considered as an overview of his classical 
realism. Even then the question remains how certain passages have to be interpreted in 
268 That means that I position Morgenthau in line with Murray. He argues that the conventional opinion is that realism 
is an amoral or immoral approach to international politics. Current revisionist literature has sought to overcome this, 
but they tend to interpret realism – including Morgenthau – as incoherent. Murray shows on the basis of the study of 
historical texts that realism is a coherent and unified tradition of political ethics, and argues for an alternative reading of 
realism, namely that of Augustine and the tradition of Christian realism, instead of the traditional reading which includes 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. Murray, Reconstructing Realism, 11-13. Williams explains the background of the 
renewed attention for realism and Morgenthau. Michael C. Williams, “Introduction,” in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy 
of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5-9.
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light of other writings. That is why I also include other publications by Morgenthau in 
my representation of his classical realism. 
Next, I explain why it is justified to primarily base Morgenthau’s classical realism on 
his Politics Among Nations, and within that work, his six principles. Then I will argue that 
Morgenthau’s classical realism is more a set of assumptions than a theory in the strict 
scholarly sense of the word. Subsequently, I will illustrate that Morgenthau’s classical 
realism forms a consistent whole and that there is no such thing as two Morgenthaus: a 
young realist and an older idealist. Before I elaborate on the six principles of Morgenthau’s 
realism, I will argue that the order of the six principles is not arbitrary, because one flows 
naturally from the other and they all presuppose one another. 
5.1. ‘Augustinian Moments’ in Morgenthau’s Classical Realism
In Chapter 1, I set out that IR theories are mostly composed of an empirical, domain-
specific and philosophical level. I also stated, however, that there is a fourth level, 
the worldview level, which often influences the other levels. This is clearly visible in 
Morgenthau’s theory and his theory of international politics cannot be understood 
properly if this worldview level is not taken seriously. My claim is that Morgenthau’s 
worldview contains ideas about human nature, history and ethics, which are built on 
theological ideas. The exclusion of Morgenthau’s political theology and the corresponding 
Augustinian elements leads to an imbalanced and incomplete vision on Morgenthau’s 
classical realism and on the role of religion, which I will discuss in the following chapter. 
For that reason, I will start this chapter with these political-theological ideas concerning 
the human person, ethics and history and then discuss how this shaped his theory.269
It should be said that Morgenthau himself did not write much about theology. As 
I quoted earlier, he once said that he did not need all the ‘metaphysical’ stuff ‘Reinie’ 
needed to come to a similar point. This does not mean, however, that it does not play 
a role. The problem is, however, as with Waltz that he did not actively reflect on it even 
though some of his vocabulary and core ideas are indebted to theology. In order to 
fully understand Morgenthau’s political realism, it is important to draw attention to 
these ideas. For example, Morgenthau did not use the term katechon, but the idea is 
presupposed in his political theology. In this first section, I will provide a picture of the 
hidden theology of Morgenthau’s classical realism. It is ‘hidden’, because Morgenthau 
himself did not pay much attention to it. However, to understand Morgenthau correctly 
we need this missing piece of the puzzle in order to have a clear picture of his thinking. 
Since it is a hidden theology, my sketch will be based on some writings of Morgenthau, 
269 In the introduction to Part II, I maintained that the influence of Augustine on Morgenthau took place mainly through 
Niebuhr. I will discuss this in Chapter 6 in more detail when I deal with the religionist argument that the influence of 
theology has vanished over time. 
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but mainly on secondary sources.  
As said, the Augustinian moments in Morgenthau become part of his theory by way 
of his political theology. According to Nicolas Guilhot, Morgenthau’s political theology 
challenges rationalist conceptions of politics, and the enlightened assumption of liberal 
modernity that politics can be freed from religion.270 For example, Morgenthau assumes 
that there is a transcendent reality, and that knowledge regarding reality cannot only 
be garnered through science (the ratio) but also by means of philosophy and religion. 
As I will explain later in this chapter, for Morgenthau science, religion, and philosophy 
are equal reactions to the shock of wonderment. Morgenthau makes a principal 
distinction between the human reality on the one hand and the transcendent or divine 
reality on the other, even though they influence each other. This vision correlates with 
Morgenthau’s vision on human beings, their limited capabilities, but also the tendency 
to cross the boundaries of their knowledge (in science) and capabilities (in politics), 
due to hubris. According to Morgenthau, ‘Western man has eaten from the apple of 
knowledge and wants to be more than he actually is. He wants to become like God. 
But the tragedy is that his condition does not allow for his aspirations.’271 In another 
place, Morgenthau writes that in the Western world, the sinfulness of man is conceived 
as necessarily connected with the order of the world. The result of that is that there is 
no inevitable progress toward the good, but an undecided conflict between good and 
evil.272 This vision, in turn, has consequences for Morgenthau’s view on time and history. 
Morgenthau assumes that human time or history is surrounded by God’s time. The 
destination of history will eventually not be realized by people, but by God. 
Religiously founded justice will fully reveal itself only in the other world when, according to 
Christian dogma, at the Last Judgment God will separate the just from the unjust. Justice will 
then be done, it must be noted, not only because God is Love, but also because He is omniscient, 
knowing all the hidden facts that bear upon the decision, and because He is all-powerful, being 
able to make justice prevail in fact.273
The concept katechon plays a central role in this vision. Guilhot explains that the word 
katechon refers to the second epistle of Paul to the Thessalonians wherein Paul seeks to 
curb the eschatological enthusiasm of the local Christians, which threatens to disrupt 
public order. Katechon is often translated with ‘restrainer’, ‘delayer’ or ‘withholder’ and 
functions as the mundane force that delays the arrival of the Antichrist, the lawless one 
that would precede the return of Christ.274 Katechon, in fact, delays the establishment of 
270 Guilhot, American Katechon, 226 .
271 Hans J. Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master? (New York: New American Library, 1972), 8, 9.
272 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 204-206.
273 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Justice and Power,” Social Research 41 (Spring, 1974): 167.
274 Guilhot, American Katechon, 234.
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the kingdom of God by fighting chaos and maintaining order until the day comes which 
makes history possible; it does not want to bring the kingdom of God in a progressive or 
teleological sense. This political theology makes it possible to have a de-theologized form 
of politics, because it embodies a politics that does not want to accomplish eschatological 
goals. It provides a sort of middle-range theory by avoiding the illusion of both absolute 
perfection and absolute evil and puts politics on realistic grounds that make it immune 
to utopian cues. This so-called third position is at the heart of the realist position about 
morality and politics.275  
The concept katechon therefore has an ambiguous side. It prevents the Antichrist, 
the radical evil, but it also prevents the parousia, the second coming of the Messiah. In 
that sense, it maintains evil: it restrains evil by tolerating it. To understand this better, it 
helps to look at Carl Schmitt’s vision on history. It is not without reason that I introduce 
Schmitt here, because Morgenthau wrote his dissertation on Schmitt’s concept of the 
political. Schmitt wonders how it is possible that eschatological belief on the one hand, 
and historical consciousness and political action on the other, can ever go together. If 
you really expect the end to be near, it takes away any meaning from history, leading to 
an eschatological paralysis of which there are many historical examples. But for Schmitt, 
the katechon is precisely the force that has to keep off this eschatological paralysis. He 
states that the katechon  functions as a bridge between an eschatological vision and a 
political understanding of history. According to Schmitt, the katechon is necessary as 
some sort of gatekeeper to safeguard a political form of historical consciousness while at 
the same time maintaining an eschatological perspective (even if it is only to intensify 
the consciousness of the danger of such a perspective).276 
That is exactly the role the katechon  fulfills, as a force restraining the end and making relative 
evil possible by suppressing its radical counterpart. The katechon is thus the gatekeeper between 
a profane and political understanding of history on the one hand and the dangerous illusion of 
salvation through the final struggle of humanity on the other. It is the bridge between eschatology 
and historical conscience. It is the minimal rest of an eschatological vision needed to keep history 
and theology apart and to maintain an open and profane understanding of history. The image of 
the katechon is very ambiguous, however. Although it only makes sense within an eschatological 
view on history, it functions in such a way as to keep off the detrimental effects of eschatological 
ideas on human political affairs. Indeed, the katechon is what makes the political as such possible. 
Its polemical aim is to ward off the idea that humans can definitively judge over the world, history, 
and morality and announce the end of history. The political is conditional on such a refusal of the 
theologization of history.277 
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Epp states that the acceptance of the lesser evil to prevent apparently greater ones, 
is a distinctive Augustinian idea which the realists often express in words like ‘love’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘justice’, and ‘order’.278 As I will explain later, Morgenthau takes the 
moral significance of politics seriously, but wants to be realistic about the application of 
moral principles. For this reason, he introduces three rules, namely that context should 
be taken seriously, that the tension between morality and politics should be kept in place, 
and that practical wisdom, or prudence, is required to deal with this tension. It is not 
without reason that Morgenthau’s realism is presented as an alternative to idealism and 
that he is critical about liberal Protestantism as regards its beliefs of progress, perpetual 
peace, or the unification of humankind as something that can be achieved in history. 
Morgenthau believes that hostility cannot be eliminated from this mundane world, 
which is bound to remain juxtaposed.279 With this political theology, Morgenthau’s 
realism created a bulwark against the moral self-sufficiency which characterized political 
modernity with its worrying replacement of politics with technology, a fundamental 
indifference for values, and the deficiency to make political judgments. The realist insists 
on concrete situations, the material dimensions of power, and the limited nature of 
political aims. It avoids a simplistic view of politics by emphasizing its finite nature, but 
creates room to make political decisions even in the absence of absolute justifications.280
Morgenthau’s political theology effects a number of issues, such as the role of the 
state, the autonomy of the political, the separation between religion and politics, and the 
role of (the balance of ) power. Morgenthau’s political theology holds that the sovereignty 
of the state is essentially defined by its transcendent relation to the law and that the state 
can never be truly neutral. A state that is completely contained within the rule of law is 
a fully secularized state, because it operates on the basis of concepts whose theological 
roots are concealed by a positivist legal ideology. To prevent the secularization of the 
state, Morgenthau opposes a strict separation between religion and politics, because a 
strict separation would mean that the political would come to an end. It implies that 
the state would become a fully secularized body that sees itself as self-grounding, and 
which would deny that its legitimacy is ultimately based on revelation and not reason. 
It is against this theological background that Morgenthau argues for the autonomy of 
the political and the central role of the state, because his political theology provides a 
foundation for the legitimacy of concrete territorial ordering. The autonomy of the 
political is premised on the historical constitution of a territorial order which is distinct 
from, but closely related to, the moral order as developed in Western Christendom 
and the ecclesial institutions of Christianity. When secularization proceeds, the state no 
longer sees itself in relation to this Christian and moral background and it conflates its 
own interests with morality as liberalism does; secularization would give rise to political 
278 Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, 16.
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religions. Because of this, Morgenthau sees the autonomy of the political and the state 
as legitimate holder of this autonomy, as a historical counterforce to chaos and the 
historical unfolding of secularization.281  
The political theology behind realism also explains why Morgenthau argues for 
a balance of power. He sees it as a way to restrain attempts that try to accomplish 
eschatological goals; moreover, it maintains order and prevents chaos. The possible 
absence of a katechon in international politics was one of Morgenthau’s concerns.282 It 
is important to realize that the balance of power was seen by Morgenthau as a principle 
that could flourish within the Western European context with a shared moral horizon, 
‘moral climate’, ‘moral standards of conduct’, values which placed limitations on warfare, 
and disconnected state interests from issues of morality.283 This means that the concept 
of the balance of power cannot easily be applied to any other situation, because it comes 
from a very specific, and maybe historically unique, European situation.284 When this 
moral horizon disappears and states detach politics from its religious background, it will 
give rise to nationalism which comes close to ‘an expansive religion’, and a force with 
‘many messianic facets’.285 
[C]arrying their idols before them, the nationalistic masses of our time meet in the international 
arena, each group convinced that it executes the mandate of history, that it does for humanity 
what it seems to do for itself, and that it fulfils a sacred mission by ordained providence, however 
defined.286 
The root cause of the emergence of this messianic nationalism was, according to 
Morgenthau, secularization. Morgenthau’s critique of liberalism internationalism is a 
critique of radical secularization which leads to moral abstractions, legal globalism and 
humanitarianism.287  
5.2. Politics Among Nations as the Centerpiece of  Morgenthau’s 
Classical Realism 
Before I describe Morgenthau’s political realism in more detail, I would like to explain 
why I base my description of Morgenthau’s classical realism mainly on Morgenthau’s 
281 Ibid., 234. 
282 Ibid., 235, 236.
283 Ibid., 237, 241.
284 Ibid., 237.
285 Ibid., 242.
286 Ibid., 243. 
287 Ibid., 243.
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magnum opus, Politics Among Nations, which he first published in 1948.288 Morgenthau 
starts all its later editions with the sentence: ‘This book purports to present a theory of 
international politics’.289 Chapter 2 starts with the sentence: ‘This book has two purposes. 
The first is to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among 
nations, and second to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon each other 
and upon international political relations and institutions.’290 Morgenthau’s research 
assistant Kenneth Thompson who completed the sixth edition of Politics Among Nations 
after Morgenthau’s death, states that Morgenthau himself took it for granted that most 
discussions about his philosophy considered this book as a summation of his worldview. 
He also argues that Morgenthau considered Politics Among Nations as a book apart from 
his other works. This appears from the fact that his two other books, Scientific Man 
Versus Power Politics and The Purpose of American Politics, lack any reference to Politics 
Among Nations.291  
Another reason to focus on Politics Among Nations to describe and understand 
Morgenthau’s classical realism is that Morgenthau worked on the book for the most of 
his academic life, with the result that it reflects most of his thinking and discussions he 
had with others, most importantly his students and his research assistant Thompson. 
Thompson states that: ‘It would be no exaggeration to say his classroom experiences 
were trial runs for the final draft of Politics. He took his students’ questions very much 
to heart.’292 According to Christoph Frei, who wrote an intellectual biography about 
Morgenthau, there is no document that reflects Morgenthau’s theorizing better than 
Politics Among Nations. Frei argues that Morgenthau announced the book as early as 
1933 and kept renewing the announcement in the years after. In 1937, Morgenthau 
already wrote: ‘The project occupies myself since the beginning of my scientific activities, 
that is to say since 1927.‘293 In 1938 he wrote: ‘The project I hope to realize with the aid 
of a fellowship I have been working on since 1927, and all my preceding publications 
touch one or another of the problems with which this project deals.’294 In the preface of 
this second volume, Morgenthau stated that ‘When this book was written in 1947, it 
summarized an intellectual experience of twenty years.’295  
Lastly, Politics Among Nations has been the ‘field’s most influential textbook’ and 
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one of the key books on most literature lists at American universities for decades.296 As a 
result, Politics Among Nations has become a book through which people, the religionists 
too, primarily know about and understand Morgenthau’s classical realism. Taking Politics 
Among Nations as starting point in this chapter creates a common frame of reference 
which makes it is easier to discuss the validity of the religionist position.
The fact that I take Politics Among Nations as the basis to describe Morgenthau’s 
classical realism, does not mean that I will leave his other books and writings out. I will 
involve these, but always in relationship to Politics Among Nations as the summation 
of Morgenthau’s worldview. That is also why I use the sixth edition of Politics Among 
Nations, because in this version Thompson introduced ‘wherever possible fragments of 
Morgenthau’s own writings’.297  
5.2.1. Politics Among Nations and the Six Principles of  Political Realism
Within Politics Among Nations, I consider Chapter 1 as foundational for the whole 
book and all Morgenthau’s other works. One important reason is that Morgenthau 
added this as the first chapter to his second edition, in order to respond to some of the 
criticism of his work and it remained the first chapter of his book in all later editions.298 
According to a leading realist, Robert Gilpin, this happened because Morgenthau 
realized when he moved to Chicago that if he wanted to make an impact, he would 
have to learn and write about social science, as the social sciences were very dominant 
there.299 Another consideration is that other scholars also interpret the six principles  as 
foundational.300  
The risk of presenting Morgenthau’s classical realism on the basis of his six principles 
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is that his classical realism becomes interpreted too narrowly and that it would not 
do justice to the ‘subtlety and depth of his thinking on politics’, as Anthony Lang 
correctly states.301 For this reason, I will also involve Morgenthau’s other writings when 
interpreting his six principles, but I will stick to the six principles as the starting point. 
I will also use the six principles to structure my presentation of Morgenthau’s classical 
realism, because I believe that the sequence of the principles represent an important 
structure which is crucial to understand Morgenthau’s classical realism adequately.  
5.2.2. Morgenthau’s Realism: A Theory or Set of  Assumptions? 
My presentation of Morgenthau’s classical realism is based on the assumption that 
Morgenthau is much more a political philosopher and practical thinker rather than a 
theorist. Morgenthau put his most important assumptions and theoretical principles 
in his Politics Among Nations, but he never presented a coherent and consistent theory. 
Large parts of his work are about practical foreign policy issues, while other parts are 
more philosophical. Although much of his work is about theory and the task of political 
science, he himself never developed a full-blown theory. It might even be hard to call 
his six realist principles an embryonic theory, as Waltz likes to do, because most of his 
writings are of a political-philosophical nature. Morgenthau’s principles provide a loose 
framework, a way of seeing the world. It is a set of assumptions about the human person 
and society.302 Morgenthau’s six realist principles are an attempt to formulate some 
guiding principles, informed by realist political philosophy and history for the practice 
of international politics.303 By doing so, as Waltz correctly points out, Morgenthau 
did not distinguish between foreign policy and international politics.304 The fact that 
Morgenthau himself uses the term ‘theory’ and that he writes much about the function 
and meaning of political theory does not diminish the fact that his classical realism is a 
set of assumptions rather than a theory. Rosenthal refers to Michael Smith who states 
that ‘realism was more than a theory: it was an expression of a set of beliefs.’305 That 
Morgenthau used the term theory, should be seen against the background of his time 
and the attempt to secure room for an alternative theory, over against positivism and 
behavioralism.306 I will use the term theory in this chapter but understood in a much 
broader meaning, namely as a coherent set of ideas, principles or assumptions. 
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5.2.3. Different Morgenthaus?
Scholars differ how to read and interpret Morgenthau’s classical realism. In 2009, 
Duncan Bell states that:
[T]here is little agreement on the character of his political vision. We now have almost as many 
Morgenthaus as there are interpreters of him, and he has been presented as everything from an 
arch-conservative to a critical theorist.307
I do not think that things are as bad as Bell claims here, but I do see that Morgenthau 
is interpreted in different ways, or that people perceive different Morgenthaus. There 
are scholars who argue that Morgenthau’s classical realism was not consistent over time 
and that there are two Morgenthaus: a conservative and realist, and an idealist and 
progressive.308 
I agree that Morgenthau’s writings indeed give the impression that he becomes more 
idealistic and normative in later years, but I disagree that this justifies the conclusion 
that his thinking has fundamentally changed. In my view, there is one Morgenthau who 
developed some basic assumptions about international politics. These assumptions did 
not change fundamentally over time, but the context in which he operated changed to 
such an extent during his life that he was challenged to emphasize certain aspect of his 
theory over others depending on the context.309 I would like to support this argument 
with the view of Campbell and Frei on this.  
Campbell states that Morgenthau tried to integrate his new understanding of 
international politics into his old framework. Campbell correctly states that this does 
not mean that he is embracing the idealist or utopian way of thinking. He argues, 
instead, that the prospect of nuclear war led Morgenthau to a merging of idealist and 
realist approaches. The reason for this was social pressure, which was lacking before, but 
could now generate political pressure to make a world state possible.310 In other words, 
Morgenthau does not embrace the liberal and optimistic view that states, because of 
enlightened self-interest will create international organizations or a world state. On the 
contrary, it is because of an external threat and the will to survive that there is sufficient 
social pressure to propose a world state. So, Morgenthau sticks to his realist assumptions, 
but adjusts these in light of security threats on a planetary scale.311 
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On the page where Frei points out that Morgenthau suddenly seems to switch 
positions, he also points out that Morgenthau had developed certain ideas during his 
earlier Germans years, which he brought forward later in the American context. Frei 
argues that The Purpose of American Politics is a continuation of Morgenthau’s idealist 
past, because Morgenthau had developed the system of transcendent idealism thirty 
years earlier. Frei especially refers to Morgenthau’s well-known dualism, meaning that 
the is had to be confronted with the ought to be. Morgenthau already wrote about this in 
1937 in an essay with the title Kann in unserer Zeit eine objective Moralordnung aufgestellt 
werden?. Frei even goes so far as to state that what Morgenthau wrote in The Purpose of 
American Politics, was just a continuation of what he had written in earlier manuscripts 
in the 1930s. He resumes his old polemic against a secular ethics that does not take into 
account the absolute, a transcendent order of the good, the true and beautiful. The only 
difference is that his enemies are not Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) or Ernst Jünger 
(1895-1998), a German conservative writer who wrote Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis, 
but the government and the people of the United States, Frei states.
Another interesting similarity between Morgenthau in the 30s and 60s is that 
Morgenthau is not very interested in the specific content of ultimate values, because 
these would depend on the particular circumstances of that time and place. His main 
purpose is to defend the meaning and relevance of transcendent values as such. ‘Plato’s 
ideas, the moral law in the Bible, the various expressions of the natural law tradition, 
these are all historically and socially conditioned approximations to a timeless normative 
reality’, Morgenthau maintains.312 This means that it does not do justice to state that 
there are two classical realist theories of Morgenthau. It would be more precise to argue 
that there is a realist and a more idealist Morgenthau, but that both elements are integral 
to his classical realism. In the words of Murray, Morgenthau’s realism offers a coherent 
approach which retains a commitment to moral universalism, while recognizing the 
essential location of morality within community. Its core is to reconcile the ideal and 
real in international politics.313 It is often the context that makes his idealism or realism 
come to the forefront. The following considerations sustain this point.
In the first place, as William Scheuerman points out, at the time of Morgenthau 
political scientists in the United States increasingly tended to separate normative and 
empirical concerns and as a result they ran off with the empirical realist and tried to 
develop empirically testable hypotheses. The result was that Morgenthau was interpreted 
as a power-politics advocate, who as Kenneth Waltz argues later, failed to develop a 
value-free and scientific theory of international politics. The result was, as Scheuerman 
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sets out, that Morgenthau became the ‘unhappy founding father of an influential, but 
normatively numb Realist research paradigm’.314 Scheuerman argues that Morgenthau 
always has been an uneasy realist, he only adopted the label realism quite late in his 
career. It was only in the second edition of Politics Among Nations and in his In Defense 
of the National Interest (1951) that he labeled his thinking as realist. Scheuerman also 
writes that political theory in the US was a different discipline compared to empirical 
IR.315
Secondly, Morgenthau was not just a political philosopher, his aim was also to detect 
and analyze the underlying reasoning of decision-makers: to eliminate ‘faulty modes 
of thinking’ and to influence American political thought.316 This is also reflected in 
Morgenthau’s writings, Frei argues. In all Morgenthau’s works since 1948, which include 
the two monographs In Defense of the National Interest (1951) and A New Foreign Policy 
for the United States (1969), hundreds of articles, and lecture notes, Morgenthau is 
commenting on American foreign policy issues.317  
Morgenthau’s dual role as theorist and commentator on foreign policy has two 
consequences. It forced Morgenthau to reflect on the practical consequences of his 
theorizing and it also forced him to change his position sometimes. Frei points out 
that when Morgenthau became aware that Washington elites were more than willing 
to play the power game on the basis of political realism, he became deeply concerned 
by the one-sided emphasis on military might. He wrote: ‘We seem to have learned our 
lesson now’ and he became convinced that a corrective from the opposite direction was 
needed.318 So, Morgenthau became aware of the consequences his political realism had 
in policymaking circles, in other words, there was a growing discrepancy between what 
Morgenthau propounded and others implemented. When Morgenthau tried to correct 
this, many thought that Morgenthau had changed, but the difference was in policy not 
in his theory.319 In other words, Morgenthau could emphasize other elements of his 
theory to correct one-sided policymaking, but this does not mean that he changed his 
theory. 
The other consequence of the fact that Morgenthau philosophized about 
international politics, but also commented on foreign policy, was that Morgenthau had 
to balance between his wish for theoretical consistency and his responsibility for good 
foreign policy. The outcome of this process could be interpreted as an inconsistency 
of his theoretical assumptions or as an adjustment of it. Campbell illustrates this with 
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Morgenthau’s position on the world state. He argues that Morgenthau was not against 
a world state, but in 1948, he did not believe a world state was realistic in a world 
dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Taking his role as public intellectual seriously, Morgenthau concluded that it was necessary 
to emphasize this opinion to his more idealistic compatriots, to focus intensively upon the 
impossibility of world government, lest they become enchanted with world government, pursue 
it in lieu of a balance of power, and end up committed to a toothless international organization 
vulnerable to the domination of a cynical and militaristic state.320 
It was the context which made that Morgenthau argued against a world state. He saw 
Stalin’s Soviet Union as a cynical and poor partner in working towards global government. 
The fact that the possibilities were so low and the risks of failure high, made his notion 
of the world state, as put forward in Politics Among Nations, speculation; even though 
it logically followed from his argumentation as the chapter titled ‘The World State’ 
shows.321
Finally, Morgenthau’s theorizing has a flexibility and an ability to adapt to new 
situations without sacrificing its basics.322 The consequence is, however, that Morgenthau’s 
application of his theory to new situations could be interpreted as a change of his 
theory. As I already explained, it was not so much a change of his theory, but rather that 
Morgenthau saw the result of his theorizing and wanted to correct this by emphasizing 
other aspects of his thinking. In that sense, it helps to see Morgenthau, as Scheuerman 
proposes, as an ‘uneasy realist’. 
Unsatisfied with conventional interpretations of the tradition and its intellectual forerunners and 
at times unsure whether his work should even be described as a contribution to it. To his enormous 
credit, he at least occasionally acknowledged that Realism, as generally conceived, was poorly 
suited to some of the novel challenges of our times. Although this exegesis will surprise many 
readers, it offers not only a more accurate, but also a theoretically more fruitful, interpretation of 
Morgenthau’s far-flung and admittedly sometimes tension-ridden writings.323 
 In this section, I have argued why I will base my presentation of Morgenthau’s classical 
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have also set out that there is one Morgenthau with one theory, although he emphasizes 
various elements of his theory depending on the context, audience, and time. In the 
next section, I will set out the relevance of the sequence of Morgenthau’s six principles.
5.2.4. The Relevance of  the Sequence of  the Six Principles  
In the second edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau called his position on 
international politics realism. His standpoint as realist must be seen over against the 
other school, called idealism at the time. The latter’s point of departure was, Morgenthau 
writes, the conviction that a rational and moral order based on universally abstract 
principles can be realized in the here and now. It believes in the essential goodness and 
the infinite possibility of change of human nature. It blames the social order, social 
institutions, the depravity of certain groups, or isolated individuals for not following 
rational standards, and it relies on education reform and the scarce use of force for the 
realization of its goals. Realism starts from the opposite perspective, and states that the 
world is imperfect, and that improvement of the world will only be possible by taking 
into account these imperfect forces. Moral principles will never be fully realized and 
can only be approximated through the balancing of interests. Realism takes history as 
a guidance more than abstract principles and sees the lesser evil as a more realistic goal 
than the absolute good.324  
Morgenthau introduces six principles as the tenets of his political realism. I believe 
that the sequence of the principles is important, because it starts with the principle that 
there are objective laws which have their roots in human nature, and then the book 
continues to explain what the rational principle in politics is, according to realism. So, 
Morgenthau first wants to argue for the existence of objective laws which are rational 
before he outlines the rationality of the political domain. This principle of interest 
defined as power connects ‘reason trying to understand international politics and the 
facts to be understood’.325 He then moves on to the third principle in which he argues 
that this core principle is universally valid, but that the actual content of interest depends 
on the political and cultural context.326 After establishing and securing that politics is 
a separate sphere, which can be distinguished from the ethical, religious, economic, 
and aesthetical spheres in the third principle, Morgenthau decides to address morality 
in the fourth principle.327 In his fourth principle, he discusses the tension between the 
moral command and successful political action and argues that this tension should not 
be obliterated. He defends the application of universal moral principles, but also that 
they have to be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.328 In the 
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fifth principle, after Morgenthau defended the relevance of universal moral laws, he 
argues against the identification of the universal moral law with the aspirations of states. 
Morgenthau closes his argument with the sixth principle, which comes close to the start 
of his argument in which he defines realism against idealism. He argues that political 
realism is different from other approaches regarding intellectual and moral matters. 
Intellectually, because political realism maintains the autonomy of the political which is 
characterized by interests and defined as power. Morally, because political realism does 
subordinate the standards of other spheres, like the moral and religious spheres, to the 
standards of the political sphere.329 Like with the first principle, Morgenthau grounds 
this on his view on human nature.330 This shows that the beginning and the end of 
his argument are closely related, but it also shows that each principle presupposes the 
preceding one. For this reason, I think we should interpret the principles accordingly, 
which also means that the sequence reveals an order of importance. 
5.3. Principle 1: A Rational Theory Based on Objective Laws 
Rooted in Human Nature 
Guilhot holds that realism should be seen as an attempt to secure a space for an alternative 
vision of politics and statesmanship over against positivism and behavioralism, and to 
create space for a vision on politics that challenges the liberal view that science could 
subdue political conflict. In this position, it is not only important to look at political 
theology, but also at theory and method.331 That is why it is important to start with 
Morgenthau’s view on theory. 
The first principle of political realism is that politics is governed by objective laws 
that have their roots in human nature, which have not changed since the classical 
philosophers. For Morgenthau, human beings are born in chains, but they want to be 
free from political domination. However, man not only wants to be free, he also wants 
to reign. This ambivalence of man is the perennial condition of politics.332 Morgenthau 
states that in order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which 
society lives.333 The existence of objective laws makes it possible to develop a rational 
theory and to distinguish between truth and opinion.334 The principle that there are 
objective laws and the possibility of a rational theory is based on a couple of assumptions 
regarding science and political theory, which I will address in more detail hereafter.
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5.3.1. Science, Philosophy and Religion  
Morgenthau sees science as an activity that is similar to philosophy and religion. All three 
activities are the result of a response to the same shock of wonderment.335 ‘Wonderment 
is the condition in which reason finds itself in the face of the unforeseen and hence 
the unintelligible.’336 According to Morgenthau, mankind wants to know all there is, 
but it is limited by empirical reality. This experience is accompanied by feelings of 
suffering, because it shows the dualism between mankind and the world which cannot 
be overcome. As a result, it longs for more consciousness, but more consciousness leads 
to more suffering. Mankind feels in danger as long as he is not completely conscious of 
the world. This experience belongs to the existence of human beings and the attempt 
to seek union with the world is the result of a religious impulse, Morgenthau states. 
This religious impulse is also at work in genuine scientific thinking, which wants to 
unravel the mysteries of the universe. Religion, philosophy and science are one in this 
movement, they only differ in the outward manifestation.337 From that perspective, there 
is no difference between the activities people can perform in the church and the activities 
of a scientist.338 This means that Morgenthau sees religion at work in the impulse that 
pushes human beings to do science, religion, or philosophy, but that he also sees religion 
as a specific human activity different from science and philosophy.  
The scientific approach is the most modern and popular response, because ‘science is 
the attempt to make experience conscious in reason in a theoretically valid way’.339 The 
fact that people try to answer the shock of wonderment through science is ‘deeply rooted 
in the religious experience of post-ancient Western man. Western man has eaten from 
the apple of knowledge and wants to be more than he actually is. He wants to become 
like God. But the tragedy is that his condition does not allow for his aspirations.’340 
However, based on the development of the sciences, human beings think they will be 
able to control and master reality.341 
The move from a scientific question to a philosophic and religious one is easily 
made, Morgenthau states. Science is the systematic understanding of what is empirically 
known. The more scientists try to uncover the unknown, the more they realize how 
much will remain unknown. Philosophy tries to understand the empirically unknown 
by means of conceptual abstractions.342 Religion does something similar, but it makes 
use of symbols, parables and stories. It uses images and signs ‘that project the empirical 
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world into the unknown’.343 However, there is a fundamental difference between 
religion and science. The former will be tempted to reject science when it contradicts 
revealed truths, while the latter will reject religious truth when it contradicts empirical 
reality.344  
Morgenthau was worried about the science of his day. He argues that, as a result of the 
disintegration of the norms and values inspired by religion, science has lost a transcendent 
reference point and does not see the importance of such a point. The advantage of a 
transcendent reference point, is that it decides what is worth knowing.345 This value 
system has been replaced by a value system which pretends to find the truth through 
science, while it replaces the knowledge given through religion, art, and philosophy.346 
It is the result of the emancipation of the social sciences from the metaphysical systems 
which made the social world subjects of metaphysics and ethical postulates.347 The social 
sciences focus on the collection of factual information, but overlook the fact that science 
starts with understanding this data.348 Morgenthau argues that the objects of study of 
the social sciences were originally tied to valuative standpoints. For example, economics 
was approached from the valuative standpoint of an increase in wealth.349 Each student’s 
thoughts and actions are determined by his presuppositions and his perspective: ‘He is a 
political philosopher before he is a political scientist’.350 Presuppositions are the result of 
a total worldview, which is religious, poetic, or philosophical in nature.351 Morgenthau 
objects to the view of modern science as value free and neutral; students at the university 
still expect that they will be provided with knowledge that helps them understand their 
own existence in relation to the world.352 He states that science without any transcendent 
reference point is what is left to the scholar.353 The result is a multiplicity of truths and 
a focus on factual and quantitative knowledge.354  
The fact that Morgenthau sees philosophy, science, and religion as three different 
responses to the same shock of wonderment, which he ascribes to a basic religious 
impulse of man, shows three things. In the first place, he acknowledges that the religious 





347 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The State of Political Science,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), 19.
348 Ibid., 26.
349 Stephen P. Turner and George Mazur, “Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist,” European Journal of International 
Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 487. 
350 Morgenthau, The State of Political Science, 31. 
351 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Commitments of Political Science,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 41.




equally important and valuable as scientific knowledge. Finally, when it comes to science, 
Morgenthau argues that science cannot be separated from religion. On the contrary, 
science needs a transcendent reference point, which religion or philosophy can provide. 
5.3.2. The Scope of  Political Theory  
What does Morgenthau’s view on science mean in understanding his own theory? Does 
his view on science apply to his own theory? According to Ben Mollov, Morgenthau 
holds that political science must be based ‘upon a total worldview – religious, poetic, 
as well as philosophic in nature – the validity of which it must take for granted’.355 
Morgenthau defines a theory in general as ‘a system of empirically verifiable, general 
truths, sought for their own sake’.356 He distinguishes the knowledge that is produced 
in this way from practical knowledge, which is interested in truth with direct practical 
relevance, common sense, which is particular and unsystematic, and philosophy, which 
is not necessarily empirically verifiable.357 Most of his writings are, however, on political 
theory, which means that his understanding of theory, with respect to the social and 
political sphere, differs from his more general definition of a theory. There are three 
elements which characterize Morgenthau’s view on political theory. First of all, he 
believes in the existence of objective truth in political matters. Secondly, he assumes that 
a theory has a rational and an empirical side. Thirdly, he considers theorizing always 
normative.  
First, Morgenthau believes in the existence of objective and rational truths in political 
matters and does not want to fall prey to relativism. According to Morgenthau, ‘we must 
be able to learn from political insights of a Jeremiah, a Kautilya, a Plato, a Bodin, or a 
Hobbes’, because history is philosophy taught by example, says Thucydides (460-400 
BC).358 He agrees that the idea of relativism is justified, as long as it is acknowledged 
that each fact is part of a unique historical context and that the political scientist is part 
of a social reality which determines his view.359 With regard to the historical context, 
Morgenthau warns the scientist not to take theory too absolute, because then it easily 
becomes a metaphysical system that imposes some coherent intellectual scheme upon 
reality. However, by means of his own rationality the political scientist is able to trace the 
rationality of political processes. That makes it possible for a theory of politics to become 
‘a rationally ordered summary of all the rational elements which the observer has found 
in the subject matter’.360 
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Secondly, one of the difficulties of an adequate understanding of the nature of 
politics, as Morgenthau notices, is that events are unique on one hand, but also very 
similar, because they are manifestations of social forces.361 Morgenthau nevertheless 
believes that it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws, 
be it imperfect and one-sided.362 A political theory should, therefore, present a rationally 
consistent system, which takes account of the contingencies without allowing them to 
spoil its rationality.363 Morgenthau calls the essence of politics rational, over against the 
contingent facts of political reality. His position is that the more politics follows its own 
rationality the better it will function. A theory of politics should therefore paint the 
rational essence of the political sphere. Morgenthau uses the word painting, because 
there will always be a difference between reality itself and the theory. He compares it 
with a photograph and a painted portrait. A photograph shows everything that can be 
seen with the naked eye. But a photograph cannot show the essence of the subject, that 
is the task of the painting.  
Morgenthau holds that the essence a rational theory tries to grasp reflects the one-
sidedness of objective laws. The one-sidedness of the law must be combined with other 
empirical laws in order to complement it.364 A theory can ascertain facts but has to give 
them meaning through reason. For example, we can find out what statesmen have done, 
and we also might find out what their objectives were, but we also need a rational map to 
give meaning to the facts.365 So, rational laws and empirical research are complementary 
in Morgenthau’s view, and a political theory contains both. Robert Jervis summarizes 
it as follows: ‘As both a detached scholar and a passionate observer of world politics, 
Morgenthau sought to have his general philosophy guide his views on specific issues and 
yet to remain open enough to allow his observations of the wisdom and folly – usually 
the latter – around him alter some of his most deeply-held beliefs.’366 
5.3.3. Ideal Types: Empirical, but Normative
In the third place, the fact that objective laws are one-sided and must be complemented 
by empirical research means that political theory is always normative. To understand this, 
it helps to take into consideration that Morgenthau subscribes to Weber’s ideal-typical 
understanding of theory, as George Mazur and Stephen Turner point out.367 According 
to them Weber sees ideal-types as: ‘conceptual forms, idealizations, which selectively 
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present some aspects of social life, particularly social action, for the purpose of making 
them more fully intelligible by redescribing them in terms of clarified concepts’.368 That 
means that Morgenthau, in studying politics, selects some elements and describes them 
by means of concepts, which makes social actions intelligible and understandable.  
The ideal-typical approach of Morgenthau can create confusion. According to 
Jaap Nobel, Morgenthau presents two realities: the essential world on which his pure 
theory is founded and the actual world on which his political practice is based. This 
dichotomy is also visible in his book Politics Among Nations, Nobel states. On the one 
hand Morgenthau claims to have a theory which is empirical, but on the other hand he 
labels it as essential when it disagrees with empirical evidence. The consequence of this 
position, Nobel argues, is that the political practice as described in the second part of 
Politics Among Nations does not agree with the rationality that Morgenthau postulated 
in the first part.369  
This apparent contradiction can be explained by the application of ideal-types. An 
ideal-typical approach means that the theoretical construct, the theory, is more rational 
than reality itself: it does correspond to reality as a painting does to a photograph.370 This 
makes it possible, as Mazur and Turner state, that Morgenthau believes that there are laws 
governing international politics and that his interpretative social theory lends rationality 
to the actions of the statesman.371 That can give the impression that this rationality differs 
from the way in which Morgenthau describes political practices, because it is a difference 
between the theory, which is an abstraction of reality, and the empirical observation of 
daily political practices. Morgenthau responded to this criticism when he wrote that this is 
not an argument against his theory presented here, that actual foreign policy does not or 
cannot live up to it, because the intention of Politics among Nations is to present a rational 
theory of international politics.372 Besides that, Morgenthau also argues that the ‘one-
eyed rationality’ of political theory has to be supplemented with the moral wisdom of the 
statesman.373 For example, when the statesman believes that a certain truth will be upheld 
forever, he or she should realize that circumstances may vary infinitely.374 They should 
also be aware that they can lack an objective view of history, because of pride based upon 
intellect, goodness, or a collectivity he or she belongs too.375 
The ideal-typical approach of Morgenthau also sheds light on the role of normativity 
in his view of theory. The one-sidedness of the law (that it is ideal-typical) allows for 
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contingencies and systematic irrationalities, which makes theorizing normative, because 
it can never be completely objective.376 Morgenthau bases this on his argument that the 
greatness of the scholar follows from his or her ability to know what ought to be known. 
Following certain norms, the scholar shows what moral standards are guiding him or 
her. Science and reason that do not acknowledge their social and moral roots make room 
for all kinds of ideology.377 
This also holds for statesmen and foreign policy, Morgenthau argues. When a 
statesman believes that a certain truth will be upheld forever, he or she should realize 
that circumstances may vary infinitely.378 State leaders should be able to supplement the 
‘one-eyed rationality’ of political theory with their moral wisdom.379 Political realism is 
aware of the gap between good – that is rational – foreign policy and how it actually is. 
For that reason, Morgenthau argues, foreign policy should also be rational in view of its 
own moral and practical purposes.380  
Morgenthau’s view on theory and normativity come together in political realism, 
because as a rational theory of international politics it reflects objective laws, although 
they are one-sided and imperfect. The existing objective laws can only be accessed 
through the understanding of statesmen.381 That means that political realism will always 
be a combination of a rational principle, its interpretation and application in a political 
policy. According to Morgenthau, such a rational principle functions as some type of 
hypothesis that needs to prove itself and give meaning to the facts of international 
politics in confrontation with the actual facts. According to Morgenthau, the rational 
principle for international politics is the national interest defined as power.382 This 
principle is neither the direct result of the facts of international politics, nor the result 
of theory, but is based on the assumption that the statesman thinks and acts in terms of 
interest defined as power, confirmed by history.383 This brings us to the second principle 
of political realism as formulated by Morgenthau.
5.4. Principle 2: National Interest Defined as Power 
Morgenthau believes that, although the circumstances and the manifestations have 
changed over time, the essence of foreign policy has not changed; moreover, that it is 
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possible to develop a distinct theoretical understanding of international relations that is 
true regardless of time and place.384 The essence, according to him, is that when a nation 
becomes confronted with another hostile nation its foremost and moral duty is to take 
care of its own interests, because no other nation will do this.385 History has shown that 
it is reasonable to assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power.386 The United States have, from the beginning of their history, held two guiding 
objectives: its security in the Western hemisphere and the maintenance of the balance of 
power in Europe.387 
Morgenthau defines power as human being’s control over the minds and action of 
others. By political power he thinks of ‘the mutual relations of control among the holders 
of political authority and between the latter and the people at large.’388 Morgenthau 
explicitly states that interests can be material and ideal, as power can be physical or 
psychological; however, he also says that the actions of man are directly dominated by 
their interests and not ideals. That does not mean that ideals do not play a role at all. He 
asserts that the images of the world, which are created by ideas, often serve as switches 
that determine the course certain interests and their subsequent actions take.389  
According to Morgenthau, the principle of the national interest defined as power 
makes it possible to retrace and anticipate the steps a state leader has taken or will take 
in the political scene. Through this principle, we might even be able to understand 
the thoughts and actions of a statesman better than he does himself. The national 
interest defined as power, helps us to understand why American, British, or Russian 
foreign policy appears to us as an intelligible and rational continuum.390 But what 
about all these foreign policies that did not follow this rational and objective principle? 
Morgenthau admits that elements such as personality, prejudice, subjective preference, 
and weaknesses of intellect and will deflect foreign policies from their rational course. A 
theory of foreign policy should, however, try to abstract from these irrational elements 
and paint a picture that presents the rational element, to be found in experience, without 
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its contingent elements. Morgenthau is open to the idea that there are deviations from 
rationality which might appear as contingent or irrational, but which may be elements 
in a coherent system of irrationality. He suggests that it would be worth to explore the 
possibility of developing a theory of irrational politics.391 
Another reason for Morgenthau to come up with the principle of national interest 
defined as power, is that it makes it possible to set politics apart as an autonomous sphere 
of action which can be distinguished from other spheres such as ethics, aesthetics, or 
religion. Without such a concept it would be impossible to come to a theory of politics 
and bring ‘at least a measure of systemic order to the political sphere’.392 
Morgenthau also points out that focusing on the national interest defined as power 
prevents one from two fallacies: the concern with motives and ideological preferences.393 
In Morgenthau’s view, it is not very fruitful to study the motives and intentions of 
statesmen, because these motives are very difficult to observe and history does not show 
a necessary relationship between the good motives of a statesman and the quality of his 
foreign policy. Although good motives can restrain explicitly bad policies, they are not a 
guarantee for successful and moral foreign policy.394 A realist theory will also distinguish 
between the foreign policies of a statesman and his personal political and philosophic 
ideas. Although politicians will present their foreign policy in terms of their personal 
convictions or in terms of their philosophical and political sympathies, the first cannot 
be deduced to the latter.395 Statesmen must distinguish between their personal wishes 
and the interest of the state. As Morgenthau says, ‘He will distinguish with Lincoln 
between his “official duty” which is to protect the national interest and his “personal 
wish” which is to see universal moral values realized throughout the world.’396  
Morgenthau supports this position by the argument that human beings have the right 
to judge their fellow creatures by some moral standard. It would, however, be unacceptable 
when they would act upon that judgment. According to Morgenthau, the same rule 
applies to nations. States that would act upon their judgment fail to acknowledge how 
corrupt judgment on matters political can be. They overlook the narrow limits within 
which nations have to apply moral standards, and they close their eyes to their primary 
responsibility: to take care of the interest and survival of their own nation.397 
This does not mean that morality does not play a role. Morgenthau argues for the 




394 Ibid., 5, 6. 
395 Ibid., 6, 7.
396 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Problem of the National Interest,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), 110; Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 7.
397 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Neutrality and Neutralism,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), 280, 281.
158
Interest. 
Self-preservation both for the individual and for societies is, however, not only a biological and 
psychological necessity but, in the absence of an overriding moral obligation, a moral duty as 
well. (...) A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign 
policy inspired by universal moral principles.398 
According to Rosenthal, the national interest defined as power, was not meant to 
exclude moral principles, but to show what has priority. Morgenthau acknowledges 
the normative element of realism, but he subordinates it to the more immediate power 
considerations.399 
5.5. Principle 3. The Universality and Limitations of  the National 
Interest  
The third realist principle holds that interest defined as power is an objective key 
concept, which is universally valid, although its meaning depends on the political 
and cultural context.400 According to Michael Williams, the specificity of the political 
sphere lies in power as an interest in itself. It is lacking any concrete interest except the 
pursuit of power. Other spheres, on the contrary, have concrete interests. In economics, 
for example, the interest is material gain, but the fact that the political does not have 
a specific interest makes it unique compared to other spheres. It is the sphere where 
the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined.401 
Morgenthau argues that interests are the essence of politics and that this is not 
influenced by time and place. His argument is, through Weber, that interests directly 
dominate the actions of men. It depends, however, on the particular period of history 
and the political and cultural context that determines which interests hold sway.402 The 
result is that Morgenthau maintains that the goals that are pursued by nations in their 
foreign policies, run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might 
pursue. As with interests, the content of power and the manner of its use are determined 
by the political and cultural environment. Morgenthau writes that the content of the 
concept of power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains control of man, 
be it physically or psychologically, be it disciplined by moral ends by institutions like 
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those in Western democracies or even when it is untamed and barbaric.403 Thus, on 
the one hand, Morgenthau says that interest defined as power is universally valid, and 
on the other hand he recognizes the influence of time and place. The way this unfolds 
becomes apparent when Morgenthau differentiates between the role played by interests 
in the domestic and the international domain. Morgenthau distinguishes between the 
domestic and international realm, but sees both domains as expressions of the political 
sphere. International politics is part of political science’s general theory of politics.404 
Morgenthau nevertheless, acknowledges that power and morality play a different role in 
the domestic and international realm. 
Morgenthau describes the difference between the domestic and the international 
sphere as follows. In domestic politics, the government or the state is the embodiment 
of the values of the community and the object of the ultimate loyalty of its members; 
it is an integrated society.405 International society differs from the domestic domain, as 
becomes prevalent in the relationship between national interest, morality, and power. 
In the first place, on the domestic level the interests to which power attaches itself are 
as varied as the members of society, while in international society power belongs to the 
interests of a nation. Secondly, the political attention to particular interests of citizens in 
domestic society can vary, but in international politics the interest of nations, the survival 
of the country, and its identity are constant over time. Thirdly, the interests of citizens 
in domestic society are part of a larger transcendent, comprehensive social interest that 
defines and limits its pursuit, while in international relations national interests as a part 
of a larger transcendent entity barely exist.406 In short, there is no principal difference 
between the domestic and the international political domain, because in both cases 
the political domain is determined by power. There is a gradual difference, because the 
actors and the role of morality are different in the domestic realm; citizens are part of a 
larger transcendent whole which barely exists in international relations. 
Though Morgenthau distinguishes between the domestic politics and international 
politics, he does not explicitly separate the one from the other.407 That is understandable, 
because most of his theorizing is about foreign policy, which takes place between the domestic 
and international realms. This also explains the role of morality in relation to national interest 
and power. He could relativize morality on the basis of an analysis of international politics, 
which lacks a transcendent whole; however, that is impossible from the perspective of domestic 
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politics in an integrated society based on shared transcendent values. Foreign politics comes 
about in the interaction between the international realm and domestic politics.  
That Morgenthau distinguishes between the domestic and international realms, but 
that he approaches both of them from the perspective of the political sphere becomes 
clear from the way he characterizes international politics. The first step he makes is 
that he basically understands international relations as international politics. He argues 
that, in this period of history, in this culture, for practical and theoretical reasons, 
the international sphere can best be understood through international politics.408 For 
Morgenthau, international relations consist of collective and individual relations, which 
affect each other and transcend national boundaries. International relations are political 
relations, characterized by the aspirations for power.409 
These aspirations can manifest themselves in three ways: to keep, to increase, or 
to demonstrate one’s power. These three manifestations relate to three styles of policy, 
namely: status quo policy, imperialism, and the policy of prestige. The clashes between 
these various styles characterize international relations.410 International politics, 
Morgenthau argues, ‘like all politics’, is a struggle for power and ‘a continuing effort to 
maintain and to increase the power of one’s own nation and to keep in check or reduce 
the power of other nations’.411 Although all kinds of other aims can play a role, the 
immediate aim in international politics is power.  
Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seeks freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They 
may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may 
hope that this ideal will materialize through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation 
with other nations or international organizations. But whenever they strive to realize their goal 
by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power. The Crusaders wanted to free 
the holy places from domination by the Infidels; Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the world safe 
for democracy; the Nazis wanted to open Eastern Europe to German colonization, to dominate 
Europe, and to conquer the world. Since they all chose power to achieve these ends, they were 
actors on the scene of international politics.412
According to Morgenthau, the fact that power politics is the distinguishing element 
of international politics is a universal given which can be confirmed by history and 
experience. Even if anthropologists could show that people free from aspirations for 
power exist, they would not be able to demonstrate whether it holds when those 
408 Morgenthau, Nature and Limits, 15, 16.
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people operate under the condition of international politics.413 The consequence of this 
standpoint is that many activities of states are not of a political nature. Examples of such 
undertakings are legal, economic, humanitarian, or cultural activities.414 
Although Morgenthau, in his time, came to the conclusion that international relations 
were mainly political, that would not always be the case. Morgenthau himself realized that 
the relation between national interests and the nation-state is subject to change. Times 
could come when the nation-state would be replaced by a larger unit with a different 
character.415 Morgenthau warns for the human temptation to take the contingent events 
of their time as a perennial phenomenon.416 For that reason, he argues that the current 
connection between interest and the nation-state is a product of history, which is therefore 
bound to disappear in the course of history.417 Morgenthau’s former assistant Thompson 
says that Morgenthau was concerned that his view of national interest would be interpreted 
too narrowly. In the past, national interest was often associated with the nation. But since 
the 1970s Morgenthau was aware that certain interests, like the threat of nuclear war, the 
population explosion, the environment, and world hunger, could no longer be solved by 
the nation-state and required an international system.418  
Morgenthau’s third principle seems to serve the purpose to explain that the national 
interest defined as power may be a universal principle to understand international 
politics. It should however, always be applied carefully, taking context into consideration, 
especially when sudden, unexpected circumstances arise.419 That Morgenthau limits 
international relations to international politics, ‘in this period of history, in this culture, 
for practical and theoretical reasons’, has consequences. Cultural, legal, and religious 
considerations will always be secondary to the primary principle, namely interest defined 
as power. I write ‘always’, but this only applies when Morgenthau interprets and defines 
international relations as international politics. Morgenthau seems to be open to the 
fact that in another period of history in another culture international relations might be 
something other than international politics. 
5.6. Principle 4. The Morality of  Politics 
The fourth principle holds that realism takes the moral significance of politics for 
granted, but what does that mean precisely? Morgenthau is often misunderstood on the 
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role of morality in his theory. Critics often interpret Morgenthau’s insistence that power 
is important in all political relationships, as him endorsing axioms like ‘might makes 
right’.420 Against this view, Murray states that Morgenthau adopts an Augustinian, rather 
than a Hobbesian-Machiavellian, framework, because Morgenthau’s political realism 
reconciles the imperatives of morality and the national survival. Morgenthau holds 
that the national interest must be protected, but it must always be subjected to strict 
moral limitations.421 Mollov argues that Morgenthau acknowledges that when there is 
power, it also implies that there is justice and that man is an animal longing for power 
but also a creature with a moral purpose.422 Rosenthal formulates this with respect to 
Morgenthau as follows: the realist lives primarily in the ‘twilight zone’ where ethics and 
politics meet.423 Besides that, in his fourth principle, Morgenthau explicitly states that 
‘[b]oth individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, 
such as that of liberty’.424 Instead of trying to label Morgenthau’s realism as either power 
politics or moral politics, it would be more adequate to characterize his view as tragic. 
He is aware of the fact that power does not ultimately suffice, but that international 
politics cannot do without it. As Richard Lebow points out, for Morgenthau 
moral principles can never be fully realized, but only approximated through the ever temporary 
balance of interests and equally precarious management of conflicts. A wise statesman “aims 
at achievement of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good.” “Power”, Morgenthau 
acknowledged, “is a crude and unreliable method of limiting the aspirations for power on the 
international scene,” but the balance of power may be a good short-term strategy for preserving 
the peace.425 
According to Morgenthau, statesmen must often choose between different moral 
principles. The question which principles should take precedence depends on the 
context. It is for this reason that Morgenthau once stated, in ‘extreme and striking terms’, 
that it is impossible to be a successful politician and a good Christian.426 Morgenthau 
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distinguishes between pure ethics and political ethics. Pure ethics can judge actions by its 
conformity with moral law, but political ethics must judge actions by its consequences 
in the real world. To illustrate the importance of this point, Morgenthau refers to the 
statement ‘that if events proved him wrong, “ten angels swearing I was right would make 
no difference.”’427 
5.6.1. Three Ground Rules for Political Realism 
The fact that Morgenthau takes the moral significance of politics seriously, leaves us with 
the question as to how this works in practice. For this reason, Morgenthau introduces, as 
it were, a few ground rules. In the first place, time and place, or in other words, context, 
should be taken very seriously. Morality functions differently in different situations. He 
distinguishes three ways in which morality could relate to power: morality can limit 
power; morality can approve of power; and morality may serve power. In a civilized 
political community these three functions function well, but in the international sphere 
the strongest moral force is the nation-state, and as a result, international morality is 
much weaker. As a result, states tend to equate their morality with international morality: 
morality becomes ideology and theory becomes ideology. That might explain why, 
according to Morgenthau, there are so many ideologies and so few theories.428 Another 
well-known example that Morgenthau uses to illustrate the importance of context, is the 
difference between the individual and the state.429
The individual may say for himself: “fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the 
world perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. (….) 
Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle 
[of liberty, SP], the state has no right to let its moral approbation of the infringement of liberty 
get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national 
survival.430 
For Morgenthau, the confusion about the application of moral principles begins with 
each social relationship. Even in a relationship between two human beings, sin cannot be 
ruled out. He or she can try to minimize it, but it is inevitably found in social relations. 
There is always egotism, selfishness, and pride present, while the Judeo-Christian ethic 
teaches us to respect human beings as an end in themselves. What is true for individual 
social relations, becomes the more pregnant in the behavior between states, because 
the mitigating circumstances of the domestic sphere are lacking.431 That means that 
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the substance of the moral principle remains. The only thing that statesmen can do 
is change the social environment in which the moral value has to be implemented.432 
Morgenthau takes ethics very seriously, but he also explains that it cannot be applied 
directly to the political sphere. 
The fact that Morgenthau ascribes such an importance to context should not be 
seen as relativism as if morality is a relative thing and meaning depends on the context. 
Morgenthau asks then, how it is possible that we still understand the moral relevance of 
the Ten Commandments, the moral ideas of Plato, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Buddha, 
and Aquinas, while they originated in totally different contexts. The answer is that what all 
human beings have in common is that they are moral beings. Civilized human beings differ 
from the barbarian, because they make right moral judgments. They share with each other 
and with Socrates, the Greek tragedians, the biblical prophets, and the great moralists of all 
ages, the belief in the sanctity of the moral law. This morality is required for the flourishing 
of humankind’s transcendent orientations.433 Great human beings in history have devoted 
themselves to transcendent purposes. They revealed the truth of Scripture that ‘He that 
findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loses his life for my sake shall find it.’434
The second ground rule is that political realism does not want to obliterate the tension 
between morality and politics. In Morgenthau’s view, there has to remain a difference, 
or even a tension, between politics and morality, because removing that tension would 
obscure both. Morality might look less exacting and politics more moral than they 
are.435 Morgenthau makes this very clear in his article The Demands of Prudence. That is 
why I quote him at length.
An unbridgeable gulf separates the demands of Christian ethics from the way man is compelled 
by his natural aspirations to act. That conflict is fore-ordained by the nature of Christian ethics 
and the nature of man. Christian ethics demands love, humility, the abnegation of self; man as a 
natural creature seeks the aggrandizement of self through pride and power. It is the tragedy of man 
that he is incapable, by dint of his nature, to do what Christian ethics demands of him. It is the 
guilt of man that he is unwilling, by dint of his corruption, to do what he could do to meet the 
demands of Christian ethics. The best man is capable of is to be guided by the vision of a life lived 
in compliance with the Christian code and to narrow the gap between his conduct and that code. 
The closing of that gap through complete harmony between the demands of Christian ethics and 
man’s conduct is not a problem for ethics but for theology. Only divine grace can establish that 
harmony in another world. What is true of man in general applies with particular force to political 
man. For the natural aspirations proper to the political sphere – and there is no difference in kind 
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between domestic and international politics – contravene by definition the demands of Christian 
ethics. No compromise is possible between the great commandment of Christian ethics, “Love 
Thy Neighbor As Thyself,” and the great commandment of politics, “Use Thy Neighbor As Means 
To The Ends Of Thy Power.” It is a priori impossible for political man to be at the same time a 
good politician – complying with the rules of political conduct- and to be a good Christian – 
complying with the demands of Christian ethics. In the measure that he tries to be the one he 
must cease to be the other.436
Morgenthau moves on to criticize people who want to bridge the incompatibility of this 
gap. There are people who ‘liberalize’ Christian ethics by watering down its demands 
and suggest that the Gospel did not mean what it obviously said. He calls this the escape 
of the Pharisees. Others, whom he calls sophists, try to overcome the gap based on the 
assumption that man is naturally good, and his actions are naturally moral. This is at the 
root of political ideologies, when the sophists attempt to make peace with the demands 
of Christian ethics without having to forego man’s natural aspirations. Morgenthau 
advocates that the best way to deal with the opposition between the moral demand, and 
his natural and political aspirations, is to accept the strategy of the lesser evil.437
Morgenthau knows that morality and politics in theory should be distinguished, but 
that it is impossible to separate the two from each other in political practice. Gaining 
political legitimacy through morality is an inevitable weapon in the hands of politicians 
striving for power. By means of religion, they try to suggest that their aims are more 
noble than political reality suggests.438 According to Morgenthau, the mutual influence 
is not always proportional: ‘Typically, it is politics and imperium as its more dynamic 
manifestation that transform and corrupt morality and religion, and it is much rarer for 
morality and religion to reform and spiritualize politics and imperium.’439
Morgenthau wants the tension, or dualism, between morality and politics to remain, 
and he argues against ethical monism. 
No society can escape for any length of time the consequences of that dialectic [between power 
and justice, SP]. Even the ‘band of robbers’ with which St. Augustine equates a government 
without justice, that is devoid of that particular Augustinian justice, would have to comply with 
certain rules recognized as just by its members.440
Morgenthau writes that, in his time, ethics was relegated to the private sphere of religion. 
He is very critical about this development. Where traditional ethics was founded on 
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the distinction and strict separation between the normative and the empirical, the 
rationalization of ethics removed this distinction. Morgenthau ascribes the start of this 
development to Kant’s formalization of the ethical imperative, ending with Comte’s 
identification of ethical rule and scientific law. He described the consequences of this 
development as follows. 
Where ethics is still recognized as an independent sphere, it is relegated to religion, a private 
domain such as family or art, where man may satisfy his emotional needs. The dual morality of 
the age has here one of its roots. Yet, this private domain where normative ethics may still find 
refuge is regarded as a residue from a pre-scientific age, which will not survive the coming age 
of science. With the coming of this age, normative ethics and religion itself will disappear, to be 
replaced by rational science. (...) Whereas, the good of traditional ethics can be achieved only 
through a struggle within the soul of man or through an act of divine grace, scientific ethics leads 
man toward perfection through the mere intellectual process of learning what is reasonable and 
good. Yet, in opposition to the platonic remembrance of the distinction between good and evil, 
which, like the principles of mathematics, is pre-existent in the human soul, the ethical perfection 
of utilitarian rationalism consists simply in acquiring the empirical knowledge of how certain 
effects are co-ordinated with certain actions, that is, what good, in utilitarian terms, to expect 
from certain actions.441
Morgenthau is concerned about this modern development, because the equation of ethics 
with science leads to the idea that all success and progress is automatically moral.442 The 
consequences for the social and political sphere are that successful action will be seen as 
the equivalent of moral action.443 The fact that ethics becomes perceived as something 
that will disappear over time leads to the idea that politics stands on its own. Ethics, 
then, becomes an obstacle for the fuller realization of the state. The idea that politics can 
be inspired and moved by the belief in rational force was clearly expressed in the foreign 
policy approach of President Wilson, according to Morgenthau. But it is also visible 
in liberal Protestantism and modern Catholicism when they portray the established 
government as the embodiment of the divine will. Totalitarianism does the same thing 
but the other way around. It fits the ethical principles into the existing political reality, 
so that all what the state does seems to be in accordance with ethics.444  
Morgenthau criticizes rationalism, also called positivism, because of its philosophical 
and ethical monism. Morgenthau holds a dualistic view of morality, which means that 
human beings are subject to an external transcendent concept imposed on him. He 
compares it with Moses coming down from Sinai with the law, confronted with the 
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people of Israel and their worship of the golden calf.445 The ethical monism of rationalism 
sees evil as the absence of good or even as the absence of reason. This way of thinking 
contradicts rational Western thought, in which God is challenged by the devil and the 
sinfulness of man is conceived as necessarily connected with the order of the world. In 
this view, there is no inevitable progress toward the good, but undecided conflict between 
good and evil.446 Morgenthau states that this worldview is based upon three experiences. 
First, in the contemplative experience, mankind perceives an ongoing struggle between 
good and evil, reason and passion, life and death, peace and war. Second, in his active 
experience, he observes how his good intentions result in evil. Third, in his intellectual 
experience, he undergoes the discrepancy between the mysteries of the world and the 
way he understands the world, without ever reaching the point where he knows all 
questions or understands the meaning of life.447  
The third ground rule to deal with the tension between morality and politics, is that 
it requires prudence. Prudence is necessary to weigh the demand for successful political 
action and compliance with the moral law. Morgenthau calls it the supreme virtue in 
politics. Prudence is the watchword of realism.448 
5.7. Principle 5. Nation Between God and Idol 
With the fifth principle, Morgenthau makes clear that political realism does not allow 
for the identification of the moral law with the aspiration of any particular nation. 
There is a world of difference between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, 
inscrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is always on one’s side 
and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed by God also.449 
According to Morgenthau, the principle of the national interest defined as power, 
saves countries from self-righteousness and from messianic intentions in international 
politics. Realism pierces the veil and shows that all countries eventually act according to 
the underlying principles of the national interest defined as power. It therefore offers a 
good foundation to make political judgments.450 Morgenthau calls it the sin of pride or 
idolatry when nations equate their nationalism and the counsels of Providence, against 
which the Greek tragedians and biblical prophets have warned.451
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States are tempted to equate their foreign policies with universal morality. This 
happens not by ignorance or misjudgement, but by hubris and pride. As a result, they 
overlook the possibilities of their power and forget prudence and morality.452 If such 
a nation wins a war, it does not think that the modern arms or the number of troops 
caused their victory, but it imagines that Providence, be it a personal divinity or the 
logic of history, provided for the success of the morally superior nation. Such an attitude 
easily develops into the idea that this inherent superiority compels the nation to reform 
the world according to its standards.453 For Morgenthau, the United States deals with 
the attitude as described. The United States has formed a certain utopian moral image 
of itself and judges other states in the light of that image. States that oppose these moral 
standards are automatically selfish and immoral.454 
The principle of the national interest defined as power, would be a remedy against 
this ‘moral excess and political folly’, Morgenthau argues.455 When every state would 
adhere to this principle and judge other states accordingly, they would judge each other 
like they judge themselves, and they would respect each other’s national interest in 
pursuing policies and would protect and promote their own: ‘Moderation in policy 
cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment’.456  
It is striking that in the quote at the beginning of this section, Morgenthau argues 
like a theologian when he talks about the judgment of God and the impossibility 
to equate the moral law with the aspirations of nations. In other words, he takes a 
theological position on God and human beings and argues that this theological view 
does not justify the equation of the moral law with the aspiration of a particular country. 
5.8. Principle 6. The Autonomy of  the Political 
This last principle about the autonomy of the political is central to Morgenthau’s 
theory.457 For this reason, it is reflected in his second and third principle too. The 
autonomy of the political means that the political should be respected as a sphere on 
its own, unrelated to economics, ethics, aesthetics and religion. As set out earlier with 
respect to the second principle, the political sphere characterizes itself through interest 
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defined in terms of power.  
The sixth principle sets out that political realism is different from other schools 
of thought with respect to intellectual and moral matters. Like in the first principle, 
Morgenthau reasons from his view of human nature. 
Real man is a composite of “economic man,” “political man,” “moral man”, “religious man,” etc. 
A man who was nothing but “political man” would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking 
in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but “moral man” would be a fool, for he would be 
completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but “religious man” would be a saint, 
for he would be completely lacking worldly desires.458
By stating that politics is an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau wants to distinguish it 
from other domains of action, like economics, law, or religion. Through the concept of 
spheres, he also makes it possible to limit and give focus to the study of the political 
realm. 
Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether 
impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts, nor 
could we bring at least a measure of systemic order to the political sphere.459
Political science should deal with political man, abstract it from the other aspects of 
man as if it were the only aspect of man and apply the standards of thought that are 
appropriate.460 It is for theoretical reasons that the observer has to distinguish between 
politics and other social spheres. For example, economics is centered upon the concept 
of interest, defined as wealth, and in the same way politics is characterized by its concept 
of interest defined as power. That does not, however, mean that only power determines 
the political sphere, but the concept of national interest defined as power, provides 
the observer with a rational and timeless concept to approach his object of study. It 
gives intellectual discipline to the observer and infuses rational order into the subject 
matter of politics, making a theoretical understanding of politics possible. Besides that, 
it provides the actor, the statesman, with rational discipline in action and an overview 
of the conditions for successful action which leads to continuity in foreign policy.461 
Political realism guarantees the autonomy of the political sphere against the moral or legal 
sphere. The moralist asks whether his policy is in accord with moral principles, whereas 
the political realist asks: ‘how does this policy affect the power of the nation?’462   
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Morgenthau wants to maintain the autonomy of the political sphere and wants to 
assign the religious and moral spheres their proper place and function. This does not 
mean that Morgenthau discards the standards of the other spheres, or that he denies 
the actual influence of standards from other spheres. It is for theoretical reasons that 
he wants to deal with each sphere on its own terms. The moral difference with other 
approaches is that the political realist will not subordinate political standards to standards 
from other spheres, but the other way around. Morgenthau refers here in particular 
to the legalistic-moralistic approach to international politics.463 Economic, legal, and 
moral concerns are considered, but the first and foremost consideration is the political 
dimension. Realism wants its own territory or sphere wherein political considerations 
are to be supreme.464 
The use of the term sphere in this principle comes from Weber. Morgenthau defines 
a sphere like Weber does, as ‘a domain or action which is intelligible in terms of the 
consequences of actions and value-choices’.465 There are different spheres, such as the 
moral, religious, economic, and legal sphere. These spheres are formed over the course 
of history by human choice and action, and are as such, the historically and naturally 
given structure within which value-choices are possible and intelligible. The various 
spheres and the values involved, conflict and interpenetrate each other, which makes it 
impossible to develop a predictive theory. Within each sphere, values play a role, but 
these values are derived values, and not necessarily ultimate values, because the latter 
belong to the otherworldly realm. Although some people will consider the nation-state 
as their ultimate value, most of them take political order as a means to an ultimate 
end.466  
The fact that Morgenthau distinguishes between the religious and political sphere 
and wants to maintain the autonomy of the political is not only to make theorizing 
possible. It is also inspired by an Augustinian theology and view on history and ethics that 
wants to create room for the possibility to act politically knowing that the completion 
of history will not be realized by human beings. In the conclusion, I will address this a 
bit more.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have set out how I interpret Morgenthau’s theory. I paid attention 
to his theory of international politics, but also to his view on theory. Morgenthau has 
an ideal-typical view on theory. This means that Morgenthau assumes separate realms, 
463 Ibid., 14, 16.
464 Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, 6.
465 Turner and Mazur, Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist, 493.
466 Ibid., 494.
171
thereby marking the territory of his theorizing, and leaving other issues out. Politics are 
regarded as a different realm than that of law, religion, or aesthetics. Within each of these 
realms, a certain rationality can be distinguished that determines the characteristics of 
the realm at hand. Consequently, the study and analysis of the rationality of the political 
realm is then separated from the study of the other realms. A second consequence of 
Morgenthau’s choice for an ideal-typical approach is that it strengthens his assumption 
of the autonomy of politics. Finally, an ideal-typical theory is both normative and 
empirical, but the line between these two is not always clear: what is political theory and 
what is the result of empirical observation? In Morgenthau’s case, it is not always clear 
where exactly this line is, because he claims that his political theoretical foundations 
come from his observations and interpretation of reality. This becomes clear, when he 
states that politics is characterized by the principle of the national interest defined as 
power. Morgenthau regards this as inevitable, because theorizing always involves the 
observer with his or her values and presuppositions. 
Besides the point about theory, I also wanted to make the claim that Morgenthau 
cherishes a number of theological assumptions of Augustinian nature. The most 
important note that appears here, is Morgenthau’s emphasis on the saeculum, the time in 
which people are up until the eschaton. Morgenthau finds it important, when thinking 
of international politics, that the idea of the completion or fulfilment of history will not 
be realized by mankind is kept alive. When this realization is missing, this leads to an 
absolutization of the saeculum: all redemption must take place here and now.467 This is 
what is defined as secularization according to Morgenthau. A transcendent reality or a 
God above history and time is no longer taken into account. According to him, this leads 
to utopic expectations regarding the possibilities to achieve perfect justice and peace in 
this life. That is why the notion of the katechon is so important. It is the resilient force 
that ensures that chaos due to secularization will not dominate. Morgenthau relates 
this to the autonomy of politics and the state as preventer and counter force. Ethics 
will therefore always be ethics for this interim, and an interim solution in light of the 
eventually redeemed state towards which humanity is heading. 
In this conclusion, I also want to evaluate Morgenthau’s classical realism from the 
viewpoint of the Amsterdam School. Some aspects stand out. First of all, Morgenthau 
pays attention to the fact that science is not neutral. In stronger terms, Morgenthau 
argues that science cannot do without a transcendent reference. Science is therefore not 
neutral, because it has convictions that cannot be separated from a scholar’s scientific 
activities. As I showed above, Morgenthau states that science and reason that do not 
acknowledge their social and moral roots make room for all kinds of ideology that 
human beings want to invoke.468 That is exactly what the Amsterdam School also states. 
The Amsterdam School of Philosophy therefore urges scholars and scientists to reflect 
467 See also, Herman Paul, De slag om het hart. Over secularisatie van verlangen (Utrecht: Boekencentrum, 2017), 43, 56.
468 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 166, 167.
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actively on their deeper convictions and assumptions and to be open about it, because 
that furthers scholarly debate and research. Proper science is not afraid to bring these 
assumptions to the fore so that they can be discussed and criticized. This core idea 
certainly has relevance for IR and religion. If scholars are not religiously neutral in their 
theorizing, this will have an impact on the way in which they approach this object of 
study.469 Morgenthau and the Amsterdam School would agree that it is better to be 
explicit regarding someone’s pre-scientific presuppositions, than to suggest that they are 
not present, while indeed having an influence. Morgenthau has a keen eye for the fact 
that politics and science often portray a religious zeal in the realization of their objectives, 
under the guise of so-called rationality and objectivity. Religious presuppositions can 
participate according to Morgenthau, because eventually, philosophy, science, and 
religion are equal reactions to the shock of wonderment and the knowledge garnered 
by one is not by definition more or less valuable than the other. According to Mollov, 
Morgenthau holds that political science must be based ‘upon a total world view – 
religious, poetic, as well as philosophic in nature – the validity of which it must take for 
granted’.470 With this, Morgenthau concurs with the Amsterdam School, which raises 
awareness for the role of world views and the role that religion can play in this.
As I have shown earlier, Morgenthau’s statements on science can also be applied to 
his own thought process. Many aspects of Morgenthau’s theorizing are of a pre-scientific 
nature. His worldview is based on the idea that all people answer to their religious 
impulse, the effects of this may vary, but he starts his thoughts on the assumption that 
people are deeply religiously motivated. Here too, there is a lot of resemblance with the 
Amsterdam School, because it states that theory is somehow related to presuppositions 
concerning the question of what is seen as ‘ultimate’.471 This means that there is no 
theorizing that is religiously neutral; the default option is that theorizing is not neutral 
and always influenced by deeper convictions: there is no place from nowhere nor can 
someone claim to have a God’s eye point of view. 
The second point in which Morgenthau closely resembles the Amsterdam School 
is regarding his distinction between the different realms. According to the Amsterdam 
School there is a reality outside of ourselves – it exists independently of our thoughts.472 
The ontological basis of this reality is that it is meaningful and diverse. The assumption 
of a meaningful reality leads to the idea that humans have the task to find and interpret 
this meaning – which is a challenge in itself. Not only has the diversity just mentioned 
an ontological basis: a state ‘is’ not a business firm nor a family, a school ‘is’ not a 
hospital, mass media ‘is’ not a recreational park, and so on. Moreover, they all have 
different ‘qualifications’ or teloi that can be studied empirically, but can also guide action 
469 Cf. Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 190.
470 Mollov, Power and Transcendence, 4.
471 Cf. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: HarperOne, 2009).
472 Hengstmengel, Denken met het hart, 198.
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within these various domains or ‘sovereign’ spheres. The sovereignty of the various 
spheres also prevents the political from being subjected to the religious or moral sphere, 
as often is the case with political religions, and vice versa. These ideas are very similar to 
Morgenthau’s ideas about various spheres with their own rationality and the autonomy 
of  it.  
Furthermore, Morgenthau assumes that theories are always normative and empirical, 
and that the normativity of certain realms cannot be ignored, as the Amsterdam School 
emphasizes as well. The Amsterdam School sees the normative and empirical as much 
deeper intertwined than what Hume famously identified as the ‘is-ought’-fallacy can 
account for.473 Reality is diverse and, thus, made up of various aspects, economic, social, 
juridical, biological, religious, and so on, and cannot be reduced to one of these aspects. 
These aspects are not solely constructions of the mind, but are aspects of reality itself 
that relate to possibilities of human experience.474 The Amsterdam Philosophers see 
reality as meaningful, as actually ‘out there’ and not as something entirely constructed 
by humans. The puzzle for scholars is to find out the difference between these two and to 
be aware that what they study is a construction of the human mind as well as something 
that reality reveals. There is a world that exists independently of our perception, but our 
cognitive abilities are attuned to the world.475 
 
473 Cf. ‘Thus the default position is that international relations is an explanatory endeavor, concerned with the “is” of 
world politics not the “ought.” We find this segregation both unsustainable and unhelpful. All theories of international 
relations and global politics have important empirical  and  normative dimensions, and their deep interconnection is 
unavoidable.’ Christian Reus-Smit and Snidal Duncan, “Between Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourses of 
International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Snidal Duncan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 4.
474 Hengstmengel, Denken met het hart, 148, 150.
475 Ibid., 198.
Chapter 6
Religion in Morgenthau’s Classical 
Realism: ‘It Is the Theology!’
Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I have demonstrated that Morgenthau’s realism can only 
adequately be understood if his ‘hidden’ theology is taken into account. I have made 
that argument, because in this chapter I will show that to understand the way he deals 
with religion one needs to take Morgenthau’s political theology seriously. Hence, ’it is 
the theology!’.  
Very few publications explicitly deal with the role of religion and theology in 
classical realism, and more specifically Morgenthau’s realism.476 For that reason I write 
this chapter in a way that it includes an overview of the role of religion in Morgenthau’s 
realism. This representation will also clarify whether the religionists are correct in their 
claims that IR theory unjustifiably ignores religion. This assessment knows a limitation 
in that the religionists do not often support their claims with references to specific 
writings of Morgenthau. On the other hand, it is sometimes quite easy to disprove the 
religionists, because there are specific writings of Morgenthau which clarify the issue at 
stake immediately. 
In this chapter, I want to illustrate the role that religion plays for Morgenthau on 
the multiple levels discussed earlier, namely the empirical, the subject-specific, and the 
philosophy of science level. In the previous chapter, I have already shown the aspects 
that come into play for Morgenthau on a pre-scientific level: there are some Augustinian 
elements in Morgenthau’s reasoning that influence his classical realism. I will conduct 
the assessment of the religionists according to the outlines in Chapter 1 of this book. 
For every subthesis, I will describe what Morgenthau has said on the topic. In my 
reconstruction of the religionists, each of the theses has been subdivided and these 
476 The few exceptions are Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics; Sandal and Fox, Religion in International 
Relations Theory; Troy, Religion and the Realist Tradition.
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subdivisions have been further divided. It is impossible to always retrace Morgenthau’s 
thoughts on the matter in detail. That is why, for every statement, I will indicate the 
elements that I have analyzed. Although most criticism put forward by the religionists 
involves IR in general, and sometimes more specifically classical realism, at times 
Morgenthau’s ideas or quotes are discussed more concretely. In such cases, I will point 
this out. 
I will argue that the religionist position appears to be weak in confrontation with 
Morgenthau’s theory, and that the religionists provide insufficient ground for their claim 
that IR theory should incorporate religion. On an empirical level, Morgenthau pays 
attention to religion but not to same extent as the religionists. I will also show that on 
the domain-specific level, Morgenthau is much closer to the religionist interpretation 
then they think. My analysis of Morgenthau’s philosophy of science makes clear that 
he offers insightful ideas for the religionist position and barely meets the picture they 
have created of him. First, I will compare the religionist definition of religion with 
Morgenthau’s. After that, I discuss the role religion plays on the empirical level, the 
subject-specific level and the philosophy of science level. 
6.1. How Morgenthau Defines Religion: Religion and Religiosity
How did Morgenthau view religion? With his Jewish roots, but assimilated in Christian 
Germany, Morgenthau makes a distinction between religion and religiosity.477 The 
second term carries a broad connotation for him, while the first has more to do with 
the institutional formation of this religiosity. By holding on to this broad definition, 
Morgenthau perceives many forms in which religion appears. Simultaneously, he does 
not become too vague, or too general, because he also pays attention to the institutional 
form of religiosity. The question in this section is whether Morgenthau regards religion 
in a similar manner as the religionists do. I think their visions share enough similarities 
to allow for a comparison. First of all, Morgenthau defines religion as related to a 
transcendent reference point. Secondly, he makes a difference between religion and the 
communities and institutions that are based on it. Finally, he distinguishes religion from 
ideology. After presenting these three points, I will also pay attention to Morgenthau’s 
understanding of morality and its relationship to religion. I will argue that Morgenthau 
closely relates morality to religion and that it is justified to refer to his writings about 
morality to show his attention for religion.  
Morgenthau states that religion in a proper sense – which he distinguishes from 
the distortion of religion in the form of ideology – functions in a similar way as 
477 Mollov argues that Morgenthau was not an observant Jew per se, but that there is evidence that he was aware of the 
‘spiritual side’ of his Jewish existence. Mollov also states that Morgenthau respected the Jewish tradition and performed 
Jewish rituals at various times in his life. Mollov, Power and Spirituality, 95.
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metaphysical philosophy by opening human consciousness to the mysteries of the 
world.478 Morgenthau calls this otherworldly religion, because it is based on religious 
faith and its truth cannot be tested by experiment.479 It is peculiar to religion that it 
believes in the existence of another world which is not subjected to empirical tests, 
because it is superior to the world of the senses.480 Religion paints a picture of the 
empirically unknown with its own proper means.481 At another place, Morgenthau calls 
this form of religion religiosity. What he means by that appears from a passage in the 
book Essay on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics. 
The issue that precedes all others both in time and importance is that of religion. When we speak 
here of religion we have in mind not only membership in a particular religious organization or 
observance of religious practices or professions of faith in a particular religious dogma. What 
we have in mind is primarily a religious attitude that recognizes the insufficiency of man as a 
finite being and seeks to orien tate itself through some transcendent guidance, so that man can 
come to terms with himself, his fellowmen, and the universe. Religion is here conceived as a 
universal human attitude, with which believers, atheists, and agnostics alike approach themselves, 
their fellowmen, and the universe and of which the historic religions, religious organiza tions, and 
religious observances are but particular manifestations.482
In this quote, Morgenthau describes religiosity as ‘a religious attitude that recognizes 
the insufficiency of man as a finite being and seeks to orien tate itself through some 
transcendent guidance, so that man can come to terms with himself, his fellowmen, and 
the universe’. At another place he describes it as ‘the awareness of his dependence upon 
a will and a power which are beyond his understanding and control’.483 Morgenthau 
sees religiosity as something universal which is shared by all human beings. This 
understanding of religiosity comes very close to the part of the religionist definition 
which states that religion is about transcendent, ultimate or supernatural claims.  
Secondly, in the quote above Morgenthau makes a distinction between religions 
and religiosity. He sees religions like Judaism, Christianity or Hinduism as particular 
manifestations of a broader religious awareness called religiosity. This agrees with 
the distinction in the religionist definition between the beliefs about the ultimate, 
transcendent or supernatural and the institutions and communities that are formed 
478 Morgenthau, Science, 66.
479 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), 253.
480 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Death in the Nuclear Age,” in The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), 20.
481 Morgenthau, Science, 64.
482 Kenneth W. Thompson, Hans J. Morgenthau and David Hein, Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics (Lanham, New 
York and London: University Press of America, 1983), 6. Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Rediscovery of Imagination and 
Religion: Arnold Toynbee,” in The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 54-62.
483 Ibid., 60.
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around or based on these beliefs.484  
In the third place, Morgenthau distinguishes between religion and ideology, or, as 
he calls it, religiosity or proper religion versus political or improper religion. Whereas 
religiosity is the fruit of experience which is ‘transformed into intellectual and moral 
awareness by mind of conscience’, religion has the temptation of eclectic idolatry which 
is ‘often blasphemous in man’s self-identification with the deity’.485 This happens, 
according to Morgenthau, when religion becomes political religion. In this improper 
variant, religion constructs the empirically known through its own images and signs. 
It then easily becomes ideology, because it conceals a reality that is already empirically 
known.486 The fact that religion so often plays an ideological role has to be attributed 
to the nature of politics. Morgenthau often refers to this situation when he speaks of 
political religion. The validity of political religion depends on its success in the here and 
now. Morgenthau sketches the difference between genuine religion and ideology when 
he compares Christianity and Marxism.487
The Christian can wait without a time limit for the Second Coming, for it has been divinely 
revealed that Christ will come again. His faith will survive delay as long as he believes in the 
revelation itself. The Communist cannot indefinitely maintain his faith in the “withering away of 
the state” and the coming of the classless society or in the triumph of Communism throughout 
the world; for these prophecies are subject to historical verification, not at the end of time but, if 
not here and now, certainly tomorrow or the day after. Thus Marxism-Leninism contains within 
itself the seeds of its own destruction; it becomes the victim of the self-same dialectic from which 
it deduced the inevitable doom of all historical phenomena. For the very scientific pretense of 
Marxism-Leninism makes the confrontation of the pseudoscientific dogma with empirical reality 
inevitable. Sophisticated arguments may stave off the confrontation for the time being, but the 
“science of society”, in contrast to an otherworldly religion, cannot evade the empirical “moment 
of truth” forever.488
As I have shown in the previous chapter, we can see the role that the eschaton plays in 
Morgenthau’s theory. As history will not be completed by mankind’s interventions, but 
by God, genuine religion such as Christianity does not exclusively focus on the here and 
now, while political religion and ideology do.489 At another place, Morgenthau also makes 
a difference between genuine religion and political religion when he writes about Nazism. 
484 Morgenthau’s distinction between religiosity and religions largely agrees with Kant’s approach of religion. Hurd, The 
Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 34.
485 Morgenthau, The Rediscovery of Imagination and Religion, 62.
486 Morgenthau, Science, 64.
487 Morgenthau, The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism, 253.
488 Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969), 38, 39.
489 See Section 5.1.
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In sum, naziism is less political philosophy than a political religion. It has in Hitler its savior, 
S.A., S.S., and party its sacred orders, in Mein Kampf its bible, in the immutable twenty-five 
points of the party program its catechism, in the racial community its mystical body. It has its 
miracles and rituals, its apostles, martyrs, its claim to acceptance not from the truthfulness of its 
suppositions, which is verifiable by experience, but from authority, and, furthermore, that its 
claims to acceptance is absolute and not subject to critical doubt. It differs from genuine religion 
in that its manipulators are not supposed to believe in it, that it constantly changes according to 
the exigencies of the political situation, and, finally and most important, that its avowed objective 
it not to establish relationships between the individual and supernatural forces, but to establish 
and perpetuate the political power of a self-appointed elite over the masses of humanity.490
Morgenthau shows that Nazism displays many features of a religion, but it is a political 
religion, not a genuine religion. In both quotations, Morgenthau distinguishes religion 
from ideology by referring to religion’s transcendent reference point and to the immanent 
role of religion in political religion. This explains why Morgenthau at another place 
warns against a religion that loses its transcendent reference point and ‘its concern for 
truth and sin and joins other social forces in justifying, strengthening, and improving 
society’ and becomes an ‘organized social activity and the public demonstration of 
official piety, permeated with doubt and disbelief ’.491 The distinction that Morgenthau 
makes between religion and ideology comes close to the religionists’ approach, because 
both acknowledge that there can be overlap and also maintain that religion, more 
than ideology, is about a transcendent or otherworldly reality. In sum, Morgenthau’s 
understanding of religion is almost similar to the way in which the religionists see it. 
As said before, Morgenthau often writes about morality in relation to international 
politics. Although it is possible to have a view of morality without a religious perspective, 
there are reasons to assume that Morgenthau relates the two. In 1979, Morgenthau 
delivered a lecture under the title Human Rights and Foreign Policy as part of a series 
of lectures on morality and foreign policy. This series was organized by the Council 
on Religion and International Affairs.492 In that lecture, Morgenthau acknowledges the 
importance of religion as a foundation of human rights:
490 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Naziism,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 
228, 229.
491 Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 3; Morgenthau, The Purpose 
of American Politics, 228.
492 Morgenthau himself was for almost forty years a member of the board of trustees of the Council on Religion and 
International Affairs (CRIA), a non-governmental organization, which describes itself as an ‘an independent, non-
sectarian organization, founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1914. The Council subscribes to the thesis that the ethical 
principles of the major religions are relevant to the world’s political, economic, and social problems’. Mollov, Power and 
Transcendence, 59; Thompson, Brauer and Morgenthau, U.S. Policy in the Far East, Back cover. The CRIA later became 
the well-known Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.
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I personally believe that it is impossible to postulate a plausible moral code without a theological 
foundation. But how you formulate that foundation is a difficult theological question. I do not 
believe that you can postulate, for instance, the dignity of human life or the sacredness of human 
life without a theological foundation.493 
This means that Morgenthau relates morality and religion. However, in his survey about 
his six realist principles, he sets out that ethics or morality are a different sphere than the 
religious sphere.494 They do not, however, exclude each other. When Morgenthau writes 
about morality, he sees it as something that is founded on or derived from religion, but 
he still sees them as two separate spheres, which means that people can agree on moral 
issues without sharing their theological or religious foundation.495
6.2. Morgenthau’s Sensitivity to Religion  
In the first part of this dissertation, I have set out the religionists’ position. They argue 
that IR should incorporate religion, because it plays an important role in the world. 
This is an empirical argument. The question is whether Morgenthau indeed neglected 
the empirical role of religion. Based on his theory, not only his six principles but also his 
other writings, I will show that Morgenthau was sensitive to religion on the individual, 
national, transnational and international level. This is surprising since Morgenthau 
does not refer to anything similar to what the religionists call a global resurgence of 
religion. How can that be explained given the fact that Morgenthau writes about the 
role of religion in world affairs, as I will demonstrate hereafter? It could mean that the 
global resurgence of religion implied not so much a quantitative increase of religion, but 
much more a renewed (academic) interest in religion. This is not the general view of the 
religionists, but there are religionists that do take that position. It is also important to 
keep in mind that the religionists also point out that the resurgence of religion started in 
the 1960s, but that it was not until the 1990s before religion was picked up within IR. 
The global resurgence is a term they invented in retrospect. The fact that Morgenthau 
passed away in 1980 might explain why he never mentioned a global resurgence of 
religion. Although these considerations might soften the conclusion that Morgenthau 
did not know about a global resurgence, the fact remains that he never wrote about an 
increase in religiosity or something similar. Jodok Troy links Morgenthau’s statements 
about the power of religiosity with the global resurgence of religion by quoting him:  
493 Hans J. Morgenthau, Human Rights and Foreign Policy (New York, N.Y.: Council on Religion and International 
Affairs, 1979), 10.
494 I discuss this in more detail in the section on the influence of the Enlightenment.
495 Cf. James Gustafson, “Say Something Theological!” in Moral Discernment in the Christian Life: Essays in Theological 
Ethics, eds. James M. Gustafson, Theodoor Adriaan Boer and Paul E. Capetz (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2007), 95.
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[I]t is naive to believe that religious faith can be recaptured by a conscious act of will, as though 
the increasingly disenchanted structure of our moral universe could simply be rolled back by an 
organized campaign among intellectuals.496
Troy suggests that Morgenthau would judge the current global resurgence similarly. That 
would mean that the resurgence will not be able to bring an enchanted structure back. 
In the sections below, I will show that Morgenthau drew attention to religion’s role 
on the individual, national, transnational and international level. In the reconstruction 
of the religionists, I have used further subdivisions within these four levels, but I will not 
use them here, because this is not necessary to illustrate the correctness or incorrectness 
of the empirical statement. 
6.2.1. Individual Level: Morgenthau’s Appreciation of  Lincoln’s Religiosity 
Morgenthau writes at various places about the influence of religion on individuals, 
which is not surprising, because he focuses on state leaders in his theories. He seems 
to have a personal preference for the way in which Lincoln as a statesman expresses 
his religiosity. Below I will present some of his descriptions and go into more detail 
regarding his appreciation for Lincoln. 
There are a couple of examples that give an indication of Morgenthau’s awareness of 
religion’s role in the life of politicians. He writes, for example, that President Ngo Dinh 
Diem (1901-1963) of Vietnam is a practicing Roman Catholic, who does not so much 
rely on his Christian faith, but more on the Confucian worldview as the foundation of 
his political thinking and regime.497 Another example Morgenthau gives is President 
William McKinley (1843-1901), who declared that his decision to annex the Philippines 
was the result of his prayers to God. According to his own testimony, one night he 
prayed to God and asked for divine guidance. In the morning he heard the voice of God 
telling him to annex the Philippines.498 Morgenthau does not condemn this behavior 
but rather finds it a totally inadequate basis for foreign policy. Such behavior could 
happen in the times of the Puritans and Calvinists in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, because then ‘they represented a spiritual and moral reality’.499 The world of 
today is different, because of a contrast between religious and moral ideology and the 
political realm.500 Morgenthau argues that this intermingling of the political and the 
religious realm has not been absent in his age. According to Morgenthau, political and 
military leaders sometimes feel the need for divine inspiration. It is the experience of 
insecurity that gives leaders the need of a confirmation that what they are doing is in 
496 Jodok Troy, “Faith-Based Diplomacy Under Examination,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3, no. 3 (2008): 215.
497 Hans J. Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 21.
498 Thompson, Brauer and Morgenthau, U.S. Policy in the Far East, 57; Morgenthau and Thompson, In Defense of the 
National Interest, 23.
499 Thompson, Brauer and Morgenthau, U.S. Policy in the Far East, 57.
500 Ibid., 57.
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accordance with a higher power which will ultimately decide in their favor.501
Morgenthau further mentions the role of religion in the foreign policy decision 
making of Albert J. Beveridge (1862-1927), who was a senator from Indiana. He said in 
the Senate on January 9, 1990:
He [God] has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the 
earth. He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage 
and senile peoples. Where it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism 
and night. And all of our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally 
lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all 
the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of the world’s progress, 
guardians of its righteous peace.502
One of Morgenthau’s greatest examples is President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865). He 
appreciated especially the way Lincoln dealt with the religious claims both parties made 
during the Civil War (1861-1865). He therefore cites how President Lincoln replied to a 
petition of a delegation of Presbyterian ministers in 1862, called Emancipation Memorial 
Presented by Chicago Christians of All Denominations. 
The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past and I 
might even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice and that 
by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either 
the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will 
not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point 
so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am 
more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence 
in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, 
and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain 
physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible and learn what appears to be wise and right.503
His appreciation for Lincoln appears also from another passage in which he describes 
Lincoln’s position in the Civil War. It seems that here his own position agrees with 
Lincoln’s view. 
The most mortal men, such as Lincoln, could do was to work to the best of their ability toward the 
end which they expected to be the design of the higher power: the restoration of the Union. God governs 
501 Thompson, Morgenthau and Hein, Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics, 9, 10.
502 Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States, 80, 81.
503 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 278; Morgenthau, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 8; 
Thompson, Morgenthau and Hein, Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics, 10, 11.
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the world according to his own designs which can neither be known nor influenced by man. Thus in one 
sense man is a forlorn actor on the stage of the world; for he does not know the nature of the plot and the 
outcome of the play written by an inaccessible author. But he is also a confident and self-sufficient actor; 
for he knows that there is a script, however unknown and un knowable its content, and he can do no more 
than act out what he believes the script to require.504 
Morgenthau suggests that perhaps the best way to act is according to this political 
morality.505 The three examples and Morgenthau’s preference for Lincoln’s approach 
towards religion show that Morgenthau clearly was not blind for religion the lives of 
individual politicians, but he also does not assign much weight to it. 
6.2.2. National Level: Religion as Challenger and Change Agent 
It is beyond doubt for Morgenthau that religion plays a role, if only because historically 
religion has always been present and, in the case of America, churches have always been 
closely involved with the state. Morgenthau’s reflections on the role of religion on the 
national level have two sides. On the one hand, it becomes clear that religion can have 
influence and bring about change, not only through ideas, but also because the close 
ties between church and state are often used by the state to legitimize its actions. On the 
other hand, religion also functions as a challenger, especially when political regimes are 
involved. I will start to set out religion’s role as change agent.  
Morgenthau draws attention to the fact that many ideas that play a role in American 
culture and politics have religious origins or can only be understood in relation to 
religion. In his lectures on The Politics of Aristotle, he argues that modern egalitarianism 
is tributary to religion. The religious idea that all people are created in the image of God 
implies that they all are children of God and therefore equal in the sight of God.506 For 
the same reason, Morgenthau calls ‘humanity’ a Christian concept which changed the 
ideas of the ancient world, because it acknowledges all people as children of God.507 
Another example he mentions is the freedom of speech. Morgenthau explains that this 
principle, although now accepted as natural right for everybody within American society, 
originated as a principle by which religious and political minority groups secured their 
freedom from intervention by the state.508 
Morgenthau, in the second place, describes that religion can have an influence on 
politics through its, often historically grown, relationship with the church. One way 
in which this takes place is in theocracy, because it claims to have the monopoly of the 
truth.509 History has known such political systems, especially of a theocratic nature, and 
504 Ibid., 15, 16.
505 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 278.
506 Lang, Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s the Politics, 38.
507 Ibid., 99.
508 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 55, 56.
509 Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, 1, 2.
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these systems were completely stable over long periods and completely self-contained in 
their conception of justice.510 Morgenthau mentions how the immigrants from Europe 
came to America with the belief in an objective order that had to be realized in America. 
Some described that order in religious terms, others did so in secular terms. It was 
inspired by the English High Church on the one hand and the teaching of the Romans 
and the French Encyclopedists on the other hand.511 
The third example of religion’s influence is that churches strive for political power in 
order to survive, while empires use religion to justify their existence and their policies in 
the vocabulary of morality and divine Providence. This use of religion to gain legitimacy 
is common to all politics, Morgenthau states. It is an inevitable weapon in the hands of 
politicians striving for power. By means of religion they seek to prove that their aims are 
nobler than political reality suggests.512  
Religion functions as a challenger when it opposes political regimes like 
totalitarianism. The example Morgenthau gives is the confrontation between Christ and 
Pontius Pilate. 
Christ, the non-democrat, says, “I am the King of the Jews.” And that’s it. You don’t have to put 
that to a democratic test. And Pontius Pilate, the relativist, asks the people, “Whom do you want, 
Barrabas or Jesus of Nazareth?” And the majority decides. The opinion hasn’t been unanimous 
that the decision was correct but that is democracy.513 
Morgenthau wants to show that democracy must be able to criticize the inclination of 
the political system to see itself as the highest power and truth. A totalitarian system 
cannot live with such a democracy and that often leads to the persecution of religious 
minorities for political reasons. Morgenthau describes how the persecution of the early 
Christians took place for exactly this reason. They were revolutionaries, because they 
challenged the idea that the Roman Emperor was not a godhead, but was subjected to 
another, higher power. The same holds for the Jewish minorities in the Soviet Union 
and other places.514
6.2.3. Transnational Level: Civilizations and the Constitutive Role of  
Religion
The transnational level has only been a theme in IR since the end of the Cold War. In 
that respect, it is not surprising that Morgenthau does not use the term transnational. Yet 
that does not mean that he did not think about it. I will illustrate this with two examples. 
510 Morgenthau, Justice and Power, 170.
511 Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, 15.
512 Morgenthau, The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, 107, 108.
513 Lang, Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s the Politics, 86.
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First of all, Morgenthau describes how civilizations play a role on a transnational level 
and discusses the role of religion on this level. Secondly, Morgenthau writes about a 
transnational religious community, namely the Quakers.  
Morgenthau describes a civilization as a community of people sharing certain moral 
principles, fundamental religious beliefs and a common way of life.515 He argues that in the 
Western world such a civilization has existed throughout modern history, if not since the end 
of the ancient world. He maintains that the Western world is not only a geographical, but 
also a cultural and moral unity despite temporary exceptions such as the religious wars at the 
end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century and the Napoleonic Wars 
at the turn of the nineteenth century. Because of the unity of the Western world, political 
writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries spoke of ‘the family of nations’. As in all 
families, there were quarrels within the family of nations. Yet there was something stronger 
than all conflicts, something that kept the ambitions and rivalries of nations within certain 
bounds, which was the consciousness of a unity overriding all disruptive tendencies: the 
unity of Western civilization itself.516 Morgenthau approvingly quotes the historian Edward 
Gibbon (1737-1794) that even the French Revolution
cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws, and 
manners, which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and 
their colonies… The abuses of tyranny are restrained by the mutual influence of fear and shame; 
republics have acquired order and stability; monarchies have imbibed the principles or freedom, 
or, at least, of moderation; and some sense of honour and justice is introduced into the most 
defective constitutions by the general manners of the times.517
At another place, Morgenthau discusses the relationship between religion and civilization 
more explicitly in his article on Toynbee’s The Study of History. He then states:
If we assume that only religious civilization is worthy of the name, it cannot be hard to 
demonstrate that the flowering of civilization depends on religious faith. Yet if we give to 
civilization its common secular meaning, it can hardly be open to doubt that from Plato to Kant, 
from Sophocles to Dostoevski, from Michelangelo to Rodin, the weakening of religious faith and 
the flowering of civilization not only coincide in time but also are organically interconnected. It 
is true that these great achievements of civilizations owe their greatness to the religious experience 
of mystery, tragedy and guilt.518
515 In the first chapter on the religionists (Chapter 2), I place civilizations on the international level while in the case 
of Morgenthau I deal with it in the context of the transnational level. The difference is that Huntington deals with 
civilizations as if they were nation-states, while Morgenthau does not. For that reason, I place Huntington’s description 
on the international level and Morgenthau’s on the transnational.
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517 Ibid., 61.
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Morgenthau also writes about the religious transnational community of the Quakers. 
In a foreword to a volume with the title Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy, he praises the 
Quakers for not shying away from the inevitable conflict between Christian teaching 
and human action. He also admires the way they try to overcome this discrepancy 
through action rather than through imposing dogma on the political domain. He finds 
the Quakers’ attempts ‘moving’, especially because ‘in their convictions, achievements, 
and sufferings the Quakers bear witness to the teachings of Christianity, in their failures 
they bear witness to the insuperable stubbornness of the human condition’.519 Not 
surprisingly, Morgenthau finds their pacifist stance not realistic. Though it may provide 
a satisfying solution to some situations, it eschews the consequences of political life. The 
Quakers’ advocacy of pacifism looks like the decision of hermits to go into the woods 
and pray there for the rest of their lives, Morgenthau states.520 Although Morgenthau 
does not discuss the relevance of this transnational religious community, the attention 
that he pays to it, shows, at least, that he knew about such groups. 
6.2.4. International Level: Political Religion, Diplomacy, Human Rights, 
Nationalism and Ideology  
Morgenthau sees religion playing a role on the international level in many ways: in 
political religions, ideologies, and nationalism, etc. This closely resembles the position 
of the religionists, who claim that religion is virtually everywhere.   
Morgenthau sees the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States as a 
conflict between two different political religions, between two mutually exclusive ways 
of life, moral systems, political philosophies and institutions.521 In Morgenthau’s view, 
Bolshevism is the most ‘elaborate’ and ‘most sophisticated’ political religion, because 
it strives for realization of its historic and sacred mission aimed at universal salvation 
to remake the world in its own image.522 Political religion differs from otherworldly 
religions which are based on religious faith. The truth of the latter cannot be tested by 
experiment, while the validity of political religion depends on its success in the here and 
now. According to Morgenthau, Marxism has been falsified by experience.523 
519 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Christian Ethics and Political Action,” in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962), 375, 376. This comes from a preface of this book: Robert O. Byrd, Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960). Quakers are members of a Christian group called the Society of Friends or 
Friends Church that stresses the guidance of the Holy Spirit, rejects outward rites and an ordained ministry, and that has 
a long tradition of actively working for peace and opposing war. Encyclopedia Britannica entry ‘Quaker’, online available 
at http://www.britannica.com (accessed December 28, 2020).
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521 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Foreign Policy of the United States,” in The Impasse of American Foreign Policy (Chicago: 
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Although Morgenthau does not use the phrase ‘faith-based diplomacy’ as it is 
currently understood, one of his rules for effective diplomacy in his book Politics Among 
Nations is that diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit.524 Morgenthau means 
that diplomacy must be aware of the fact that religious doctrines are articles of faith 
that people do not believe on rational grounds, but by virtue of their membership of 
a church or community. A religious doctrine is a metaphysical assertion of a certain 
abstract principle, Morgenthau states. Absolute and abstract principles are dangerous 
because they do not fit the conditioned and relative nature of human reality.525 For 
Morgenthau, the truth of this statement can been shown by the Thirty Years’ War during 
which Catholics and Protestants tried to impose their own religion upon the rest of 
the world. It took many years of bloodshed before the two religions could agree to live 
together in mutual tolerance. According to Morgenthau, the wars of religion of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century have been taken over by the conflict between the two 
political religions of his time. The question is whether they will learn from the lessons of 
the Thirty Years’ War, namely that a foreign policy should not claim that it follows from 
universal political religion. Peace will only have a chance from a moral consensus based 
on common values and convictions.526 
Morgenthau describes how nationalism sometimes looks like religion in a functional 
sense. He distinguishes two forms of nationalism. The first took place in the nineteenth 
century and was aimed at freeing the nation from domination by other states. This strive 
was rightfully recognized by other states.527 The nationalism of the twentieth century 
differs from this struggle of independence, because it takes the nation as a starting 
point of a universal mission to impose its standards of action upon all other nations.528 
This kind of nationalism, as expressed in fascism, Nazism and Marxism, believes in the 
chosen nation, which implies that one nation is unique and superior to all others.529 
This nationalism has become a nationalistic universalism and displays features of an 
expansive religion that wants to convert other nations to its standards. It will not unify 
the world, but leads to religious wars in which traditional religion may be involved 
524 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 584. ‘Faith-based diplomacy, while conceptually new to the field 
of international relations, is a form of Track II (unofficial) diplomacy that integrates the dynamics of religious faith with 
the conduct of international peacemaking. As such, it is more about reconciliation than it is conflict resolution. The peace 
that it pursues is not the mere absence of conflict but rather a restoration of healthy and respectful relationships between 
the parties. While faith-based intermediaries believe that diplomacy and the international system should be morally 
grounded (as do many secularists), they also understand the need for pragmatism in their pursuit of reconciliation.’ 
Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, “Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement,” in Faith-Based Diplomacy: 
Trumping Realpolitik (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 15. Cf. Troy, Faith-Based Diplomacy Under 
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526 Ibid., 586. 
527 Hans J. Morgenthau, “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” The Review of Politics 10, no. 2 (1948): 155.
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too.530 He writes: ‘It is a secular religion, universal in its interpretation of the nature and 
destiny of man and in its Messianic promise of salvation for all mankind. A particular 
nation will bear its torch at any particular time, but in principle any nation can.’531 
Finally, Morgenthau sees that religion often functions like ideology, because religion 
too can easily become a means to cloud the real issue at stake. This agrees with what 
I wrote about the legitimizing function of religion in the section about religion on 
the national level. What Morgenthau writes about ideology indicates how, in his view, 
religion could function. He would, however, describe this form of religion as improper; 
a distortion of religion in the form of ideology. Morgenthau defines ideology as Karl 
Mannheim does in his book Ideology and Utopia. 
[T]he term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our 
opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, 
the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. This distortion ranges all 
the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts 
to dupe others to self-deception.532 
At another place, he describes an ideology as ‘any system of thought which rationalizes or 
justifies a particular social position.533 The reason that ideology and politics are narrowly 
intertwined is the result of the nature of politics.534 In the first place, ideology is a very 
effective means to raise the national morale and overrule the rival nation with it.535 
Secondly, a human being holds power and is at the same time the object of political power. 
This ambiguous position reveals itself in the way he or she justifies and rationalizes his or 
her own drive for power and the strive for power of the other.536 It would be impossible 
for a nation to say frankly that it wants more power, because then it will find itself at a 
great disadvantage in the struggle for power.537 A state that succeeds in convincing its 
rival that what it wants is something different than power has already won a substantial 
part of the battle.538 This happened when the United States tended to take communism 
more seriously as a political ideology than the communist government itself, because the 
communists saw communism as an ideological means for the traditional imperialism of 
Russia.539 
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The function of ideology to justify one’s position in politics is also what religion can 
provide. However, in the end, Morgenthau states, it is not ideology or the military, but 
the visible virtues and vices of the philosophy that prove the superiority of the political 
system.540 A conflict between two different philosophies or moral systems for its control 
over the consciences and actions of humankind has the advantage that both systems are 
able to prove their strength. The validity of the ethics of humility and self-denial of the 
Sermon on the Mount over against the ethics of self-advancement and power of Western 
society is put to test. Such a test should make clear its strength in relation to foreign 
policy, supranational ethics and the ethics of nationalism.541 It seems that Morgenthau 
opens space for proper religion here, because, as I wrote earlier, proper religion functions 
in a similar way as metaphysical philosophy. This means that Morgenthau is aware of 
the impact of distorted, improper religion as well as the influence of proper religion.542
6.3. Evaluation of  the Empirical Thesis  
It is clear from the preceding sections that Morgenthau knew about the role of religion 
in the world. Although he is not very explicit about the importance that should be 
ascribed to it – as will become clear in the section on the domain-specific level –, he pays 
attention to it. Another way to evaluate the importance he ascribes to it, is by weighing 
how much attention he pays to religion in comparison to other factors and issues. In 
that case, the conclusion should be that religion is not a major but rather a minor issue.
The question is how relevant it is that Morgenthau ‘missed’ the global resurgence 
of religion while he shows to be aware of religion’s presence on all four levels. I would 
argue that the fact that Morgenthau did not seem to be aware of a so-called religious 
resurgence, but nevertheless pays attention to religion on all four levels, shows his 
sensitivity to religion anyway. Something else that supports this is that Morgenthau is 
not negative about the role religion might play in foreign policy, though he distinguishes 
between, for example, the way in which McKinley and Lincoln incorporated religion, 
and between the use of proper and improper religion. Morgenthau, in short, was 
attentive to religion though not very extensively. Whether he has missed important 
religious issues or factors in his time, or whether his level of attention does not meet the 
religionist standard is difficult to decide, also because the religionists did not provide a 
way to measure or evaluate this. The bottom line, however, is that the religionists are not 
correct that Morgenthau ignores religion. 
540 Ibid., 243.
541 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 269.
542 See Section 6.1.
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6.4. Domain-Specific Level: Morgenthau’s View on Westphalia 
and its Assumptions
The fact that Morgenthau did pay attention to religion in his reflections on international 
affairs, makes it all the more interesting to know how he deals with religion on the 
domain-specific level. In this section, I want to look into Morgenthau’s interpretation 
of Westphalia, and into the importance of the resulting assumptions for the attention 
to religion, such as the central role of the state and the national interest defined as 
power. I will argue that Morgenthau’s reasoning regarding the Westphalian is closer 
to the interpretation of the religionists. Then I will show that Morgenthau is a lot less 
secular and much richer in his reasoning than the religionists would have us believe. 
6.4.1. Disenchantment and Westphalia: The Need for Religion in an ‘Empty 
Transcendent Space’  
Morgenthau did not write explicitly about his interpretation of Westphalia. In his 
Politics Among Nations, he states that the Treaty of Westphalia brought the religious 
wars to an end and that it made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state 
system. He also describes, although without reference to the Westphalian Treaty, how 
the transition of the Middle Ages to the modern period of history was accompanied by 
a move from a feudal system into a territorial state, while the monarch did no longer 
share authority with the feudal lords and the church within the state territory.543 As I 
mentioned above, Morgenthau describes the wars of religion as a violent time during 
which people tried to impose their own religion upon the rest of the world. According 
to Morgenthau, what happened in the sixteenth and seventeenth century is reflected 
in the conflict between the two political religions in his time. Will they learn from the 
lessons of the Thirty Years’ War? Morgenthau states that one of the lessons learned is that 
foreign policy should not define its objectives in terms of a world-embracing political 
religion, and that peace-preserving diplomacy only will have a chance to grow when a 
moral consensus emerging from shared convictions and values has developed.544 
Morgenthau does not say that the lesson is that religion should be privatized, for 
which the religionists blame him. He problematizes the presence of a moral consensus, 
which has to do with his view on secularization. Morgenthau strongly leans on Weber 
regarding his view on secularization. With Weber, Morgenthau would rather speak of 
disenchantment than secularization. Morgenthau recognizes that a unifying worldview 
is becoming increasingly rare in the West, giving way to a differentiation of numerous 
clashing value spheres.545 Mihaela Neacsu states that Morgenthau in one of his early 
543 Ibid., 293, 294.
544 Ibid., 586.
545 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, entry ‘Weber’, online available at https://plato.stanford.edu (accessed December 
28, 2020).
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unpublished IR lectures which he held in 1946 points to  
the breakdown of universal religion and universal humanism, arguing that the “universal ties” 
which bind men together have become “weaker and weaker”, and that while looking at the moral 
principles which shape human conduct, one can notice that “the strength of non- or anti-universal 
allegiance is greater today than it was at any time in the history of Western civilization”.546
Neacsu refers to various phrases in various books that Morgenthau uses to describe 
this development: ‘man is a creature who has “lost its animal innocence and security”’, 
‘the attacks “upon the very foundations of Western civilization”, which have left “the 
received systems of thought empty of content and, in any event, without conviction’’, 
‘a secular age, which has lost “faith in individual immortality in another world and is 
aware of the impending doom of the world through which it tries to perpetuate itself 
here and now”, is left “without a remedy”, and that “once it has become aware of its 
condition, it must despair’’’. ‘In this age, men live in a threatening world, plagued by 
an “unprecedented increase in physical danger, social disintegration, and metaphysical 
doubt’’’, ‘the “hopeless impotence of universal ethics”’, ‘the “empty transcendent 
space’’’.547 In this world, Morgenthau says, it is downright dangerous for a nation to 
claim that morality is on your side and to devise foreign policies based on that. Instead 
of an overarching metaphysical whole, there are now competing value spheres, each with 
its own rationality. The political sphere thus cannot simply follow the rationality of the 
moral or religious sphere. Morgenthau, however, does not believe this to be the end of 
the role of metaphysics. On the contrary, he stresses the importance of a transcendent 
reference point and warns against all sorts of alternative systems that are supposed to 
bring meaning. I will come back to this later in this chapter, in the section on philosophy 
of science. 
It seems that Morgenthau comes close to the neosecularization theory of the 
religionists, namely that Westphalia signified the separation of spheres, thus reviving the 
Augustinian political theology of the city of man and the city of God. I am not sure, 
however, whether Morgenthau would label Westphalia as the birth of religious freedom, 
as do religionists. Another point of agreement between Morgenthau and the religionists 
is that they both emphasize that the Westphalian settlement and the emergence of 
different spheres cannot be separated from the (Christian) cultural context in which 
it emerged. In that sense, Morgenthau’s position is closer to Hurd’s Judeo-Christian 
secularism than to her laicism. If this conclusion is correct, this raises the question 
whether this affects the way in which Morgenthau sees the state and the national interest.
546 Mihaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations. Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment 
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6.4.2. Morgenthau on the Importance of  the State and Statesmen 
Morgenthau attributes an important role to the state, the statesmen, and lesser so to 
religion. To start with the first, Morgenthau is clear about the fact that he has always 
focused on statesmen in his theorizing. In that sense, I do not understand the criticism 
put forward by religionists that Morgenthau treats the state as a black box without 
caring for things that happen within the state. Morgenthau’s theory, above all, is a theory 
of foreign policy, and not just a theory that discusses the system and the interactions 
between states, as is the case with Waltz. Morgenthau knew and theorized about the 
impact individuals, such as state leaders, and societal factors could have on the state, as 
I have shown in the section on the empirical thesis. In his Politics Among Nations he also 
states, in his first realist principle, that theory consists of ascertaining facts and that ‘we 
can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences 
of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been’.548 The focus of this 
theorizing should be that ‘we put ourselves in the position of the statesman who must 
meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances’.549 One of the 
outcomes is Morgenthau’s idea of the national interest defined as power, that is to say, 
it gives intellectual discipline to the observer, infuses rational order into the subject 
matter of politics and makes a theoretical understanding of politics possible. Besides 
that, it provides the actor, the statesman, with rational discipline in action which leads 
to continuity in foreign policy.550 In this way, Morgenthau does not only theorize about 
statesman, but they even are the aim of his theorizing.  
The religionists argue that Morgenthau’s overemphasis of the state could be strongly 
defined by the Cold War paradigm of two competing secular ideologies. This might 
have blinded or distorted Morgenthau’s view on religion. It is interesting to notice, 
however, that it is not that easy, because Morgenthau has a sharp eye for the role of 
religion – though distorted – in this power conflict. Morgenthau writes that the East 
and the West share certain characteristics of political religion, either in the name of 
‘people’s democracy’ or under the banner of the Wilsonian credo ‘to make the world safe 
for democracy’.551 Morgenthau illustrates this point by presenting the 1848 text written 
by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) which he has slightly 
modified. The text could have just as well been written by an admirer of the Soviet Union 
as by one of the United States. It shows the affinity between communism and capitalism 
in their economic aspirations and achievements.552 For that reason, Morgenthau is also 
very critical of the influence of religion on America’s foreign policy. He points at the 
fact that the Manifest Destiny, as ‘the most typical ideology of American foreign policy’, 
548 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 4, 5.
549 Ibid., 4, 5.
550 Ibid., 5.
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was couched in terms of the quasi-theological conception that divine Providence has 
reserved the North American continent for pioneers.553 He often criticizes the tendency 
to equate American society with the ultimate goal of mankind. The idea that the United 
States was created by Providence has too many similarities with the Marxist idea that 
mankind moves toward a classless society and that all Marxists have the duty to advance 
the goal of socialism.554 Morgenthau says about it: 
The history of the formulation of the national purpose, in America as elsewhere, is the story 
of bad theology and absurd metaphysics of phony theories and fraudulent science, of crude 
rationalizations and vulgar delusions of grandeur.555 
Instead of neglecting religion and framing the conflict as one between two secular 
ideologies, Morgenthau points out that religion plays an important role in this conflict, 
and he does not shy away from calling this distorted religion or bad theology and absurd 
metaphysics, discriminating thus between good and bad religion. 
That Morgenthau nevertheless pays more attention to the states and statesmen 
than to religion, is the result of theoretical and political-theological considerations. As 
I set out earlier, Morgenthau distinguishes between the domestic and the international 
sphere. The consequence of this distinction is that religion becomes less important in the 
international sphere, in which it is all about the national state, its survival, and not about 
something like a transcendent whole that defines and limits the pursuit of the state. 
The chance that religion overcomes these dominant forces and plays a significant role is 
much smaller than in the domestic realm. In addition to this, Morgenthau approaches 
international relations as international politics.556 That means that cultural, juridical, 
and economic relations and religious relations are taken into consideration in so far as 
they are relevant for the political sphere. 
The fact that Morgenthau distinguishes between spheres is a result of his ideal-
typical approach. Consequentially, Morgenthau has to select the relevant actors in the 
international political sphere, of which the state is a prominent one, much more so 
than religion. Religion being a separate sphere can influence other spheres, such as 
the political, by interpenetrating it or through shaping ultimate values of which other 
values in these spheres are derived. The distinction between ultimate and derived values 
and between various spheres limits the possibility that religion is taken into account in 
theorizing about the international political sphere. 
This does not mean that Morgenthau excludes religion a priori. Morgenthau believes 
553 Morgenthau, Organic relationship, 120. Manifest Destiny is the belief that American expansion westward and 
southward was inevitable, just, and divinely ordained. 
554 Thompson, Brauer and Morgenthau, U.S. Policy in the Far East, 58.
555 Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, 7.
556 For an extensive discussion of this topic, see the section on the Third Realist Principle of Chapter 5.
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that, in his time, the state was the central actor, but he nuances this by saying that it is 
possible for a time to arrive in which a different entity becomes important. It seems that 
he acknowledges the urgency of this in his later work when the nation-state fails when 
tackling transnational problems.557 This shows that Morgenthau was willing to address 
and incorporate empirical developments in his theorizing. That opens the possibility 
for Morgenthau to be also interested in religion as a factor which has to be dealt with 
internationally.558 In short, for Morgenthau it is a fact that the state plays an important 
role, but this does not prevent religion from being taken into consideration by him. 
He recognizes that empirical developments might lead to a change of his theoretical 
principles, which means that he is open for religion. At the same time his distinction 
between the domestic and the international and the use of the concept of sphere limits 
the role religion could play in his theorizing about international politics. 
There is, however, also a political-theological reason that Morgenthau grants the 
state such a central role. As I have shown in the previous chapter, Morgenthau attributes 
an important role to the state due to political-theological considerations. He regards it as 
an important bulwark against secularization.559 The religionists claim that Morgenthau’s 
view on the state prevents religion from being taken into consideration. But Morgenthau 
has theological reasons to defend the central role of the state. So, one could say that his 
political-theological ideas leads ‘paradoxically’ to less attention for religion and more 
attention for the state. In that sense, the religionists are correct when they say that 
his assumption about the state marginalizes religion, but they overlook that political 
theology plays an indirect role in support of the state. The question remains whether this 
marginalization is a bad thing, looking at the arguments given above.
6.4.3. The Context- and Time Dependency of  the National Interest
What applies to the state, in a way also applies to the national interest. Morgenthau 
views this as an important characteristic of the international politics of his time, but 
this characteristic can change over time. Morgenthau also holds, however, that there is a 
timeless aspect to international politics, namely the conflict of interests. This aspect can 
be denied, but that is what Morgenthau warns against in his sixth principle regarding 
the autonomy of the political. Below I will lay out that (1) Morgenthau indeed defines 
the national interest as power in his time, yet is open to the fact that this depends on 
time and place; (2) Morgenthau does not discard morality, even though he emphasizes 
the importance of national interest and survival, and (3) Morgenthau assumes the 
autonomy of the political and therefore grants religion a derived function.
557 See Chapter 5, the section on the Third Realist Principle.
558 Although I do not subscribe to Campbell’s characterization that Morgenthau and Niebuhr committed ‘a form of 
intellectual suicide’, he correctly points out that Morgenthau adjusted (I would say that he emphasized other elements 
of ) his theoretical principles in light of new developments. Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, 116.
559 See Section 5.1.
195
In the first place, the religionists are correct that Morgenthau assumes that 
international relations has its own logic, namely the reason of state, which is the security 
and survival of the state. The religionists are also right that Morgenthau derives this 
from his view on human nature and the will to power.560 It is, however, not taken for 
granted that Morgenthau relates the interest defined as power to the state. Morgenthau 
certainly applies the interest defined as power to the nation-state, but he draws this idea 
from the practice of politics which is characterized by interest defined as power. As I 
stated in the section before, Morgenthau realizes that in his time interest and the nation-
state were closely related, but he also acknowledged that this could disappear in the 
course of history. Moreover, Morgenthau does not hold the view that interest defined as 
power is something fixed once and for all, although he considers interests as the essence 
of politics unaffected by the circumstances of time and place.561 This means that the 
content of interests can vary and is not limited to power. In short, Morgenthau relates 
the national interest to the state and defines it as power, yet recognizes that this might 
change depending on the time and situation. This means, in my view, that religion also 
has a chance to play a more prominent role in the future when it becomes a matter of 
interest. 
Secondly, the principle of the interest defined as power does not imply that Morgenthau 
discards morality. The religionists specifically make this argument and suggest that 
discarding morality would also imply discarding religion. However, Morgenthau has 
often been misunderstood on this point. Critics often interpret Morgenthau’s insistence 
that power is important in all political relationships as if he endorses axioms like ‘might 
makes right’.562 Mollov argues that Morgenthau acknowledges that when there is power, 
there is justice as well, and that man is both an animal longing for power and a creature 
with a moral purpose.563 Besides that, Morgenthau sees the strive for power and the 
strive for love coming from the same source in the human soul. He considers them both 
as attempts to overcome loneliness.564 
Nobody who disparages the perennial importance of power in human existence and human 
society can do justice to the other great force which determines human existence and human 
life and society, and that is the element of love. It may be surprising to some of you that I would 
correlate in a discussion such as this the problem of power with the problem of love... And no 
560 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 4. Cf. Craig writes that: ‘It was this understanding, [that deterrence 
can’t last out the necessary timespan, SP] grasped dimly and gradually by Niebuhr and Morgenthau, that led them to 
“instruct” the public about the dangers of accepting the perpetuation of international anarchy, and, correspondingly to 
let go their earlier belief that a world state was neither desirable nor possible.’ Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, viii
561 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 10, 11.
562 Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics, 216.
563 Mollov, Power and Spirituality, 103, 104; Mollov, Power and Transcendence, 52. Mollow takes this quote from the 
archives on Morgenthau. 
564 Mollov, Power and Spirituality, 97.
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political society can exist for any length of time in any harmonious and stable way which does not 
take into consideration both the desire for power and the desire for love.565
According to Morgenthau, empirical evidence that power and love are coming from 
the same source in the political realm is that all governments and dictators attempt to 
appear as the servant of the people.566 Morgenthau’s view on politics has been labeled as 
tragic, because he knows that power does not suffice ultimately, but that international 
politics cannot do without it. As I quoted earlier on, Morgenthau holds that moral 
principles can only be approximated and that power is a crude and unreliable method 
to limit the aspirations for power and the balance of power a good short-term strategy. 
The fact that Morgenthau is critical on international morality does not mean that he 
discards it. As I have shown in the preceding chapter, Morgenthau holds that morality 
functions differently in different situations.567 Political realism, Morgenthau says in his 
fifth principle, refuses to identify the moral aspirations of particular nations and the 
moral laws that govern the universe: ‘To know that nations are subject to the moral 
law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in 
the relations among states is quite another.’568 Morgenthau’s purpose is not to discard 
religion or morality, but to show that its role in international politics is different from 
other situations. Another important element in Morgenthau’s theorizing is that he 
separates the political sphere from the moral and the religious, but that ‘does not imply 
disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought. It rather 
implies that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function’.569 
That is to say, if I want to understand “religious man,” I must for the time being abstract from 
the other aspects of human nature and deal with its religious aspect as if it were the only one. 
Furthermore, I must apply to the religious sphere the standards of thought appropriate to it, 
always remaining aware of the existence of other standards and their actual influence upon the 
religious qualities of man. What is true for this facet of human nature is true of all the others.570 
In other words, the differentiation of spheres limits the role of religion and morality, but 
does not discard them. One could even say that Morgenthau also defends the autonomy 
of the religious and moral sphere over against the political. 
The religionist Philpott is therefore correct when he states that, in Morgenthau’s 
theorizing, national interest is no longer a religious or moral goal, but the security and 
survival of the state. Philpott is, however, not correct that the influence of Nietzsche 
565 Ibid., 98.
566 Ibid., 97.
567 See Chapter 5, section ‘Three Playing Rules for Political Realism’.




leads to relativism on transcendent truths in Morgenthau’s theorizing. Philpott suggests 
that in the following quote:
Implied in Morgenthau’s Nietzscheanism is the death of religion, metaphysics, and the ability of 
reason to grasp objective, transcendent truth. In international relations these would no longer be 
considered the ends of states.571
Neacsu adopts a different position, to which I consent. According to her, Morgenthau’s 
endorsement of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the ‘death of God’ does not mean that he succumbs to a 
relativism which denies the existence of any transcendental source of values whatsoever. On the 
contrary, the dangers implied by the continuous erosion of morality will preoccupy Morgenthau 
throughout his life. According to the present interpretation, Morgenthau gains from Nietzsche 
an awareness of a certain kind of relativism, one which takes into account historical and cultural 
variations. Nevertheless, Morgenthau still rates Judaeo-Christian and Kantian moral values highly, 
and he also regards the consolidation of a universal realm of values favourably.572
Philpott is not right in putting Morgenthau’s position over against a religious or moral 
position. As the latter just emphasizes the importance of the national interest defined 
as power and warns against the subversion of the political sphere by other modes of 
thought.573 In his Politics Among Nations he states:
Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral 
principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible – 
between what is desirable everywhere and at all times what is possible under concrete circumstances 
of time and place.574 
Morgenthau even goes a step further by declaring national survival a moral principle. 
He literally states, as I quoted earlier on:
Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, 
the state has no right to let its moral approbation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of 
successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.575
571 Philpott, The Challenge of September 11, 79. Cf. Philpott, Has the Study of Global Politics Found Religion?, 190.
572 Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations, 53. For an explanation of Morgenthau’s tension between 
nihilism and morality in a disenchanted world. Ibid., 33, 34; Mollov, Power and Transcendence, 33-35.




According to Mollov, Morgenthau once said to his students, during a talk on the decline 
of religion, that religion is a crucial foundation of life, and that he was critical about the 
fact that ‘modern man didn’t take religion seriously enough’.576 
Thirdly, Morgenthau’s thinking is strongly shaped by his assumption of the autonomy 
of the political. The consequence of this assumption for theorizing on religion is that 
Morgenthau acknowledges that religion is an important factor which interferes in the 
political sphere. The political, however, is determined and characterized by its focus on 
the principle of interest defined as power. Morgenthau acknowledges that this ideal-
typical approach is one-sided and has to be supplemented by other insights, yet it adds 
to an intelligible understanding of the political. From a political perspective, hence, 
religion is always subordinated to the political, which is qualified by its power element. 
An example of this attitude is Morgenthau’s view on whether the defense of human 
rights should be one of the targets of foreign policy. He states that this would come into 
conflict with the basic interest of the state and that it would be impossible to be consistent 
in defending human rights.577 At another place, Morgenthau states that when certain 
developments, for instance in the political system, become of great importance during a 
particular period, political science is tempted to include this subject immediately in its 
curriculum. Not everything which is important at a certain moment, however, is always 
theoretically relevant.578 I imagine that Morgenthau would have responded in the same 
way when it comes to religion.  
But, clearly, this does not suggest that religion is and be will irrelevant for all times. 
In his lectures The Politics of Aristotle, Morgenthau maintains that the question of what 
is politically relevant depends on the historical period and culture.579 He explicitly 
mentions that religion has been regarded as politically relevant in some countries - 
the disenfranchisement of Catholics in Great Britain and of Jews in most countries.580 
Morgenthau’s theory keeps open the possibility that religion becomes more important 
in particular periods. 
My conclusion is that Morgenthau defines the national interest as power, but that he 
does not discard morality and religion. Nor does he limit the national interest as power 
to the nation-state forever or exclude the possibility that instead of power something else 
might be the interest of politics at some point. Finally, his idea of the autonomy of the 
political means that the religious and moral spheres are secondary to the political sphere, 
but it does not follow that he discards them. He tries to give religion and morality their 
right place in relation to the political sphere. 
576 M. Benjamin Mollov, “The Influence of the Jewish Experience on the Liberal Realism of Hans J. Morgenthau,” 
in Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back, ed. Jodok Troy 
(London; NY: Routledge, 2014), 29.
577 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 277.
578 Morgenthau, The Commitments of Political Science, 50.
579 Lang, Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s the Politics, 44.
580 Ibid., 42.
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6.4.4. Evaluation of  the Domain-Specific Thesis  
In this evaluative part, the question to be answered is to what extent Morgenthau’s 
theorizing has a Westphalian bias. It appears that Morgenthau subscribes to a couple 
of Westphalian assumptions, but that these assumptions do not necessarily lead to the 
neglect of religion. In the first place, because Morgenthau does not subscribe to the 
assumption that Westphalia implies the privatization of religion. Morgenthau admits 
that there is a process of disenchantment going on, but he stresses the ever-present 
importance of a transcendent reference point. The latter has become harder after the 
spheres differentiated: every sphere has its own autonomy and central values that cannot 
be circumvented. The religious or moral has not become irrelevant, but it has to relate to 
the autonomy of the political sphere. Westphalia, thus, is rather a new relation between 
the religious and the political than the starting point of a linear development in which 
religion is increasingly marginalized while the political becomes more important. In 
fact, the distinction between these different spheres can be regarded as a revival of the 
distinction between the religious and the political as introduced by Augustine. 
The fact that Morgenthau does not subscribe to the interpretation of the religionists 
also becomes apparent from his view on the role of the state and the national interest, 
which is much less secular than the religionists say. Regarding the first, it is true that 
Morgenthau pays more attention to states and statesmen than to religion, but he does 
not completely ignore it: he attributes their own place and function to the different 
spheres. Relying on theoretical and political-theological considerations, his position 
seems to be that it is justified for states to play a central role in his time, and for religion 
to play a supporting role. One could suggest that religious convictions still play a role 
in politics through the statesmen. That is true, but this state leader should abide by the 
‘law’ for states in international politics. Ignoring that principle would lead to inefficient 
and even immoral politics. It does not mean that moral or religious convictions should 
not play a role at all, since Morgenthau was well aware of the significance of religion 
and morality with respect to the state and national interest. He concludes, however, that 
these two should be distinguished in theory, though it is impossible to separate the two 
in political practice.  
According to Morgenthau, state leaders must often choose between different moral 
principles. The question which principles should have precedence often depends on the 
context. It is for that reason that Morgenthau once stated, in ‘extreme and striking terms’, 
that it is impossible to be a successful politician and a good Christian.581 Statesmen have 
to distinguish between their personal wishes and the interest of the state. As Morgenthau 
says: ‘He will distinguish with Lincoln between his “official duty” which is to protect the 
national interest and his “personal wish” which is to see universal moral values realized 
throughout the world’.582 Evidence for the position of Morgenthau follows from his 
581 Morgenthau, The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, 102.
582 Morgenthau, The Problem of the National Interest, 110; Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 7.
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argument that human beings have the right to judge their fellow creatures by some 
moral standard. It would, however, be unacceptable when they would act upon their 
judgment. According to Morgenthau, the same rule applies to nations. States that would 
act upon their judgment fail to acknowledge how corrupt judgment on political matters 
can be. They overlook the narrow limits within which nations have to apply moral 
standards and close their eyes to the primary responsibility to take care of their own 
interest and survival.583 As I quoted earlier, Morgenthau argues strongly for the morality 
of national interest in the book In Defense of the National Interest: 
Self-preservation both for the individual and for societies is, however, not only a biological and 
psychological necessity but, in the absence of an overriding moral obligation, a moral duty as 
well. (...) A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign 
policy inspired by universal moral principles.584 
The latter point is especially relevant for political actors who are always tempted – not 
by ignorance or misjudgment, but by hubris and pride as taught by the Greek tragedians 
and biblical prophets – to overlook the possibilities of their power and forget prudence 
and morality.585 If such a nation wins a war it does not think that modern arms or the 
number of troops have brought this about, but it imagines that Providence, be it a 
personal divinity or the logic of history, provided for the success of the morally superior 
nation. Such an attitude easily develops into the idea that this inherent superiority 
compels the nation to reform the world according to this standard.586 For Morgenthau, 
the United States has developed this very attitude. The United States has formed a 
utopian moral image of itself and judges other states in the light of that image. States 
that oppose these moral standards are automatically selfish and immoral.587
My conclusion regarding the domain-specific thesis is that it does not generally 
apply. Morgenthau does not ignore religion, but distinguishes it from other phenomenon 
based on theoretical and political-theoretical considerations. One should note, however, 
that Morgenthau did this in his time, and he is open to the idea that other times and 
contexts can lead to other choices. 
583 Morgenthau, Neutrality and Neutralism, 280, 281.
584 Morgenthau and Thompson, In Defense of the National Interest, 38, 39.
585 Morgenthau, The Moral Dilemma of Political Action, 325, 326.
586 Ibid., 326.
587 Morgenthau and Thompson, In Defense of the National Interest, 93.
201
6.5. Philosophy of  Science: How the Religionists Understood 
Morgenthau Wrongly  
In the previous chapter, regarding the third, scientific-philosophical level, I made a 
distinction between the social and cultural embeddedness, ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology. In this section, I will use that same structure. For every aspect, I will 
discuss the various elements that the religionists have introduced. During the discussion 
of the social and cultural embeddedness, I will detail the influence of the Enlightenment 
and the role of modernization and secularization theory. I will present Morgenthau’s 
stance on the relationship between faith and reason, the value he attributes to religion, 
and the degree to which he reduces religion to morality. The ontological section will 
mainly revolve around the presence of reductionism in Morgenthau’s approach towards 
religion. My arguments will show that the religionists have misunderstood Morgenthau 
on numerous issues, sometimes even interpreting his words in the exact opposite manner. 
6.5.1. Social and Cultural Embeddedness: Influence of  Enlightenment Thin-
king 
The religionists ascribe the way Morgenthau deals with faith, reason and religion to the 
influence of the Enlightenment, but Morgenthau was very critical of the Enlightenment. 
Mollov says: ‘At the philosophical core of Morgenthau’s approach to international 
politics is his rejection of enlightenment assumptions which stressed man’s inherent 
rationality and goodness, and the possibility of easy progress in human affairs.’588 The 
religionists argue that the Enlightenment broke with the idea that faith and reason 
are on equal footing and relegated religion to the private and subjective sphere. They 
ascribe this process to the growing confidence in the empirical sciences. Morgenthau, 
they argue, was influenced by this Enlightenment view.  
That is not correct, however. In the first place, Morgenthau is aware of the conflict 
between faith and reason. He writes that religion easily transgresses its boundaries when 
it compels human reason to accept its images and signs as empirical knowledge. He 
also writes that there is an existential conflict between science and religion: science 
only accepts as truth what is empirically proven and religion rejects the empirically 
proven if it contradicts revealed truth. When a scientific truth contradicts a religious 
one, it puts into question the truth of religion altogether.589 Morgenthau clearly aims to 
separate science and religion, because he wants to safeguard the one against the other. 
He explicitly states that religion transgresses its boundaries and discredits itself when 
it tries to compel human reason to accept constructions of the unknown as empirical 
knowledge. This could be seen as a restriction of reason, since religion does not fall 
within its scope, as the religionists claim, but one could also state that Morgenthau 
588 Mollov, Power and Transcendence, 92.
589 Morgenthau, Science, 63, 64.
202
frees religion from the standards of science. He tries to avoid that religion becomes 
subordinated to science and vice versa. Moreover, as I have shown in the preceding 
chapter and will further discuss in the section on positivism, Morgenthau strongly 
criticizes the claims of the empirical sciences of his day, which agrees with the point of 
the religionists that the Enlightenment view was the result of the growing confidence of 
the empirical sciences. The religionists, therefore, incorrectly argue that Morgenthau has 
been influenced by Enlightenment ideas and as a result separated religion and reason. 
If the religionists are wrong about this, the question is if they are wrong about the 
influence of the Enlightenment on Morgenthau’s assumptions regarding religion as 
well. For example, they claim that Morgenthau replaces religion with morality; that he 
regards religion as something dangerous that should be privatized; and that he regards 
religion as secondary. Below, I will address each of these points. 
It is true that Morgenthau’s theorizing is more often about ethics and morality than 
religion, but this is not the result of his attempt to replace religion with morality and no 
more does he reduce religion to a set of rules. In his writings Morgenthau pays attention 
to ethics and morality, but also to religious communities and churches. The fact that he 
mostly deals with ethics and morality does not mean that he discards religion, because 
in Morgenthau’s writings religion and morality are related. He does not replace religion 
with morality, nor reduces religion to a set of rules. 
Instead of considering religion a dangerous phenomenon which has to be privatized, 
Morgenthau regrets the absence of transcendence and the privatization of religion. As 
I have extensively discussed in the previous chapter, Morgenthau is worried about the 
sciences and politics of his day because of their lack of a transcendent point of reference. 
He also criticizes the fact that ethics had been relegated to the private sphere of religion.590
Where ethics is still recognized as an independent sphere, it is relegated to religion, a private 
domain such as family or art, where man may satisfy his emotional needs.591
I also set out that Morgenthau considered philosophy, science and religion as three 
equally valid responses to the shock of wonderment which only differ in their outward 
manifestation. Morgenthau sees them as distinct activities which emerge from the same 
source. Although there can be tensions or competition between the different spheres, 
Morgenthau does not a priori choose the one over the other. 
Morgenthau’s position with respect to religion and science comes close to his 
position on religion and politics. It sometimes depends on the audience and the context 
what position he takes. Over against the positivists, he would argue in favor of religion, 
but had his audience been liberal Protestants in the Wilsonian sense, he would have 
defended the autonomy of the political and warned against the influence of religion. 
590 See Chapter 5, the section on Principle 1.
591 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 15-17.
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The bottom-line is, however, that he appreciates the necessity and value of religion, but 
within limits and respecting the autonomy of other spheres. This might not go as far as 
the religionists would like to see it, but it at least shows that they are not correct in that 
Morgenthau sees religion as a danger which calls for privatization. As such, Morgenthau 
does not subscribe to laicist secularism as Hurd describes it. 
Certainly, Morgenthau, reproached for this by the religionists, takes religious 
knowledge as a form of value rationality, which leads to action for ethical, aesthetical 
and religious purposes. However, that does not lead to him degrading religion. On the 
contrary, Morgenthau writes that a religious reflection upon empirical reality is no less 
valid than secularized science. He states that religious reflection upon the empirical 
world is a branch of science, different from secularized science only in the unifying 
systematic point of view and its terminology. An example of this approach is the political 
theory as developed in the Catholic Middle Ages. Its ideas about politics were the result 
of a theoretical reflection from a theological point of view. The political philosophy of 
Augustine and Hobbes differ in the wording, but not so much in the understanding of 
politics, Morgenthau states. Morgenthau also states that the opposition between religion 
and science is false. He has noted that some modern political theories whose assumptions 
belong to metaphysical philosophy and whose methods belong to empirical science, are 
in truth ideologies whose profane terminology hides a religious type of thinking.592  
When it comes to the supposed influence of modernization and secularization 
theory, it appears that Morgenthau acknowledges the descriptive fact that traditional 
religion is disappearing. He argues, though, that this does not apply to the human 
religious impulse and underlines that transcendent values and religiosity remain vital for 
the flourishing of human beings and civilization. I address this issue explicitly since this 
is one of the reproaches of the religionists. Morgenthau’s awareness of the disappearance 
of religion appears when he writes about a period of history in which religious 
institutions and dogmas have lost their persuasiveness. He also speaks about the death 
of God. Morgenthau makes clear, however, that the traditional images and signs are no 
longer able to evoke the mysteries of the world to the human consciousness, does not 
mean that the longing of consciousness for union with those mysteries has disappeared 
too. According to Morgenthau, the religious impulse is at work wherever people seek 
union with the world by becoming conscious of its mysteries. The religious impulse is 
at work in genuine scientific thinking that is moved by the shock of wonderment. In 
that movement, religion, philosophy, and science are one, because they all approach the 
mysteries to understand them by way of conceptual construction. Even though they use 
different concepts, this does not affect the substance of the concepts.  
Although Morgenthau acknowledges that in his time the norms and values 
inspired by religion have become disintegrated, he often emphasizes the importance 
of transcendent values. America, Morgenthau writes, is in dire need of transcendent 
592 Morgenthau, Science, 65.
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values, of ideals that are not invoked just rhetorically, but are taken seriously as ultimate 
goals.593 At another place, Morgenthau states in response to Toynbee that a return to 
religious faith to save Western civilization might have been successful in the past, but 
not in this age in which truth has been reduced to science and religion has declined.594 
Distinguishing between religion and religiosity, Morgenthau suggests that the lack of 
religiosity may well have led to the failures of the modern age. The decline of religiosity 
shows that humankind has been losing the awareness that it depends on a will and 
power which are beyond its understanding and control. According to Morgenthau, this 
‘irreligious self-glorification’ leaves out mystery, tragedy and guilt, which are important 
for human flourishing.595 
The fact that Morgenthau notices the decline of the relevance of traditional religion 
does not lead him to do away with religion at all. On the contrary, he argues that 
the religious impulse, though in different forms, remains present in human endeavors 
to unravel the mysteries of life. Morgenthau also emphasizes the importance of 
transcendent values to set ultimate goals and the necessity of religiosity. As I set out 
earlier, Morgenthau disagrees with people who leave religion and morality out of 
their approach to social issues and think they can do without religion and morality. 
The religionists, in conclusion, have understood Morgenthau wrongly on the issue of 
modernization and secularization theory.
6.5.2. Ontology: Morgenthau’s Supposed Materialism
Considering Morgenthau often emphasizes the ideological function of religion in order 
to uncover the real interests, I can see why the religionists think Morgenthau reduces 
religion to material capabilities. This could give the impression that he overlooks or 
reduces religion. I think it is more accurate to argue that Morgenthau prioritizes, rather 
than reduces, interests. In his view, ideas, ideology or religion color the way in which 
interests (either material or ideal) should be understood.
Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the “images 
of the world” created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on 
which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.596 
593 Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 214; Morgenthau, Science, 65, 66. At another place, Morgenthau relativizes the particular 
wording of the transcendent values: ‘We will not delve here into the specific content of these values; it is only their 
function that we consider significant in this context.’ (...) ‘It is irrelevant to this discussion whether theological or secular 
terms were used to formulate them’. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 214.
594 Morgenthau, The Rediscovery of Imagination and Religion, 54, 59, 62.
595 Ibid., 60. It is not clear whether Morgenthau reviews the whole twelve-volume magnum opus or one of its parts. The 
latter appears to be most likely, because the original review of Morgenthau dates from 1955 and The Study of History was 
just finished in 1961.
596 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 11. Morgenthau quotes this directly from Max Weber.
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This prioritizing of interests does not just follow from the demand for theory and 
finding the rationality of particular spheres, but also from the empirical observation that 
people are directly moved by interests and indirectly by ideas. Empirical observations 
and theoretical notions coincide here. 
Morgenthau states that interests can be material or ideal. He writes that the goals 
pursued by nations in their foreign policies run the whole gamut any nation has ever 
pursued or might pursue. Morgenthau also says – as some of the religionists admit – that 
the concept of power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control 
of man over man, be it physically or psychologically.597 Knutsen even interprets the latter 
as power being a product of material and spiritual factors.598 The religionists nevertheless 
claim realism theorizes about material factors primarily. I challenge that position on the 
same grounds as I did before, because Morgenthau’s theorizing is not only shaped by 
the wish to select variables, but also by empirical observations. This means that both 
the demand for strong theory and the empirical relevance determine what Morgenthau 
takes into account.599
6.5.3. Epistemology: Morgenthau’s Critique on Positivism
When reading Morgenthau’s first principle, one may indeed get the impression that he 
is a positivist: ‘Political realism, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that 
have their roots in human nature’.600 That might also explain why religionists blame 
him for being a positivist and claim that he ignores religion. But is that correct? Before 
discussing this in more detail, I examine the religionists’ definition of positivism. The 
religionists identify positivism by three characteristics. In the first place, positivism 
holds that there is a unity of science and a single logic of explanation. There is only one 
reality in the physical and social worlds, and therefore the methodology of scientific 
investigation is the same for both worlds. Secondly, facts can be separated from values 
because, as with the physical world, there exists something external and independent 
from theories or interpretations in the social world. And thirdly, positivism assumes 
that, like the physical world, the social world is governed by general laws and patterns 
that can be discovered empirically.601 This definition of positivism largely agrees with 
Morgenthau’s. He characterizes positivism, or rationalism, as follows: 
597 Ibid., 11.
598 Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 242.
599 Cf. Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas Part-Way Down,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 127, 128; Alexander 
Wendt, “On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 167.
600 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 4; Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, 4.
601 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 60, 61. Thomas’s definition also agrees with Steve Smith’s definition. The 
only difference is that Smith adds a fourth characteristic, namely a ‘tremendous reliance on the belief that it is empirical 
validation or falsification that is the hallmark of “real” enquiry’. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 40-42. Thomas sometimes equates rationalism with positivism while at other moments 
he seems to consider positivism as one of the assumptions of rationalism. Pettman gives a more extensive treatment of 
positivism, or rationalism, either with a capital ‘P’ or ‘R’, and its limitations. Pettman, Reason, Culture, Religion, 1-11.
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First, that the rationally right and the ethically good are identical. Second, that the rationally right 
action is of necessity the successful one. Third, that education leads man to the rationally right, 
hence, good and successful, action. Fourth, that the laws of reason, as applied to the social sphere, 
are universal in their application.602 
The equation of the ethical and the rational agrees with the second point of the 
religionist definition that there is an external world which exists independently from 
our interpretations of the world. The fourth characteristic agrees with the first and 
third point of the religionists. At another place, Morgenthau writes about this fourth 
point that man thinks he will master reality as the natural sciences mastered the blind 
forces of nature.603 With respect to the separation of facts and values, I wrote earlier that 
Morgenthau rejects the view that science is value-free and neutral, as human beings have 
their presuppositions and evaluative standpoints from which they understand the world.
This already shows that Morgenthau cannot be considered a positivist on all points. In 
the next section, I will argue that Morgenthau is not a positivist on the other points 
either. I will set out that he is not striving for explanatory power and hence neglecting 
religion, nor secularizing the role of religion and therefore neglecting religion.604 
6.5.3.1. Why Morgenthau’s Ideal-Typical Theory Is not Positivist 
The religionists claim that realism wants to develop theories with great explanatory 
power. This is the result of positivism, which does not make a clear distinction between 
the social world and the world of physics. Unfortunately, the application of this positivist 
idea to IR leads to a gap between the theory (which omits religion) and the world (in 
which religion plays an important role).
The religionists are correct that Morgenthau’s view on theory explains why he deals 
with religion as of secondary importance. They are not correct, however, that his ideal-
typical theorizing is positivist and that explanatory power is his goal.605 I base this on 
the following: (1) the rational part of Morgenthau’s theorizing sometimes seems to be 
positivist, but should be seen in relation to the empirical part of his thinking; (2) it is not 
because of positivist assumptions that Morgenthau aims at explanatory power; and (3) 
Morgenthau criticizes positivism because of its mismatch between theory and practice. 
I understand the religionists’ stance, because of the ambiguity in Morgenthau’s 
thinking. When the focus is on the more rational part of Morgenthau’s theorizing, the 
602 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 13.
603 Morgenthau, Science, 30.
604 I do not assess whether Morgenthau believes in context-independent rationality, because the religionists only criticize 
neorealism for it. 
605 That does exclude the possibility that the religionists are correct in their criticism with respect to current mainstream 
IR theory. Kukalkova and Luoma-aho point out that an important survey called TRIP provides strong evidence that 
among IR analysts in the United States there is little epistemological diversity, because American IR scholars share a 
strong and growing commitment to positivism. Kubálková and Luoma-Aho, Religion and the Realist Tradition, 147.
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religionists have a point that it looks positivist. However, to do justice to Morgenthau, 
the focus should be on his rational as well as his empirical considerations. The ambiguity 
in Morgenthau’s thinking sometimes gives the impression that he is primarily a rational 
thinker, while at other moments he is more of an empirical and practical thinker. When 
the religionists argue that his rational part does not allow for religion, it is not difficult 
to find evidence that he pays much attention to religion in his writings. And when they 
criticize Morgenthau for not paying attention to religion sufficiently, it is not difficult 
to find theoretical or rational considerations to defend Morgenthau’s position. My view 
is that both elements are integral to Morgenthau’s thinking and that this ambiguity 
is not a weakness but, instead, a strength, because the continuous move between the 
rational principles and empirical data shows the willingness to be accurate and open 
in his theorizing. Morgenthau tries to disclose the rational principles behind actual 
developments, and is willing to adjust his theoretical assumptions when there is reason 
to do so. Troy, referring to Scheuerman, argues that the classical realist tradition is open 
to changing its theoretical framework.606 Morgenthau did not subscribe to scientism 
and was certainly not a positivist. His theorizing has a certain flexibility and therefore it 
was able to encompass it all: individuals, the responsibilities of leadership, the national 
character of states, real human beings and also religion.607 
Next, Morgenthau does not aim at explanatory power because of positivist assump-
tions. Morgenthau defines a theory in general as ‘a system of empirically verifiable, general 
truths, sought for their own sake’.608 He distinguishes this knowledge from practical 
knowledge, which is interested in truth with direct practical relevance, common-sense 
knowledge, which is particular and unsystematic, and philosophy, which is not necessarily 
empirically verifiable.609 Most of his writings are, however, on political theory and this 
shows that his understanding of theory with respect to the social and political sphere 
differs from his more general definition of a theory. With respect to political theory, 
he believes that there is rationality which can be rationally ordered by the observer. 
Such a theory must allow for contingencies, without spoiling its rationality. Theorizing 
takes place through ideal-types, ‘conceptual forms, idealizations, which selectively 
present some aspects of social life, particularly social action, for the purpose of making 
them more fully intelligible by redescribing them in terms of clarified concepts.’610 
The ideal-typical approach starts from the assumption that there are objective laws, 
but that theories are one-sided because they have to be supplemented with empirical 
606 Jodok Troy, “Getting Theory? Realism and the Study of Religion in International Relations,” in Religion and the 
Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back, ed. Jodok Troy (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 5.
607 Kubálková and Luoma-Aho, Religion and the Realist Tradition, 156.
608 Morgenthau, Nature and Limits, 16.
609 Morgenthau, The Commitments of Political Science, 44.
610 Turner and Mazur, Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist, 490.
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laws.611 This demonstrates that for Morgenthau it is the subject at stake, and it is not 
explanatory power per se that comes first. And this approach is definitely not based on 
positivist assumptions. As I have already shown in this section, Morgenthau also thinks 
that theorizing always involves the observer with his or her values and presuppositions. 
In addition, Morgenthau believes that there is not a single logic of explanation for the 
social and natural world. Thus, the religionists are not correct that Morgenthau, either 
as a result of positivist assumptions or separate from it, strives for explanatory power in 
a natural scientific fashion.  
The religionists, finally, argue that, because of his longing for explanatory power, 
Morgenthau’s theorizing does not reflect the practice of international politics. They state 
that this discrepancy between theory and practice is particularly apparent in relation to 
the question of whether power is the ultimate aim – or states the most central actors – in 
international politics. They note that Morgenthau acknowledges that there are ultimate 
aims in international politics beyond the immediate aim of power. The religionists, 
however, consider this lip service, because, in Morgenthau’s theory, power has become 
the ultimate aim and religion does not play a role in it. To the religionists, this shows 
that realism is not realistic: it does not describe the world as it actually is, namely as a 
world in which religion continues to matter a great deal. As a result, American diplomats 
raised in the Enlightenment secularism of the realist school are unprepared to recognize 
spiritual aspects of problems and solutions. Furthermore, the religionists maintain that 
the state-centric assumption seems not to fit the nation-states as we know them outside 
the theoretical machine. Though Morgenthau saw the problem, he ultimately dismissed 
it, according the religionists.612  
I agree on the state-centrism to a certain extent as I set out in earlier in this chapter.613 
I disagree, however, with the reasoning of the religionists that this is because of his 
positivist ‘theoretical machine’. Morgenthau criticized positivism on the exact point 
the religionists are criticizing him. Morgenthau rejects the idea that social problems 
can be addressed and solved through the methods of the natural sciences. He argues 
that positivism and its belief in progress have proved to mismatch our experience. 
According to Morgenthau, the increase of knowledge has led to physical danger, social 
disintegration and metaphysical doubt. The current revolt against science, society and 
politics-as-usual is the result of the shocking paradox that man can master nature, yet 
unable to control the results of that mastery.
[A]nd this very inability to make meaningful distinctions makes science the slave rather than 
the master of its subject, and man the victim rather than the beneficiary of knowledge. (...) 
By surrendering himself to the world through action, man gives to the dual question posed 
611 Ibid., 489.
612 See Section 4.3.1.
613 See Section 6.5.2.
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by politics, the empirical and the metaphysical, no answer at all or at best an incomplete and 
insufficient one.614
Morgenthau further argues that rationalistic positivism is fascinated by the success of 
the exact sciences in the empirical world. It conceives science as systematic, theoretical 
knowledge of what is empirically knowable. It sees the universe composed of objects, 
some already known, others not yet known, but something that will be known in the 
future depending upon the progress of science. This conception of science lacks the 
tension between the finiteness of our knowledge and the infinity both of our desire 
to know the universe. Morgenthau admits that scientific progress consists in the 
progressive penetration of the mysteries of the universe. He criticizes, however, ‘the 
implicit expectations of the total triumph of science not only unraveling one mystery 
after the other but banishing mystery itself from the consciousness of man’.615
In addition to the preceding rebuttal, it is true that Morgenthau considered national 
interest defined as power as the defining principle of international politics in his time. It 
is, however, not correct to label Morgenthau’s statement that there are ultimate aims in 
international politics beyond the immediate aim of power as lip service. There are many 
places where Morgenthau acknowledges the importance and necessity of a transcendent 
reference point and the importance of morality and ethics, as I have demonstrated 
throughout this chapter and will continue to do so in the next section. Besides that, 
Morgenthau’s theorizing is open to empirical data showing that the state is no longer 
the central actor or that interest is defined as power. Morgenthau’s theory is one-sided, 
because it has to be combined with other empirical laws. If empirical data point at 
religion as a factor of importance or shows that the state is no longer the central actor, 
Morgenthau’s thinking is open to such findings to the extent that theory requires the 
elimination of elements that do not belong to its rational scheme. That makes a theory 
as such more rational than political reality.616 A theory has to ascertain facts and give 
them meaning through reason.617 The validity of a theory depends on the extent to 
which it broadens and deepens the understanding of what is to be known.618 It has to 
meet two criteria: do the facts agree with the interpretation of the theory and is the 
theory consistent within itself?619 The consequence of the fact that Morgenthau has to 
eliminate elements that do not belong to its rational scheme is that religion possibly 
will lose out in the rational scheme that the national interest is defined as power. By 
contrast, the fact that Morgenthau holds that theorizing is always normative and has 
to be complemented by the moral wisdom of the statesman, allows for the influence of 
614 Morgenthau, Science, 47, 48.
615 Ibid., 62, 63.
616 Morgenthau, “Introduction,” in The Restoration of American Politics, 1.
617 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 4.
618 Morgenthau, The Commitments of Political Science, 46.
619 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 3.
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religion on the worldviews of statesmen and scholars.  
The above considerations make clear that Morgenthau is not in favor of positivism 
nor of explanatory power per se.620 That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain 
that he neglects religion because of adherence to positivism. However, the religionists are 
correct that they point at Morgenthau’s view on theory, because as I set out earlier, his 
ideal-typical theory leads to dealing with religion as of secondary importance. The fact 
that the religionists are wrong about positivism and explanatory power can be ascribed 
to their one-sided interpretation of Morgenthau’s thinking and their focus on his 
rational assumptions. If the religionists took into account that Morgenthau’s thinking 
includes his empirical observations, they could conclude that Morgenthau would have 
been willing to evaluate the accuracy of his theoretical assumptions in light of the global 
resurgence of religion and the actual role religion plays in the world. 
6.5.3.2. The Impact of  Christian Theology on Morgenthau’s Classical 
Realism
The religionists argue that secularization leads to the neglect of religion in IR. They 
base this on two points, first that there was a religious or theological influence on IR 
which has disappeared because of positivism; and, second, that the diminishing religious 
influence on IR also implies less attention for religion in IR.  
The first point is difficult to argue for, because, as discussed in the preceding section, 
Morgenthau was critical rather than positive about positivism. Morgenthau criticizes 
rationalism, or positivism, because of its philosophical and ethical monism, while he 
holds a dualistic view of morality, implying that humankind is subject to an external 
transcendent concept. He compares it with Moses coming down from Mount Sinai 
with the law being confronted with the people of Israel and the worship of the golden 
calf.621 The ethical monism of rationalism sees evil as the absence of good or even as the 
absence of reason. But this way of thinking contradicts Western thought in which God 
is challenged by the devil. In this view, there is no inevitable progress toward the good, 
but undecided conflict between good and evil.622 This view on morality deviates from 
the positivist stance towards morality.  
Moreover, Morgenthau has paid considerable attention to the role of ethics and 
morality. His fourth principle of international politics explicitly states that: ‘Political 
realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the 
ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful 
620 Cf. Felix J. Rösch, Hans J. Morgenthau: The ‘Marginal’ Man in International Relations. A ‘Weltanschauungsanalyse’ (PhD 
thesis, Newcastle University, 2011), 132; Troy, Getting Theory?, 1; Hartmut Behr and Felix J. Rösch, “The Ethics of Anti-
Hubris in the Political Philosophy of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau,” in Religion and the Realist Tradition: 
From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back, ed. Jodok Troy (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), 
14.
621 Lang, Hans J. Morgenthau on Aristotle’s the Politics, 92.
622 Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, 204-206.
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political action’.623 At the same time he accounts for his political realism by distinguishing 
between ethics and political ethics, as I quoted earlier on.624 Morgenthau takes ethics very 
seriously, but he also explains that it cannot be applied directly to the political sphere. 
It is not to be conceived as relativism that Morgenthau ascribes such an importance to 
the context, as if morality were a relative thing whose meaning depends on the context. 
In the preceding chapter, I referred to Morgenthau’s question of how it is possible that 
we still understand the moral relevance of the Ten Commandments and the moral 
ideas of Plato, Pascal, Buddha and Aquinas, while they all originated in totally different 
contexts.  
The answer of Morgenthau is that all human beings have in common that they are 
moral beings. Civilized men differ from the barbarians, because they make the right 
moral judgment. They share with each other and with Socrates, the Greek tragedians, 
the biblical prophets and the great moralists of all ages what is meant by the sanctity of 
the moral law. This morality is required for the flourishing of mankind’s transcendent 
orientations.625 Great people in history have devoted themselves to transcendent 
purposes. They revealed the truth of Scripture that ‘He that findeth his life shall lose it; 
and he that loses his life for my sake shall find it.’626  
The statement of the religionists that Morgenthau secularized the religious or 
theological influence and therefore neglected religion in his theorizing is not correct. 
Morgenthau criticized positivism for its ethical monism meaning that it equates the 
normative and empirical. On top of that, morality and ethics have a central place in 
Morgenthau’s thinking; even his fourth political realist principle is devoted to it. And 
he rejects the idea that morality is a relative thing. However, even if positivism was 
not the reason that a religious perspective disappeared in the case of Morgenthau, it 
is still possible that secularization took place. That leads to the second point of the 
religionists that the diminishing impact of religion in IR also implies less attention for 
religion. The religionists base this on the fact that IR theory has been influenced by 
theology (internally) and ethics (externally) in the past, but that this disappeared over 
time. It is true that at the formation of International Relations there was a religious 
or even a theological perspective that shaped many thinkers of international relations. 
With respect to the diminishing influence of ethics, I refer to the earlier sections in 
which I set out that Morgenthau still involved ethics and morality in his thinking, and 
applied ethics and morality to IR. Regarding the influence of theology, this came from 
Christianity as well as Judaism. The influence from Judaism is closely related to the fact 
that Morgenthau himself was a Jew. The fact that, as Mollov states, Judaism combines 
people and faith explains why Morgenthau’s Jewishness moves him to deal with anti-
623 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 12.
624 See Section 5.6.1.
625 Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, 357, 358.
626 Ibid., 358.
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Semitism, the cultural and intellectual offshoots of Judaism, the Soviet Jewry movement, 
Israel and formal religious theology and practice.627 Explicit theological statements come 
to the fore, for instance, when Morgenthau criticizes the Soviet Union for singling out 
the Jews for repression. He then stresses that 
“the prophets of the Old Testament” subjected “the rulers of Israel to the moral standards of the 
moral world. [The prophetic tradition of Judaism] has endeavored, in the Biblical phrase, “to 
speak truth to power,” and thereby remind the powers-that-be of a higher law to which they are 
subject.”628
At another place, Morgenthau emphasizes that
the mission of the Prophets such as Isaiah and Amos is to “give voice to the power which the king 
(political powers) are subject, and threaten them with petition and punishment if they do not 
submit themselves to the superior power.”629
In an unpublished essay entitled The Significance of Being Alone, Morgenthau traces 
the biblical antecedents of man’s self-doubt and his efforts to overcome the mystery 
of existence to the book of Genesis. Morgenthau takes the description of the creation 
of mankind as starting point for his theoretical reflection on the ambitions of man as 
a political animal. He then writes that God is perfection and goodness, wisdom and 
power and that man is imperfect, but that he has a vision of perfection. Mankind is 
searching restlessly for this perfection, but acquires a sense of tragedy and guilt, because 
he recognizes that there is a gap between what he is and what he should be. It is because 
man’s hubris that he oversteps the bounds of his nature, but the tragedy is that he 
must labor in vain until the end of time, trying and failing.630 These explicit theological 
references show that the theological perspective is still present in Morgenthau’s thinking. 
Regarding the influence of Christian theology, it was Reinhold Niebuhr who 
influenced Morgenthau’s thinking substantially. Morgenthau and Niebuhr met at the 
University of Chicago for the first time. He wrote about their meeting: ‘Niebuhr is here 
for six weeks (...) and he is, of course, a tremendous hit’.631 Frei says that although they 
came from different experiences and traditions in terms of direct formative influences, 
they quickly discovered common ground. Morgenthau said that: ‘Reinie and I come out 
about the same on politics’.632 At another place he says:
627 Mollov, Jewish Experience, 21, 22.
628 Ibid., 27. Mollov takes this quote and the quote hereafter from the archives on Morgenthau. I do not have access to it. 
629 Ibid., 28.
630 Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau, 74, 75.
631 Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 110 fn. 70. Cf. Mollov, Power and Spirituality, 95, 96, 102; Mollov, Jewish Experience, 30.
632 Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 110.
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Again it is probably by virtue of the similarity between the development of my own thought and 
that of Niebuhr’s with regard to this fundamental problem that I can speak with a certain degree 
of confidence in trying to interpret the position of Niebuhr. (...) Let me say in conclusion that 
I have always considered Reinhold Niebuhr the greatest living political philosopher of America, 
perhaps the only creative political philosopher since Calhoun.633 
To his students, Morgenthau said that a theologian like Niebuhr has made the 
greatest contemporary contribution to the understanding of basic political problems. 
To Niebuhr’s widow Ursula he wrote shortly after Niebuhr’s death in 1971: ’the man 
whose mind and soul I owe so much’.634 According to Frei, Morgenthau used Niebuhr’s 
language to introduce his German intellectual heritage in an unobjectionable manner in 
America. Some people have, as a result of this, overemphasized the influence of Niebuhr. 
Some claim that Niebuhr provided the anthropological foundation to Morgenthau’s 
political theory, others argue that Morgenthau used Niebuhr’s insights in a secularized 
way.635 Morgenthau himself said that: 
You are indeed right in surmising that Reinhold Niebuhr’s writings have made a profound 
impression on me. They have confirmed certain conclusions at which I arrived independently and 
have contributed to deepening and stimulating my thinking.636
The fact that Morgenthau was already forty years old when he started to read Niebuhr, 
also points to the idea that Niebuhr confirmed ideas which he had already developed.637 
When Morgenthau was asked, in 1976, by a journal to indicate the ten books that 
meant most to him, he not only included the collected works of Nietzsche, but also 
Niebuhr’s book The Nature and Destiny of Man.638  
Besides relating ethics and morality to the study of international relations, 
Morgenthau’s approach to international relations was clearly influenced by theological 
ideas. This aspect of Morgenthau is often overlooked by conventional wisdom that 
Morgenthau utilizes a Machiavellian-Hobbesian framework. This ‘wisdom’ overlooks 
633 Morgenthau, The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, 106, 107, 109. On the same pages Morgenthau also praises how 
Niebuhr discovered the autonomy of the political sphere. 
634 Mollov, Power and Transcendence, 49.
635 Frei states that it was not so much a matter of secularizing Niebuhr, but of rephrasing Nietzsche with slightly religious 
overtones. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau, 111, 189. Earlier on in this chapter, I criticized Philpott for ascribing to much 
influence to Nietzsche when it comes to metaphysics. I think that the question to what extent Morgenthau has been 
influenced by Nietzsche also depends which parts of Nietzsche’s thinking someone is referring to. 
636 Ibid., 112.
637 Ibid., 112.
638 Ibid., 113. For examples of how Morgenthau’s thought and phrasings agree with Niebuhr: Ibid., 56, 58. How Niebuhr 
has acted as a ‘conduit’ or as a ‘Christian catalyst’ for evoking Judaic themes in Morgenthau’s thinking and how he 
functioned as a Judaic mentor. Ibid., 79, 91, 92, 109, 110, 115. 
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the transcendental aspects of his Judeo-Christian-oriented theory.639 The above argument 
seems to contradict that there has been a diminishing influence of theology. That is true, 
but there is also another aspect which I will deal with in Chapter 9 more extensively, 
namely that Morgenthau was less intrinsically connected to and less existentially 
influenced by the Christian faith, even though he uses theological concepts. For 
example, Niebuhr speaks of redemption while Morgenthau uses the term tragedy. From 
that perspective, there is a diminishing influence, but this is not such an influence that 
it would lead to a fundamental different political theology and therefore to a significant 
different treatment of religion in IR theory. To the religionists I would like to say that it 
is not a diminishing influence of religion or theology, but a different political theology 
which is cautious to involve religion in politics. One might consider this a secularizing 
move, but it is secularization within a theological discourse and legitimized by it. 
6.5.4. Methodology: Reductionism in Morgenthau’s Approach of  Religion?
The statement that Morgenthau reduces religion to an irrational, individual or 
institutional phenomenon is difficult to reconcile with several of Morgenthau’s 
writings on religion. Before I move on to these writings, I first want to challenge the 
interpretation of Morgenthau’s text on which the religionist Erin Wilson bases her 
point that Morgenthau reduces religion. In my view, Wilson does not do justice to 
Morgenthau. She states that irrationality is a prominent characteristic of religion in 
Morgenthau’s work and supports this with a quote from Morgenthau: ’The passions 
of the religious wars yielded to the rationalism and the skeptical moderation of the 
Enlightenment.’640 She then concludes that ‘this implies a belief in the irrationality of 
religion as well as linking religion to emotions (passions)’.641 I think this conclusion 
cannot be drawn on the basis of this quote. Morgenthau does not equate or reduce the 
religious wars to wars of passions, but he argues that during the religious wars ‘passions’, 
‘national hatreds’, ‘collective enmities’, ‘egotistical motives’ played a role and could be 
‘nourished by principles of any kind’. He wants to emphasize the collective or national 
scale of the clashes that took place. The Enlightenment with its rationalism and skeptical 
moderation has recognized these facts, and then international politics turned into a 
‘sport for princes’ who play by the same rules and with the same limited stakes, according 
to Morgenthau.642 Wilson also refers to another sentence of Morgenthau to support her 
claim that he sees religion as inherently irrational.643 She does not quote it directly, but 
it should be about this sentence: ‘The age of the machine, which has sprung from man’s 
self-sufficient mind, has instilled in modern man the confidence that he can save himself 
639 Troy, Getting Theory?, 4.
640 Wilson, After Secularism, 71.
641 Ibid., 71.
642 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 240.
643 Wilson, After Secularism, 71.
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by his own unaided efforts here and now. Thus the traditional religions with the negation 
of that confidence and relying upon divine intervention, have become bloodless images 
of themselves’.644 In the first place, I wonder, what is irrational in this description of 
religion? People relying on divine intervention? Morgenthau indeed places religion over 
against the spirit of the modern scientific age, but that does not imply he sees religion 
as irrational. In addition, Morgenthau’s description does not mean that he conceives 
of religion this way, it rather is an observation of how religion manifested itself during 
those days. Consequently, it is not possible to hold to the opinion that Morgenthau sees 
religion as irrational based on these sentences. 
Also, there is evidence that he addresses both the ideational and institutional, the 
rational and irrational, and the individual and communal aspects of religion. Let me 
start with the institutional and the ideational dimensions of religion. As explained in 
the beginning of this chapter, Morgenthau makes a distinction between religions and 
religiosity. He understands religions like Judaism, Christianity or Hinduism as particular 
manifestations of a broader religious awareness called religiosity. They can be considered 
as institutional expressions of religion. The ideational dimension of religion comes to 
the fore in Morgenthau’s idea that religiosity is based on the idea that mankind depends 
upon a will and a power which are beyond its understanding and control. Another 
ideational expression of religion Morgenthau identifies is the existence of religious 
practices or faith in a particular religious dogma.645 
Regarding the rational and irrational, Morgenthau points at the rational side of 
religion, because he sees religiosity as an experience which is transformed into intellectual 
awareness.646 As I have set out earlier, it is also important to understand that Morgenthau 
wants to keep in place the autonomy of religion. He criticizes the identification of the 
ethical and the scientific with the religious. Science and religion are separate actions in 
response to the religious experience of the shock of wonderment. From that perspective, 
there is no difference between the activities people perform in church and the activities 
of a scientist. Morgenthau says that a religious reflection upon empirical reality does not 
yield in validity to secularized science.647 
Finally, Morgenthau addresses the individual as well as the collective aspect of 
religion. In the section on Morgenthau’s definition of religion, I quote Morgenthau 
when he writes that he has in mind not only the membership of a particular religious 
organization, observance of religious practices or professions of faith in a religious 
dogma. He distinguishes this from a religious attitude that recognizes the insufficiency of 
human beings as finite beings seeking orien tation through some transcendent guidance, so 
that they can come to terms with themselves, their fellowmen, and the universe. Morgenthau 
644 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 412.
645 Thompson, Morgenthau and Hein, Essays on Lincoln’s Faith and Politics, 6.
646 Morgenthau, The Rediscovery of Imagination and Religion, 61, 62.
647 See Section 5.3.1 and 6.5.1.
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emphasizes that religion is a universal human attitude, and that the historic religions 
and their religious organiza tions are but particular manifestations of it.  
Morgenthau’s thinking, to conclude, does not give reason to claim that he reduces 
religion to an irrational, individual or institutional phenomenon. It not only appears 
that this idea is based on an incorrect interpretation of certain passages in Morgenthau’s 
writing, but it also turns out that Morgenthau was well aware of the other aspects of 
religion. 
6.6. Evaluation of  the Philosophy of  Science Thesis 
While the religionists were correct on various issues regarding the empirical thesis 
and the domain-specific thesis, this is hardly the case for the scientific-philosophical 
statement. It appears that the religionists often claim that Morgenthau said the opposite 
of what he actually said, which is particularly true for his view on the Enlightenment, 
the modernization theory, ontology, epistemology, and methodology. As I argued earlier, 
this can only be the result of a superficial reading of his works; the ‘real’ Morgenthau 
is quite different from the Morgenthau described in religionist literature. In a large 
number of cases, Morgenthau could even strengthen the position of the religionists 
with his criticism on positivism and the Enlightenment. Regarding his view on theory, I 
believe that Morgenthau challenges religionists to reflect on the exact requirements and 
the scope of a theory of IR and religion. He himself has various clear conceptions about 
this and I think religionists can find common ground there.
Conclusion
In this conclusion, I aim at combining the results of both this chapter and the previous 
chapter. First of all, I will recall the steps taken in the Chapters 5 and 6, followed by 
a short summary of the role of religion in Morgenthau’s classical realism. Then I will 
explain how it is possible for the religionists to be so wrong about Morgenthau. Finally, 
I will make a diagnosis in which I compare some elements to the ideas of the Amsterdam 
School.
In this chapter, I have investigated to what degree the subtheses of the religionists 
to support their claim apply to Morgenthau’s realism. To make this possible, I presented 
my interpretation of Morgenthau’s classical realism in Chapter 5, clarifying in this 
manner my assessment of the religionist position. In that chapter, I maintained that 
Morgenthau’s realism can only be adequately understood when his view on theory and 
his political theology are taken into account.  
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The religionists believe that IR should give religion a place in its theories. This claim 
is based on three subtheses, and the validity of the claim, obviously, depends on the 
maintainability of these subtheses. The first thesis holds that Morgenthau’s realism pays 
no attention to religion. The second thesis involves the degree to which Morgenthau is 
influenced by the Westphalian system and consequently biased, leading him to ignoring 
religion within the domain of international relations. It is possible that someone may pay 
attention to religion, yet still ignore it when explaining or understanding international 
politics. The same applies to the third thesis. Recognizing religion and even regarding 
it as an important factor does not automatically imply including it in an analysis based 
on philosophy of science grounds. The question therefore is not necessarily whether 
religion plays a role on the domain-specific or scientific-philosophical level, but to what 
degree the assumptions and ideas within these levels prevent religion from playing a role 
in theory at all. 
I conclude that the religionists’ criticism of Morgenthau that he neglects religion for 
many reasons barely applies. The question then is to what degree Morgenthau adheres 
to the religionist demand to integrate religion. As the religionists are not really clear 
on this issue, I indicated at the end of Part I that they consider both a minimal variant 
and an optimal scenario to which IR should adhere. In Morgenthau’s case, I see the 
following. Morgenthau perceives the role of religion, he is aware of the varieties found 
within religion, but he does not explicitly strive for incorporating it. On a domain-
specific level, there are no assumptions that actively contribute to religion’s neglect. But 
Morgenthau also does not actively incorporate religion as a factor. This might be too 
little for the religionists, but if he takes religion insufficiently into account, he at least 
explains it. On the philosophy of science level, it appears that Morgenthau actively 
creates openness to religious or theological ideas. On certain points, as I explained in 
Chapter 5, Morgenthau also introduces theological notions of an Augustinian nature. 
The influence of these Augustinian ideas must not be underestimated, because it leads to 
the ironic situation that Morgenthau – partly relying on theological considerations – is 
cautious to separate religion too much from the political on the one hand, and fearful to 
separate religion and politics too little on the other hand.  
How is it possible that the religionists’ assessment of Morgenthau differs so much 
from mine? I believe there are a couple of reasons for this. First, it could be that the 
religionists are not sufficiently aware of the fact, as Shireen Hunter points out, that 
during Morgenthau’s writing it was all about ideologies like nationalism, socialism and 
liberalism. That would justify the relative neglect of religion or the fact that Morgenthau 
often thought about religion in its ideologized form.648 Secondly, the religionists are not 
specific enough in their criticism on realism. I have chosen Morgenthau to verify their 
position, which, however, turned out to have an opposite effect. In short, it would have 
been better if the paradigm challengers had been more specific in their criticism: what 
648 Shireen Hunter, God on our Side: Religion in International Affairs (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 223.
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do they mean exactly with realism, and to which thinkers and which books do they 
refer? In addition, they did not study Morgenthau thoroughly enough, as appears from 
the few references to Morgenthau’s writings. It seems to me that the religionists too 
often rely on particular textbook representations of Morgenthau’s classical realism which 
do not do justice to it. Morgenthau would not always recognize the realism in which he 
is still revered, albeit perfunctorily, as a founding father.649 Kubálková and Mika Luoma-
Aho even go so far as to state that: ‘The works of major figures of the Anglo-American IR 
discipline showing Judeo-Christian influences have been suppressed or excluded from 
the discipline’s history’.650 This is quite crucial, because taking note of these influences 
would have shown that it is for political-theological reasons that Morgenthau is cautious 
to involve religion too much. Since I have brought this hidden theology to the surface, 
the religionists should think how they relate to them and the way Morgenthau applies 
them in his theorizing.
Besides that the religionists have overlooked theology, they have – partly as a result 
of this – missed aspects of Morgenthau’s theorizing which are quite crucial to understand 
the place religion has in his writings. I will briefly recall these assumptions hereafter. And 
finally, there is a certain ambiguity in Morgenthau’s theorizing which makes it difficult 
to grasp how he would have dealt with religion today. This ambiguity is caused by 
the fact that Morgenthau’s thinking has a rational and an empirical side and the exact 
weighing of both elements in light of the present role of religion in the world is difficult. 
It is my impression that the religionists have focused mainly on the rational side of 
Morgenthau’s theory. I have included Morgenthau’s more empirical contributions too. 
Morgenthau gradually distinguishes international relations, as characterized by 
international politics, from the domestic domain. Morgenthau distinguishes different 
spheres, each having something characteristic that separates it from other spheres. The 
consequence of this is that Morgenthau distinguishes between the political, the religious 
and the moral sphere. Morgenthau, furthermore, wants to safeguard the autonomy of 
the political. This means that politics should not be reduced to one of the other spheres, 
like the economic, religious or moral sphere. The consequence is that religion is not 
central to his theory of international politics, but has meaning in so far as it relates to the 
political sphere, so its role is always indirect. And finally, we have to bear in mind that 
his theoretical approach is ideal-typical, that is to say, a simplification in order to find 
the rationality of a certain phenomenon. Religion, although it can be important, is not 
part of the political rationality which is national interest defined as power. Each of these 
assumptions in Morgenthau’s theory, then, interacts with and strengthens one another, 
because his view on theory influences his understanding of international relations as 
international politics, and his assumption about spheres strengthens his ideas about the 
autonomy of politics. Thus, even though Morgenthau is aware of religion’s role he does 
649 Kubálková and Luoma-Aho, Religion and the Realist Tradition, 148, 149.
650 Ibid., 146.
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not give it a place in his theorizing about international politics. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the religionists are erroneous in their explanation 
of Morgenthau’s approach to religion, together with their overlooking of the three 
assumptions just mentioned, does not give an answer to how Morgenthau’s dealing 
with religion should be appreciated. Does Morgenthau offer something of use for the 
religionists? In my view, the three points Morgenthau puts forward should be taken 
seriously by the religionists. He challenges the religionists to think about the necessity 
of theory, the autonomy of the political and the conception of international relations as 
international politics.  
In the previous chapter, I referred to the many similarities of Morgenthau’s thinking 
with the Amsterdam School. Related to that, I would like to stress that Morgenthau 
recognizes that religion was losing significance in its traditional form, but that he assumes 
that the religious impulse remains active. There will always be a need for transcendence, 
although its shape may vary. Morgenthau looks beyond the superficial image that 
people attribute to traditional religions. Also, it is interesting that Morgenthau dares 
to make a distinction between various religious expressions and make value judgements 
on them. That is an important point also being practiced by the Amsterdam School. 
Dooyeweerd also made a distinction between the different ground motives of humanist, 
Catholic, and Protestant persuasions. He eventually concluded that the ground motive 
of creation, the fall of man, and redemption is the most accurate and realistic. I do not 
know if Morgenthau would support that statement, but they do share the opinion that 
a worldview in which there is no room for redemption and tragedy or where all bets are 
on the saeculum as the place where it must be realized, is inferior to a worldview which 
acknowledges the possibility of redemption.
Chapter 7
Waltz’s Neorealism: Political Realism in 
a Scientific Coat651
Introduction651
‘The most important international relations theorist of the past half century’, ‘the pre-
eminent international relations theorist of the post-World War II era’, ‘the pre-eminent 
theorist of international politics of his generation’, and the King of Thought’.652 This is 
what Kenneth Waltz is sometimes called in mainstream IR. Besides the fact that Waltz 
is one of the most prominent theorists in IR, the founder and main representative of 
neorealism, he also has been criticized by many religionists as malefactor for the neglect 
of religion.
In the preceding chapter, the role of religion in Morgenthau’s theory was discussed. 
It turned out that the religionists have overlooked important elements of Morgenthau’s 
theory and that many of their reasons do not adequately explain the absence of religion 
in his theory. This chapter is devoted to the work of Waltz who belongs to the realist 
tradition but developed it further. He introduced a theory of international politics based 
on realist thought and on the criteria for a good theory. In Waltz’s view, a theory of 
international politics should limit itself to the systemic level of analysis and should not 
be based upon the foreign policies of states or an analysis of human nature. Through 
this strict scientific approach modeled after the natural sciences, he makes realism more 
acceptable as a scientific theory. 
A lot of continuity can be found between both theories, because Waltz and 
Morgenthau can both be seen as belonging to the the school political realism. At the 
same time, there is a discontinuity at play. The thread that runs through this chapter 
651 Parts of this chapter have also been published in Simon Polinder, “A Practice-Based Theory to Explain Religion in 
International Relations,” in The Future of Creation Order: Order Among Humans: Humanities, Social Science and Normative 
Practices, eds. Govert J. Buijs and Annet K. Mosher, Vol. 2 (Heidelberg/Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2019).
652 Ken Booth, “Introduction,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): 179.
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is my view of Waltz’s neorealism as an attempt to salvage whatever can be salvaged 
from the ideas of political realism, within the confines of the requirements set for 
scientific theories.653 When Waltz was developing his theory in the 1960s and 70s the 
classical realists were pushed out of the theoretical mainstream by behavioralists, systems 
analysts, game theorists, neo-functionalists, and institutionalists. Through his theory, 
Waltz brought a lot of political-realist ideas back to the discussion. Hall, in an article 
titled Kenneth Waltz: The Man Who Saved Realism, even calls ‘Waltz’s greatest legacy to 
IR (…) his revival – indeed, his resurrection – of realism’.654 My claim is that Waltz’s 
neorealism has to be seen as an attempt to save as much of political realism as possible. 
To comply with the requirements of science that were decisive in his time, Waltz had 
to make a number of radical choices that have consequences. In the first place, he has 
to relate himself to the theological inspiration of Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s realism. 
Secondly, he also had to deal with the requirements of science. That is why this chapter 
starts to set out how Waltz deals with this theological heritage. It also explains why 
the next chapter has in its title ‘it is the theory’. If the two elements as mentioned are 
overlooked, Waltz’s theory in general, but in particular his dealing with religion cannot 
properly be understood. 
In this chapter, I will illustrate how Waltz relates to the theological or Augustinian 
influences within political realism that I presented earlier in the chapters on Morgenthau. 
I will also set out his theory of international politics. In the subsequent chapter, I will 
show the consequences this has for the way in which Waltz deals with religion. This 
chapter and the subsequent chapter therefore have a similar focus and structure as the 
chapters on Morgenthau’s realism.
I start this chapter by showing that there is substantial theological influence on Waltz’s 
theorizing. After that, I discuss the large degree of continuity between Morgenthau and 
Waltz. I also set out how they differ. The difference between both thinkers becomes 
apparent regarding the concept of theory: what is a scientific theory, what requirements 
should it adhere to, and what does it mean for theorizing on international politics? In 
the conclusion, I address the strengths of Waltz’s theory, but also some of its weaknesses. 
7.1. From Niebuhr to Spinoza: The Augustinian Roots of  Waltz’s 
Neorealism
As with Morgenthau, Waltz did not write much about the influence of theology on 
his theory. My view is, however, that Waltz’s theory cannot fully and adequately be 
understood if this relationship is left out. For that reason, I will demonstrate how 
Waltz has been influenced by Augustinian ideas through Niebuhr, but also that Waltz 
653 Cf. Kamminga, Structure and Sin.
654 Ian Hall, “Kenneth Waltz: The Man Who Saved Realism,” E-International Relations ( June 24, 2013)
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prefers Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) and secularizes his theory as a result. 
This secularization is necessary to make realism acceptable as a scientific theory. I 
find it important to emphasize that this secularization, as with Morgenthau, is not a 
secularization out of hostility towards religion. In Waltz’s case, he deems it necessary to 
save realist political thought and be acceptable to the standards of science. It seems a 
kind of secularization as if theology continues by other means.655 In other words, Waltz 
leaves the theology behind and uses other means to make his point. He does not need 
the ‘metaphysical stuff’ that Augustine and Niebuhr needed to come to a similar point. 
Because Waltz is more radical than Morgenthau was, the question whether he can do 
so without any consequences will be discussed in the conclusion of the chapter and 
in Chapter 9. I will now move on start with a few quotes from Waltz about theology, 
Augustine, and Niebuhr. 
7.1.1. The Influence of  Christian Theology: Augustine and Niebuhr 
In the introduction of Man, the State and War, Waltz writes on the question of the cause 
of evil and the theological answer to this question.
Why does God, if he is all-knowing and all-powerful, permit the existence of evil? So asks the 
simple Huron in Voltaire’s tale, and thereby confounds the learned men of the church. The 
theodicy problem in its secular version – man’s explanation to himself of the existence of evil 
– is as intriguing and as perplexing. Disease and pestilence, bigotry and rape, theft and murder, 
pillage and war, appear as constants in world history. Why is this so? Can one explain war and 
malevolence in the same way? (…) Our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The 
root of all evil is man, and thus he himself is the root of the specific evil, war. This estimate of 
cause, widespread and firmly held by many as article of faith, has been immensely influential. It 
is the conviction of St. Augustine and Luther, of Malthus and Jonathan Swift, of Dean Inge and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. In secular terms, with men defined as beings of intermixed reason and passion 
in whom passion repeatedly triumphs, the belief has informed the philosophy, including the 
political philosophy, of Spinoza.656
In Chapter 2, he refers to Niebuhr and what the Christian tradition says about the root 
of evil. 
They [utopians, SP] have assumed that progress moves in a straight line, ever upward, whereas 
in fact each advance in knowledge, each innovation in technique, contains within itself the 
potentiality of evil as well as of good. Man widens his control over nature, but the very instruments 
655 Terpstra, Democratie als cultus, 11.
656 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 3. 
It is interesting to see how Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man. A Christian Interpretation starts in the 
same way. 
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that promise security from cold and hunger, a lessening of labor and an increase of leisure, enable 
some men to enslave or destroy others. (…) Man is a finite being with infinite aspirations, a pigmy 
who thinks himself a giant. Out of his self-interest, he develops economic and political theories 
and attempts to pass them off as universal systems: he is born and reared in insecurity and seeks 
to make himself absolute secure; he is a man but thinks himself a god. The seat of evil is the self, 
and the quality of evil can be defined in terms of pride. This view is, of course, much older than 
Niebuhr. Within the Christian tradition, it is stated in classic terms by St. Augustine. Outside that 
tradition, it is elaborated in the philosophy of Spinoza.657
Later Waltz writes about the explanation of Augustine and the shift taking place in the 
philosophy of Spinoza. 
Each man does seek his own interest, but, unfortunately, not according to the dictates of reason. 
This St. Augustine had explained by original sin, the act that accounts for the fact that human 
reason and will are both defective. In Spinoza’s philosophy this religious explanation becomes 
a proposition in logic and psychology. (…) That men are defective then becomes an empirical 
datum requiring no explanation from outside; indeed there can be no more explanation from 
outside, for God has become nature.658
Later on, Waltz quotes Niebuhr again.
Niebuhr explicitly distinguished primary from secondary causes. “All purely political or economic 
solutions of the problem of justice and peace deal with the specific and secondary causes of 
conflict and injustice,” he declares. “All purely religious solutions deal with the ultimate and 
primary causes.” Although proponents of one kind of solution often exclude the other, both kinds 
are necessary. Niebuhr makes clear, for example, in his criticism of Augustine, that a realistic 
understanding of Christian tenets requires that men concern themselves with degrees of merit 
in social and political institutions. None can be perfect, but the imperfections of democracy are 
infinitely preferable to the imperfections of totalitarianism.659 
If one looks at these quotes, one will see that both Augustine and Niebuhr’s theological 
ideas played a role in Waltz’s thinking.660 This does not mean that he also agrees with 
these ideas. In an interview in 2007, Waltz responded to the interviewer: 
657 Ibid., 21.
658 Ibid., 23, 24.
659 Ibid., 32, 33.
660 In an interview with Harry Keisler, Waltz says that he had very interesting kitchen conversations about the 
interpretation of Augustine which he enjoyed immensely when he was at Oberlin College with Eward Lewis who was an 
expert in medieval thought. Harry Kreisler, “Theory and International Politics. Conversation with Kenneth N. Waltz.” 
Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley (2003): 1, online available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/
Waltz/waltz-con0.html (accessed December 28, 2020).
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You talk about the first image? Those are reflections of course about other people’s ideas. But, 
yeah, it makes a certain – I don’t believe in any – in other words, we have become atheists. But by 
then at graduate school, I was an atheist. I was certainly influenced by a really rigorous Lutheran 
upbringing. (…) Even though the religious content in the long run did not take on. It was still a 
useful regiment to go through.661
It is not fully clear what he exactly means here, but we cannot take for granted that 
Waltz also subscribes to these ideas personally or as an academic. It shows that he is 
somehow reluctant to use these theological ideas as a basis for this theorizing, but it 
also demonstrates that there has been influence of this (Lutheran) tradition. The latter 
confirms my claim that these ideas have shaped his thinking and that he has secularized 
them (more about this in the next section). For now, I would like to show to what extent 
Waltz’s theory is indebted to these ideas.  
For example, the quotes above contain ideas about human nature, ethics, and 
history of a clear Augustinian nature. When Waltz writes ‘Our miseries are ineluctably 
the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he himself is the root 
of the specific evil, war’, he summarizes the political realist view on human nature. In 
another quote, Waltz resists a utopian approach from a Christian vision on history, 
in which the eventual destination of history will not be decided by men, but by God 
himself. ‘They [utopians, SP] have assumed that progress moves in a straight line, ever 
upward’. Instead, Waltz states that ‘in fact each advance in knowledge, each innovation 
in technique, contains within itself the potentiality of evil as well as of good’. He 
contributes that to the fact that a human being is a finite being with infinite desires, 
with a tendency to regard itself as a god. With this, Waltz puts to paper what I illustrated 
in the introduction of Part II, namely that history is the site of human freedom as well 
as finitude, creativity, and destruction, renewal and tragedy, and that there are ‘endless 
possibilities’ for the development of human capacities and social organization, but that 
this may also be an instrument of chaos, as well as of order. This results in a middle range 
ethics, because ‘a realistic understanding of Christian tenets requires that men concern 
themselves with degrees of merit in social and political institutions. None can be perfect, 
but the imperfections of democracy are infinitely preferable to the imperfections of 
totalitarianism’.662 Waltz also states in Man, the State and War that perfect earthly justice 
is impossible, and that it is about the approximation of a little more justice or freedom 
and seeking to avoid politics that lead to a little less of it.663 
These quotes clearly show the Augustinian nature of Waltz’s writings here. It is my 
claim that these ideas, similarly to Morgenthau, led to a political theology in which the 
role of the state is central, and survival by power is seen as the central principle, resulting 
661 Anna Cornelia Beyer, Kenneth Waltz’s Life and Thought: An Interview (n.p.: Lulu.com, 2015), 33.
662 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 33.
663 Ibid., 33.
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in the balance of power as an instrument to prevent worse.664 Waltz argues for these 
political realist ideas in his other writings, but without any reference to Niebuhr and 
Augustine. That is, because he secularized these assumptions and cut off this normative 
element. How he secularized it will be discussed in the next section.
7.1.2. Conservation Through Secularization: From Niebuhr to Spinoza  
The debt to Augustine and Niebuhr, or to theology in broader terms, has become 
invisible, because Waltz does not want to base his theory on a theological explanation. 
In his writings, Waltz discusses Niebuhr, but also Spinoza.665 Waltz says that in the first 
chapter of Man, the State and War: ‘There was a lot of Spinoza in the original, which 
doesn’t appeal much to students of international relations.’666 At the same time, Waltz 
states that Niebuhr (and Morgenthau) had a ‘tremendous influence’ on him and that he 
‘developed a special fondness for Niebuhr’.667 
Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who in the last twenty-five years has written as many words 
of wisdom on problems of international politics as have any of the academic specialists in that 
subject, has criticized utopians, Liberal and Marxist alike, with frequency and telling effect.668 
Immediately after these positive words about Niebuhr, Waltz uses four pages to 
set out how the religious explanation of Niebuhr and others differs from Spinoza’s 
secular explanation.669 It seems, therefore, that Waltz wants to show how the secular 
explanation of Spinoza is able to replace a theological or a religious one.670 That Waltz 
prefers Spinoza over Niebuhr appears from the fact that he later refers to Spinoza as 
representative of the first image.671 Consequently, I assume that Waltz follows Spinoza in 
his thinking that ‘God has become nature’ (Deus sive Natura). This also has implications 
for the explanation of evil. In earlier (Christian) theological thought (see Augustine), 
evil was explained by the concept of original sin. In Spinoza’s philosophy, this religious 
explanation becomes a proposition in logic and psychology: 
664 Guilhot states that the idea of the katechon gave a theological coating to the question of the balance of power after 
1945, because each historical epoch has a katechon. Guilhot, American Katechon, 235. See also Section 5.1.
665 I follow Waltz in his description of Spinoza’s thinking as secular, and I consider Waltz’s description of Spinoza’s idea 
that God has become nature as a secularizing move.
666 Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg (2000), “Interview with Ken Waltz,” 372.
667 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Q&A Session,” Conference The King of Thought: Theory, Subject, and Waltz (Aberystwyth, 2008), 
online available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-gNRkjFKlI (accessed December 29, 2020).
668 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 20.
669 Ibid., 23-26.
670 Kamminga points out that Niebuhr criticized Spinoza, because he expresses the modern culture’s confidence in both 
nature and reason and fails to understand that human egotism has the power to defy both nature and reason. Kamminga, 
Structure and Sin.
671 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 161, 162. See also William M. Hawley, “Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical 
Analysis,” The European Legacy 25, no. 7-8 (2020): 7, 8.
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That men are defective then becomes an empirical datum requiring no explanation from outside; 
indeed there can be no explanation from outside, for God has become nature.672 
The fact that Waltz follows Spinoza in his conclusion that God has become nature, does 
not mean that Waltz draws the conclusion that God does not exist or that religion is 
something superfluous, as the religionists accuse him of saying. He just takes the Spinozist 
assumption as a given for his explanation of human behavior. When Waltz states that 
Niebuhr had a tremendous influence on him this means that he has taken his ideas. This 
does not imply that he also subscribes to Niebuhr’s theological perspective.673 Waltz, for 
example, admits that his preference for balanced power instead of concentrated power is 
partly based on Niebuhr.674 The latter derived his ideas about power from his view on the 
egoism, pride, or, in theological terms, the original sin of human beings. As a theorist, 
though, Waltz does not use ‘original sin’ in order to explain his position. Therefore, 
Waltz’s position could be described as methodological agnosticism or methodological 
naturalism: he aims at a scientific explanation that leaves out religious or theological 
concepts. In Chapter 4, I discussed this position already shortly and concluded that this 
is not a neutral position. Both methodological agnosticism and naturalism contain a 
view on science that does not follow from science itself: is a pre-scientific assumption. 
Guilhot argues that Waltz secularizes his theory, because IR theory became part of 
the social sciences and was influenced by the behavioral revolution. Through Waltz, the 
anthropological and theological assumptions of realism became an immanent feature of 
the world system. Waltz secularizes realist thought but in such a way that he preserves 
its core hypotheses.675 Guilhot writes that Waltz’s Man, the State, and War signalled the 
end of the theological moment, because the link between political order and the destiny 
of man was severed, and the theological underpinnings of international relations theory 
were cut off from the new science of international relations. Waltz’s removed the need for 
an explicit theodicy by decoupling the question of war from the metaphysical question 
about evil and human nature. Guilhot calls this secularization, which he considers a 
rather complex, non-linear mechanism of transfer, translation, and anamorphosis of 
religious patterns.676 I called this earlier on the continuation of theology by other means. 
This sounds more positive than Guilhot’s indication ‘anamorphosis’, and this might 
depend on the perspective from which I evaluate it. I will illustrate this with an example 
672 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 23, 24.
673 Kamminga argues that Waltz’s neorealism strongly relies on certain theological notions of Niebuhr”s Christian realism. 
Kamminga, Structure and Sin.
674 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” in Neorealism and its 
Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 341.
675 Guilhot, American Katechon, 247, 248.
676 Ibid., 224, 225. Cf. Chris Brown, “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature,” International Relations 
23, no. 2 (2009): 265, 266; Vassilios Paipais, “First Image Revisited: Human Nature, Original Sin and International 
Relations,” Journal of International Relations and Development 22, no. 2 (2019): 364–388.
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of this secularization. 
One of the main contributions of political realism is that it creates room for the 
destructive side of humankind which is a good remedy for all too utopian thinking. 
Waltz preserves the pessimistic view on human nature of realism by limiting his 
theory to the third level (more about this follows later in this chapter). The defining 
characteristic of this level is its anarchy. As a result, states have to rely on their own 
power in order to survive.677 As Kamminga argues, the third level in Waltz’s theory is a 
non-religious argument for the original sin of the theologians Augustine and Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Similarly, his assumption about states striving for security and survival is a 
transformation of Niebuhr’s idea of the collective pride of nations.678 As a result of 
Waltz’s theory this political realist idea has become very influential in IR theory. Did 
Waltz provide a full description of the behavior of states? No, he did not, but he did 
provide a theoretical explanation of them. Did Waltz do justice to the completeness of 
Augustine and Niebuhr’s theological view on politics and the behavior of states? No, he 
did not, but he at least provided a scientific theory. Might Waltz have lost something 
important in his secularization move? Yes, I think so. I will come back to this later in the 
conclusion of this chapter and in Chapter 9 when I compare Morgenthau and Niebuhr. 
However, given the possibilities of the sciences in his day, he has saved a lot of political 
realism.  
7.1.3. Waltz’s Indebtedness to Theology 
The fact that Waltz replaces a religious explanation by a secular one, does not take away 
that he is indebted to theology. This indebtedness cannot be a surprise for those who 
know Waltz’s view on theories. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz says that theories 
are made creatively by means of intuition and ideas. If I interpret this statement in light 
of what philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994) writes, and to whom Waltz often refers, 
it means that these intuitions and ideas can also be religious: 
The fact that value judgments influence my proposals does not mean that I am making the 
mistake of which I have accused the positivists – that of trying to kill metaphysics by calling it 
names. I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. 
For it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of 
677 P. Schouten, “Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz - the Physiocrat of International Politics,” Theory Talks (2001): 6, 
online available at http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html (accessed December 28, 2020). Brown 
links Waltz to the righteous realists, the Augustinian strand of thought identified by, among others, Joel Rosenthal and 
Alastair Murray, because of his scientific, non-metaphysical application of the Augustinian ideas about human sin as the 
root of evil. Brown, Structural Realism, 265. Cf. Neta C. Crawford, “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking 
`Man’,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): 273-276.
678 Kamminga argues convincingly that Waltz’s attempt to bypass Niebuhr’s theological account does not suffice. This 
underscores my argument that Waltz has other reasons to leave theology behind namely to meet the criteria for theorizing 
according to the social science standards. Kamminga, Structure and Sin.
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science there have been others – such as speculative atomism – which have aided it. And looking 
at the matter from the psychological angle, I am inclined to think that scientific discovery is 
impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite 
hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to 
that extent, is “metaphysical.”679
For Popper scientific discovery is possible through faith in ideas which might be 
speculative or unwarranted from the point of view of science and to that extent 
metaphysical. In Waltz’s case, there are such ‘speculative’ ideas which have inspired his 
theory. Kamminga states that: 
Whereas Waltz insists that theory is to be built “creatively” from a “brilliant intuition” or “creative 
idea”, and so is “artifice”, the doctrine of original sin entails the foundational “creative” assumption 
for his neorealism  to work. “Original sin” cannot claim conclusive proof – although Niebuhr 
suggested strong empirical evidence for this “obvious fact” – but it should be no problem for Waltz 
to “see” a sin-constituted human nature without being able to prove its existence. Presuming its 
presence gives him the ultimate explanation of international-political action.680
Another assumption that shows the relationship between Waltz’s theorizing and 
theological presuppositions is the orderer he assumes. In Chapter 5 of  Theory of 
International Politics,  Waltz introduces philosopher and economist Adam Smith 
(1723-1790) to explain how there can be order without an orderer, because Smith’s 
theory describes how order is spontaneously formed from the self-interested acts and 
interactions of individual units. According to Waltz, states within the international 
system function in the same way: no state intends to participate in the formation of 
a structure, but ultimately states are constrained by the structure that results from 
their individual striving for security. The co-action of the units creates a structure that 
transcends the egoism of the individual states. Waltz does not mention Smith’s use of 
the notion ‘the invisible hand’. According to economist Bob Goudzwaard, the ‘invisible 
hand’ can best be seen as the deistic version of God’s Providence, because in the book The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith states: ‘by acting according to the dictates of our moral 
faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means of promoting the happiness 
of mankind, and may therefore be said in some sense to co-operate with the Deity 
and to advance, as far as in our power, the Plan of the Providence’.681 As this quote, 
the notion of the ‘invisible hand’ refers to a metaphysical presupposition.682 Waltz has 
679 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1972), 38.
680 Kamminga, Structure and Sin.
681 Bob Goudzwaard, Capitalism and Progress. A Diagnosis of Western Society (United Kingdom: Paternoster Press, 1997), 
22. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part III, Chapter 5.
682 Gerrit Manenschijn, Moraal en eigenbelang bij Thomas Hobbes en Adam Smith (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979), 285.
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cut this presupposition from his theory and that is legitimate, but it means that his 
theory presupposes elements which are not mentioned. That means that his theory of 
international politics is, strictly speaking, not religiously neutral because there seems to 
be a metaphysical or religious assumption present that is not articulated.683  
My point is that the example of the orderer and the influence of theological ideas 
through Niebuhr show that Waltz’s theory is indebted to religious or theological ideas. 
I point this out, because Waltz does not account very explicitly for this influence 
though he also does not hide it.684 The fact that Waltz aims at a scientific explanation 
of international politics, does not mean that his theory is cut off from theological 
assumptions. By shining light on these theological influences, it becomes clearer what 
Waltz is aiming at: he wants to save the core principles of political realism. These 
principles are, however, built on theological or religious assumptions and that is not 
acceptable within the sciences of his day. For that reason, Waltz has to secularize them 
in order to conserve them!  
The question is, was it worth it, what is lost and what is gained from what he has 
done? Murray is quite negative about this development, because neorealism ‘abandons 
the core of realism, the concern to reconcile the ideal and real in international politics’, 
and ‘it cuts theory off from any concern with the normative’.685 Epp also uses terms 
with a negative connotation such as the triumph of ‘a narrow, scientific conception’, 
and ‘marginalizing the Augustinian tradition’.686 For now, I would like to state that I am 
more positive about Waltz’ contribution to political realism than Epp and Murray, given 
the scientific context he was in.  
7.2. Waltz’s Theory of  International Politics: Classical Realist 
Thought and Neorealist Theory
Neorealism basically preserves classical realist thought and most of its political-
philosophical assumptions, yet does so in a more scientific fashion. As Jervis phrases it 
‘is developed with much more rigor and analytical power’.687 Hall argues:
Waltz recognised early on that classical realism was problematic. In particular, the philosophical 
[I would say the theological, SP] anthropology on which it was based was impossible to prove 
or disprove – it rested simply on inherited beliefs about human nature that, to his mind, lacked 
683 See also William Bain, Political Theology of International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 159-184.
684 Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics, 341.
685 Murray, Reconstructing Realism, 8, 9, 201.
686 Roger I. Epp, Power Politics and the Civitas Terrena: The Augustinian Sources of Anglo-American Thought in International 
Relations (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1990), iii.
687 Jervis, Hans Morgenthau, 858. Sandal and James approvingly cite Keohane that neorealism preserves the core 
assumptions of the theory. Sandal and James, Religion and International Relations Theory, 12.
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scientific credibility. The “evidence” on which it was based was not a systematic body of evidence 
and analysis, but rather sets of religious or philosophical speculations. As such, Waltz was 
convinced, it would not stand as a theory.688 
As the title of this section already indicates, Waltz’s theory of international politics 
is composed of classical realist thought and neorealist theory, or to say it in different 
words, his theory is a product of political theory on the one hand and a certain type 
of philosophy of science on the other. It is important here to clarify that Waltz used 
the term political theory for political philosophy, and that he considered a ‘real’ theory 
a theory that is able to explain.689 His theory of international politics (as he set out 
in Theory of International Politics) is a combination of classical realist political theory 
(political philosophy) and philosophy of science ideas about explanatory theory. When 
I use the term theory of international politics or political theory I refer to his theory and 
political philosophy.
On the other side, according to Waltz, neorealism improves classical realism, 
because it develops a theory of international politics as a distinct domain. According 
to Waltz, Morgenthau presented elements of a political theory but not a theory of 
international politics. Morgenthau singled out salient facts and constructed causal 
analysis around them. He wanted to paint a picture of foreign policy that would present 
its rational essence; therefore, Morgenthau was engaged in a gigantic struggle with the 
facts to find an explanatory principle. He developed concepts like national interest and 
interest defined as power, but like other realists, he failed in taking the decisive step to a 
recognizable theory. Morgenthau maintained, for example, the autonomy of politics but 
did not apply this concept to international politics. Morgenthau confused the problem 
of explaining foreign policy with the problem of developing a theory of international 
politics. This was the result of Morgenthau’s basic assumption that the international 
political domain cannot be marked off from other domains to construct a theory of 
international politics.690 He therefore saw explanations of foreign policy as explanations 
of international politics and vice versa, argues Waltz.691
Neorealism differs from realism on four points, writes Waltz. First, neorealism 
distinguishes between factors which are external or internal to the political system 
and isolates the one from the other to deal with them intellectually. By approaching 
international politics as a system with interacting units and a structure, neorealism 
establishes the autonomy of international politics. Critics often point out that logically 
many factors other than power, such as the governmental form or national ideology, 
should be considered. However, adding elements of practical importance and describing 
688 Hall, Kenneth Waltz: The Man Who Saved Realism.
689 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, Mass, etc.: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 6. See also Section 7.2.3.
690 Waltz, Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, 71.
691 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 122.
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the rich variety and wondrous complexity of international life would go at the cost 
of developing a theory. For Waltz, theory is not a statement about everything that is 
important or of practical interest in international political life, but necessarily a rather 
slender explanatory construct. For Waltz, the structure of the system is defined by the 
power distribution across nations, and this power distribution dominates considerations 
of ideology.692 Second, while for realists the world consists of interacting states, neorealists 
hold that interacting states can only adequately be studied by distinguishing between 
structural and unit-level causes and effects. For realists, causes run in one direction 
from the interacting units to international outcomes, while neorealists also take into 
account the influence of the structure on the behavior of the units. Neorealism is more 
deductive and realism more inductive.693 Third, for many realists, the drive for power 
is located in human nature. Morgenthau was aware that the struggle for power can be 
explained without the evil born in human beings, as there is a competition of scarce 
goods where no one functions as arbiter. He nevertheless pulled more towards the drive 
for power as the root of conflict than to the chance conditions under which struggles for 
power occur. Based on that, Morgenthau considered the drive for power of nations as 
an objective law that has its roots in human nature. Waltz’s neorealism, on the contrary, 
sees power not as an end in itself, but as a useful means of which states can have too 
little or too much. Weakness may invite attacks from stronger states, while strength may 
prompt other states to an increase of arms. In crucial situations, the ultimate concern for 
states is not power but security.694 Fourth, for realists, anarchy is a condition with which 
different states, with different governments, character of rules, and types of ideology 
have to cope. Because of the anarchical structure states can be seen as like units. Factors 
on the unit or structural level merely affect and do not determine the outcomes. It 
depends on the internal and external circumstances whether structures and states bear 
more or less causal weight.695
Unlike Morgenthau, Waltz is very clear regarding the domain of his theory. In 
Morgenthau’s case, his six principles and his further work were regarded to be his theory, 
whereas Waltz clearly put his 1979 book in the center. That is because Waltz, even more 
so than Morgenthau, has a clearly defined view on theory at the domain-specific level, 
while Morgenthau uses a number of principles that permeate all his work. That does not 
take away the fact that Waltz’s theory also contains empirical and philosophy of science 
elements that I include in my analysis. Partly in this chapter, but also in the next one 
when I evaluate the religionist position. 
In this section, I lay out what Waltz’s theory of international politics is about and how 
I understand it. I start, therefore, with an introduction to Waltz’s main theoretical works 
692 Waltz, Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, 73-76.
693 Ibid., 76-78.
694 Ibid., 78, 79.
695 Ibid., 79, 80.
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Man, the State and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979). Although 
all Waltz’s writings are consulted, I consider his theory of international politics, as it 
is expounded in the second book, as his core position.696 However, to understand his 
theory fully, it is necessary to involve his other writings, because they shed light on some 
of his assumptions that are made in his theory of international politics. 
7.2.1. Three Images: Man, the State, and the International System 
In his book Man, the State and War, Waltz provides a causal explanation for war.697 He 
distinguishes three levels or ‘images’ of analysis: the individual, the state and society, and 
the international system. The term ‘image’ is important here, for ‘it suggests that one 
forms a picture in the mind; it suggests that one views the world in a certain way’.698 The 
distinction between the three images should be seen as a foundation for his later book, 
Theory of International Politics, which aims to explain international politics. According 
to Waltz, the first image focuses on human nature as the cause of war, because war occurs 
as a result of selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, and stupidity.699 Optimists and 
pessimists agree in diagnosing the basic cause of war as human nature and behavior, 
but they disagree in their answers on whether human nature can be changed to bring 
peace.700  
According to the second image, human nature cannot be the single determinant; 
psychology must be complemented by the findings of sociology, which means that the 
internal organization of states is important. That is what the second image is about. But 
how does war occur in the second image? An example of how the internal organization 
of the state influences the external behavior of the state, is when states try to overcome 
internal defects or internal strife by making war, in the assumption that a common 
enemy will bring internal peace.701 Examples of internal defects that bring war can range 
from the form of government to the lack of natural frontiers that are necessary for its 
security.702 The question then is what form of government or state is needed to overcome 
the cause of war? According to Waltz, Marx found the answer in the ownership of the 
means of production, Kant in abstract principles of rights and Woodrow Wilson in 
terms of national self-determination and modern democratic organization. All these 
solutions have the idea in common that reform of the state will lead to world peace. 
Peace has not occurred yet, because there is not enough democracy or socialism.703 
696 Waltz himself says that ‘strictly speaking, Man, the State, and War did not present a theory of international politics. It 
did, however, lay the foundation for one’. Waltz, Man, the State and War, ix.
697 For this overview I also used an excerpt of Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism, and Beyond, 130-144.
698 Waltz, Man, the State and War, ix.
699 Ibid., 16.
700 Ibid., 39.
701 Ibid., 80, 81.
702 Ibid., 82, 83.
703 Ibid., 83, 84.
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Waltz criticizes these approaches because they rely on a generalization of one pattern 
of state and society to bring peace in the world. It is true that bad states may lead to 
war, but the opposite of this statement, that good states lead to peace in the world, is 
doubtful. The second image deals with the same difficulty as the first image, because men 
make societies, but societies also make men. That also applies to the third image, because 
in international relations the actions of states make up the substance of international 
relations but also are determined by the international political environment.704 That is 
what the third image is about. Waltz describes the third image as follows, using the story 
from Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality. 
Assume that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each 
other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each 
of them will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they “agree” to cooperate in a project to trap 
one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within 
reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing 
so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.705
Waltz’s conclusion is that in cooperative action, one cannot rely on others. While Spinoza 
linked conflict causally to man’s imperfect reason, Rousseau counters this analysis with 
the idea that the sources of conflict are in the nature of social activity.706 That is also how 
Waltz thinks about it. That means that the tension between the immediate interest of 
man and the general interest should be resolved by the unilateral action of one man. 
Reason would tell him that his long-term interest is that cooperative action benefits all 
the participants. But reason also tells him that if he forgets the hare, the man next to him 
might leave his post to chase it, leaving him with nothing. To create harmony in this so-
called anarchic situation requires not only perfect rationality but also the certainty that 
others act purely rationally. Waltz concludes that Spinoza is right that the rationality of 
human beings is important and Rousseau that different social contexts shape different 
conditions for mankind and, therefore, different behavior.707 In the stag-hunt example, 
the behavior of the rabbit snatcher was rational from his point of view, but from the 
perspective of the group it was arbitrary and capricious.708
Waltz describes two possible solutions to create harmony. Either impose an effective 
control on the separate and imperfect states, or remove states from the sphere of the 
accidental, that is, define the good state as so perfect that it will no longer be particular. 
Kant tried to compromise by making states good enough to obey a set of laws to which 
704 Ibid., 122, 123.
705 Ibid., 167, 168; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, (1755): Part II.
706 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 168.
707 Ibid., 169, 170.
708 Ibid., 183.
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they have volunteered their assent. Rousseau, however, emphasized the particular nature of 
the good state, which means that states always provoke other states. In Rousseau’s view, the 
bloodiest stage of history was the period that preceded the establishment of society. Now, the 
states of Europe are at the same stage in the establishment of an international society, Waltz 
maintains.709 
For Rousseau, the cause of the deviant behavior of the states is the international 
system. It is the general structure that permits states to exist and behave in a specific 
way. It is not possible to eliminate the cause of war without altering the structure of the 
state.710 Is Kant’s idea of a voluntary federation a good idea? According to Rousseau, this 
would be desirable, but only when it unites states in the same way as it unites individuals 
within a state. But that is not possible, because a federation does not have the power 
to enforce the rules. The states of Europe are in a condition of balance sufficiently fine 
to prevent the control of one over the other. From that perspective, a federation is a 
utopia.711 The application of this to international politics means that war occurs because 
there is nothing to prevent it. However, this does not explain why certain wars occur, 
because we know that war may occur at any moment. The reason that state A attacks 
state B cannot be explained from the structure of the state system. That depends on a 
number of special circumstances: location, size, power, interest, type of government, past 
history and tradition. These reasons are the immediate causes for war and are a result of 
image one and two. States are motivated to attack each other or to defend themselves, 
by the reason and/or passion of the people involved. As said earlier, this does not mean 
that improving men or states eliminates war, because such reasoning does not take the 
international environment into account: why can and should some states improve while 
others continue to follow their way?  
The three images make clear that it is impossible to reduce the cause of war to 
just one cause. The increased propensity to peace of some participants in international 
politics may increase the likelihood of war: when the western democracies became more 
inclined to peace, Hitler became more aggressive.712 
As said, Man, the State and War is the foundation of Theory of International Politics, 
because although the first and the second image describe the forces that are at stake in 
world politics, it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results without 
the third image.713 Stated differently, the first and the second image are the immediate 
causes and the third image is the underlying cause.714 For this reason, the main focus of 
Theory of International Politics is the third level.715   
709 Ibid., 182-184.
710 Ibid., 184.
711 Ibid., 185, 186.
712 Ibid., 232, 233.
713 Ibid., 238.
714 This is a phrase of the interviewer which Waltz confirms. Kreisler, Theory and International Politics, 3.
715 For this overview I also used a summary presented by Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
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7.2.2. A Theory of  International Politics: A Systemic Approach
Contrary to the first book which is mainly about war, Theory of International Politics is 
about international politics. In this book, Waltz wonders how it is that the nature of 
international politics seems to be constant. For him, the explanation of this continuity 
cannot only be found at the level of the state.716 Instead, he tries to develop a theory of 
international politics based on the international system. 
Waltz starts his book from the basic point that international relations theories can 
be divided into two groups: those that see causes at the level of individual states and 
those that see them operating at the systemic level. He calls the former reductionist and 
the latter systemic. Reductionist theories explain the whole by analyzing the attributes 
and the interactions of the units. Waltz takes as example John A. Hobson (1858-1940) 
and Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) who took the domestic economic situation to explain 
imperialism in international politics.717 Many present-day reductionist theories fail 
to explain politics, because they leave out the causes on the systemic level. Removing 
the causes on the level of the units removes the symptoms, but not the cause. The 
statement: ‘he is a troublemaker’ is not the same as ‘he makes trouble’. The attributes 
of actors do not explain why they act in that way. On the system level, a set of factors 
determines the outcomes of the interactions between states.718 Waltz finds that none of 
the existing systems theories are real systems theory. In fact, they are all reductionist. 
Hans Morgenthau, Morton Kaplan, Richard Rosecrance, Stanley Hoffmann and David 
Singer have failed to develop a real system theory.719 They do not start from a clear 
understanding of what a system is, and they all end up with a system that is the result 
of the interacting units.720 For Waltz a systemic explanation of international relations is 
constituted by a system that comprises two elements: a structure and a set of interacting 
units. These two elements should not be confused.721 Both the unit and the structure are 
theoretical concepts; they do not exist in reality. It is the arrangement of the parts within 
the system and the principle of the arrangement that define the structure. Economists 
are concerned with the nature of the market and not with the personalities of managers. 
In the same way, the effects of the situation on the behavior of actors are explained 
by omitting the motives of the individuals, and the interactions among them, from 
the analysis. Following the sociologist Émile Durkheim, Waltz argues that any political 
structure is defined by three elements: the principles by which the parts are arranged, 
the characteristics of the units, and the distribution of capabilities across the units.722 
Relations, 105-110.
716 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 67, 68.
717 Ibid., 18, 19.
718 Ibid., 60, 61.
719 Ibid., 45.
720 Ibid., 38-78.
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The political scientist Hans Mouritzen speaks about these elements as layers, whereby 
the lowest layer concerns the arranging principles of the parts, and the highest layer the 
distribution of capabilities among the system’s units.723 
The first characteristic is about the way in which units are ordered. The international 
system has two ordering principles: hierarchy and anarchy.724 These principles differ, 
because hierarchy means that the units stand in a legally and constitutionally organized 
relationship. Anarchy is a system where none of the formal power relations is at work; 
it is a system of self-help.725 Many people think of anarchy as a disorganizing principle, 
but it is a principle that tells how the major units of the realm relate to each other.726 The 
second characteristic refers to the functions of units. In contrast to domestic politics, the 
international system does not involve units that perform different functions. The units 
are all states with the same functions. That does not mean that only states play a role, but 
they are the primary units. All states share the same attribute, namely sovereignty, being 
independent and autonomous with respect to other states.727 Waltz uses Durkheim’s 
distinction between mechanical and organic societies, and examples of, respectively, 
the international and the domestic sphere. Waltz describes mechanical societies as 
that ‘they have their own needs and interests, but they do not interact through their 
special characteristics in such a way as to become entangled in one another’s affairs and 
dependent on one another’s efforts’.728 Organical societies are societies that promote the 
sharpening of individual talents and skills. Parts of them depend on others for services 
and supplies that they cannot provide for themselves.729 The third element of structures 
is the distribution of capabilities among the units. The distribution of the capabilities 
changes, although all international systems are anarchical and all units are functionally 
interchangeable. This means that states stand in a relative position to each other. The 
focus is not on the ideologies or beliefs of the leaders, or the alliances and interactions, 
but on the relative power situation. A change in the distribution of capabilities results in 
a changing power configuration, and the international system determines the behavior 
of its units by virtue of its anarchical structure. The structure and units set the situation 
in which all the units exist. The change of the structure determines the interactions 
723 Hans Mouritzen, “Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist between International Politics and Foreign Policy,” in The 
Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?, eds. Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (London; New York: 
Routledge, 1997), 69.
724 ‘The term ‘anarchy’ comes to us from the Greek, meaning, literally, absence of government or rule (arche). In popular 
discourse ‘anarchy’ often suggests chaos or violent disorder. But the absence of hierarchical order need not lead to a 
Hobbesian war of all against all.’ Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 81.
725 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 88-93. According to Waltz, a ‘self-help system is one in which those who do 
not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than other, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will 
suffer’. Ibid., 118.
726 Kreisler, Theory and International Politics, 3.
727 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93-97.
728 Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics, 323.
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between the units.730 
For Waltz, agents and agencies act, but systems as a whole do not. The actions of the 
agents are affected by the structure of the system. This seems to be circular reasoning, 
but Waltz explains how these effects are produced: through socialization of the actor 
and through competition among them. By the process of socialization, Waltz means 
that two actors can create a condition that cannot be controlled either by decisions or 
by individual acts. The behavior of a pair cannot be apprehended by taking a unilateral 
view of each of them, because their interrelations have made them parts of a system. 
It is the same mechanism when individuals become a member of a group, because the 
group puts them in possession of a collective mind, which makes them feel, think, and 
act in a manner quite different to what they would feel, and think when they are alone. 
The characteristics of group behavior result partly from the qualities of its members 
and in another part from the characteristics their interactions produce.731 However, 
that does not mean that people are doomed to live according to the structure of the 
system, because virtuosity, skills, and determination can help to transcend the structural 
constraints of the system.732  
The other way in which structures have effect is through competition, because it 
generates order. Competition spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to the socially 
most acceptable and successful practices. Waltz uses Adam Smith’s theory to explain 
how competition works whereby firms are assumed to be maximizing units. Some firms 
may not even try to maximize, others do. Competitive systems are regulated, so to 
speak, by the ‘rationality’ of the more successful competitors. Here, rationality means 
only that some do better than others.733 
According to Waltz, the existence of anarchy and the fact that units strive for survival 
lead to a balance of power politics.734 Waltz’s core message is that when a state does not 
see to its own survival, its existence will be in danger. He is, therefore, very sceptical 
about states that aim at higher goals, such as freedom and justice. When Waltz mentions 
the word freedom as a possible goal of the state, he immediately adds ‘that if freedom 
is wanted, insecurity must be accepted’.735 He also discusses the relationship between 
might and right. He then states that ‘if might decides, then bloody struggles over right 
can more easily be avoided’.736 Waltz suggests that it is irrational to fight for right, while 
might decides. In sum, Waltz’s theory teaches the important and prevailing role of power 
but does not give much guidance for the use of power, besides that it should serve the 
survival of the state.
730 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 107-110.
731 Ibid., 75, 76.
732 Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics, 344.





The similarity with Niebuhr is striking here. Niebuhr, makes a clear distinction 
between how people relate to each other on an individual level and on a group level. 
Niebuhr, for example, argues that in a relationship between two individuals, people can 
sacrifice their own interests for the interests of the other through agape love, which helps 
them to transcend their own egoistic motives by imagining themselves in someone else’s 
situation; the social aspect of Wendt. For Niebuhr, this becomes much harder among 
groups because the collective egoism can barely be transcended. Within the nation-
state, it is the government that can transcend the selfishness of groups and try to achieve 
justice, although it cannot enforce agape love. On the international level of nation-states, 
where an overarching supranational authority is lacking, it is already an accomplishment 
when states balance each other’s struggle for power and prevent the dominance of one 
state over the other. For Niebuhr, the derived norm of the balance of power was a very 
important normative notion, which could only be overlooked by statesmen at their own 
peril.737
In Waltz’s view, international relations are the result of power relations, which can 
be multipolar or bipolar. Proponents of a multipolar system believe that five dominant 
powers are more stable than a bipolar system, which is a situation where two powers 
balance each other. Waltz argues that a bipolar system is more stable, because they are 
focused on each other and know each other very well. Its balance is based on a zero-sum 
game; the gain of the one is the loss of the other. This mutual control leads to tensions 
and crises but prevents the great powers from attempts to overrule the other.738 In the 
time that Waltz wrote his book Theory of International Politics, the United States and 
the Soviet Union had not had any direct military confrontation, and, would not have 
any, until the end of the Cold War and many years after it. Waltz rejects the liberal 
assumption that more interdependence leads to more stability. For him interdependence 
also ‘raises the prospect of occasional conflict. The fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest 
international ones are fought within arenas populated by highly similar people whose 
affairs are closely knit’.739 Waltz illustrates his argument with the interdependency of 
Germany and the other European countries before First World War, which did not 
prevent the outbreak of the war. 
Bipolarity is also more appropriate to deal with international problems such as 
pollution, poverty, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because of anarchy, solutions 
must be found at the state level. International organization will not work, because each 
state will try to dominate or control the organization at stake, which will be an invitation 
to prepare for a world civil war. A bipolar system works better, because ‘the greater the 
737 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society. A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1960), 257-277; Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940), 26, 27, 
78; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. II (London: Nisbet & Co, 1941), 
85-94, 275, 276.
738 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 172-176.
739 Ibid., 138.
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relative size of a unit the more it identifies its own interest with the interest of the system’ 
and ‘the smaller the number of great powers, and the wider the disparities between the 
few most powerful states and the many others, the more likely the former are to act for 
the sake of the system’.740 
7.2.2.1. Is Neorealism Holistic or Methodological Individualistic? 
There has been some debate on whether Waltz is a holist or a methodological 
individualist, also among religionists (see Chapter 3). The question is whether 
Waltz uses a top-down or a structural approach to social inquiry, one that seeks to 
explain individual actors by a larger whole. Or, does Waltz use a bottom-up approach, 
and does he take individual actors or social units as the determiners of the structure of 
the system?
It is important to answer this question, because in the next chapter I will assess to 
what extent Waltz’s holism causes religion to be left out. IR theorist Wendt characterizes 
Waltz as a methodological individualist.741 Wendt argues that in Waltz’s theory, the 
characteristics of the structure are built out of the ontologically primitive attributes 
of states, because the distribution of capabilities is a function of state attributes. Also, 
the fact that the system is competitive and dominated by power politics is the result of 
states that are egoistic about their security. This makes the state ontologically prior to the 
structure of the system and thus methodologically individualistic.742 I agree with Smith 
and Hollis who, on the contrary, argue that Waltz can be read in two different ways, 
but they are convinced that their holist interpretation of Waltz is more accurate.743 I will 
not repeat their argument here fully, but lift out their main point that structure plays an 
independent role in Waltz’s theory. A specific quote which they take from Waltz shows 
this clearly. 
From the coactions of the like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them. 
Once formed, a market becomes a force in itself, and a force that the constitutive units acting 
singly or in small number cannot control.744
740 Ibid., 198.
741 Alexander Wendt, “Review: Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations,” Review of 
International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 384, 388, 389. See also, Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in 
International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 339, 341, 342; Alexander Wendt, “Levels 
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being reduced to statements about the properties of individuals or their interactions’. Alexander Wendt and Ian Shapiro, 
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Monroe (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California, 1997), 176.
742 Wendt, Review, 388, 389.
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Wendt argues that structure in Waltz’s theory should be seen as given external constraints 
on the actions of states, rather than as conditions of possibility for state action.745 In my 
view, Waltz’s theory describes how the structure conditions the behavior of the units, 
and shapes the behavior and the outcomes.746 Waltz’s theory of international politics 
limits itself to the structure and does not deal with the units. He admits that an ideal 
theory would comprise both levels, but he argues that a good theory limits itself for the 
purpose of explanatory power.
7.2.2.2. Waltz’s A Posteriori Materialism 
Another point of discussion that is relevant for the debate is whether Waltz’s theory is 
based on materialism. Wendt describes Waltz’s theory often as a materialist theory, or 
in one place, as an implicit materialist theory. Wendt mentions the latter possibility, 
because Waltz does not defend materialism nor argues that ideas do not matter. He 
suggests that because of the evolutionary pressures in a self-help system, perceptions 
or ideas will tend to reflect the reality of who has the material power to hurt whom. 
This finally leads, according to Wendt, to an equation of the international structure 
with the distribution of the material capabilities.747 Wendt also says that his problem 
with Waltz’s theory is its materialism, because he thinks that ideas should have greater 
explanatory power.748 The fact that Wendt frames the opposition between Waltz and 
himself as materialist versus idealist is not correct.  
Wendt’s depiction of Waltz as materialist is not accurate, because Waltz is not a 
hidden or an implicit materialist, but an a posteriori materialist. He assumes a posteriori 
that material capabilities are more important than ideas, because he concludes on 
empirical grounds that the behavior of states in anarchy can better be explained by 
their material capabilities than their mutual perception of each other. He argues that 
how you help yourself in a self-help situation depends on the resources you can dispose 
of and the situation you are in.749 This means that ideas and ideologies can play a role, 
especially on the unit level, but they are not strong enough to have explanatory power 
at the structural level. It is the wish for explanatory power that has been overlooked by 
Wendt, because Waltz does not disregard non-material factors solely because they are 
non-material. He also does not equate the international structure with the distribution 
745 Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem, 342.
746 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 7.
747 James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International 
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748 Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State,” 
International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 692; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 184.
749 Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, “Interview with Ken Waltz,” Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (2000): 382. 
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of material capabilities, but he explains the international structure by it. Wendt says 
that one debate is about what structure the international system is made of, the other 
about what explanatory difference it makes.750 In my view, the explanatory difference is 
the most important question for Waltz, and that leads him to consider matter as more 
important than ideas. Wendt’s comment applies here: ‘this question is ultimately an 
empirical one’.751 
7.2.3. ‘Clothes Make the Man’: Waltz’s View on Scientific Theories 
So far, I have dealt with Waltz’s neorealism as a composition of realist political thought 
on the one hand and neorealist theory on the other. There is, however, another crucial 
factor to understand Waltz and that is his view on theory. In the title of this section I 
referred to this as ‘the scientific coat’, because as the saying goes: ‘clothes make the man’. 
This metaphor has, however, also another meaning, because a coat or a jacket can also 
be or become too tight. 
According to Waltz, a theoretical notion may be a concept, or an assumption. 
However, a theoretical notion does not explain or predict anything; it finds its 
justification in the success of the theories that employ them. A theory, though related 
to the world is not the same as the world, because explanatory power is gained by 
abstracting from reality. Otherwise it would remain only descriptive and it would not 
become explanatory. Waltz maintains that a theory or a model is never congruent with 
reality, because theories are mediators between reality and the observer.752 He says: ‘If 
we could directly apprehend the world that interests us, we would have no need for 
theory’.753 Waltz states that his definition of a theory corresponds to the definition that is 
used in the natural sciences and in some of the social sciences, such as economics. It does 
not correspond with a philosophical interpretation, like much of traditional political 
theory. The reason for Waltz’s preference for theories with explanatory power comes 
from the desire to control, or at least, to know if control is possible.754 
Although Waltz prefers an explanatory approach modelled after the natural 
sciences, he does not disregard other more interpretative approaches. The latter are 
important because they point to a variety of ideas and concepts that may be needed 
to recognize different phenomena that are part of a greater, coherent whole.755 While 
the natural scientists look for simplicity, elemental units, and elegant theories, students 
of international politics complicate their studies and claim to identify more and more 
750 Wendt and Friedheim, Hierarchy Under Anarchy, 692.
751 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
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variables.756 Although a high regard for systematic theory is often coupled with disdain 
for more interpretative political philosophy, Waltz, on the contrary, finds history and 
political philosophy very important.757 An important contribution of political philosophy 
is that it helps to discover how the images entertained by different people lead them to 
select, filter, and interpret data in different ways.758 A theory, on the other hand, intends 
to identify why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits and why 
certain patterns of behavior recur. Such a theory has elegance when its explanations and 
predictions are general. A theory of international politics will explain why wars recur 
and will indicate some of the conditions that make war more or less likely, but it is not 
able to predict the outbreak of particular wars.759 Such a realist theory is better at saying 
what will happen than saying when it will happen, because international political theory 
deals with the pressure of structures on states, and not with how states will respond.760 
Although Waltz maintains that the emphasis of theory is not prediction but explanation, 
he also says that a theory indicates what actors will try to do and what will happen to 
them if they do not manage to do it.761 
A theory is an instrument used to explain “the real world” and perhaps to make some predictions 
about it. In using the instrument, all sorts of information, along with a lot of good judgment, is 
needed. Theories don’t predict, people do.762
Waltz claims that his theory is modelled after the natural sciences and that it is not 
prescriptive. Waltz argues that you cannot go directly from theory to application.763 As 
he writes in the final sentence of his book, his theory is not about how to manage the 
world, but about describing ‘how the possibility that great power will constructively 
manage international affairs varies as systems change’.764 Waltz claims that he does not 
describe the world one might want, but the world as it is likely to become, irrespective 
of what anybody may want.765 By emphasizing the fact that his theory is not normative, 
Waltz was able – in the words of Campbell – to maintain ‘realism as a more rigorous, 
756 Ibid., 68.
757 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Philosophy and the Study of International Relations,” in Theoretical Aspects of International 
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descriptive, and potentially theoretical field of inquiry’.766 In my own words, Waltz 
needs the above view on theory to stay within the confines of the sciences of his days 
and uses it to save as much as possible of political realist philosophy. To me that is also 
an important motive for Waltz to secularize his political theology, because in that way 
he can preserve it. Whether he succeeded in doing so remains to be seen. I will discuss 
that in the conclusion. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Waltz’s neorealism is the combination of classical 
realist thought, neorealist theory and his view on scientific theory. I have also shown that 
many of his theorizing is inspired by, and sometimes presupposes, theological or religious 
ideas. I have tried to demonstrate that Waltz has secularized this theological influence 
in order to conserve it. Also, by choosing for the third level, the system level, Waltz cut 
off his indebtedness to these theological ideas more rigorously than Morgenthau. I have 
defined this secularization as a continuation of theology, but by other means. I have also 
stated that I consider this an impressive move, because within the limited possibilities of 
the scientific discourse of that time, Waltz saved realism.  
At the same time, however, when reading Waltz as the secularized variant of 
Niebuhr, it also becomes clear that there is something lost. For example, in Section 
7.2.2. I demonstrated how Waltz’s distinction between the behavior of individuals 
and groups closely resembles Niebuhr’s ideas about the (im)possibility of agape love 
between individual human beings and groups. Waltz’s argument is, however, of a 
different nature: he uses concepts from economic theory instead of theological ones. 
When he argues that virtuosity, skills and determination can help to transcend the 
structural constraints of the systems, he uses other words than Niebuhr who would 
also use terms as love and redemption to overcome the sinfulness of the system. 
This raises the question whether the explicit use of theological terms and notions 
makes Niebuhr’s realism more hopeful? Or, in other words, is Waltz’s neorealism 
more pessimistic because he cuts off theology (I discuss the same question in 
relation to Morgenthau in Chapter 9)? In Waltz’s theory, it is a good thing when 
states try to balance each other and prevent mutual dominance.767 Niebuhr would 
accept the strive for balance of power, but he would always criticize it from the 
point of agape love. There is no doubt, that Waltz would be in favor of positive change 
or greater harmony between states, but he wants to be realistic; therefore the power 
element in politics should not be overlooked. He repeatedly emphasizes that change 
and progress in international politics are only possible when the power element is taken 
766 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, 136. Descriptive should here be understood as over against normative.
767 John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): 253, 254.
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into consideration. Dangerous and ineffective politics are often the result of idealist 
thinking that overlooks the necessity of power.768 But why is Waltz so concerned about 
the (im)possibility of change and progress? That is because he is normatively involved 
and it would be interesting if he would have reflected more on that, because then these 
assumptions could have been part of closer scrutiny. 
Especially since religion has come to the forefront, it might not be necessary 
to shy away from the theological assumptions that inform political theory. I am 
not saying that Waltz does so, because he admits certain preferences, and invokes 
Popper to justify the influence of intuitive, creative ideas and theorizing. However, 
Waltz seems to find it necessary to leave out or translate the theological part, while 
I think it is helpful to show International Relations discipline, that the discipline 
itself has religious or even theological roots. According to the Amsterdam School, 
it helps to put this into the open and to avoid the idea that there is a neutral 
scientific theory of international relations, because many theories on international 
relations are indebted to certain worldview assumptions.    
In this conclusion, I would also like to evaluate Waltz’s attempt to save political realist 
thought. Waltz claims that his theory of international politics is limited to the system 
level, the third level. He argues that his theory does not include political philosophy. 
He even introduced different terms to make that possible: political philosophy became 
political theory and his neorealist theory was a theory similar to theories in the natural 
sciences and economics. I did not focus on his third level theory only, but I have laid out 
his indebtedness to classical realism, his ideas about the first and second image, and the 
inspiration from theology. Waltz wants to leave all of that behind to construct a theory 
about the structure of the system which explains international politics. His theory is not 
a prescriptive one. He also claims that it is not a normative theory. 
Even though his attempt to have a non-prescriptive theory is praiseworthy, I think he 
fails in keeping up to it. In Waltz’s view, a theory isolates a domain of reality so as to make 
it more intelligible, while policymaking has to deal with complex interwoven phenomena 
that require contextual analysis. In this way, Waltz clearly defines the function and 
scope of a theory in relation to a policymaking analysis. This prevents easy conclusions 
about the applicability of scientific theories. In my view, it is worthwhile to distinguish 
between a scientific theory and the application of that theory in policymaking; however, 
the two cannot be separated too strictly since people will always draw conclusions from 
general scientific explanations. According to Jervis, Waltz himself came into trouble 
with his own theory, regarding the Vietnam War. Waltz’s theory did neither explain 
nor prescribe an intervention in Vietnam. According to Jervis, Waltz incorporated this 
768 This explains why the neorealist John Mearsheimer argues strongly against critical theory, which Wendt, to a certain 
extent, defends. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 
3 (1994/95): 14, 15, 37-47; Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 
(1995): 71-81.
246
aberrant behavior in the form of an argument that states tend to overreact to conflicts 
in the peripheries of a bipolar world.769 On another occasion, Waltz was not completely 
consistent, says Campbell, because in the discussion on nuclear weapons Waltz seems 
to weigh policy more than theoretical consistency. Placing before himself a choice 
between philosophical consistency and a program for great-power peace, in 1981, Waltz 
decisively opted for the latter.770 This quote put forward by Campbell reveals that Waltz, 
at this point, was no longer the disinterested observer and theorist, but felt involved.771 
…all the parties in a serious crisis have an overriding incentive to ask themselves one question: 
How can we get out of this mess without nuclear weapons exploding?772
Secondly, Waltz aims at an empirical theory and not a normative theory. He warns 
his readers not to extrapolate from his observations of how things  are  to what 
they ought to be. His theory only explains what will happen if the role of power 
is not taken seriously, so he claims.773 This does not mean that Waltz denies that 
there is normative influence. He acknowledges his indebtedness to classical realist 
thought but he separates his theory from this and gives his theory a more scientific 
basis. However, he cannot do without these normative presuppositions and he 
selectively invokes them to defend his theory. For example, he argues on the one 
hand that, theoretically spoken, the object of study must be isolated, and on the other, 
that, from a realist point of view, the political should be treated as a distinct domain with 
its own logic. The drawback of this is that when people refute the empirical evidence 
that supports his view that international politics is about survival, Waltz can turn to 
philosophy of science and argue that you must leave some issues out for theoretical 
purposes. Mouritzen even states that, as a result of this, Waltz’s theory is extremely 
difficult to test, because almost everything in the world seems to be left out from his 
theory. However, by invoking selective parts of his philosophy of science, it is extremely 
easy for Waltz to defend the theory.774 So, even though Waltz’s theory is not a normative 
theory, it is theory which cannot do without normative elements. 
Waltz’s contribution to IR is that he challenges scholars to choose between various 
factors, and he limits the domain in which theorizing is possible. A theory becomes 
stronger when it is clear what the object of explanation is and what characterizes it in 
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770 Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan, 164.
771 Ibid., 167. See also Kenneth N. Waltz and James Fearon, “A Conversation with Kenneth Waltz,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 15, no. 1 (2012): 5.
772 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” The American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (1990): 
740.
773 Waltz, Q&A Session; See also Robert H. Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to InternationalRelations: Theories 
and Approaches (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 79.
774 Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 77.
247
comparison to other domains. Waltz definitely contributed to this. As every positive 
also has a negative, the consequence of this is that Waltz leaves out many factors and 
therefore explains a lot about little. 
Finally, Waltz strictly limits his theory to the political domain. He does not indicate 
how other factors such as economics, culture, law, and religion are related to the power 
structure of international politics. What does this mean? Does he consider religion to 
be totally irrelevant or is its influence still strong and comparable with economics? If we 
want to understand the role of religion in relation to international politics, it would be 
helpful if a theory could identify how the political relates to other important domains. 
In the next chapter, I will assess to what extent Waltz’s neorealism addresses religion and 
whether the religionists are correct in their criticism. 
 
Chapter 8
Religion in Waltz’s Neorealism: ‘It Is 
the Theory!’
Introduction
In the last chapter, I argued that Waltz’s neorealism is indebted to theology, and that 
this should be taken seriously to understand his dealing with religion. However, it is not 
only his indebtedness to theology, but also his view on theory that explains the way he 
deals with religion. In this chapter, I will argue that to understand Waltz’s dealing with 
religion, the religionists should focus on his decision to limit a theory of international 
politics to the third level and to aim at parsimony (a theory should provide the simplest 
possible explanation). All the other reasons that the religionists put forward to account 
for the neglect of religion are interesting and, in some case also true, but to fully 
understand what Waltz is doing, one should look at his attempt to save political realist 
thought by adhering to the scientific standards of his days: ‘it is the theory!’ That will be 
the common thread of my argument in this chapter.  
In the meantime, I will also answer the question to what extent the religionist position 
appears to be correct in confrontation with Waltz’s neorealism and what consequences 
this has for their claim that IR should incorporate religion. This chapter, therefore, has 
the same structure as the chapter on Morgenthau and religion. I will assess the validity 
of the empirical, the domain-specific, and the philosophy of science thesis. 
It is important to understand how Waltz defines religion, to be able to assess to 
what extent the religionists are correct about his ‘neglect’ of religion. Waltz’s definition 
of religion falls within the definition of the religionists. I base this on the references to 
religion as set out in the section hereafter. In the first place, Waltz distinguishes religion 
from ideology and ethnicity. Besides that, he speaks of religion as being Christianity 
many times, and in other places he uses religion in a more general sense over against 
the secular. The difference between religion and the secular seems to exist in the belief 
in a transcendent reality. Contrary to the religionists, Waltz does not ascribe a stronger 
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impact to religion in comparison to other factors, but he does not deny it either. In 
short, Waltz and the religionists sufficiently agree on the definition of religion to make 
an assessment possible.
8.1. Empirical Thesis: Waltz’s Reflections on Christianity and 
Religion 
Waltz has scarcely written about religion, let alone about the role of religion in 
international relations. At places where I would expect references to religion because of 
the religious context, he does not pay attention to it at all.775 In the book The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons, he discusses Iran, Egypt, Israel, and Palestine without mentioning or 
referring to religion. He presupposes that these states act rationally and that they make 
their decisions based on cost-benefit analyses.776 He only writes about religion in his 
book Man, the State, and War and in some other places. In the previous chapter, I already 
demonstrated what he said about the Christian faith, human nature, original sin, the 
existence of war, and the influence of the Christian theologians Niebuhr and Augustine. 
I will copy the relevant passages to make clear how and against what background Waltz 
writes about religion. These passages are quoted in full length, not only because there 
are not many, but an integral reading of the passages is helpful to understand Waltz’s 
thinking on religion.
Waltz writes the following about religion in the lives of individuals when he discusses 
the influence of religious and material forces. 
Often with those who expect an improvement in human behavior to bring peace to the world, the 
influence of social-political institutions is buried under the conviction that individual behavior is 
determined more by religious-spiritual inspiration than by material circumstance.777
In another place, in reports on a debate on nuclear weapons and Iran in which Waltz 
participated, the moderator puts forward that the Cold War was a conflict between 
reasonably stable, secular regimes oriented towards their material interests. Iran, however, 
is not governed by material interests and physical survival, but by religious zealots. Waltz 
doubts this view on the Cold War, because the Soviet Union and China were not seen 
as stable and predictable at that time. Retrospectively, it is striking how responsibly 
they acted when a nuclear war became possible, which confirms his idea that everyone 
who had these weapons behaved as anyone else would do. Waltz, therefore, states the 
775 Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,” 5, no. 4 (1981): 55, 56.
776 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate (New York, NY etc.: Norton, 1995), 
12, 13, 16.
777 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 40.
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following with respect to religiously inspired people.
I don’t think that many religiously-oriented people act in ways that will result in the massacre of 
thousands of people. I think people are people. I don’t think heavenly rewards motivate very many 
people. So I don’t worry about those who have nuclear weapons.778 
In Chapter 6 of Man, State and War, which deals with the international level though one 
also could say that this is about the domestic level, Waltz writes about the influence of 
religion on society. 
To allow in my calculation for the irrational acts of others can lead to no determinate solutions, 
but to attempt to act on a rational calculation without making such allowance may lead to my 
own undoing. The latter argument is reflected in Rousseau’s comments on the proposition that a 
“people of true Christians would form the most perfect society imaginable.” In the first place he 
points out that such a society “would not be a society of men.” Moreover, he says: “For the state 
to be peaceable and for harmony to be maintained, all the citizens without exception would have 
to be [equally] good Christians; if by ill hap there should be a single self-seeker or hypocrite. . . he 
would certainly get the better of his pious compatriots.”779 
In the conclusion he comes back to this issue. 
It is likewise true, reverting to the first two images, that without the imperfections of the separate 
states there would not be wars, just as it is true that a society of perfectly rational beings, or of 
perfect Christians, would never know violent conflict. These statements are, unfortunately, as 
trivial as they are true.780 
In a book on conflict in world politics, Waltz refers to the differences between religious 
and ethnic divisions on the one hand and political and ideological differences on the 
other.
Conflict with South Vietnam and between the two Germanies and the two Koreas turns on 
political and ideological differences, in contrast to the strong religious and ethnic divisions of the 
Middle East.781
778 Scott D. Sagan, Kenneth N. Waltz and Richard Betts K., “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” 
Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (2007): 142, 143.
779 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 169. Note that this quote comes from the part of the book which deals with the 
international level, but that the content of the quote is about the influence of religion on a societal level. Waltz uses the 
influence of religion on the societal level to illustrate how the international level works. Waltz refers here to. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract, (1762), Book IV, Chapter 8.
780 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 228, 229.
781 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Conflict in World Politics,” in Conflict in World Politics, eds. Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. 
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In an article referring to the terrorist attacks of September 11, Waltz again writes about 
the continuity of international politics. 
Why, one may wonder, does the prospect of terror not change the basic facts of international 
politics? All states – whether authoritarian or democratic, traditional or modern, religious or 
secular – fear being their targets. Governments prize stability, and most of all prize the continuation 
of their regimes.782 
Waltz’s writings show that he is not blind to the role of religion in social and political 
affairs, but he limits his description to the individual, national and, depending on the 
interpretation of the third quote above, the international level. He does not refer to 
religion on the transnational level. 
Waltz does not refer to what the religionists call the global resurgence of religion. 
Contrary to Morgenthau, who passed away much earlier than Waltz, he does not 
mention it at all. That makes it the more interesting to find out what role religion 
plays in Waltz’s neorealism. That is what the next section on the domain-specific level is 
about. 
8.2. Domain-Specific Level: Waltz on Westphalia and its 
Assumptions
Waltz did not write about Westphalia explicitly. It is, however, possible to see to 
what extent he ascribes to the so-called Westphalian assumptions, as the religionists 
put forward. In this section on the domain-specific thesis, I will describe in what way 
Waltz has been influenced by the standard interpretation of the Westphalian distinction 
between religion and politics. After that, I will deal with Waltz’s view on the state, 
his assumption that states aim at survival, and the possible influence of the Cold War 
context on his theorizing.
8.2.1. Westphalia and the Emergence of  the Political
The religionists claim that according to neorealism Westphalia marks the moment that 
Europe separated church and state, religion became marginalized or privatized, and a 
prosperous new era began (Chapter 3). This is quite a statement and difficult to verify, 
because Waltz did not write about it explicitly.  
Another idea of the religionists seems more relevant here, namely that the Westphalian 
assumptions about the primacy, centrality, and the reason of the state are typically developed 
Waltz (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1971), 464.
782 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Continuity of International Politics,” in Realism and International Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 250.
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in the West and have shaped the common understanding of religion and politics, either 
in the form of Judeo-Christian secularism, or laicism, as Hurd calls it. This means that 
the political sphere was emancipated from the religious sphere. Politics was no longer 
defined by religion but became autonomous and was treated as something with its own 
logic. The fact that Waltz takes international politics as a domain in its own right is not 
just a prerequisite to make his theory possible, but also a substantial, secular, Western idea, 
because he distinguishes between religion and politics as two different spheres. Waltz’s idea 
of international politics as an autonomous domain is a strong realist assumption, which is 
already present in Morgenthau. Realism has incorporated this idea, and Waltz takes it as an 
important prerequisite to think of international politics as a domain and a subject matter 
that could be studied in its own right.783 Like in Morgenthau’s sphere approach, Waltz’s 
view on theory strengthens this political-theoretical assumption. For Waltz, a theory marks 
out a domain to which it applies and shows how it can be conceived of as an autonomous 
realm.784 Waltz takes this idea from economics where the physiocrats asked the question: 
‘What it is that we can have theory about?’ and they drew a picture of economics, because 
one has to have a notion of a domain for that activity.785 In order to maintain the autonomy 
of the political, Waltz criticizes liberals that want the politics out of politics and plead for 
a laissez-faire state that would confine its activities to catching criminals and enforcing 
contracts.786 The assumption that religion and politics can analytically be distinguished 
and separately theorized, makes it possible for Waltz to leave religion out and limit his 
theory to the political.  
That the Western assumption regarding the political and religious sphere shapes 
how Waltz sees the rest of the world, appears from his statement that he believes his 
theory of international politics applies to the whole world. He admits that he decided to 
leave Africa out, though he states that the notion of anarchy also applies to Africa.787 So, 
there is a Westphalian influence on Waltz’s theorizing. The question is, however, whether 
this can be ascribed to Westphalia exclusively, since according to Waltz international 
politics has not changed fundamentally for millennia.788 
Waltz does not give any reason why he believes that Westphalia marks the privatization 
of religion. He seems nonetheless to be influenced by the Western distinction between 
religion and politics. Whether he understands this as a Judeo-Christian or laicist form 
of secularism is not clear. It is also impossible to conclude whether he considers the 
distinction between religion and politics an atheistic or anti-religious movement, or 
whether he sees Westphalia as the birth of religious freedom.
783 Kreisler, Theory and International Politics, 2.
784 Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics is not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies (Autumn, 1996): 54.
785 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 385; Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 9.
786 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” in Realism and International Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 199.
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788 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 66.
254
8.2.2. Waltz on the Central Role of  the State and the Ideology of  
Interdependence and Globalization 
The religionists are very critical about the central role that Waltz’s neorealism ascribes to 
the state in his theorizing. They believe that it leads to the neglect of religion, especially 
because it denies the transnational level, which turns out to be the level where religious 
and non-religious actors play important roles, especially in the twentieth century. Besides 
that, the religionists believe it no longer adequate to see the state as very important, 
because nonstate actors, multinational corporations have become increasingly important 
and the role of the government has decreased.  
In Waltz’s theory, the state is indeed considered as the main actor in international 
politics.789 The adjective ‘main’ is important here, because Waltz knows that other actors 
play a role, but for theoretical purposes he must decide which are the most important. 
According to Waltz, in order to count as a state, there has to be a certain level of self-
consciousness as to being a political entity and a certain level of competence to be able 
to fight each other.790 Waltz holds that all states are characterized by the same attribute, 
namely sovereignty, and by being independent and autonomous with respect to other 
states.791 During an interview, when Waltz is confronted with the question of how 
transnational terrorist groups should be treated in international politics with respect 
to nuclear weapons, his answer reveals his state centric approach. He emphasizes that 
states should do everything possible to prevent nuclear weapons getting into the hands 
of terrorist groups. He also admits, however, that terrorist groups are very difficult to 
address, because deterrence, a typical state centric approach, would not work. Another 
case which reveals his state centric approach is his argument that if terrorist groups would 
have received nuclear weapons from Saddam Hussein, he would have been punished for 
it.792  
In the chapter on Morgenthau, I have argued that Morgenthau’s preference for the 
state is related to his political theology that the state makes politics possible, and as such, 
is a bulwark against secularization. I have also pointed out that there is much continuity 
between neorealism and classical realism, and that Waltz wants to preserve realist thought. 
It is possible that Waltz’s defense of the enduring relevance of the state has been inspired 
by the aforementioned idea that there should be room for politics and the state which 
could function as a katechon. I make this point, because there is a striking similarity 
between the way in which Waltz warns against – what Morgenthau would call – the 
‘subversion of the political by other modes of thought’ and the reduction of the political 
sphere to economics or military. It may be that Waltz’s critique on interdependence and 
globalization is inspired by the same conviction, namely that it neglects the state and the 
789 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 379.
790 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 14.
791 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 93-97.
792 Kreisler, Theory and International Politics, 6.
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political. 
The argument that the world of the twentieth and twenty-first century is an 
interdependent or, as it has been called later, a globalized world which undermines 
the state as the main actor does not convince Waltz. He argues that the fact that states 
that adapt easily to technological innovation and economic changes have a considerable 
advantage in the world economy, shows that international politics remains international. 
Given that global or world politics has not yet taken over national politics, the twenty-
first century will be a century of the nation-state.793 Besides that, he argues that the 
interdependence between nations now should be compared with interdependence 
earlier on in history. The comparison leads Waltz to the conclusion that, in most ways, 
the level of interdependence of 1910 has not been exceeded. Even financial markets, 
of which one can say that they truly have become global, were at the turn of previous 
century as integrated as they are now.794 Waltz also points to the fact that states perform 
essential political, socioeconomic functions, and no other organizations appear as 
competitors to them. States foster institutions that make internal peace and prosperity 
possible. The state has proven to be the best organization for keeping peace and fostering 
the conditions of economic well-being, as examples of fading states show. Economic 
markets and economic interests cannot perform the functions of government.795 Waltz 
refutes the argument that the world is increasingly ruled by markets, because he observes 
that the main difference between international politics now and earlier is their growing 
inequality in the distribution of capabilities and not their increased interdependence. 
These inequalities do not enhance economic forces but the political role of countries, 
because politics prevails over the economy as usual.796  
This brings us to another important criticism that Waltz puts forward, namely 
that interdependence appears to most of the world as Americanization.797 In fact, 
globalization is not global but mainly limited to northern countries.798 Waltz describes 
interdependence as an ideology used by the Americans to camouflage the great leverage 
the United States has in international politics, suggesting that rich and poor, and strong 
and weak states are similarly dependent on each other. Interdependence suggests a 
situation of equal dependence of parties on each other, while much of international 
as well as national politics are about inequalities. The use of the term interdependence 
emphasizes the low fungibility of power and blunts the effects of inequality.799 The 
term interdependence has been used in American discourse as a leveling ideology to 
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obscure inequalities of national capabilities.800 For Waltz, high inequality means low 
interdependence, meaning that some states are highly independent and other states are 
highly dependent on those states that have greater economic and military power.801 
Even during the Cold War, there was no interdependence: the United States and the 
Soviet Union scarcely traded with one another. Interdependence was only a factor with 
military issues, but that is because in a situation of self-help, the risk of damage is what 
counts.802 Waltz rejects the liberal assumption that more interdependence leads to more 
stability. As I set out in the previous chapter, for him interdependence also raises the 
prospect of occasional conflict.803 
Waltz’s argument that interdependence is used to hide the real power inequalities also 
applies to the existence of international institutions, because international institutions 
are created by the more powerful states and survive in their original form as long as 
they serve the major interests of their creators.804 Weaker states, on the contrary, have 
greater difficulties to fashion institutes that serve their own ends, especially with respect 
to security issues.805 The NATO is a good example of an international institution that is 
created and maintained by stronger states to serve their interests.806  
It is noteworthy that Waltz not only takes interdependence as a confusing vogue 
word, but that he does the same with transnationalism.807 Waltz’s criticism of the use 
of the term interdependence runs parallel with his criticism of transnationalism. This is 
important, because the increasing relevance of religious actors is often ascribed to the 
rise of transnational phenomena. The fact that Waltz only includes states in his theory 
leads to the exclusion of many religious political leaders and transnational, non-state 
actors. 
8.2.3. ‘Nothing Beyond the Survival Motive Is Theoretically Relevant’: Waltz 
on State’s Interests 
Waltz is very outspoken about the fact that states strive for survival through power or 
security. The religionists consider this an important assumption, because it leads to the 
neglect of spiritual forces, religious ideals, motivation, and action in neorealism. The 
religionists are correct on this point, though it would be too strong to state that Waltz 
discards morality and that he does the same to religion. It is true that in the theory of 
Waltz the religious identity of a state would not make a difference, because states in 
800 Kenneth N. Waltz, “America’s European Policy Viewed in Global Perspective,” in The United States and Western Europe. 
Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspectives, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1974), 13.
801 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 13.
802 Kreisler, Theory and International Politics, 4.
803 See Section 7.2.2.
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general strive for survival through security. This is the consequence of Waltz’s theoretical 
limitation. Waltz concludes in his book Man, the State and War that, without the third 
image, it is impossible to assess the importance, or predict the results of, forces on the 
individual or domestic level.808 From a theoretical perspective, it is the international 
system that best explains the outcome of international politics. The international level is 
distinct from the individual and state level, because of anarchy, which creates a situation 
of self-help, whereby power is the most important means for the survival or security 
of the state. From this theoretical perspective, it is not relevant what the ideologies or 
beliefs of the leaders are, because it is all about the relative power situation. 
Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the 
ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. Survival is the prerequisite to 
achieving any goals that states may have, other that the goal of promoting the own disappearance 
as political entities.809
For Waltz, the reason of the state is survival through security, or in other words, when a 
state acts according to its national interest, it wants to assure its own security.810 That does 
not mean that Waltz is not aware of the fact that states can be religiously or normatively 
motivated, because in various places he pays attention to the conflict between survival 
and other goals. He mentions, for example, the word freedom as one of the possible 
goals of the state, but he immediately adds ‘that if freedom is wanted, insecurity must be 
accepted’. He also discusses the relation between might and right. He states: ‘If might 
decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided’.811 He also says 
that states may have other ends, but survival is always a prerequisite.812 Since the bottom 
line of his theory is that the security of the state overrules normative concerns, it is 
irrational to fight for right while might decides. In other words, it would be irrational to 
follow (religious) ideals like freedom, justice and equality while overlooking the security 
issue. To Waltz, the one thing governments share – millenarian, Islamic or whatever 
they may be like – is that they almost surely want to stay in power. That explains why 
deterrence works, independent of the kind of country, government or ruler.813 This view 
of Waltz explains why the religionists justifiably say that he treats the state as a black 
box. The term ‘treat’ is important here, because he knows and sees that the foreign 
policies of states are shaped by internal affairs, but he decides to treat states as black 
808 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 238.
809 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91, 92. Note the resemblance with the quote from Morgenthau ‘whatever the 
ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim (...) ‘. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics 
Among Nations, 31.
810 Waltz, America’s European Policy, 26.
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boxes and focuses on the structure of the system. The latter is necessary to have a theory 
with explanatory power. Contrary to classical realism, he does not consider the beliefs 
and actions of religious individuals and communities relevant, because he limits his 
theorizing to the structural level. 
The way Waltz speaks about power needs some clarification, because for him power 
is not the customary, American, pragmatically-formed, and technologically-influenced 
control. This pragmatic definition implies that power is the ability to get people to do 
what someone wants them to do, when otherwise they would not do it. However, given 
the fact that politics is the realm of unintended and unexpected outcomes, whereby the 
intention and its result are seldom identical because of the environment by which it is 
conditioned, a more accurate definition of power is needed. Waltz, therefore, suggests 
taking someone as powerful refers to the extent that he or she affects others more than 
that they affect him or her. With this definition of power, Waltz wants to separate two 
questions: how is power distributed and what are the effects of a given distribution of 
power? In the definition that Waltz rejects, these two questions are merged and confused. 
The consequence is that people become frustrated when power and the effects of it appear 
not to be equal. Waltz, on the contrary, sees power as means and the outcome of its use 
as uncertain. The political relevance depends on the distribution of capabilities: power 
cannot be measured based on the results one may or may not get.814 Another important 
clarification that Waltz makes, is that, in the context of self-help, it is not only military 
power that counts but also economic power, because how you help yourself depends on 
the resources you can dispose of. This makes the distinction between high politics as the 
domain of military and diplomacy and low politics being economic misplaced.815
8.2.4. Did the Cold War Context Lead to a Secular Neorealism? 
There are also adherents of the religion paradigm that point to the Cold War context 
to account for the neglect of religion in neorealism. They argue that Waltz’s theorizing 
is influenced by the Cold War context, with two competing powers representing 
two secular ideologies. As a result, Waltz treats religion the same way as ideology. 
However, this argument does not hold because, as I stated in the beginning, Waltz 
distinguishes religion from ideology and ethnicity. It is, therefore, more accurate to 
argue that topics like ideology and religion disappear in his theory entirely, because 
one of Waltz’s theoretical assumptions is that all states act in the same way. From the 
theoretical perspective of the third level, states act according to the same logic, namely 
the national interest defined as survival through power. That is why Waltz is able to say: 
‘[T]he difference between the United States and the Soviet Union has been less in their 
behaviors than in their ideologies. Each sought to make other countries over in its own 
814 Waltz, America’s European Policy, 13, 14; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 191, 192.
815 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 382, 383.
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image’.816 One could say that religion and ideology are treated the same way in Waltz’s 
theory, but that is not because he defines them similarly. For Waltz there is a good 
historical and theoretical basis for the statement that in international politics there is not 
a direct correspondence between the attributes (these include beliefs and ideologies) of 
the actors and the outcomes that their interactions produce.817 The only argument that 
could be made is that the dominance of ideology during the Cold War, together with the 
realist emphasis on the ideological distortions of religion, influenced Waltz’s idea that 
religion distorts a rational assessment of world politics. This is hard to prove though.818 
8.2.5. It Is not Holism, but the Limited Scope of  Waltz’s Theory 
Religionists have pointed out that another reason why Waltz omits religion is because 
he holds a holistic approach, meaning that he tries to account for the behavior on the 
unit level through a top-down approach. I agree that Waltz neglects religion but not 
necessarily because of holism. It is because of his view on theory and his decision to 
focus on the system level. I will set out this argument again, because his reasoning really 
challenges the religionists.
In the first place, it is important to realize that Waltz acknowledges that an ideal 
theory provides an explanation which includes the unit and structural level as well as 
political and economic matters.819 However, nobody has figured out how to do so. Waltz 
agrees that a theory of foreign policy should take the unit level very seriously, but he wants 
to present a theory of international politics. Besides that, the task of theory, which is not 
the same as an analysis, is mainly to omit certain items and make bold simplifications. If 
theories do not select and omit, they are not theories; it is the same thing in the natural 
sciences.820 Waltz nevertheless admits that there remains a theoretical challenge. He says 
816 Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, 169.
817 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 379.
818 Examples are the way in which Waltz speaks about deviant forms of Islam as ideologies and the egalitarian idea that 
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the following about it:
Our problem, recall, is that a neorealist theory of international politics explains how external 
forces shape states’ behavior, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces. Under most 
circumstances, a theory of international politics is not sufficient, and cannot be made sufficient, 
for the making of unambiguous foreign-policy predictions. An international-political theory can 
explain states’ behavior only when external pressures dominate the internal disposition of states, 
which seldom happens. When they do not, a theory of international politics needs help.821 
Waltz would prefer to have a theory including both levels. His quote also shows that his 
theory of international politics has a very limited scope and explains little. He suggests 
two ways to deal with this problem. The most satisfying way would be a single theory 
that explains the behavior of states, their interactions, and international outcomes. 
But so far, no one has constructed such a theory. The other possibility would be that 
someone fashions a theory including the external and internal politics. As long as such 
a theory does not exist, students of politics like in economics, have to deal with separate 
theories of internal and external politics.822 
A clear example of how Waltz limits his explanation to the level of international 
politics, is the way he deals with the question whether the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 produced a strategic revolution or left the underlying conditions of 
international politics largely intact. His answer is that it contributed to the continuity 
of international politics. According to Waltz, the terrorist attacks did not change the 
three large developments that took place since the end of the Cold War. In the first 
place, the gross imbalance of power in the world. Instead, the effect of September 11 
is that American power is enhanced and its military presence in the world extended. 
Secondly, the existence of nuclear weapons and its gradual spread to other countries. 
This does, however, not change the brute fact of international politics, because nuclear 
weapons govern the military relations of nations that have them. Moreover, the politics 
of America enhances the spread of nuclear weapons, because states feel threatened by 
the United States and know they can only deter them with nuclear weapons. Thirdly, 
the prevalence of crises that plague the world and with which the United States is often 
involved. Terrorism does not change this basic fact of international politics. The politics 
of the United States rather adds crises to this list, because of threatening to attack states 
that harbor terrorists. In sum, terrorism is a response to changes in the political structure 
during the last decades. In the past, weak states and disaffected people could hope to 
play off one superpower against the other, but since the decline and disappearance of the 
Soviet Union these weak states are on their own and they lash out at the United States, as 




politics explains the existence of terrorism and not the other way around. This leads 
to the ironic conclusion that terrorists contribute to the continuity of international 
politics.823 Waltz does not claim to provide a full explanation of terrorism in general, 
but a full explanation of terrorism within the limited scope of the structure of the 
international system.
In the second place, the structure in Waltz’s theory should not be seen as an agent, 
because it only has a mediating function. His theory of international politics observes 
the effect of the environment on the acting units and how this environment affects the 
outcomes we are concerned with. It explains what happens on the level of structure 
and not on the level of units. This structure conditions the behavior of the units, it 
shapes the behavior and it shapes the outcomes.824 Culture, personality traits, character 
of political processes ‘and all such matters are left aside’. Their omission does not imply 
their unimportance. They are omitted, because Waltz wants to find out the effects of 
structure on process and vice versa.825 The structure is a primitive selector that encourages 
certain behavior and discourages others via the unit based mechanisms of socialization 
and mutual competition.826 It is important to notice here that Waltz focuses on the 
structure of the international system in order to account for the fact that the intentions 
of an act and its result are seldom identical, because of the person or object acted upon, 
and the conditioning influence of the environment. From the perspective of a realist 
political philosophy, politics is pre-eminently the realm of unintended and unexpected 
outcomes.827 The structure is the mechanism that intervenes between individual actions 
and outcomes and produces unintended results.828
8.3. Evaluation of  the Domain-Specific Thesis
Waltz does not write about the Westphalian system as the historical moment that 
marked the beginning of the privatization of religion, but he clearly distinguishes the 
international political realm as an autonomous domain, which reveals the influence of 
the Western (or should we say Augustinian?) distinction between religion and politics. 
The religionists are correct that Waltz takes the state as the central actor in international 
politics leaving religion out to make theorizing possible. However, it might be possible 
that – as in the case of Morgenthau – political-theological ideas about the state and 
its function as ‘restrainer’ (katechon) play a role here too. Waltz also gives an empirical 
argument that interdependence, globalization, and transnationalism are terms with 
823 Waltz, The Continuity of International Politics, 246-250.
824 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 7.
825 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 82.
826 Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 73.
827 Waltz, America’s European Policy, 13.
828 Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 73.
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an ideological function, because the state remains the central actor in international 
politics.  
The religionists have a point that the assumption that states aim at survival leaves 
religion out. This is, however, not because of an atheistic agenda or a secular mind-
set. Waltz strongly believes that a theory should leave things out that do not provide a 
simple, powerful explanation, and his conclusion is that the survival motive provides a 
stronger empirical and theoretical basis than morality or religion. Because Waltz shows 
that he is aware that religion is something different from ideology in the way he writes 
about it, there is no reason to believe that the Cold War context, with two competing, 
secular ideologies, has led him to neglect religion. Finally, although Waltz is a holist, 
this does not specifically explain his neglect of religion. It is his view that a theory of 
international politics has a very limited scope but has to give a full explanation.
8.4. Philosophy of  Science: Not Everything of  Waltz’s Neorealism 
Is What it Seems  
Waltz has also written about the philosophical foundations of his political theory. That is 
why it is not difficult to examine his works on philosophy of science issues. However, also 
in this case, it is not always possible to detect Waltz’s exact view on the Enlightenment 
and the relationship between faith and reason, or modernization theory. For this reason, 
this ‘assessment’ is sometimes limited to statements like ‘there is no indication to believe 
that…’. In other cases, it is quite clear that Waltz does not meet the picture that the 
religionists have drawn of him. Since there are also issues that are not in favour of the 
religionists per se, but are not totally besides the truth either, the common thread is that 
the religionists definitely have a point, but they can learn a lot about the deeper reasons 
for the omission of religion in Waltz’s theory of international politics.
8.4.1. Social and Cultural Embeddedness: Enlightenment Thinking and Mo-
dernization Theory 
Because Waltz did not write about the Scientific Revolution and the French 
Enlightenment, it is only possible to assess their influence on his theory by looking at 
the way he sees reason and rationality, in relation to faith. Does he separate the two, 
does he subordinate the one to the other, and does he identify modern reason with 
mathematics and the scientific method? 
Waltz wants to avoid a theological explanation of human behavior. I draw this 
conclusion from the way in which Waltz deals with the theologian Niebuhr and the 
‘secular’ thinker Spinoza. His preference for the secular explanation of Spinoza reveals the 
influence of Enlightenment thinking, because faith and science become separated and 
Waltz ascribes much value to rationality, empirical evidence, and the scientific method. 
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Waltz, however, does not go that far that he only considers the results of empirical 
research ‘real’ knowledge and that he sees theological knowledge as subjective and 
irrational. Waltz maneuvers within the parameters of the scientific discourse in his day, 
but there are no indications that he subscribes to the radical enlightened assumptions 
– religion being violent, intolerant, subjective, and dangerous – such as the religionists 
blame him for (Chapter 4). 
The consequence of Waltz’s separation between science and faith for theorizing on 
religion in the life of human beings, which has to be explained in secular vocabulary 
and according to the empirical method, is that religion as factor is easily overlooked. 
The fact that religion is considered as something unprovable and ‘irrational’ within a 
scientific theory, makes it plausible that, in competition with other factors, religion will 
not play a role in the final theory. There are no indications – as the religionists state – to 
think that Waltz considers religion as something dangerous, which should be privatized 
as the result of Enlightenment thinking. The same applies to the religionist idea that in 
neorealism, religion is reduced to morality or a set of rules. Waltz’s theory is clearly based 
on scientific knowledge and not on religious knowledge, although he acknowledges his 
indebtedness to it.
As I argued above, Enlightenment ideas on faith and reason, belief and science 
have influenced the theorizing of Waltz to a certain extent. One specific way in which 
these Enlightenment ideas have become influential in the social sciences, is through the 
modernization and secularization theory. As explained before, this theory holds that 
the progress of science and modernity causes religion to fade away. In the discussion on 
Spinoza, Augustine and Niebuhr, a more scientific approach of Spinoza challenges the 
religious interpretation. The fact that Waltz argues for the secular approach of Spinoza, 
which does not need an explanation from outside, reveals a certain preference for science 
over religion, and the conviction that science is able to replace religion. This does not 
mean, however, that Waltz ascribes to the modernization and secularization theory, 
that religion will decline automatically in the future and that he leaves it out for that 
reason. On the other hand, his shift from Niebuhr to Spinoza, assuming that a scientific 
explanation can replace a theological one, reveals that he quite easily goes along with the 
scientific way of thinking of his time.  
8.4.2. Ontology: Waltz on Immaterial Issues 
Materialism, as defined by the religionists, is the view that everything which can be 
observed reflects material causes. They consider this an important reason for the neglect 
of religion in IR. The consequence of materialism is that ideas, ideology, and religion 
have no independent role in an explanation. However, the reason for the absence of 
religion, ideology and ideas in Waltz’s theory is not that Waltz has a materialist view on 
the world, at least not in an ontological sense. He is not a materialist in the sense that he 
would argue that nothing but matter exists. Waltz says the following about it: 
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[E]ven when Stephen Hawking’s fondest wish comes true and physicists come up with a theory of 
everything, that theory would not explain everything. It will explain most what goes on in daily life, 
but it will only provide, what physicist call, a full explanation of certain phenomena’.829 
Or differently said: ‘theory is a picture of the world that one is concerned with - but 
it’s not the whole world’.830 It could be argued that Waltz ends up to be a materialist 
in the sense that religion plays no role in his explanation of international politics, but 
the reason is not his a priori materialist assumption that material factors like power and 
military are more important. Waltz openly disagrees with the general assumption held 
by many people that realism means it is always military power that counts. Based on 
structural theory, he argues that, in a context of self-help, how you help yourself depends 
on the resources you can dispose of and the situation you are in.831 If it were true that 
Waltz is a materialist in an ontological sense, he should not have taken seriously how 
certain ideological ideas influence and shape American foreign policy. 
A country’s perceptions of international politics are not determined entirely by what the world 
is like. Its perceptions are also affected by the circumstances of its birth and development, by 
its experiences at home and abroad, by its public philosophy and national ideology. We have to 
understand how America sees the world in order to understand how it has acted, and is likely to 
act, in it.832  
As this quote illustrates, Waltz is not a materialist per se: he sees the relevance and 
impact of immaterial factors. As a result of his emphasis on empirical evidence – his 
wish to select the most relevant factors – Waltz draws the conclusion that religion, ideas, 
and ideology play no determining role in international politics. He does not exclude 
these factors because of disdain, but simply because it is difficult to include them in an 
empirically based theory which needs to have strong explanatory power.
8.4.3. Epistemology: Positivism and its Consequences for Theorizing 
Religion in IR  
The religionists claim that neorealism, because of the influence of positivism, want to 
develop theories with great explanatory power, that it believes in a rationality independent 
of context, and that the applied concepts must be secular. Unfortunately, the application 
of positivism to IR leads to a gap between the theory (which omits religion) and the 
world (in which religion plays an important role).  
To assess this claim, it should be clear how positivism is understood by the 
829 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 383, 384.
830 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 4.
831 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 382.
832 Waltz, America’s European Policy, 8, 9.
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religionists. First of all, positivism holds that there is a unity of science and a single logic 
of explanation. There is only one reality in the physical and social worlds, and therefore 
the methodology of scientific investigation is the same for both worlds. Secondly, facts 
can be separated from values in the social world because, as in the physical world, there 
exists something external and independent from theories or interpretations. Thirdly, 
positivism assumes that, like the physical world, the social world is governed by general 
laws and patterns that can be discovered empirically. Below, I will first address the 
supposed influence of positivism, and then discuss to what extent Waltz assumes a 
rationality independent of context and the secularizing influence of behavioralism.  
My conclusion is that the religionists refer too easily to positivism as one of the 
reasons to explain the lack of religion in Waltz’s theory. The reason for that is that Waltz 
shares only one characteristic with positivism, as defined by the religionists. This is the 
idea that there is a unity of science and a single logic of explanation; the idea that reality 
is governed by general laws which can be discovered in the same way as in the natural 
sciences. Waltz does not subscribe to the positivist idea that facts can be separated from 
values, as if the researcher is neutral. In various places, he criticizes positivism, as if 
facts would speak for themselves. He quotes Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) 
that ‘The highest wisdom is to realize that every fact is already a theory’ and states 
that theories are made creatively by means of intuition and ideas.833 The reason why 
students of politics should study the philosopher Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) is because 
his ‘assaults crush the positivist ideas about how to evaluate theories that are accepted 
by most political scientists. He demolishes the notion that one can test theories by 
pitting them against facts’.834 Waltz is quite clear about the idea that data does not 
interpret itself and that the social scientist is unavoidably subjective. The same difficulty 
plagues the natural scientist, because empirical verification in the social or in the natural 
sciences cannot produce certainty, given that tests are only conclusive with reference 
to the assumptions postulated. Waltz therefore quotes the philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead (1861-1947) that ‘Induction presupposes metaphysics’.835 This critique of 
Waltz on positivism does not take away his aim to develop an empirical theory. In his 
view, a theory could never be completely neutral, because there are always normative 
influences. That does not mean that a theory has to be normative. Developing an 
empirical theory remains his goal. The consequence is that he calls political philosophy 
political theory, but his theory just a theory. That is also what distinguishes Waltz from 
Morgenthau: he radicalizes the distinction between the normative and empirical. 
Although Waltz cannot be considered a full-blown positivist, he nevertheless shows 
some of its characteristics. The question of when someone should be considered a 
833 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Thoughts about Assaying Theories,” in Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 
2008), ix.
834 Ibid., xi, xii.
835 Waltz, Political Philosophy, 55, 57.
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positivist depends, of course, on the definition of positivism. That could explain why 
Waltz denies being a positivist, while others argue he is.836 An important positivist idea 
that influences Waltz’s theory, is his choice to theorize about international politics in 
analogy with the natural sciences. He builds this idea on the positivist assumption that 
there is a unity of science and a single logic of explanation, meaning that there is one 
reality out there, and that the social and the natural world can be known in the same 
way. This is apparent from his realist ontology and his instrumentalist and pragmatic 
epistemology.837 Mouritzen qualifies Waltz’s ontological position as metaphysical realism, 
as labeled by Popper, because of the statement that a reality exists independently from 
our language and theories about it.838 Although Waltz acknowledges that the subject 
matters of social and natural sciences are profoundly different, this does not obliterate 
the possibility and the necessity to isolate a certain domain, to simplify the material, 
to concentrate on central tendencies, singling out the most important forces.839 That 
presupposes that the social as well as the natural world can be dealt with in a similar way, 
meaning that this reality is essentially the same reality.  
Waltz’s epistemology is instrumentalist and pragmatic, because reality can be 
explained through theories, which he defines as statements that explain collections or 
sets of laws pertaining to a particular behavior or phenomenon. These laws establish 
relations between variables. If the relation between variable A and B is invariant, the law 
is absolute. If the relation is constant, the relation has a high probability. A law is not 
simply built on relations, but also on the repetition. The difference between laws and 
theories is that the first is about truth and the latter about the explanatory power, because 
theories explain laws. As set out earlier, Waltz aims at explanatory power, because we 
need a theory to explain and possibly to control the world.840
A theory should be tested in order to know how strong the explanation it offers 
might be. Therefore, seven things should be done: (1) State the theory being tested. (2) 
Infer hypotheses from it. (3) Subject the hypotheses to experimental or observational 
tests. (4) In taking step two and three, use the definitions of the terms found in the 
theory being tested. (5) Eliminate or control perturbing variables not included in the 
theory under test. (6) Devise a number of distinct and demanding tests. (7) If a test is 
not passed, ask whether the theory still stands, needs repair and restatement, or requires 
a narrowing of the scope of its explanatory power. In the case that a hypothesis proves 
wrong, point two and seven should be re-examined, keeping in mind that a hypothesis 
is not the theory itself but is derived from it.841  
836 Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 67; Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 379, 386.
837 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 9; Herman Koningsveld, Het verschijnsel wetenschap. Een inleiding tot de 
wetenschapsfilosofie, 5th ed. (Meppel: Boom, 1980), 14, 15.
838 Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 70.
839 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 68.
840 See Section 7.2.3.
841 Ibid., 13.
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As I set out in the previous chapter, Waltz does not disregard interpretative 
approaches. On the contrary, he values them, because they help to uncover reasoning 
behind the behavior of people. Theory, in his view, indicates what you are likely to try to 
do and what will happen if you do not. This is a very modest understanding of theory. 
Waltz’s natural science approach to international politics, because of his desire to control 
and wish for theoretical explanatory power, leads to the exclusion of various factors. 
However, as Waltz argues, that matters are omitted does not mean they are neglected.842 
Waltz reaffirms and strengthens his choice for the state as the central actor and the 
autonomy of the political. Everything that does not contribute to the relative power 
situation securing the survival of the state, is left out from his theory out of theoretical 
necessity. Waltz’s strict definition of theory makes it possible to exclude everything which 
he considers as empirically incorrect and wrong, from a political philosophy point of 
view. The result is, as the religionists rightly point out, that there is a gap between theory 
and reality, and when diplomats apply this neorealism to international affairs, they leave 
religion out. Waltz would probably say: ‘that is not my fault, because I have always made 
clear that my theory is not a theory for foreign policy and it does not prescribe what to 
do.’ 
A consequence of Waltz’s empirical theory, modelled after the natural sciences, is 
that it is explanatory and not prescriptive. As I stated in the previous chapter, his theory 
is not about how to manage the world, but about describing ‘how the possibility that 
great power will constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change’.843 
Waltz claims to describe and not prescribe, and that one cannot go directly from theory 
to application.844 With this standpoint, Waltz rejects the realist theoretical style, but 
retains many significant markers of that tradition.  
The book Man, the State and War was built on a reading of classical European political 
philosophy, but treated as a way to empirical, rather than normative, insights. Already 
in this period, Waltz was moving away from Morgenthau’s style, which conflated the 
is and the ought. This made Waltz’s realism more acceptable to the mainstream social 
sciences with its emphasis on deduction and rationality and in that way placed realism 
on firmer ground in the academy.845 I agree with Murray that neorealism in comparison 
with realism cuts off its concern with the moral, because it rules out the possibility of 
any standard externalities to the realities of international politics. But while Murray 
concludes that neorealism abandons the core of realism, my view is that Waltz radicalizes 
the autonomy of politics. Waltz also radicalizes the distinction between the empirical 
and the normative without accepting that they can be separated completely. This is in 
842 Waltz, Neorealism, 3.
843 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 210.
844 Halliday and Rosenberg, Interview with Ken Waltz, 385.
845 Jack L. Snyder, “Tensions within Realism: 1954 and After,” in The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, 
the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory., ed. Nicolas Guilhot (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011), 65.
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line with the attempts of earlier realists and acceptable to the scientific standards of his 
day.846  
8.4.3.1. Context-Independent Rationality 
The religionists argue that neorealism understands rationality as independent of the 
social and historical context, and as a result, it pays limited or no attention to ideational 
factors such as, among others, religion. I interpret Waltz differently, because Waltz also 
denies a form of rationality independent from the context. In the first place, Waltz does 
not have a clear definition of rationality. He even said: ‘I don’t like the word rationality. 
I’ll admit it’.847 His understanding of rationality as something dependent appears from 
the stag-hunt example, where he writes that the behavior of the rabbit snatcher was 
rational from his point of view, but from the perspective of the group it was arbitrary 
and capricious.848 In analogy with Adam Smith’s theory, Waltz also believes that 
rationality in international systems means that some states do better than others and 
that competition spurs the actors to accommodate their ways to the most acceptable and 
successful practices.849 In another place, Waltz argues that rationality can only be defined 
within narrow settings, for example in game theory where one can define under what 
conditions an actor is considered rational. One has to go back and forth between theory 
and what goes on in the real world; rationality separate from empirical reality does not 
exist.850 According to international relations scholar Snyder, Waltz retains some of the 
realists’ traditional ambivalence regarding rationality, namely that states and statesmen 
are not always rational in their strategic decisions and calculations. However, they are 
always constrained by the structure of the system, weeding out those who failed to 
get it right the first time through natural selection and socialization.851 Besides this, it 
can simultaneously be true that people are not fully rational but that it is still feasible 
to derive valid propositions from the assumption that they are. According to Waltz, it 
would be rational if statesmen took the impact of the structure into account, but many 
do not. This makes his understanding of rationality context-dependent. 
8.4.3.2. The Secularizing Impact of  Positivism and Behavioralism
The religionists argue that the secularization of IR leads to the neglect of religion. 
They base this on two points, first that there was a religious or theological influence 
on IR which has disappeared because of positivism and behavioralism; and, second, 
that the diminishing religious influence on IR also implies less attention for religion in 
IR. In the view of the religionists, the field of international relations has undergone a 
846 Murray, Reconstructing Realism, 8, 9.
847 Mearsheimer, Reckless States and Realism, 241.
848 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 183.
849 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 76, 77.
850 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 8.
851 Snyder, Tensions within Realism, 65.
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secularization, while there was originally a certain religious or theological perspective, 
be it through the application of various ethical traditions which were applied to the field 
or because theology played a role in the formation of the field. It is true that if one reads 
Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and then Waltz, the original theological contribution fades away, 
or theology is continued by other means. The question is whether it has disappeared 
because of positivism and behavioralism. I have argued already that this is definitely not 
the case with Morgenthau. 
With respect to Waltz, I have set out that he is not a full-blown positivist, meaning 
that this cannot fully account for the disappearance of religion. When we read what Waltz 
writes about behavioralism, it becomes clear that he criticizes it for assuming that the 
behavioral sciences provide the opportunity to transform and control society by gathering 
more data, sharpening its tools as in the natural sciences. He calls the identification of 
knowledge with control a rationalist fallacy. Waltz therefore cites some people that pointed 
out the limitations of the social sciences on methodological and metaphysical grounds. 
Waltz suggests that behavioral scientists would become more modest and sensible in 
the contribution to peace, if they would take into account of the international political 
structure.852 It is interesting that Waltz looks like a behavioralist with his choice for the 
natural science approach, because he is also driven by the desire to control. The difference 
is, as I have pointed out with respect to materialism and positivism, that Waltz uses 
elements of the natural sciences approach without sharing all of its assumptions.853 Waltz 
also argues that, contrary to his focus on the structural level, it is typically behavioral 
to locate the cause in acting or behaving units.854 Waltz criticizes the behavioralist idea 
that theories are the result of induction. With this standpoint, Waltz retains the realists’ 
traditional disdain for a theoretical inductive strategy of inference, as practiced by some 
statistically minded behavioralist scholars.855 While inductivists build a theory of facts, 
Waltz argues that many of the great natural scientists built upon highly abstract and 
truly breathtaking generalizations. Theory, therefore, requires more abstraction and less 
history.856 So, behavioralism and positivism do not sufficiently explain the secularization 
of IR and the disappearance of ethics and theology.  
As I argued earlier on, Waltz wants to save as much as possible of the realist political 
philosophy, by adjusting himself to the dominant scientific discourse. I have also 
argued that Waltz’s political realism is indebted to certain theological notions. He has, 
852 Waltz, Man, the State and War, 58-60, 72, 73, 79.
853 Here I disagree with Murray who argues that Waltz’s emulation of the theoretical sophistication of the natural sciences 
finally leads to the adoption of their goals. Murray, Reconstructing Realism, 8.
854 Schouten, Theory Talk#40: Kenneth Waltz, 7.
855 Ibid., 4; Snyder, Tensions within Realism, 65; Ole Waever, “The Speech Act of Realism. The Move That Made IR,” in 
The Invention of International Relations Theory. Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory., ed. 
Nicolas Guilhot (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 118.
856 Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 1999), 
94.
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however, decided to translate this into secular concepts and vocabulary. The religionists 
are correct that this can be considered a secularizing move, but they portray this more 
negatively than I tend to do. They also define secularization differently. While they see 
secularization as the disappearance of religion’s influence, I conclude that theology is 
continued by other means. The religion scholars also presume that when theology plays 
a role in the formation of the discipline of IR, religion will more easily be included 
as a factor of importance. This overlooks the possibility that theological ideas itself 
could be a reason to be careful with including religion. As I explained with respect 
to Morgenthau and Waltz, one of the goals of realism was to have a de-theologized 
form of politics, which does not want to accomplish eschatological goals and avoids the 
conflation of moral abstraction with political ends. My argument is that to understand 
Waltz’s theory correctly, one has to read it as an attempt to maintain realist thought as 
much as possible. In order to succeed in this endeavor he decided to adapt himself to 
the scientific discourse. In my view, he has successfully adapted realist thought to the 
requirements of the sciences, and preserved much of the realist philosophy. 
Both Morgenthau and Waltz preserve the distinction between the religious and the 
political, but at the same time want to avoid a strict separation, as if politics can do 
without a metaphysical basis. Waltz does not make this argument explicitly, but his point 
that science and theories can only provide ‘full explanations of less’ reveals a political 
realist view on the limitations of science. Waltz’s Popperian view on theory formation 
which leaves room for and acknowledges the influence of pre-scientific intuitions and 
creative ideas on theorizing is also in line with political realist thinking. The same goes 
for his appreciation of political philosophy, the interpretative sciences, and his critique 
on behavioralism.  
However, Waltz’s project has a price. In this attempt to save as much of political 
realism, his theory also becomes too rigid and leaves many issues out. Also, is it possible 
to develop a theory on international politics and claim not to be prescriptive? In the 
conclusion, I discuss these points more extensively. For now, my conclusion is that the 
religionist idea that the secularization of international relations theory leads to the neglect 
of religion is not fully adequate and that it overlooks other important considerations.
8.4.4. Methodology: Theorizing Is not the Same as Reducing
Religionists hold that neorealism subscribes to a secularism which promotes a dualistic 
understanding of religion. As a result, neorealist theory maintains that religion, though 
it is considered historically significant, is a private, irrational, and individual matter and 
not relevant for the analysis of contemporary international politics.857 Based on the few 
writings of Waltz on religion, it is almost impossible to see this as a reason to explain the 
neglect of religion. Even when Waltz writes on religion, he does not reduce it to politics, 
economics, military action, fundamentalism or a radical, militant extreme phenomenon, 
857 Wilson, After Secularism, 69.
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or understand it as a subcategory of something else like institutions, terrorism, society, 
or civilization. As far as he defines religion, he neither ignores the communal aspect of 
religion nor does he take it as a private set of dogma’s or beliefs.  
Another way to check the validity of the religionist argument is to answer the question 
of whether it would be possible to fill in religion at places where ideology or terrorism 
is mentioned. In some cases, it seems so. It can, however, not be proven that this is 
intended reductionism; it seems to be a consequence of his theoretical preference for 
simple theories and his limitation to the third level. The fact that ideology, ideas, culture, 
and ethnicity all fall in the same category, because of Waltz’s focus on the structure 
of the international system and his strict selection of factors, makes it impossible to 
know whether he would differentiate between the various phenomena. In conclusion, 
the argument that Waltz reduces religion does not hold, because this is what Waltz sees 
as the result of sound theorizing.  
8.5. Evaluation of  the Philosophy of  Science Thesis 
The question of whether the religionists are correct that Waltz has neglected religion 
because of the influence of the Enlightenment, materialism, positivism, and 
reductionism is difficult to answer. The answer is far more complicated than a simple 
‘yes’ or ‘no’. In many cases, it is not so much the direct influence of these factors that has 
led to the omission of religion, but rather the indirect influence of Waltz’s theorizing. A 
superficial reading of Waltz’s main articles and books might give the impression that he 
is a positivist, a materialist, a reductionist, and influenced by Enlightenment thinking. 
However, after closer scrutiny, it appears that Waltz is not any of them per se, and that 
his stance is better explained by considering his view on theory and the political realist 
ideas he wants to save. That is why I have paid so much attention to the reasoning 
behind his theorizing and why I have shed light on the role of the realist political theory 
and the influence of theological ideas. I have also made clear that this latter point, as 
with Morgenthau, can also (‘ironically’) lead to caution, to involve religion too much, 
though a strict separation between religion and politics is impossible and undesirable. 
Waltz comes close to many religionists in taking seriously how theological ideas have 
inspired his theorizing. At the same time, he has strongly argued that the demand of 
theory forces him to leave religion out together with many other variables or factors. 
272
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I will address three questions: (1) To what extent are the religionists 
correct in their criticism? (2) Why did the religionists interpret Waltz so differently? (3) 
Did Waltz successfully save political realism?
The answer to the first question depends on the answers given to two questions which 
are derived from the three subtheses. First of all, is Waltz aware of the role that religion 
plays on the individual, national, transnational and international level, distinguishable 
from other factors, and as defined by the religionists? Yes, Waltz is aware of the role 
of religion on the individual and national level, but he does not clearly describe how 
religion plays a role on the international level, and the transnational level is not even 
mentioned. Secondly, has Waltz neglected religion in his theory because of subject-
specific reasons related to the Westphalian system and philosophy of science issues? Yes 
and no. Yes, Waltz is influenced by the Westphalian assumptions about the central role 
of the state, the reason of state, and the separation between religion and politics. Waltz 
also has taken over the Enlightenment idea of the separation between faith and reason, 
religion and science. The result is, that it is understandable that the religionist conclude 
that from the perspective of his theory religion becomes relegated to the unprovable, the 
subjective, and the irrational domain. It is also correct that Waltz follows the positivist 
preference for the natural science method, leading to a strict empirical account of a 
limited number of factors that can be taken into account for the purpose of a theory 
with explanatory power.  
However, there are also several issues on which the religionists are mistaken or 
even incorrect. The argument about the Cold War period with two dominant secular 
ideologies does not clarify much. The point that Waltz’s holism causes religion to be left 
out does not really explain the omission of religion. The philosophical argument that 
Waltz is a positivist turns out to be the opposite. Waltz differs more from positivism 
than he shares with it, or more strongly stated: Waltz rather criticizes positivism instead 
of supporting or embracing it. This also applies to the religionists’ arguments on 
rationality, behavioralism, and materialism. The argument that Waltz holds a reductionist 
understanding of religion or sees religion as a set of ideas, did not apply either.  
 In accordance with the scheme I used in the conclusion of Part I, I conclude the 
following. Waltz notices the role of religion, but he only refers to it a few times and mostly 
as Christian theology. He does not really discuss the various ways in which religion 
manifests itself. On the domain-specific level, there are no assumptions that actively 
exclude religion, but the fact that Waltz only allows a few factors to play a role in his 
theory causes religion to be left out. Waltz does not address the factor religion explicitly, 
but he explains why he omits certain factors and includes others. On the philosophy 
of science level, Waltz does not hold assumptions that actively exclude religion. Waltz 
is open to the fact that in theory formation, pre-scientific intuitions can play a role, he 
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also admits that the theologian Niebuhr inspired him, even though he did not actively 
discuss and reflect on this relationship.  
My conclusion is that the religionist criticism that religion in Waltz’s theory is 
lacking is correct, but they do not always provide the correct explanation for it. The lack 
of religion is not because Waltz consciously neglects religion, but because he does not 
use it to explain international politics. That is something different. He has theoretical 
and philosophical-political reasons to be cautious to involve religion. This leads me to 
the second question: why did the religionists, on so many issues, fail to understand the 
neglect of religion in neorealism? 
There are several reasons for this. In the first place, they might not have studied 
Waltz thoroughly enough, they also might have based their knowledge of Waltz on the 
handbook representations of neorealism. In addition to that, they have not taken notice 
of the fact that Waltz’s realist political theory and his philosophy of science explain 
why he leaves religion out. His philosophy of science radicalizes his choice for the state 
as the main actor, the reason of the state, and the autonomy of the political. Waltz 
wants to save political realism by secularizing (understood as continuing theology by 
other means) it and by adapting to the scientific standards of his time. This means 
that his theory might seem to be the expression of an atheistic, radically enlightened 
aversion to religion resulting in positivism, reductionism, and materialism. Yet this is 
not true. Waltz is none of these, but his radical limitation to the third level gives that 
impression. Waltz’s theory states that there are three levels or images to account for 
social and political phenomena. He grants the third level most weight in explaining 
international politics, although the other levels are still important to indicate the forces 
that are at play! That means that he is aware of these levels and does not disregard the 
role of religion or morality on these levels per se. However, Waltz takes the third level as 
the exclusive domain of international politics with its own distinctive logic in relation to 
the other levels. To develop a clear understanding and offer strong explanation of what 
happens on the level of international politics, Waltz relies on the theoretical model of 
the natural sciences with its strong emphasis on empirical results.858 He therefore has 
to limit the number of factors and select the most relevant, characteristic ones to make 
theory possible.  
It makes it easier for Waltz to embrace the natural science approach with the 
Enlightenment assumption that reason and faith are separated, and that only can be 
known what is empirically proven. Again, the fact that Waltz limits his theorizing 
exclusively to the third level does not mean that he excludes the other levels, but means 
that a theory of international politics can only say something about the other levels 
within its own terms and variables. Ideally, a theory would indeed take into account the 
858 Mouritzen argues that the move from Man, the State and War to Theory of International Politics with its exclusive focus 
on the third level is more the result of a scientific orientation than a substantial move. Mouritzen, Kenneth Waltz, 69, 
71, 72.
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domestic factors, as well as the international structure that constrains them. However, 
international politics indicates only how much importance should be ascribed to 
structural forces. This is what international politics can offer: no more, no less. Waltz’s 
theory explains why wars recur, why balances of power recurrently form, and why bipolar 
distribution of power is more stable or more peaceful than a multipolar one.859 That is 
a limitation, and to some extent relativizes what a real scientific theory of international 
politics can accomplish. In this way, he continues the realist criticism on positivism 
with its belief in progress through science. For Waltz, a scientific understanding of 
international politics is not a full, let alone, direct picture of the reality of international 
politics. It is an attempt to make this field intelligible under the ceteris paribus condition. 
All criticism of Waltz’s theory only shows how limited a theory of international politics 
is when it wants to follow the scientific and political discourse, with its desire to control.
If the above is the outcome of Waltz’s theorizing, did he successfully save realism or 
is the price too high? It is beyond all doubt that Waltz has made an enormous impact 
on IR theory and has been successful in keeping political realist issues on the agenda. 
One could think of issues such as: the limited possibilities of a scientific theory, the 
perennial problem of anarchy, the survival motive of states, the inevitability of power, the 
important role of the state, the importance of singling out a certain domain to theorize 
about, and the role of pre-scientific intuitions in theorizing. It is quite a success and 
an accomplishment that Waltz has been able to keep these undeniable political realist 
assumptions on the agenda of IR theory, and he definitely challenges the religionists to 
face these issues when criticizing Waltz for his neglect of religion.  
On various issues the Amsterdam School would praise Waltz. The fact that he 
acknowledges the influence of pre-scientific or worldview ideas on his theorizing is 
something they would agree on, although they would also challenge Waltz to be more 
open about these ‘hidden’ assumptions. They would also be fond of his emphasis on 
the limited scope of science since they consider absolutizing of scientific knowledge at 
the cost of the daily experience and philosophical knowledge dangerous. They would 
also understand, and to a certain extent agree, like in the case of Morgenthau, that 
theorizing requires singling out a certain sphere or domain to make it intelligible. The 
question is, however, whether Waltz is not too rigid with the result that he leaves out 
the first and second image. It is impressive how rational and well-structured Waltz’s 
approach to international politics is, but at the same time, he leaves many issues out; his 
strict limitation leading to explanatory power weakens the richness of his explanation. 
I side here with Jean Bethke Elshtain, who was a student of Waltz, that ‘all levels must 
be in play if one is to craft a compelling explanatory framework’.860 Notice that she 
859 Snyder, Tensions within Realism, 66.
860 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Woman, the State, and War,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): 289. Elsthain was 
introduced to Augustine’s political realism through her teacher Kenneth Waltz and the writings of Niebuhr. Eric Gregory, 
“Taking Love Seriously: Elshtain’s Augustinian Voice and Modern Politics,” in Jean Bethke Elshtain Politics, Ethics, and 
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uses the word ‘compelling’. That is exactly what is lacking in Waltz’s neorealism: it is 
a strong theory, but not compelling as explanatory framework. It is interesting to note 
that Elshtain draws this conclusion with respect to how gender could be integrated 
into IR theory, because the discussion of gender and IR has many similarities with the 
religion and IR discussion. She also admits that it is quite obvious that women and 
gender play a role in global affairs, like religion, and therefore the question is similar to 
religion: ‘Is gender a definitive or causal factor in international relations beyond those 
empirical considerations above, considerations that may increase problems and tensions 
within nation-states and in relations between them?’861 
Waltz states that one cannot base policymaking on his theory, but is it possible 
to claim that a theory is solely explanatory? As I have argued in the previous chapter, 
Waltz has not been fully consistent on this point himself. Regarding the first and second 
image, Waltz acknowledges that these images are important, but that it is impossible to 
take them into account, because it would make theorizing impossible. The Amsterdam 
School tries to account for this problem by making the distinction between foundational, 
qualifying and conditioning aspects, and between structural and directional issues (more 
about this in Part III). With these distinctions this school is able to prioritize the various 
factors, avoiding reductionism and doing justice to the variety of reality, while keeping 
focus. 
I have the impression that Waltz leaves the international political domain too 
much, in the words of Thompson, ‘to Caesar alone’.862 Or is that what Waltz aims 
at? Maintaining the autonomy of the political? Is that still what we should be aiming 
at a few decades later, with the so-called global resurgence of religion that has taken 
place since the 1960s? These questions are so important and penetrating that I conclude 
that there is a challenge for the religionist to incorporate religion based on a clear view 
on the function and scope of theory. At the same time, however, Waltz’s neorealism 
insufficiently accounts for the way it deals with religion, partly because it is not very 
clear about its hidden theological assumptions and how this translates into the theory 
of international politics. When Waltz would be clearer about this, he would do a great 
favor not only to the political realist tradition, but also to the debate on religion and 
IR, possibly solving the supposed ‘irony’ that Christian religion or theology might be a 
reason not to incorporate religion.
Society, eds. Debra Erickson and Michael Le Chevallier (Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 2018), 179.
861 Elshtain, Woman, the State, and War, 290.
862 Thompson, Religion and International Relations, 7.
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If we look back on the second part of this dissertation, we can see two developments 
with respect to political realism and religion. Political realism becomes a major part of 
the scientific discourse of IR and the original theological influence on political realism 
secularizes, that is to say, theological notions are transformed into secular concepts. How 
should these two developments be appreciated?
 The fact that political realism is now part of the scientific discourse has 
consequences of which the religionists are more critical than I am. This is partly 
the result of their interpretation of Morgenthau’s classical realism and Kenneth 
Waltz’s neorealism and the definition of secularization that they use. They interpret 
Morgenthau and Waltz as much more secular and anti-religious than I do. I understand 
Morgenthau’s secularization as an acknowledgment that the various spheres of life have 
become differentiated. This does not mean that religion’s influence is in decline. Also, 
Morgenthau warns against the process of secularization meaning that any transcendent 
reference point has been abandoned. The religionists did not take this side of Morgenthau 
into account. I see Waltz’s secularization as the continuation of theology by other means. 
He tries to find a way to keep the valuable insights of political realism. The religionists 
see this secularization more as an anti-religious attempt to marginalize the influence of 
religion. To support my position, I started this Part II by emphasizing the continuity 
between Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz regarding the realist political philosophy and 
I have drawn attention to the Augustinian moments in all three of them.  
The religionists have pointed out that Morgenthau and Waltz, like most IR theorists, 
have fallen prey to secular thinking which has affected their theorizing on the philosophy 
of science level, and the domain-specific level, which has created a bias on the empirical 
level. I have challenged this observation by investigating the writings of these thinkers 
and often I came to opposite conclusions, or I frequently concluded that these thinkers 
were much more nuanced on issues like the Enlightenment or theory. In a few instances, 
I agreed with the religionists, but even then, I felt pushed to explain how Morgenthau 
or Waltz came to their position. I have also concluded that, even though the religionists 
are not very successful in accounting for the supposed neglect of religion, their point 
might still be worth taking seriously. However, that also requires much more theoretical 
reflection from the side of the religionists on the importance of religion in theorizing 
international or foreign politics, in comparison to other factors. And what view do they 
hold on the function and scope of a theory? 
This leads me to the second point, on which I am more positive than the religionists. 
In my view, Morgenthau and Waltz have been wrestling with the overwhelming number 
of facts that play a role in international relations, but they have also tried to overcome 
theoretical paralysis by finding out what international relations and international 
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politics are really about. Taking seriously the facts at hand before making judgments 
is a very important characteristic of political realism. Morgenthau and Waltz have 
faced this challenge, and they teach us that the field of international relations can be 
made intelligible by focusing on the main issues and factors. In doing this, they have 
emphasized repeatedly that science has its limits and that a theory is not a picture, but a 
painting of reality which always reflects the ideas, intuitions, and beliefs of the painter. 
Both thinkers have also emphasized that the ought should not be conflated with the is 
and that a realist approach of international relations dares to set aside the wishes of the 
state leader or the scholar to do justice to the facts, because moralism and idealism easily 
distort or hide a sound analysis of the issue on the table. Although Morgenthau and to 
a lesser extent Waltz also admit that in practice these matters are often intertwined.  
Morgenthau and Waltz apply the latter principle also to the theological inspiration 
of their own political realism. Niebuhr already introduced this critical point over against 
the liberalism in politics and religion in his time, but Morgenthau and Waltz respectively 
secularized and radicalized this. The religionists are very critical about this development 
and consider it one of the reasons that IR theory has overlooked or neglected religion, 
calling it ironic that a theological perspective leads to less attention to religion. I differ 
with the religionists on this point. 
In the first place, involving a theological perspective should not necessarily lead 
to more attention for religion, because the kind of Augustinian theology that political 
realism contains, is very reluctant to involve religion in politics. To understand this 
‘irony’, it might be helpful to think about a phrase of Niebuhr that Ruurd Veldhuis refers 
to: ‘it is the first duty of a Christian in politics to have no specific Christian Politics’.863 
The reason for this is not only because it can easily lead to moralism, and the idea that 
certain policies are expressions of God’s divine will, but also because it runs against 
Christian Augustinian theology itself, which has always emphasized that redemption 
does not come from politics. Political realism has emphasized that the political or the 
state should be a restrainer (katechon) that prevents religions and ideologies to further 
their earthly goals through state power. This means that classical realism takes religion 
and theology very seriously and therefore treats it cautiously in relation to political 
power. 
In the second place, I am not convinced that the secularization of the original 
theological perspective or influence – and consequently the use of secular concepts – 
makes it more difficult to see religion, as long as it is accepted that scholars are open 
about the theological, or worldview inspiration on their theorizing. In Chapter 8, I 
have argued that Waltz replaced a theological explanation of human behavior by a 
psychological explanation, and left theology behind by limiting his theory to the 
structure of the system of states. In the meantime, however, Waltz acknowledges, 
863 Ruurd Veldhuis, Realism Versus Utopianism?: Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian Realism and the Relevance of Utopian Thought 
for Social Ethics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975), 115.
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though not very explicitly and without much discussion, his indebtedness to theology. 
He translated these ideas into concepts that are also understandable, accessible, and 
acceptable to people that do not assent to these ideas themselves. 
Acknowledging worldview and theological influences requires that a scholar can 
‘think twice’ (dubbel denken), as the Dutch theologian Gerrit de Kruijf called it. This 
means that a scholar first has to think about how a certain idea or concept relates to his 
theology, faith or tradition, and then he or she has to translate it into terms, concepts, or 
vocabulary that are understandable for people who do not believe.864 I base the necessity 
to think twice on the fact that Niebuhr once pointed out that his use of Christian 
theology might have been less useful or effective than he would have liked. 
I confessed that I had made a mistake in hurling the traditional symbols of Christian realism – 
the fall and original sin – in the teeth of modern culture when I sought to criticize the undue 
optimism of the culture. Both these symbols, though historically significant, are subject to 
misunderstanding in a secular culture.865 
At the same time, however, we cannot do without these symbols and the language, 
because it makes a difference when it comes to theorizing. Leaving these Christian 
symbols or narratives aside is impossible, because they are at the basis of the disposition 
of scholars. Rice quotes James Gustafson, who states that for Niebuhr ‘the revelation 
of God’s grace’ provides a ‘stance or basis disposition towards the world’.866 I will come 
back to this point in Chapter 9.867 
At the end of Part I, I outlined the contours of a possible new paradigm. I have 
also questioned whether a completely new paradigm is necessary or if a renewal of the 
existing one would suffice. Religionists keep both options open. The answer depends 
partly on what the ‘old’ paradigm would have to say about religion. This is what has 
been examined in this part of the dissertation. 
I do not discuss this assessment again, but I would like to evaluate the response by 
Morgenthau and Waltz to the religionists’ criticism by means of the Amsterdam School. 
If one observes Morgenthau’s classical realism and Waltz’s neorealism the way I have 
presented them, compared to some insights of the Amsterdam School of Philosophy as 
set out in Chapter 1, it reveals that there is much agreement between them. When it 
comes to Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s view on science, I have noticed that they both agree 
that science is not the only way to acquire knowledge. They agree that there can be 
religious, theological, or philosophical notions (e.g. view on human nature) that provide 
864 G. G. Kruijf de, Waakzaam en nuchter: over christelijke ethiek in een democratie (Baarn: Ten Have, 1994). Cf. The 
requirement of translation of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006): 10-16.
865 Morgenthau, The Influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, 122.
866 Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, 270.
867 See Section 9.3.5.
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one with knowledge about reality and justifiably shape the way in which we approach 
reality through science. I argue that Waltz, possibly for strategic reasons, does not reveal 
these worldview notions, and sticks to the academic discourse arguing for these notions 
with rational, scientific arguments. Morgenthau is more open about his assumptions 
and openly argues that science, religion, and philosophy are equally important and that 
these sources of knowledge should not be reduced to each other. Partly because of the 
fact that Morgenthau and Waltz do not explicitly reflect on these notions, the overall 
reception of realism and neorealism is, unfortunately, much more positivist than an 
original reading of these thinkers justifies.  
When it comes to theory, Waltz and Morgenthau concur on the fact that scholars 
and scientists are not neutral and often normative. This does not mean that there is 
no common ground or shared rationality from which one can argue. Especially Waltz 
shows that you can translate certain ideas into scientific language, argue for it, and have 
these ideas accepted on rational grounds: for example, with his argument that self-help 
makes states striving for security first he has given a rational argument for the idea of 
original sin. Morgenthau is very clear about the fact that scholars cannot be neutral 
and strongly opposes the positivist idea that we can only be ‘saved’ by positivist science 
because it is the only reliable source of knowledge. He is aware of the ideological or 
secularized nature of this way of thinking.  
The idea that religion is an essential aspect of human nature is clearly present in 
Morgenthau: there is political, ethical, but also religious man. These various persons 
clash and that is exactly what politics is about. Waltz is also well aware of the religious 
element, but his choice for the, then prevailing, scientific discourse and the limitation 
of his theorizing to the third level leads to the exclusion of many issues, among which 
religion. However, Waltz never claims that his theory explains everything; he just 
provides a law-like explanation why states never will aim at something higher if their 
security is at stake. This means that he would never say that religion does not play a role, 
but that its role, among many other factors, does not significantly affect the particular 
object of study he is trying to account for by scientific means.  
The claim of the Amsterdam School that reality is diverse, and that reductionism 
threatens good science and sound foreign politics, comes close to Morgenthau and 
Waltz’s view of reality. They are both very sensitive and keen on attempts to explain 
international politics based on one element or aspect, as Marxists did during their 
day. They are well aware of the ideological nature of such attempts. It is on empirical 
grounds that they challenge Marxism, but also idealism; moreover, they also address 
the underlying philosophical and quasi-religious assumptions. Morgenthau’s classical 
realism comes close to the Amsterdam School, since he points at various spheres which 
should be distinguished for theoretical reasons, but which can in practice never be 
isolated, because they are interrelated. He also acknowledges that his theories have to 
account for multiple actors, but he dares to state that in his time the state was the 
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most prominent. Waltz is much more rigid. He also thinks in spheres, but he radically 
separates the international political sphere from other spheres to make theorizing 
possible. He is nevertheless sensitive to reductionism, because he always states that one 
cannot infer policies from his explanatory theory. By this he implicitly acknowledges 
that his abstraction and reductionism do not fully justice to the complex world state 
leaders are dealing with.   
It is interesting to notice that the assessment of the religionists, and the evaluation 
of Waltz and Morgenthau reveal that the Amsterdam School of Philosophy agrees with 
both sides on many issues. I understand this depends to a large extent on the way in 
which I interpret Morgenthau and Waltz, because I claim that the paradigm-challengers 
are mostly mistaken regarding their presentation and interpretation of classical realism 
and make mistakes as well at various points regarding neorealism. I have argued that 
the political realism of Morgenthau and Waltz harbours a number of important 
philosophy of science and political-theological propositions, overlooked by religionists, 
that are worthy of further study. Until it is proven that these assumptions are no longer 
tenable and applicable, I argue that they should be incorporated in a revised, or new 
paradigm.  
For this I have the following reasons. First of all, regarding political realism, we are 
dealing with a respectable tradition that has been very influential over the centuries in 
the West. A new paradigm will have to relate to this tradition and substantiate how 
it relates to these thoughts. Secondly, within IR hardly any attention is paid to the 
aforementioned assumptions of Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s realism. Because a number of 
these assumptions have a theological origin or foundation, these require further study, 
especially from the side of the religionists. The question would then be whether the 
‘political theology of realism’ can still have meaning in this time. Or does it require an 
update? What can we do with the assumption of the autonomy of the political now that 
religion manifests itself everywhere? Finally, what kind of theories is a discipline like IR 
supposed to produce? 
Overall, given what the ‘old’ paradigm has brought, I think we cannot discuss a new 
paradigm yet. It is quite impossible to speak of a new paradigm if many assumptions of 
the ‘old’ paradigm are retained. We can, however, explore whether the weaknesses of both 
the religionists and political realism can be overcome and whether their strengths can 
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Part III. ‘All Tested, Holding On to What Is Good’: Further 
Directions for Religion and IR
In 2018, an article by Shadi Hamid appeared in The Atlantic titled Resist the Lure of 
Theological Politics.868 In this article, Hamid presents arguments that are like those of the 
political realists. 
But neither returning to the Christianity of previous generations nor desacralizing American 
politics is likely to fix a public sphere that is simply too invested with meaning for anyone’s safety. 
Instead, Americans need to construct a different sort of public faith - one that borrows from 
religious sensibilities to infuse debate with a spirit of humility, instead of theological certainty. The 
problem with America’s public life isn’t that it has too much religion, or too little - but rather, that 
it has the wrong kind.869 
Hamid argues that Americans must resist the temptation to directly apply theological 
certainties to political matters. He sees this happening as we speak in the political 
decision-making process in America. One of the reasons he advances this argument is 
that he is aware of the corrupting influence politics can have on religion. Once religion 
starts to identify with certain political choices, it could have a negative effect on the 
religion itself. Hamid then holds a mirror up to the Americans regarding the theology 
they follow when dealing with politics and religion. As this dissertation has, he goes on 
to show that early in history Augustine has provided us with a vision that distinguishes 
between the city of man and the city of God: ‘they inevitably overlapped, were separate, 
and he sometimes even portrayed them as walled cities, standing in opposition to each 
other. The gap between them could not be erased, at least not entirely’.870 Hamid then 
introduces some thoughts of Abraham Kuyper, who was a theologian but also acted as 
the prime minister of the Netherlands from 1901 to 1905. 
[A]lthough one can find some individuals who wish to keep their belief private, “the absence of 
an ultimate point of loyalty, meaning, or purpose cannot persist for long.” If this is the case, then 
it becomes a question of where individuals find their “ultimate point of loyalty.” Is it in a nation, 
rationalism, truth, God, or some mix of these things? The inherent risk of finding ultimate loyalty 
in a charismatic leader or a sovereign state is that they are of this world. To claim them, then, 
requires seeking victory in this world, because they are of this world and this world alone. 871
868 Shadi Hamid, “Resist the Lure of Theological Politics,” The Atlantic (22 December, 2018). 
869 Hamid, Resist the Lure.
870 Ibid.
871 Ibid. Hamid takes this from the American theologian Matthew Kaemingk.
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Hamid also illustrates the solution presented by Kuyper and his interpreter Kaemingk. 
They argue that from a Christian-pluralistic view, the city of man must be viewed as 
inherently broken and fallen. That means that politics should be regarded as a site of 
uncertainty, rather than certainty. In some matters, only God knows for certain what is 
right. This does not equal a termination of judgment, but rather a delay. For the faithful, 
judgment will come, but not now. In other words, there should be enough room for 
political decisions, and sometimes this requires theology and religion to be excluded, 
because religion and theology tend to view matters as absolute and indisputable, which 
are not characteristics of many political issues. From this perspective, the political realists 
resist spending too much attention on religion. Therefore, they appear to refute the 
claim of the religionists. Their political theology inspires them to keep religion separate 
and to create space for the political. By doing so, they have thrown a heavy-weight 
argument into the debate on which the religionists have not yet reflected. That also 
explains their confusion over the fact that Niebuhr, who was a theologian and a believer 
himself, is considered the ‘father’ of the prominent school of realism.872  
However, this does not conclude the story. The claim of the religionists goes beyond 
a plea for ‘more’ religion or more ‘God’ in IR theory. They also argue that religion 
can indeed be a factor of power. Therefore, it should be included in political decision-
making. Religionists would contend that including religion might have enabled IR to 
foresee the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Polish Revolution and the terrorist attacks 
of the 11th of September.873 They would show that a misreading of religious forces in the 
case of Lebanon, Vietnam, Sudan and Iran led to less effective policies.874 Adherents of 
the religion paradigm would say that theories on international relations have to reflect 
reality in order to be justifiable. If the importance of certain religious factors becomes 
increasingly important theories should respond constructively to this. They would agree 
with David Brooks who states that
Our foreign policy elites (...) go for months ignoring the force of religion; then, when confronted 
with something inescapably religious, such as the Iranian revolution or the Taliban, they begin 
talking of religious zealotry and fanaticism, which suddenly explains everything. After a few 
days of shaking their heads over the fanatics, they revert to their usual secular analyses. We do 
872 There has been some discussion whether Kennan in fact has made this remark. Kennan did not remember that he said 
this when Jonathan Fox interviewed him at the age of 76, but according to Thompson, Kennan said it when he was 67 
years old and speaking from his soul and not worrying about his own status. In 1991, Dean Acheson confirmed that this 
expression came from Kennan, when he was interviewed by June Bingham Birge who was researching her biography of 
Niebuhr. Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and His Age. Reinhold Niebuhr’s Prophetic Role and Legacy (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity 
Press International, 2002), 304 fn. 49. According to Kennan, the wordings did not really express his feelings on Niebuhr. 
He personally found Niebuhr’s philosophical perspective attractive, but his political judgments and foreign-policy views 
unexceptional. Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr. A Biography (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 238.
873 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 1-10.
874 Edward Luttwak, “The Missing Dimension,” in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, eds. Douglas Johnston 
and Cynthia Sampson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 10-13.
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not yet have, and sorely need, a mode of analysis that attempts to merge the spiritual and the 
material.875 
A main counterargument from the political realists Morgenthau and Waltz is that theory 
cannot encompass everything. Their position leads to the question what the religionists 
demand from a theory? Does it have to account for all cases in which religion plays a role? 
The discussion between the religionists and the political realists mainly revolves around 
a political-theological issue and a theoretical issue. Addressing these two issues could be 
beneficial to both parties. That is ultimately the goal of this dissertation. Mapping the 
discussion, identifying the main issues, and then determine the best way forward. 
For that reason, in this final part, the third sub-question will be answered: what are 
the strengths and weaknesses of both positions, and to what extent could a so-called 
practice approach do justice to the challenge posed by the adherents of religion, while 
at the same time upholding insights of the realist school? To be able to answer this 
question, I have analyzed the discussion between the religionists and Morgenthau and 
Waltz in the two preceding parts of this dissertation. I have also tried to clarify this 
debate with insights from the Amsterdam School of Philosophy. In this final part, I 
will draw up the balance and evaluate the discussion so far. I will also come up with a 
diagnosis of the differences between the religionists and political realists. After that, I 
will show to what extent the so-called practice approach used by the Amsterdam School 
could be helpful to overcome the weaknesses of either the religionists or political realists 
and combine their mutual strengths.   
In the second part of this dissertation, I have shown that much of the criticism of 
the religionists proves to be inadequate or wrong. This could give the impression that 
we do not have to listen to the religionists anymore. That is not the position I take. First 
of all, as I concluded earlier, the fact that the criticism does not apply to Morgenthau 
and Waltz does not mean that their overall argument is worthless. Secondly, there are 
many handbooks in International Relations that still picture realism in such a way that 
it looks like a secular, normatively numb power politics approach. In the third place, 
the criticism of the religionists might apply for many other IR theories or theorists, even 
though Morgenthau and Waltz and political realism in general are quite representative 
for the development of IR since the Second World War. 
To give an impression of the benefits of the practice approach I mention a few 
characteristics. A more detailed account follows later.876 The Normative Practice 
Approach (NPA) of the Amsterdam School wants to theorize around concrete practices. 
That means that theorizing should not come to contradict the everyday experience of 
875 David Brooks, “Kicking the Secularist Habit: A Six-Step Program,” The Atlantic (1 March, 2003).
876 A very recent volume in which the NPA is explained and discussed in relation to sustainable development, health 
care, management, military operations, etc. is. Marc J. de Vries and H. Jochemsen, eds., The Normative Nature of Social 
Practices and Ethics in Professional Environments (Hershey: IGI Global, 2019).
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the daily practice. This prevents theories from becoming so rigid that they lose the 
connection to the practices they discuss. This clearly provides theories with a direction, 
although this could endanger the theoretical requirement of explanatory power. Besides 
the purpose of a theory, its reach is also of importance. The NPA wants to do justice to 
the diversity of factors that play a role in different practices. That is why it distinguishes 
between context, structure, and direction, between that which conditions, founds, 
and qualifies practices. The NPA is an integral type of theory, because it gives account 
of its ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations. The approach as 
developed by the Amsterdam School also wants to go beyond the contradiction between 
empirical and normative theory. According to them, there is no such thing as neutral 
research. The Amsterdam School denies the possibility of pure positivism because pre-
scientific presuppositions always play a role. Its starting point is that theorizing is always 
based on deeper assumptions connected to a worldview, which is of a paradigmatic 
nature and has the character of an ultimate conviction about reality. These deeper 
convictions often influence one’s view on science and theory. As the religion scholar 
Thomas states, referring to the critical theorist Robert Cox: ‘Theory is always for 
someone for some purpose’.877 Thomas himself maintains: ‘At all times, a key question 
of international theory is: What kinds of actors, doing which activities, are socially and 
politically constructed by whom, and in whose interests - to be a part, or to be excluded, 
from domestic, politics or international affairs?’878 
This critical element forces scholars to acknowledge normative considerations in 
scholarly research. The Amsterdam School advocates for openness regarding these 
presuppositions. This is not unimportant, especially when religion is involved, because 
the discussion on religion and IR also seems to be influenced by certain presuppositions 
that must be identified. Finally, with the NPA, the Amsterdam School offers opportunities 
to address the complexity of religion. The Amsterdam School itself is the product of a 
religious tradition, which is why it has always wanted to take the role of religion and 
worldview into account in its theorizing. 
877 Scott M. Thomas, “A Trajectory Toward the Periphery: Francis of Assisi, Louis Massignon, Pope Francis, and Muslim–
Christian Relations,” The Review of Faith & International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2018): 22.
878 Ibid., 24. The difference between critical theorists and the Amsterdam School is that the latter explicitly draw attention 
to the deeper, ultimate commitments while critical theorist focus on the structural conditions and power relations.
Chapter 9
Balance, Evaluation, and Diagnosis of  
the Debate Between Religionists and 
Political Realists
Introduction
Throughout this dissertation, I have continuously distinguished between four levels: the 
empirical level, the level of a specific domain, the level of philosophy of science, and the 
worldview level. If we use these levels to present the statements of the religionists and 
Morgenthau and Waltz, this will provide a clear overview of the discussion. Based on that, 
it is also possible to draw up the balance and to identify the strong and weak points.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will indicate how, respectively the religionists, 
Morgenthau, and Waltz thought about the empirical, domain-specific, and philosophy 
of science subtheses. I will also look at the worldview level. Previous chapters elaborated 
on the accusations made by the religionists and the counterarguments that can be found 
in Morgenthau and Waltz, so I will not repeat them now. I also sketched the contours 
of their alternative approach in the conclusion of Part I. Based on all of this, I will 
provide a short schematic summary of the previous chapters. More important is the 
fact that it allows for an evaluation of the various perspectives. This will be done in the 
second section. After that, I will elaborate on certain underlying issues in the discussion 
between the religionists and the political realists. 
9.1. Drawing up the Balance: The Contributions of  Religionists 
and Political Realists 
The scheme below consists of the useful input gathered from the discussion between 
the religionists and political realists (see Figure 9.1). I explicitly use the term political 
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realism when I refer to Morgenthau and Waltz, because together they are sufficiently 
representative for political realism. 
Religionists Classical Realism Neorealism Balance
Empirical
Global resurgence Religion has manifested 
itself differently since 
1960s
Does not mention it Does not mention it -Political realist are aware 
of religion and pay some 
attention to it, but this is 
not much 
-Political realists do 
not reflect on a global 
resurgence
-The exact relevance 
of religious factors for 
international relations 
remains unclear
Individual People’s worldviews, 
norms and beliefs 
influence public and 
political life
Shows to be aware of religion 
in lives of politicians and 
statesmen 
Mentions of few 
examples of religion in 
lives of individuals
National Religion influences the 
state, political society and 
civil society
Has an eye for role of 
religion as change agent and 
challenger on the national 
level 
Is aware of religion on 
the national level
Transnational Religious actors influence 
transnational  
relations increasingly
Pays scant attention to 
religion on this level 
(civilizations)
Does not discuss religion 
on this level
International Religion makes the 
greatest impact in  
international politics
Pays attention to religion 
in relation to human rights, 
diplomacy, nationalism, 
political religion
Mentions a few examples 





-Primary focus on states, state 
leaders, and some domestic 
issues. 
-State as bulwark against 
secularization
-States are central 
-Religion is an individual 
or state attribute, which 
is not part of the system 
level 
-Neoseculari-
zationtheory seems to be 
a representative view and 
they seem to share same 
view on Westphalia879
-Religionists want to 
involve all three levels in 
theorizing, while political 




of the (international) 
political sphere and 
therefore central role 
of state(s)men and not 
religion
National interest Power, but also moral, 
religious and spiritual 
goals
-National interest is time and 
context-dependent, but now 
defined as national power 
-National interest defined as 
power is moral in itself 
-Autonomy of the political 
-States aim at survival, 
not religious goals, 
because of 
anarchy  








transcendent reference point 
remains necessary 
Seems not to deviate 
much from religionists
879 The neosecularization theory is not followed by all religionists, because most religionists only counter the conventional 
modernizing and secularization theory, but do not present an alternative. I have presented the neosecularization theory 
as an alternative approach of the religionists as it strengthens their position when they offer an alternative besides their 













-Three equal responses: 
religious, scientific and 
philosophical 
-Traditional religions may 
disappear, the religious 
impulse remains
-Prefers a scientific over 
a theological or religious 
explanation, but allows 
for influence of religious 
or theological intuitions 
or ideas on theory 
formation 
-Goes along with 
idea that a scientific 
explanation replaces a 
religious one
-All respect contribution 
of religious perspective to 
theorizing 
–All understand religion 
in similar way
-They acknowledge 







More attention for non-
material factors
Ideas, ideology or religion 
color the way in which 
interests (either material 
or ideal) should be 
understood 
Is not a materialist 









-More room for 
interpretative theory and 




empirical, but normative 
-Religion and morality are 
different spheres than political 
-Valuative standpoints and 
presuppositions influence 
doing science  
-Rationality depends on time 
and context
-Prefers a psychological 
or social science 
explanation over a 
religious or theological 
explanation or account  
-Researcher is always 
subject to normative 
influences and theories 
too
-Aims at parsimony




Religion as individual 
and communal, 
rational like other 
beliefs, ideational and 
institutional
Makes a distinction between 
religions and religiosity




Man Not a particular view on 
human beings, but seem 
to be quite optimistic 
about religious man
Sinfulness of human beings 
is necessarily connected 
with the order of the world. 
The result is that there is no 
inevitable progress toward 
the good, but an undecided 
conflict between good and 
evil
Miseries are related to 
human nature: ‘The 
root of all evil is man, 
and thus he himself is 
the root of the specific 
evil, war’
-All involve worldview 
elements in their 
theorizing, implicitly or 
explicitly
-They differ on relevance 
of this for incorporating 
religion in IR theory
History Not a particular view on 
history
-Morgenthau assumes that 
human time or history is 
surrounded by God’s time. 
The destination of history 
will eventually not be realized 
by people, but by God; 
secularization denies this 
given
-Notion of katechon makes 
politics possible
Non-utopian view on 
history, because final 
destination of history will 
not be realized by human 
beings: ‘each advance 
in knowledge, each 
innovation in technique, 
contains within itself the 
potentiality of evil as well 
as of good’
Ethics Emphasis on relevance 
and necessity of religion 
for ethics and morality, 
but not a shared ethical 
perspective
Realist ethics by avoiding 
the illusion of both absolute 
perfection and absolute evil
Realist ethics: a perfect 
earthly justice is 
impossible, it is about 
the approximation a little 
more justice or freedom 
and seeking to avoid 
politics that lead to a 
little less of it
Figure 9.1. Overview contributions of  religionists and political realists
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9.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of  the Religionists and Political 
Realists: An Evaluation 
I have clarified the visions of the religionists, Morgenthau and Waltz regarding the role 
of religion on the empirical, domain-specific, philosophy of science and worldview level. 
Now it is time to evaluate the inputs of the discussion between the religionists and the 
political realists. To evaluate the debate between the religionists and these two political 
realists, I treat Morgenthau and Waltz as representatives of political realism. I will only 
refer to differences between them if that is relevant for the evaluation. Up until now, 
my contribution has mainly been a reconstruction of the religionist position. I have 
also started a discussion with the political realists Morgenthau and Waltz. In addition, I 
have introduced views from the Amsterdam School of Philosophy as these clarified the 
debate. Other sections have indicated the strengths and weaknesses of the religionists 
and political realists. Below, I will briefly describe what I said previously and then I will 
provide a short list of the strengths and weaknesses of each position. All these points 
have been addressed earlier in the conclusion of chapters or evaluative sections. It is 
for the purpose of clarity that I list them here point by point. In general, I consider 
something a strength if it furthers and clarifies the reflection on religion in international 
relations and how to theorize about it. I consider something a weakness if it further 
complicates or obstructs this reflection.  
Regarding the empirical level, it is a strength of the religionists that they cherish 
an empirical transparency that allows them to see what is going on in the world and 
that they are prepared to match their theorizing accordingly. They also succeed in 
showing where and how religion manifests itself in international relations. Also, the 
religionists ask for attention for the underlying philosophy of science level of theorizing. 
By addressing the empirical, domain-specific, and philosophy of science aspects and 
their mutual influences, their criticism has an integral form. It should be noted though 
that this integrality is the result of my reconstruction as done in Part I, because most 
individual contributions of the religionists are less coherent and systematic. The 
religionists lack a clear vision on a theory that integrates three of these four levels: the 
empirical, domain-specific, and philosophy of science levels. There is also no consensus 
among the religionists regarding the degree to which religion should be integrated, and 
especially how. They also have trouble explaining why religion is so different compared 
to other factors that it must be integrated. For that reason, the general conclusion of 
a group of scholars is that research must be conducted into the impact of different 
actors and then identify the role of religion in that process.880 One of them, Sebastian 
Rosato, states that if scholars want to convince their colleagues to give religion a special 
treatment, they should achieve at least three things: 
880 Sebastian Rosato, “The Sufficiency of Secular International Relations Theory,” in Religion and International Relations: 
A Primer for Research (University of Notre Dame: Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, 2013), 184-186.
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First, they must show that existing approaches – specifically realism, liberalism, and constructivism 
– would come up with different explanations of international politics if they were to incorporate 
religion in their theorizing. Second, they must demonstrate that religion has a causal effect on 
international politics rather than merely being correlated with various outcomes. Third, they need 
to rule out alternative, non-religious, explanations for the international political phenomena they 
claim to explain.881 
His conclusion is that proponents of the religious paradigm do not yet succeed in 
doing so.882 Rosato’s theoretical requirements are quite unrealistic. Would he also use 
these criteria to assess the statement that states aim at survival? Does neorealism as a 
theory meet these criteria? His point that it has to be ‘proven’ that religion enriches the 
understanding and explanation of international relations, is nevertheless a point which 
deserves attention.  
Religionists’ criticism of existing theories has, unfortunately, also demonstrated 
their superficial knowledge of IR theory, at least of the work of Morgenthau and Waltz. 
Additionally, most proponents of the religious paradigm seem to be positive about the 
resurgence of religion in advance. This impression is strengthened by the fact that they, at 
times, appear to confuse the return of religion with the return of God. It is to their credit 
that they not only criticize the proposed evidence for modernization and secularization 
theory, but that they also present an alternative: neosecularization theory. This means 
that secularization is seen as a process within a religious, or Christian, context and in 
that sense still indebted to this context. In this view, the secular has become a domain in 
which there are no references to religious concepts. It is, however, not hostile to religion 
and does not imply a decline of it. This theory makes it possible to have a different, 
possibly more positive and accurate, view on the Westphalian system and the emergence 
of the secular and the political.  
The political realists have a clear vision of what a theory is supposed to do and what 
should or should not be included. Furthermore, they clearly base their theorizing on 
philosophy of science. They also acknowledge their indebtedness to political-theological 
principles and do so in a comprehensible manner. The latter can also be a disadvantage, 
because it is difficult to agree with the political realists when you disagree with their 
political-theological principles. Their emphasis on the autonomy of the political can 
also prevent them from taking religion seriously as a power factor. They do not seem 
to be sufficiently aware that the autonomy of the political is a principle dependent on 
time and context, and that religious actors can exert influence on this. Is this principle 
still supported by religious communities or do political theorists maintain a political-
theological stance which has become obsolete?  
A disadvantage of Waltz’s neorealism is that his theorizing assumes an almost rigid 
881 Ibid., 176.
882 Ibid., 182, 183.
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Strengths Religionists 
• Empirical openness for what is going on in the world 
• Demonstrate overwhelming empirical evidence for religion, especially the  
 transnational level
• Draw attention to deeper philosophical levels in theorizing of IR theorists and  
 possible biases 
• Integral criticism on IR: empirical, domain-specific and philosophy of  
 science 
• Suggestion for an alternative view on secularization 
Weaknesses Religionists
• No clear view on scope and function of theory
• Unclear and divided about what is meant by integrating religion in IR theory
• Religion’s distinctiveness unclear
• Seem to be prejudiced on relevance of religion
• Do not always distinguish clearly between theology, religion and personal faith
• Many demonstrate insufficient knowledge of IR theory
Strengths Political Realists
• Openness to role of religious factors 
• Clear view on function and scope of theory of international relations 
• Integral theory 
• Clear political-philosophical and political-theological assumptions 
• View on secularization that agrees with religionists’ (Morgenthau)
Weaknesses Political Realists
• De facto not much attention for religious actors
• Rigid theorizing (in case of Waltz) and reductionism
• Political theology might make too cautious for considering religion as power  
 factor
• Disagreement with other political-philosophical and political-theological  
 assumptions makes finding common ground difficult
• Accepts and incorporates modernization and secularization theory too easily  
 (Waltz)
• Use of scientific language cloaks the fact that his theory is normative and  
 unavoidably prescriptive (Waltz)
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form. Waltz says a lot about a little, giving the impression that it no longer concerns 
the daily reality of people. Waltz also suggests having a theory that is empirical which 
is supported by his use of terms from the scientific discourse. However, at times he fails 
to resist the temptation to take a stance regarding the direction international politics 
should take.  
Both Morgenthau and Waltz, although mainly the latter, take a big step by stating 
that they interpret international relations as international politics. That means that 
they primarily interpret the economic, cultural, religious, and legal relations between 
countries as international political relations.This gives the impression of reductionism, 
especially in the case of Waltz.  
While Morgenthau regrets the loss of a transcendent reference point. Waltz clearly 
seems to favour a scientific explanation over a theological one. I do not think that the 
latter is necessary. For that reason, I will elaborate on the possibilities offered by the 
sociotheology to include religious worldviews in a scientific explanation below.  
9.3. What Are the Problems and Possible Solutions? A Diagnosis
In the debate between the proponents of the religious paradigm and the political realists, 
a number of underlying problems play a role. I have discussed some of these problems 
previously, but others just briefly or only in passing. Therefore, I will discuss them here 
and I also offer some alternative ways of thinking. The issues that I will address are: (1) 
the role of the worldview level; (2) the theoretical weight of the various levels and the 
relationship between them: irreducibility and dependency; (3) the distinction between 
a theological, religious and a scientific explanation; (4) the object of study: explaining 
international relations through religion or explaining religion in international relations?; 
(5) competing methodological foundations: constructivists versus naturalists; (6) scope 
and function of scientific, political and IR theories; (7) different political theologies. 
First of all, it appears that the worldview level is barely involved in the discussion. I 
tried to bring out this level for Morgenthau and Waltz by pointing at the role of theological 
ideas, but it is much more difficult to do so for the religionists. The religionists are 
generally much more positive about the resurgence of religion. The theological influence 
of the political realists gives them the tendency to keep religion as a meaningful factor 
away from world politics. I will return to the theological aspect later, but I would like 
to mention here that it has been especially helpful to include this worldview level in the 
discussion. That should also be a condition for the future if the debate on religion and 
international relations wants to progress. Openness regarding the worldview or political-
theological influences ensures that these can both be understood and criticized.  
Secondly, it appears that not all four levels are dealt with equally in the discussion. 
When I look at the religionists, their criticism is mainly aimed at the domain-specific 
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and philosophy of science level. They barely reflect on their own worldview and political-
theological presuppositions. When discussing their own contribution to an alternative 
approach, this primarily happens on the empirical level and partly on the domain-
specific level regarding an alternative approach of Westphalia. 
Morgenthau and Waltz discuss religion here and there, but they do not consider it a 
factor in their theorizing. For Waltz and Morgenthau, no direct cause can be found on 
the empirical level for their exclusion of religion. It should be pointed out here that the 
global resurgence was not noticed or written about by most scholars when they wrote 
their main theoretical works. It is therefore especially noteworthy to see their dealing 
with religion on the domain-specific level. It appears that Waltz is clear about the fact that 
he cannot pay attention to religion. Morgenthau’s perceptions and theorizing, at times, 
comes very close to the religionists, but religion is not a very relevant factor in his theory. 
It is, however, not evident that this is the result of Westphalian assumptions. The choices 
made by both political realists are more directly influenced by their interpretations of 
theory and their political theology. In short, the philosophical considerations regarding 
theory and political theology are much more decisive when explaining why religion 
plays a role in political realism. Religionists completely ignore both these points.  
This results in the following ironic situation: most criticism the religionists have 
on the political realists is targeted on the philosophy of science and the empirical level. 
As Part II made clear, most of the criticism of the religionists on the philosophy of 
science level turns out not to be warranted. Also, their criticism on the empirical level 
does not really apply, because the political realists already made their decision not to 
include religion empirically on the domain-specific level, and the political-theological 
level. In other words, the religionists ‘attack’ the political realists on the levels that are 
the least relevant for the political realists in their choice not to include religion. As said 
earlier, that does not mean that the religionists do not have a point, because the question 
remains whether the political realists are sufficiently open to the role of religion and 
perform a realistic power analysis.  
So far, I discussed the weight of the various levels. Now, I would like to draw attention 
to the mutual dependency and irreducibility of the various levels. The four levels cannot 
be reduced to each other, although they are all dependent on each other. The religionists 
primarily start from their positive appreciation of the resurgence of religion in the world. 
The political realists strongly base their opinions on several political-theological stances 
regarding the human person, history, and ethics. However, it is not possible to reduce 
this debate to either political theology or empirics: all four levels need to be involved, as 
well as the translation from one level to the others. It is precisely the translation from the 
political-theological to the philosophy of science and domain-specific levels that provide a 
possibility for debate. Similarly, the translation from the empirical to the domain-specific 
and philosophy of science offers talking points for a discussion. This does not mean that the 
worldview level and empirical can be excluded from the discussion, but eventually there is 
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a continuous interaction between the different levels, and considerations on the empirical 
and domain-specific levels can eventually change political-theological stances.883  
A future theory on religion and international relations will be stronger and more 
transparent if it is an integral theory meaning that it is able to account for the exact role 
of the four levels, their respective weight and the way they are related. 
9.3.1. A Theological, Religious and a Scientific Explanation
In the discussion between the religionists and political realists there is some confusion 
about the difference between a scientific, religious and theological explanation.884 
A religious explanation differs from a scientific  explanation, because it explicitly 
includes religious concepts (e.g. rituals, forgiveness, sacrifice). It uses concepts which 
do not require an insider perspective. A scientific explanation differs from a religious 
explanation, because it mainly uses non-religious (economic or political) concepts. A 
theological explanation differs from a scientific and a religious explanation, because it 
uses theological notions (e.g. incarnation, redemption, eschatology). There is overlap 
in terminology between a religious and theological perspective, but they differ because 
the latter presupposes an insider perspective. In practice, a theological explanation often 
also includes religious and scientific ideas. Similarly, a religious explanation often also 
contains scientific or non-religious concepts. It is quite uncommon that a scientific 
explanation also has theological elements in it. When the topic of research concerns a 
non-religious phenomenon, most scholars do not have problems with distinguishing 
between these three kinds of explanations. However, when the research topic is religion 
itself, the confusion arises. 
I will illustrate this with the debate between the religionists and political realists. The 
religionists sometimes seem to confuse the resurgence of religion with the theological 
statement that God has returned. Simultaneously, they seem to think it is desirable to 
use religious concepts or explanations to explain the role of religion in international 
relations.885 They also seem to imply that a lack of a theological perspective is partly 
responsible for the exclusion of religion. The political realists, especially Waltz, do 
the exact opposite. They strive for an explanation that is anything but religious or 
theological, and they do not want to include a religious or theological perspective to 
argue for the autonomy of the political domain. Their premise is that international 
883 The idea that something can both be irreducible and dependent is an idea I borrowed from the Amsterdam School of 
Philosophy. See for example H. G. Geertsema, “Denken over zin en wetenschap. Waarom de filosofie van Dooyeweerd 
zo belangrijk is.” Afscheidsrede bijzonder hoogleraar Dooyeweerd leerstoel (Amsterdam, 2005): 6. He makes a distinction 
between worldview, philosophy, and science. Ibid., 11, 12. For an example on how these borders can be crossed, see the 
way in which Geertsema argues that the Intelligent Design approach crosses the borders of science by presupposing a 
designer. Ibid., 13, 14.
884 I have set out this point earlier. Polinder, Practice-Based Theory, 263-282.
885 For example Kubálková, Towards an International Political Theology, 675-704; Thomas, Living Critically and ‘Living 
Faithfully’ in a Global Age.
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politics should not be infused by theological dogmas, because it would threaten the 
autonomy of the political. As a result, they seem to be against the inclusion of religion 
in a theory on international relations before the discussion has even started. However, a 
religious explanation is not the same as involving theology! 
As I said, I can be helpful to distinguish between the three perspectives. When I 
apply this distinction to the religionists, it would imply that the religionists should 
clearly distinguish between a religious and a theological explanation. Referring to more 
of God’s presence in this world is a theological statement which presupposes an insider 
perspective. Invoking theology makes people that do not share this perspective hesitant 
to reflect on religion in international relations. Religionists can, however, use religious 
language and symbols to try to give an adequate explanation of religion in international 
relations. They should not be deterred when scholars state that a strict scientific 
explanation does not allow for a religious explanation. IR theory should be open to 
the fact that a scientific explanation of religion could benefit from the use of religious 
concepts. It should, at the same time, be aware of the fact that a religious explanation 
is not identical to a theological explanation. Using religious concept and language does 
not mean that theological ideas are becoming part of IR theory. If the religionists and IR 
theorists can work with these distinctions, it will enable them to think about the place 
of religion in IR together. 
A good example of an approach in which religious ideas are taken seriously without 
invoking theology is sociotheology. This is an approach from Juergensmeyer en Mona 
Kanwal Sheikh in which theologically informed worldviews or religious worldview of 
a certain subject play a role in the explanation of religion in IR.886 Sheikh states the 
following about it:
In International Relations (IR), religion’s ability to provide legitimacy for an end other than 
religion has been the usual reason to include it in analysis. The instrumental use of religion is 
arguably a central concern for IR, but not a sufficient one. (…) [T]here can be religious reasons 
behind the behaviour of political actors, and hence religion should not just be treated as a 
rhetorical gloss over ‘real motives’ or non-religious goals. The actions and ideas of political actors 
can be based on hopes for spiritual transformation in this life and the next, and on the longing for 
salvation and spiritual fulfilment.887 
In another article she states that:
To take religion seriously does not mean merely to explain religion from a traditional social 
886 Jurgensmeyer and Sheikh, A Sociotheological Approach, 620-643.
887 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Sociotheology: The Significance of Religious Worldviews,” in Nations Under God: The 
Geopolitics of Faith in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Luke M. Herrington, McKay Alasdair and Jeffrey Haynes (Bristol: 
E-International Relations Publishing, 2015), 134-143.
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scientific viewpoint, which has, despite the self-perception of the social sciences, deeply imbedded 
problems living up to its own criteria of objectivity and value-free knowledge. Rather, the task 
is to open up to the idea that religion can in fact explain events taking place in International 
Relations. There is an important difference between seeking to explain religion, which in IR has 
practically meant explaining religion away more than explaining its presence, and incorporating 
religion in analysis more substantially to explain International Relations phenomena.888 
The sociotheological approach can be applied to every worldview or tradition and 
does not make any statements regarding the truthfulness of these claims. It tries ‘to 
understand the reasoning behind the truth claims, not to verify them’, and place them 
within a social context.889 
With that, the sociotheological approach meets the hesitation of the political realists 
regarding theology. It offers religionists an answer to the question on how they can use 
religion without it turning into theology. Sociotheology distinguishes between theology 
and religious studies which avoids the truth claims about the beliefs they study. A 
limitation of the sociotheological approach is that it does not claim to be a theory of 
international relations. It is more like an approach with which religion in international 
politics can be explained. The claim of the religionists goes a step further, as they want 
IR theories to incorporate religion.
9.3.2. Explaining IR Through Religion or Explaining Religion in IR? 
[T]he task is to open up to the idea that religion can in fact explain events taking place in 
International Relations. There is an important difference between seeking to explain religion, 
which in IR has practically meant explaining religion away more than explaining its presence, 
and incorporating religion in analysis more substantially to explain International Relations 
phenomena.890
As this quote illustrates, there are multiple ways to deal with religion, which has to 
do with the exact object of the study. In the discussion on religion and international 
relations, the research object is not always clear. Is the goal a better understanding of 
international relations? Do we need religion for that? Or do we want to understand the 
role of religion in international relations and do we therefore need to know more about 
religion? Both arguments come up in the discussion. 
The religionists say: religion plays an important role in the world and that role is so 
888 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “How does Religion Matter?: Pathways to Religion in International Relations,” Review of 
International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 6.
889 Sheikh, Sociotheology, 136-138. How to apply a sociotheological approach is explained in. Jurgensmeyer and Sheikh, 
A Sociotheological Approach.
890 Sheikh, How does Religion Matter?, 6.
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large and decisive that International Relations should work with that. The religionists 
also say that research must be conducted into the specific role of religion or religions 
in international relations. That last part is required to provide a better argumentation 
for the first. Once you know what religion does in international relations, it is easier to 
determine whether and how religion plays a role in research into international relations. 
When trying to understand or explain international relations better, the question will 
be: what does the factor religion add to existing explanatory variables?  
The central claim of the religionists is about both, but subthesis 1 of the religionists 
(religion is everywhere in the world and IR should not ignore it) is mainly about religion as 
object of study. Subtheses 2 and 3 (IR has a bias against acknowledging the significance of 
religion because of its Westphalian assumptions and its philosophy of science) are mainly 
about how including religion helps to achieve better theories on international relations. 
The difference between both positions also becomes visible among the religionists. 
Kubálková pleads for the creation of a sub-discipline named International Political 
Theology (comparable to a subfield International Political Economy), in which the role of 
religion in international relations is studied. Thomas leans more towards having existing 
IR theories take religion more seriously. One does not exclude the other, because a sub-
discipline might help to map how religion plays a role, while IR theory is then tasked with 
finding out what this means for research into international relations in general. As we have 
seen in the case of Morgenthau and Waltz, they are not convinced that adding religion 
can help them reach a better understanding or explanation of international relations. That 
does not mean that they think the study of religion is unnecessary. They just doubt its 
added value in the context of a theory of international politics. 
If theorizing on religion and international relations wants to succeed, it should 
distinguish: do we want to better understand international relations or do we focus on 
religion in international relations? The last can help to answer the first question, but it is 
not the same.  
9.3.3. Competing Methodological Foundations: Constructivists versus 
Naturalists
The discussion of religion and international relations also reveals that there are 
different views regarding the question whether a theory should have an explanatory or 
interpretative purpose. The choice for one or another depends on the object of study. It 
is also related to the question of what the world consists of and the (im)possibilities of 
science. Because, as I already mentioned in Chapter 1: ‘[u]nderneath any given research 
design and choice of methods lies a researcher’s (often implicit) understanding of the 
nature of the world and how it should be studied.’891 This understanding of the nature 
of the world is something that is more basic, fundamental and comprehensive than 
method. Moses and Knutsen quote Waltz who says that students 
891 Moses and Knutsen, Ways of Knowing, 2.
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have been much concerned with methods and little concerned with the logic of their use. This 
reverses the proper priority of concern for once a methodology is adopted, the choice of methods 
becomes merely a tactical matter. It makes no sense to start a journey that is to bring us to an 
understanding of a phenomenon without asking which methodological routes might possibly 
lead there.892
In my own words, it is important for researchers to know what their philosophy of 
science starting points are (the third level). Because of it, they better understand how 
to study a certain domain or object (second level). Therefore, they more adequately 
report what presents itself as empirics (first level). Moses and Knutsen emphasize, as 
Morgenthau and Waltz do, that theories are not neutral, because their methodological 
assumptions are different. 
Each research tool or procedure is inextricably embedded in commitments to particular versions 
of the world and to knowing that world. To use a questionnaire, to use an attitude scale, to take 
the role of a participant observer, to select a random sample, to measure rates of population 
growth, and so on, is to be involved in conceptions of the world which allow these instruments to 
be used for the purposes conceived. No technique or method of investigation (and this is as true 
of the natural science as it is of the social) is self-validating: its effectiveness, i.e. its very status as a 
research instrument making the world tractable to investigation, is, from a philosophical point of 
view, ultimately dependent on epistemological justifications.893 
In this dissertation, I have tried to draw attention to philosophical views that play a role 
and that these differences should be addressed. However, I also would like to emphasize 
that different methodologies can be seen as complementary.  
The diverging methodologies are a well-known problem in science. Inspired by Michael 
Polanyi, Andy Sanders has illustrated this with a scheme in which he has put the different 
cognitive appreciations of reality on a line with two extremes.894 I have put that scheme in 
the figure below and added ‘naturalism’ and ‘constructivism’ to it (see Figure 9.2). 
892 Ibid., 4. Cited from Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 13.
893 Moses and Knutsen, Ways of Knowing, 5. Quoted from John A. Hughes, The Philosophy of Social Research, 2nd ed. 
(London; New York: Longman, 1990), 11.
894 Andy F. Sanders, “ Geloof, kennis en natuurwetenschappen.” In Theologie en natuurwetenschap: op zoek naar een 
snark?, ed. W. B. Drees (Kampen: Kok, 1992), 49. See also, Andy F. Sanders, Michael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology. 
A Reconstruction of some Aspects of ‘Tacit Knowing’ (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988), 232.
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           Figure 9.2. Continuum of  competing methodologies
The above continuum shows that certain preferences regarding theorizing – explaining 
versus understanding – hide interpretations regarding the meaning of data. It also 
reveals a vision of that which makes up the world and reality. For example, naturalism 
holds a view of the world as being objectively real and permanent. Constructivism sees 
the view of the world as a human construction which is changeable. Scholars are part 
of what is being investigated and therefore they can have a role in the outcome. Their 
views on theory also differ. Naturalism sees theory as an aid to explaining and reveal 
patterns in the world and a cluster of objective laws. Constructivists maintain that 
theory is a product of human imagination and an aid to understanding and used to 
reveal contingent phenomena.895  
When discussing theorizing religion and international relations, the contradiction 
between the naturalists and the constructivists emerges. By presenting it as a continuum, 
it is no longer an absolute contradiction. It is also possible to speak of explaining and 
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understanding as complementary aspects of the acquisition of knowledge. According to 
this way of thinking scientific inquiry is a cognitive ordering of a certain part of reality.896 
That implies that the various sciences can be considered as ordered as in the table above. 
Sanders puts theology at the bottom of the hierarchy, but calls it the highest level of 
structuring. Theology, in his view, pretends to make statements about the totality of 
reality, the meaning of life and human salvation. As a result, theology is more vulnerable 
to rational criticism, because it deals with the lack of comprehension, contrast and 
incompatibility of life. According to this hierarchy it is impossible to reduce higher 
levels to the lower levels e.g. to reduce theological or philosophical issues to physical 
or biological matters.897 The fact that the higher the hierarchy the more the person is 
involved, also explains why the empirical study of religion is so often seen as difficult. 
The figure above is useful to the discussion on religion and international relations 
for different reasons. It shows that reality is pluriform and that scientific disciplines are 
an expression of that. Therefore, it is impossible and undesirable to try and reduce one 
phenomenon to something else: theology cannot be reduced to something psychological 
or social. As a consequence, the study of international relations is conducted from different 
perspectives, each with their own characteristics. Waldemar Gurian points this out nicely. 
Finally, in order to satisfy his need of finding norms for international relations, the student could 
attend courses in philosophy: ethics would teach him to understand that power politics are 
subordinated to higher aims, that conflicts and crises among nations derive from imperfections of 
human nature. In Catholic institutions, ethics would be studied in relation to the supernatural end 
of man, the consideration of which helps to evaluate human action. (...) In this evaluation, views on 
the nature of men become decisive. The Catholic student of international relations will claim that 
he has an insight which other students do not have, or, from their point of view, would be obliged 
to reject and regard as a subjective (…) I think that a well-organized class in international relations, 
accessible to all students, given with the right respect for other disciplines as well as for philosophy 
(and, I may add, theology) would help to bring about the unification of college and university 
threatened today by a combination of specialization and utilitarianism. Students and faculty would 
come to realize that in all temporal things something supratemporal appears. Therefore, they would 
be saved from the dangerous twin evils of our time - cynicism and perfectionism.898
Gurian’s vision corresponds to that of James Skillen and Lucas Freire, who both indicate 
that IR indeed knows no uniformity and brings together many different disciplines. 
They both argue that the field of international relations needs a unifying perspective and 
that the Amsterdam school offers a valuable starting point for that.899  
896 Sanders, Michael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology, 232.
897 Sanders, Geloof, kennis en natuurwetenschappen, 50.
898 Waldemar Gurian, “On the Study of International Relations,” Review of Politics 8, no. 3 (1946): 277, 280-282.
899 Lucas Freire, “Opening Up Space for a Reformational Approach to the Study of World Politics,” Presentation, 
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9.3.4. Scope and Function of  Scientific, Political and IR Theories 
A different matter that plays between the religionists and political realists is that there 
are different views on what a scientific theory on international relations should do. A 
number of discussions play a role here: (1) normative versus empirical; (2) prescriptive 
versus descriptive; (3) the object of theorizing; and (4) structure and actor. Below, I want 
to discuss each of these issues.
In this dissertation, I have continuously sought to highlight the fact that a domain-
specific theory is often based on philosophy of science starting points, and that there 
are often worldview influences hiding below the surface. Both the religionists and 
Morgenthau and Waltz also recognize that their theories are not neutral. Time and 
context, and the personal values of the researcher or scholar always play a role in the 
creation of theories. Of course, the degree to which space is provided for normativity 
varies from one thinker to the next. Waltz, for example, works more towards a theory 
that makes sense empirically compared to Morgenthau and the religionists, although the 
last group also include more positivist approaches. There is a gradual difference between 
the different positions instead of a fundamental difference. If the various theorists could 
see each other that way, their theories and approaches on religion and international 
relations would be seen as complementary rather than contradictory.
Related to this is the second point namely whether a theory should be prescriptive 
or not. The religionists generally view theories as instruments with which policymakers 
can make decisions. A large part of their plea to change IR theory is based on the fact 
that current foreign policy does not take the religious factor seriously enough. Waltz 
on the other hand says that his theory cannot be a source of conclusions on which to 
base policies. I have previously stated that I doubt whether he is always consistent in 
this, but that is how his theory is intended. Morgenthau’s theory which is less focused 
on explanatory power than Waltz also wants to be prescriptive, because the state leader 
has to know how to act. A future theory on religion and international relations should 
be aware of the fact that theories cannot be isolated from the desire or inclination of 
policymakers to draw conclusion from theories how to act. 
The third point about the demarcation of the object of theorizing also plays a role 
here. The religionists, Waltz and Morgenthau both make the conscious or unconscious 
choice to theorize on a certain domain or object. The religionists in general are not that 
explicit in their choice for a certain domain. Waltz is clearest and most outspoken in 
this. He limits his theorizing to the political domain and the third level: the structure of 
the system. Morgenthau chooses a theory of foreign policy that has both the domestic 
and international domains as starting points. He tries to limit himself within these 
confines to the political domain, but he inevitably has to make statements regarding 
characteristics on the unit level. Eventually the above choices and scientific starting 
Conference The Future of Creation Order (Amsterdam, 2011); Skillen, Unity and Diversity Among States. A Critique of 
Assumptions in the Study of International Relations, 32-34.
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points also determine whether a theory includes structure and actor, as Morgenthau 
attempts, or that it merely focuses on the structure of the system. Theorizing on religion 
and international relations means that a scholar has to make abstractions and limitations. 
That is unavoidable, but he or she should be explicit about it and substantiate the choices 
made. That makes it easier to see what the limitations and possible applications of a 
theory are.  
9.3.5. Different Political Theologies: The Need to Talk About Theology
I have continuously discussed political theology and political realism, without making 
many distinctions between different political theologies within political realism. This 
might give the impression that the discussion is about involving political theology or 
not. That is partly true, but it is also about what kind of political theology one wants 
to involve. That means that at the moment that political theology starts to play a role, 
these ideas should be subject of discussion: there is a need to talk about theology!900 
When a theorist adheres to a more positive or hopeful view on the possibilities of human 
beings inspired by his or her theology, this might lead to a different political theory 
than someone who believes that human beings are mere animals. It might also lead to 
a different appreciation of the role of religion. If religion can motivate people to reach 
beyond their self-interest, it may be granted a more prominent role in theorizing than 
in case religion is seen as superstition, divisive and dangerous. To illustrate how subtle 
theological differences matter in theorizing international politics, I will focus on some 
differences between Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Augustine. I choose to focus on Niebuhr 
and Morgenthau, because they have more actively reflected on their political theologies 
than Waltz. Niebuhr was personally committed to his theological standpoints which 
makes his reflections existential, while this remains unclear in Morgenthau’s case. This 
reflection might also show what secularization actually does, because it might lead to 
impoverished theories. 
Rice argues that Niebuhr and Morgenthau agreed on many issues as political realists, 
900 There are interesting theological discussions within the Amsterdam School about power and the state. Wolterstorff, for 
example, wrote a paper called Fallen Powers. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Fallen Powers,” Presentation Conference Consultation 
on Good Power: Divine and Human (Yale Center on Faith and Culture, New Haven, 2007). The argument in this paper 
has also become part of his later book. Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Mighty and the Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). In the article he refers to the theologian Barth that there is a parallel 
between the way in which mankind is justified, and politics. In both cases, the question is which role redemption plays. 
Wolterstorff then shows that a theological justification of power can be given. According to him, created structures have 
fallen, but they still play a role after redemption: states play a role in redemption. States may be subject to fallen power, 
but they are not fallen powers themselves. Another example is an article of Geertsema in which he discusses the meaning 
of power and conflict from the perspective of a Christian worldview consisting of creation, fall and redemption. H. G. 
Geertsema, “Power and Conflict in Human Relations. Tentative Reflections from a Christian Perspective,” in Philosophy 
Put to Work. Contemporary Issues in Art, Politics, Science and Religion, eds. Jan Van der Stoep, H. G. Geertsema and R. 
Peels (Amsterdam: Christian Studies of Science and Society, 2008), 70-99.
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but that Niebuhr’s Christian realism gave his realism a distinctive trait.901 Niebuhr’s 
theological orientation gives him a ‘disposition’ to see the world in a certain way.902 
Almost all Niebuhr’s disagreements with realist friends are the result of Niebuhr’s 
theological frame of reference. This did not mean that Niebuhr’s view was not accepted 
or understood by a broader audience. On the contrary, the philosopher Morton White 
coined the phrase ‘Atheists for Niebuhr’ to describe a group of secular or religiously 
sceptical thinkers who gravitated towards Niebuhr.903 
To understand the ‘Christian’ taint of Niebuhr’s realism, I will discuss a few 
differences with Morgenthau. Niebuhr’s difference with Morgenthau has to do with his 
distinctive view on man’s radical freedom, which is the basis of both human dignity and 
human misery.904 Niebuhr defines both from the perspective of love. The dignity of the 
human person (the fact that the self is defined by the law of love) and the misery of the 
human person (the self in its self-love is in violation of the law of love) gives a meaning 
to justice and evil which goes far beyond the common political realist understanding.905 
Daniel Rice discusses the differences between Morgenthau and Niebuhr with respect to 
power and national interest. Niebuhr and Morgenthau differ about the way in which 
love and power are related in human nature. Morgenthau ends up more pessimistic than 
Niebuhr about ‘the important residual creative factor in human rationality’ that could 
be a source for justice, understood as love making its way in the world.906 
With respect to national interest, Niebuhr is critical of realists such as Morgenthau 
who argue that the national interest is a moral end in itself. Niebuhr not only denies this. 
He is also worried that nations would be inclined to define their interests too narrowly 
and that they would sacrifice the mutual interests they have with others. Niebuhr tries 
to show how a Christian understanding could widen the vision of realists to provide a 
more humane basis for American policy. Therefore, he stresses the need to find areas 
where values that transcend the self-interest could intersect with the national interest.907 
Niebuhr’s basic critique is that Morgenthau holds a too narrow view of the nation and 
overlooks the ‘important residual creative factor in human rationality’.908 Niebuhr then 
argues for the superiority of Augustine:
Modern realists know the power of collective self-interest as Augustine did (…) they do not 
understand its blindness. Modern pragmatists understood the irrelevance of fixed and detailed 






907 Ibid., 277, 278. In Chapter 5, I maintain that Morgenthau argued for the morality of the national interest, but I doubt 
whether Rice does justice to Morgenthau by stating that he sees the national interest as a moral end in itself.
908 Ibid., 280.
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norms; but they do not understand that love must take the place as the final norm of these 
inadequate norms. Modern liberal Christians know that love is the final norm for man; but they 
fall into sentimentality because they fail to measure power and persistence of self-love.909
Niebuhr believes that justice must be the instrument of the command to love and that 
this deepens and enhances a realist approach to international and domestic politics.910 
While Morgenthau’s realism is tragic, Niebuhr goes beyond tragedy because he 
holds a Christian view of grace.911 Epp makes the same observation. He confronts 
Morgenthau’s statement that ‘to know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, 
and to act nevertheless, is moral courage’ with Niebuhr’s contention that ‘despair was 
the fate of those realists who knew something about sin, but nothing of redemption’.912
That Niebuhr sees more room for creative forces than many of his realist friends is 
also the point that Bettina Dahl Soendergaard makes. She explores this in an article in 
which she compares Augustine to Morgenthau. She concludes that Augustine believes 
that man is not completely corrupted. According to Augustine man’s nature was only 
damaged in the fall, while Morgenthau believes that man is completely corrupted. 
Soendergaard sees similarities to the discussion between the Catholic Church and the 
Protestants during the Reformation. Martin Luther (1483-1546) believed that converted 
man was declared righteous, while he was still a sinner; the Catholic Church believed 
that converted man is inspired by God with a good will which slowly drives out evil.913 
Morgenthau and Augustine agree with each other that man does not reach perfection 
in this life. Consequently, good people can be in conflict with other good people. 
Therefore, it is impossible to improve the nature of international politics. However, the 
difference is that Augustine seems to be a little more optimistic about the possibility to 
improve or heal the human person. Soendergaard argues that this leads to a different 
approach to state leaders. She states that Augustine believes that state leaders have a moral 
purpose, while Morgenthau believes that the consequences of man’s nature can only be 
counterbalanced.914 Although Soendergaard’s interpretation of Morgenthau is too one-
sided, she makes a convincing argument that Augustine has higher moral expectations 
than Morgenthau does.915 This also appears from her discussion of Morgenthau and 
Augustine’s views on war and the possibility of peace. Morgenthau would argue that one 
909 Ibid., 280. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953) 146.
910 Ibid., 280.
911 Ibid., 270.
912 Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, 19.
913 Soendergaard, The Political Realism of Augustine and Morgenthau, 8.
914 Ibid., 8. I believe that Soendergaard interprets Morgenthau too negative here. As she sets out later herself, Morgenthau 
does not discard the moral purpose, but thinks it has to be subjected to the political criterion. For that reason, I do not 
agree with Soendergaard’s critique on Murray that he reads Morgenthau as someone who applies moral standards to the 
national interest, because I side with Murray here. Ibid., 9.
915 Ibid., 10, 11. In this article, Soendergaard illustrates her point also with respect to Morgenthau and Augustine’s view 
on war.
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cannot change the world by confronting it with an abstract ideal. Augustine confronts 
the earthly peace with the ideal of the unattainable peace of God. Augustine believes 
that earthly peace can be moved towards God’s peace. He also emphasized that it is 
important that Christians participate in politics because they know, through faith, about 
God’s peace.916 Epp argues that Augustine thought that the love of God (caritas) can 
infuse social structures and transform them away from the opposite pole of self-love 
(cupiditas). This means that those in positions of political responsibility will use fatal 
force and power to maintain order and administer justice. What truly matters, however, 
is their inward disposition. The real evil in war is love of violence, since violence and war 
remain ‘so horrible, so ruthless’ even when they are just.917
According to Willem Boerma, Niebuhr is more optimistic than his fellow realists, 
such as Morgenthau, but he is more negative than Augustine. He also ascribes this to 
the fact that Augustine holds a Catholic view, while Niebuhr tends to think more like 
a Protestant. Niebuhr finds Augustine too optimistic about human beings, because he 
denies the seriousness of an ongoing struggle against sin.918 
The differences between Augustine, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau are striking. Where 
does this come from? Epp concludes that the use of the word love by realists ‘may 
be indicative of the relative emphasis of those who intersected the [Augustinian, SP] 
tradition from the domain of theology instead of politics and international relations’.919 
In that case, it matters whether someone interprets Augustine as a theologian or a 
political philosopher. That might explain why Morgenthau differs from Niebuhr and 
Augustine and why Niebuhr disagrees with Augustine to a certain extent. In both cases, 
however, it is anthropology and Christian theology that makes theorizing different to 
a certain degree. A theory of international relations and religion should not only be 
explicit about the kind of political theology it adheres to, but should also be open to 
discuss the content of its political theology. Theologians have thought about many issues 
that are crucial for political philosophy for centuries and their ideas are also developing 
over the years. Neglecting the wisdom of a discipline once called ‘the queen of the 
sciences’ would be unwise and unnecessary. 
916 Ibid., 13.
917 Epp, The Augustinian Moment in International Politics, 5.
918 Boerma, Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), 1449, 1450. Skillen, a philosopher in the tradition of the Amsterdam School, 
makes a distinction between a biblical, classical a Greek and a Roman Stoic approach. He calls Morgenthau’s realism an 
‘agnostic secularized Augustinianism’. Skillen, Unity and Diversity Among States. A Critique of Assumptions in the Study of 
International Relations, 18, 22. Kamminga nicely describes the difference between a pessimistic Protestant and a more 
optimistic Roman approach in combating climate change through carbon commodification. He points out which religious 
or theological ideas about human nature, progress, the role of the market and government are involved and decisive. His 
conclusion is that political realism is more Protestant than Roman in its orientation. Menno R. Kamminga, “The Protestant 
Dimension of the Ethical Critique of Carbon Commodification,” in Christian Faith, Philosophy & International Relations: 
The Lamb and the Wolf, eds. Simon Polinder and Govert J. Buijs (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 266, 276, 277.
919 Epp, Power Politics and the Civitas Terrena, 286.
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Conclusion
This chapter has drawn up the balance of the harvest from Part I and II. I mainly looked 
at the contributions of both the religionists and the political realists regarding their 
thoughts on religion and international relations. Many of the contributions from the 
religionists are critical of existing IR theory and a lot of this criticism is unfounded. I 
have tried to find out what kind of theory they would like to see instead. Surprisingly, 
they agree with a lot of what the political realists had to say. I brought this together in a 
schematic overview where I indicate their input on a level by level basis. 
Then, I listed the different contributions of both parties and their strengths and 
weaknesses. Also, the debate between the political realists and the proponents of the 
religious paradigm has shown that there is confusion regarding several problems that do 
play a role in the debate. What exactly is the subject of the study? What do people expect 
of science and political theories? What underlying worldview or political-theological 
preferences play a role in theorizing about religion and international relations? I have 
also indicated what are possible solutions to these problems that hinder the discussion. 
In response to that, I will argue in the next chapter that the NPA of the Amsterdam 
School offers promising leads. 
Chapter 10
A New Christian Realism: The 
Normative Practice Approach as a 
Promising Perspective
Introduction
This dissertation began with the question raised by Thomas.
Does religion need to be brought into the existing concepts, theories, or paradigms of international 
relations or are new ones required? A more disquieting suggestion is that what is required is a new 
concept of theory and what it is supposed to do in international relations.920 
I have explored various dimensions of this question by reconstructing the religionist 
position in Part I, by assessing the validity of their criticism in Part II. In the previous 
chapter, I have summarized, evaluated and diagnosed the discussion between the 
religionists on the one hand and the political realists on the other hand. In this chapter, 
I would like to present an answer to the third sub-question: to what extent could a so-
called practice approach do justice to the challenge of the adherents of studying religion 
in IR, while at the same time upholding insights of the realist school? By combining 
these various perspectives it becomes possible to develop the contours of a new Christian 
realism. This new Christian realism accepts the wisdom of the political realist tradition 
and the theoretical insights of neorealism, but it is critical of the rigidity of neorealism. It 
stands in the tradition of Morgenthau’s classical realism and Waltz’s neorealism, because 
it takes the demand for theory seriously. It is called a Christian realism, because it is in 
line with the worldview of Christian realism and the Amsterdam School. 
I will start this chapter arguing why the NPA meets many of the problems that I 
addressed in the previous chapter and that it is able to combine the strengths of both 
920 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 12.
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positions and overcome their weaknesses. The approach I sketch below is not intended 
to replace existing theories, but it shows how different approaches can be regarded as a 
single theoretical whole. The next steps are that I will set out the NPA and apply it to 
the discussion on religion and international relations. I have entitled this application a 
tentative proposal. It is no less and no more than that.
10.1. A Turn to Practice Theory in International Relations 
Working with the NPA comes at a good time, since practice theory has become a topic 
in International Relations since a few decades. This attention is not completely new, 
because elements of it were there for a longer period of time. An article from 2017 
states that many studies and approaches, like constructivism and postpositivism and 
critical theory, can be said to assume the same themes as practice theory.921 International 
Practice Theory (IPT) has now become an official term and field in IR. IPT is not a well-
defined approach, but represents a wide variety of approaches and themes. It offers an 
analytical framework to further the dialogue and exchange of different views on religion 
and international relations. 
Practice turners celebrate pluralism within PT and IR. For Adler and Pouliot, “taking international 
practices seriously leads not to synthesis but to dialogue. Instead of interparadigmatic competition, 
subsumption, or even complementarity, the concept of practice promises cross-fertilization.” For 
Bueger and Gadinger, the trading zone metaphor provides an analytical framework to think about 
PT without downplaying the important disagreements about core issues that practice theorists 
have. In the trading zone, “IR practitioners might continue to fundamentally disagree over the 
meaning of core concepts”. The pragmatic epistemology (…) provides a space for dialogue, 
eclecticism, exchange of different views, and cross-fertilization – not synthesis.922
However, as it stands now, IPT does not pay much attention to religion.923 For that 
reason, I think that the practice perspective of the Amsterdam School can enrich IPT. 
The Amsterdam School in general and the NPA in particular has a sensitivity and 
attention for the role of religion in practices. Secondly, the NPA does not necessarily 
share the critical ontological and epistemological starting points of practice theory, 
which would make it more acceptable to classical realist or neorealist IR-scholars.924  
Thirdly, the NPA recognizes the reality that people will always tend to reach insights 
based on a theory that can direct their actions. NPA does not claim to provide a theory 
that is non-prescriptive as Waltz does. It is quite the opposite, the NPA was originally 
921 Jérémie Cornut, “The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2,3.
922 Ibid., 12.
923 Cecelia Lynch, “Why ‘Practice Theory’ Should ‘Get Religion’,” International Studies Quarterly (2017): 16, 17.
924 Cornut, The Practice Turn, 13.
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developed to direct actions and to properly balance between norms which are leading, 
supporting or conditioning. It is therefore more like a theory in line with Morgenthau 
than with Waltz, and can help government leaders and other actors in international 
affairs to direct their policies and decisions. It wants to bridge the gap between theorizing 
on international relations and the practice of international relations.925 It can therefore 
also contribute to a lot of religionist literature that is mainly targeted at the relevance of 
religion for international policy.
Fourthly, the NPA is both normative and descriptive (or empirical).926 It is normative 
in the sense that it recognizes that theorizing is not neutral but inspired and regulated by 
worldview presuppositions. The NPA is open about this and does not have to translate 
a theological anthropology to a more scientifically philosophical explanation of human 
behavior like Waltz and Morgenthau. The NPA also does not have to hide a political 
theology, because it holds a Christian view of the human condition which can be in 
dialogue with those with other worldview presuppositions. The NPA is descriptive 
or empirical, because it continuously engages with the empirical and factual states of 
affairs.927
Fifthly, I have shown how important pre-scientific and worldview convictions 
are in the theorizing of the political realists and the religionists. Involving worldview 
assumptions makes the NPA open to critical theory. An example of a critical notion is that 
the religionists blame the so-called secularism of IR theory for wrongfully marginalizing 
and ignoring religious groups.928 Because of the involvement of worldviews, NPA comes 
close to what Bech and Snyder suggested, namely that a theory is needed that is able to 
comprehend the interaction and interpenetration between the religious realm and the 
realism of temporal power.929 However, that does not mean that the NPA abandons the 
claim of science in the sense of objectivity. It assumes that the normativity it perceives 
is also recognizable by others, in the same way that Morgenthau thought that the 
rationality of certain realms can be discovered by others. This rationality can be the basis 
for a theory, but not in terms of causality. It does not allow to predict certain outcomes 
though it helps to grasp the multiple forces that produce specific outcomes.930 This 
rationality does have to pass the empirical test, and must be applied dependent on time 
and place. NPA also thinks that scientific distance and objectivity can be reached better 
due to her awareness of her normative starting points. 
Sixthly, the NPA is aware that the prescriptive part of the theory is based on the 
descriptive parts, but that these are two distinct matters. In that sense, the NPA can also 
be of service to scholars that want to view the world from a distance and do not wish to 
925 Cf. Ibid., 20.
926 Chaplin, Reformational Insights, 44-47.
927 Ibid., 44.
928 Cornut, The Practice Turn, 20, 21.
929 Bech and Snyder, Religion’s Contribution, 207.
930 Cornut, The Practice Turn, 8.
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work on direct applications. Practice theory is ‘an approach that provides new tools with 
which to think about international politics’.931 That also explains why practice theory 
is linked by some to constructivism and critical analysis. Others see connections with 
realism, neoclassical realism, and the English school or poststructuralism.932 
Seventhly, the NPA offers the possibility to overcome the so-called structure-agency 
problem, and the levels of analysis problem from IR theory, because it offers both an 
analysis of the structures and of the acting actors.933 Waltz makes a clear distinction 
between the actors, the states, and the structure of the system. He is of the opinion that 
this requires two different theories: one to explain the actions of the actor from within 
and one to explain the acting of the actors from the perspective of the system. With the 
NPA, it is possible to integrate both which makes it more compelling (although it may 
perhaps lead to a loss of explanatory power). My criticism of Waltz is that his theory 
explains a few things and leaves many issues out and therefore loses the connection to 
daily experience (a critical requirement from the Amsterdam School). Waltz’s theory 
can, therefore, barely be used to develop good policies and to find out how to act in 
international politics. That does not mean Waltz’s contribution is irrelevant. Elshtain, 
who calls herself fortunate to have been his student, writes that Waltz forces  
to ask the right sorts of questions, and to be clearheaded throughout. The criticisms one makes of 
his ‘levels of analysis’ show just how indebted one is to his work in the first place. As a critical tool 
helping us to weed out all sorts of nonsense, Waltz remains enormously relevant.934 
The theoretical insights of Waltz’s neorealism on the rationality of the international 
political domain can be integrated in the NPA with Morgenthau’s search for practical 
wisdom for the state leaders and the ‘hidden’ virtuosity that Waltz expects from states to 
prevent anarchy.935 In other words, the NPA tries to combine scientific, rational insight, 
also called the ‘high grounds’ in some practice literature, and the ‘swampy lowlands’, the 
concrete situations in which policymakers, state leaders, and diplomats have to make 
day-to-day decisions.936 The NPA joins Morgenthau’s ideal-typical manner of theorizing 
in which different realms are distinguished from one another. At the same time, the 
NPA does not join Waltz’s, and to a lesser degree Morgenthau’s, reductionism that 




934 Elshtain, Woman, the State, and War, 302.
935 Skillen also appreciates Morgenthau’s emphasis on practical political knowledge Skillen, Unity and Diversity Among 
States. A Critique of Assumptions in the Study of International Relations, 32.
936 Buijs and Polinder, Christian Philosophical Reflections and Shalom-Searching Wisdom, 321, 322. The distinction 
between high grounds and lowlands comes from Donald A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in 
Action (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1991).
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Finally, it is important that the NPA looks at the many different contexts in which 
practices occur. This is important, because the context of the practice of international 
relations can vary a lot, and that is especially relevant in relation to religion. Religion has 
a different role regarding politics in different contexts.937
10.2. Integrating Religion in International Relations: A Tentative Proposal
So far, I have discussed the advantages offered by the NPA in more abstract terms. In 
this part, I will set out what the NPA is about and make a first proposal for a practice 
approach on religion and international relations.938 That gives an impression of the 
possibilities offered by the NPA in the debate on religion and international relations. 
Applying the NPA also requires making choices. As this is a first proposal, there is of 
course room for discussion, which I hope this will lead to. For now, it is my purpose to 
show that the NPA can play a heuristic and connecting role. It is not my intention here 
to present an exhaustive application of the NPA. That would require further study. 
The NPA has originally been developed by the philosophers Glas and Jochemsen for 
the practice of medicine. Later on, Henk Jochemsen and political philosopher Buijs also 
applied this approach to development cooperation.939 Recently, the NPA has been further 
developed and applied to various other domains, such as international cooperation 
in development, modern military operations, food systems, education, management, 
corporate communication and security networks.940 The NPA combines the idea of a 
social practice as developed by Alasdair MacIntyre with the philosophy of Dooyeweerd. 
An important question that characterizes this approach is: what qualifies a certain 
activity as a type of practice? For example, what qualifies medicine and development 
cooperation as such? Is it possible to distinguish those spheres from other domains, 
and if so, what makes the difference, or in MacIntyre’s words, what characterizes this 
practice? To answer that question, it is important to know how MacIntyre defines a 
practice: 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
937 Toft, Philpott, and Shah have indicated that it is important to look at two things to identify the role of religion in a 
certain context, namely the institutional relation between religion and politics and the political theology at play Toft, 
Philpott and Shah, God’s Century, 20-47.
938 Parts of this have been published elsewhere Polinder, Practice-Based Theory, 263-282.
939 H. Jochemsen and G. Glas, Verantwoord medisch handelen. Proeve van een christelijke medische ethiek (Amsterdam: 
Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1997), 64–99. Jan Hoogland is co-author of the chapter I am referring to. Govert J. 
Buijs and H. Jochemsen, “Op weg naar een herijkt ontwikkelingsbegrip,” in Als de olifanten vechten...: Denken over 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking vanuit christelijk perspectief, ed. Govert J. Buijs (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 2001), 
298–319; Corné J. Rademaker and Henk Jochemsen, “Beyond Modernization: Development Cooperation as Normative 
Practice,” Philosophia Reformata 83, no. 1 (2018): 111-139.
940 Vries and Jochemsen, The Normative Nature of Social Practices and Ethics in Professional Environments.
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with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended.941 
This definition speaks about human activities that are socially established. These human 
activities are often part of institutions and consist of socially established patterns of 
actions. Human beings have to be initiated in this practice so that they understand 
the goal of that pattern and the rules that pertain to it.942 In this definition, MacIntyre 
makes a distinction between internal goods and external goods. The latter are goods that 
are contingently attached to the practice by the accidents of social circumstances, such 
as prestige, status, and money. Conversely, internal goods can only be acquired through 
participation in the practice for its own sake. Such goods can only be recognized by 
people who are trained in the practice and possess the virtues that are required to do 
the practice well.943 Unlike MacIntyre, Jochemsen and Glas do not find the distinction 
between external and internal goods particularly clear or useful and prefer to speak 
of the aim or destiny of a practice, or its telos. They argue, a practice has a telos that 
determines how it unfolds. For example, although someone can play soccer to achieve 
financial gain, the game itself always forces the player to play well and win the game 
based on a good soccer strategy and the skills needed to play well.944 
Another element of MacIntyre’s definition is the concept of standards of excellence. 
These are the rules that people have to follow in order to realize the telos of the practice. 
These rules can be explicit or implicit, such as so-called tacit knowledge. Glas and 
Jochemsen call these rules constitutive because they define and limit the practice. The 
more adequately they are applied the better its telos will be realized.945
Constitutive rules differ from regulative rules. Constitutive rules facilitate the 
realization of the telos. The interpretation and application of the constitutive rules 
depend on the regulative rules of the human person involved, because the way people 
act in concrete situations depends on their worldview. In other words, the constitutive 
rules determine the structure of the practice, whereas the regulative rules determine the 
direction of its development. A practice can only be realized when it is guided by a point 
of reference that is based on an idea of the broader meaning and coherence of human 
actions. This idea regulates the performance and unfolding of the practice.946 It is here 
that the worldview of the participants of the practice comes into play. 
941 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2003), 187.
942 Jochemsen and Glas, Verantwoord medisch handelen, 67.
943 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 188.




    Figure 10.1. Overview different sides and norms
Jochemsen and Glas divide the constitutive side in three types of rules: qualifying, 
conditioning, and foundational (Figure 10.1).947 It is at this point that, next to 
MacIntyre, the philosophy of Dooyeweerd becomes relevant. Dooyeweerd’s theory of 
modal aspects is based upon the idea that everything which is part of reality functions 
in various aspects or modalities of experience such as the social, economic, or juridical, 
whereby each aspect of reality has its own most characteristic rules or norms.948 For 
example, according to Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects, it is impossible to reduce 
the economic aspect to the social or juridical aspect because each aspect has its own 
normativity and rules that are relevant in that sphere. For the economic aspect the norm 
is, for example, frugality. A company can only function properly when it considers 
the costs of every product, so it cannot be run like a social enterprise or a charity. 
Because of the multiple normativity, Dooyeweerd’s theory is very critical about forms of 
reductionism and it invites scholars to reflect on the variety of different norms that play 
a role in various practices.  
Additionally, for each thing or entity in reality, not all rules and aspects are equally 
relevant. Rules that belong to the qualifying aspect which define the telos of a specific 
practice are most important. The foundational aspect indicates on which rules the 
947 Ibid., 76.
948 Jochemsen and Glas use the philosophy of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd here. Dooyeweerd 
distinguishes fifteen irreducible aspects, modalities or ways of being which are ontological structures that determine 
how things exist and how can experience them. Many of the aspects agree with the various practices that MacIntyre 
distinguishes. The aspects stand in a successive order and they presuppose each other. All aspects have a governing kernel. 
Over time, these kernels have been debated so the list that follows is open to changes. Natural side of reality: numerical 
(discrete quantity), spatial (continuous extension), kinematic (movement), physical (energy), biotic (life), and psychical 
(feeling, emotion). Cultural side of reality: logical (analytical distinction), historical (mastery, control), lingual (meaning, 
symbolic signification), social (interaction), economic (frugality), aesthetic (harmony), juridical (retribution), ethical 
(moral, love), and pistical (certitude).
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practice is based. The remaining aspects are conditional, meaning that they condition or 
shape the development of a practice indirectly.949 
To illustrate the relationship between the qualifying, foundational and conditioning 
aspects, I will use an example of Jan Hoogland. He uses the medical practice to make his 
point. The medical practice has as its telos to care for – and possible cure – sick, wounded 
or handicapped people. That is the core function of the practice and this practice is 
qualified by the ethical aspect. The practice of medicine, however, can only function 
properly if it has, among other things, a sustainable financial basis. In other words, 
the economic aspect is of great importance too, because it conditions or facilitates the 
functioning of the medicine practice. Since all practices are forms of ‘cooperative human 
activities’, they must be seen as founded in the formative aspects. It means that the 
practice involves historical and technical phenomena, such as documents, techniques, 
computers, methods of working and functioning, task descriptions, etc. These features 
belong to the practice and are an integral part of it. Distinguishing between the various 
aspects makes it possible to see how the various aspects can be of service to the qualifying 
function. A good practice always requires a balanced attention to the diversity of norms 
that are at stake. This is called the simultaneous realization of norms.950 
In my application of the NPA, I will use the model Corné Rademaker developed 
with respect to the practice of development cooperation: a field of study which is close to 
the field of international relations. Rademaker developed a model in which he illustrates 
the relationship between the context of the practice, the regulative and the constitutive 
side (see Figure 10.2).951 In the next section, I will explore what each side is about with 
respect to the international relations practice and the role of religion. I will start to 
discuss the context of the practice of international relations. I situate the role of religious 
actors in a context of power politics and a domain dominated by the state. In the next 
section, I introduce the constitutive side of the practice and its qualifying, conditional 
and foundational rules. In that section, I pay attention to the presence and relevance of 
ultimate concerns and the role of worldviews in the practice of international relations. 
After discussing the aspects of the constitutive side, I move to the regulative side and 
here I explicitly draw attention to the (religious) worldviews that the professionals of the 
international relations practice bring in.
949 Ibid., 73-75.
950 Jan Hoogland, “Positioning the Normative Practice Approach,” in The Normative Nature of Social Practices and Ethics 
in Professional Environments, eds. Marc J. de Vries and H. Jochemsen (Hershey: IGI Global, 2019), 47.
951 Corné J. Rademaker, Practices Makes Improvement. A Contribution of the Normative Practice Approach to an Ethics of 
International Development Cooperation in the Agro-Food Domain (PhD thesis, Wageningen University,  the Netherlands, 
2020) 131. I have adapted this model a little bit with permission.
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     Figure 10.2. Normative practices have a structural side (circle),  
     a regulative side (circular arrow) and a contextual side (outer square).
10.2.1. Context of  the Practice: Religious Actors Among the Power Politics 
of  States
Now I have set out what are various terms and concepts of NPA, the question is how 
this will work out with respect to the topic religion and international relations. To clarify 
this, it is necessary to know the environment of the practice of international relations. 
In other words, what is the context of the practice of international relations? Before I 
move on to that, an important question is what the object of the study is: is the object 
religion or international relations? I focus on the object international relations. After 
all, the religionists criticize IR theories for their exclusion of religion. Also, the political 
realists Morgenthau and Waltz refer to international relations as their object of research. 
I want to continue this line. 
That means that choices need to be made, which is where theory comes in. It is 
necessary and unavoidable. Necessary because it tells which facts of the world around 
are relevant. Without a theory, scholars will be swimming in information and data. 
Theory is also unavoidable, because each scholar approaches his or her object of study 
from a particular point of view, perspective or paradigm.952 Morgenthau’s classical 
952 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3.
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realism is about foreign policy, while Waltz limits himself to international relations, or 
more specifically, international politics. With the NPA it is possible to overcome this 
opposition between Waltz and Morgenthau. Also, it is possible to combine the insights 
of Waltz’s neorealism with that of Morgenthau and the religionists’ regarding the role of 
religion in the world.
The object of study is international relations. At the start, I defined that as ‘[T]
he total of political, social, economic, cultural and other interactions among states 
(and even non-state actors)’.953 As this definition shows, there are various interactions 
possible between states and non-state actors, such as military, cultural, and religious. In 
other words, international relations is a practice itself, but also consists of various other 
practices, such as economic, political, cultural and religious practices. It is my aim to 
provide a framework which recognizes the variety of practices, but which main focus is 
the practice of international relations. But what makes international relations a practice? 
The answer is that it is international: it is a domain in which states, and non-state 
actors operate by crossing borders. States and non-state actors participate in a domain 
in which a supranational authority is missing with enforcing power that can regulate the 
relations between states and non-state actors. That is a huge difference with the national 
domain. When cultural, religious or political actors act within a nation-state, they are 
always subjected to and protected by the authority of the state. The moment these 
actors cross borders and enter the so-called international domain, they cannot rely on 
an authority similar to the state on a national level. The question in this chapter is how 
we can theorize about the domain of international relations and whether religion helps 
with this. That means that we have to know what this domain is about. 
As I said, on the national level, there is often an institution that can act in a mediating 
or enforcing manner. As soon as relations become supranational, however, only treaties 
or intergovernmental institutions can exert influence, but the fundamental difference 
with domestic relations remains that there is no enforcing power. Even the UN Security 
Council cannot be regarded as such, because its enforcing power is often dependent on the 
power configurations of the participating states. That illustrates the point of the political 
realists that the domain of international relations is strongly characterized by its political 
character. That is why in IR theory the domain of international relations is described as a 
situation of anarchy. As Waltz argues, the result of anarchy is that states are in a situation 
of self-help because there are no other states to rely upon for their survival. The fact 
that international relations are characterized by anarchy leading to a self-help situation 
wherein the relative power situation counts makes it plausible to understand international 
relations in the first place as international politics. Unsurprisingly, international politics 
is one of the most important sub-fields in International Relations.954 This is a huge 
step, but it is a necessary step to make the international realm understandable. States, 
953 Ibid., 483.
954 Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary, 274.
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and non-state actors, are very much dependent on the power they have if they want to 
accomplish something in the international domain.955  
So far, I have characterized the international relations practice as international 
politics. I also mentioned the main actors, namely state and non-state actors. But 
how are these actors related and what about the professionals of the practice? Since 
the NPA is an approach that aims at the professionals that shape the practice, I will 
discuss the role of professionals like state leaders and politicians when dealing with the 
regulative side of the practice. For now, I would like to draw attention to the context 
of the international relations practice and the relevant institutions through which the 
professional participates. Since this is a tentative proposal and the focus is on religion 
in international relations, I do not provide an overview of all other possible relevant 
non-religious institutions. I explicitly use the term institution, because it is a much 
broader term and includes states as well as non-governmental actors and international 
organizations.956 These institutions limit and enable people to act, but cannot be 
equated to what people do. Within the Amsterdam School it has been acknowledged 
that institutions have a Janus face. They can contribute to human flourishing, because 
institutions moderate and soften the capriciousness of individual actors. Institutions 
facilitate and encourage human cooperation (cf. liberal institutionalism). They can serve 
as a basis for trust within and between societies and contribute to ‘chaos reduction’. 
This comes close to what I earlier on, in the chapter on Morgenthau, referred to as 
the katechontic role of states. Finally, they can be learning environments for new 
generations that enter the practice of international relations. However, institutions also 
have negative sides, because they can become self-indulgent or egoistic or even amoral: 
refusing to accept higher moral principles or rules.957 
As the religionists point out, the fact that religious institutions are often organized 
globally or transnationally and that they have their own infrastructure and authority 
structures gives them a certain level of independence and power to influence the 
international domain. The question is how much they matter and how they are related 
to the power politics dynamic.  
Wendt attempts to answer this question. He points at the importance of culture and 
the influence that is exerted on the type of anarchy that arises.958 Wendt distinguishes 
between three cultures of anarchy: a Hobbesian, Lockean and a Kantian. Each of 
the cultures are characterized by a certain structure describing the shared ideas and 
955 Fred Halliday, “The Romance of Non-State Actors,” in Non-State Actors in World Politics, eds. Daphné Josselin and 
William Wallace (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 21-37.
956 Chaplin, Reformational Insights, 53, 54.
957 Buijs and Polinder, Christian Philosophical Reflections and Shalom-Searching Wisdom, 318.
958 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 249-251. For a more extensive description of the three cultures of 
anarchy. Ibid., 259-308. Wendt makes a distinction between society and culture. Society implies cooperation, while 
culture consist of shared knowledge. While shared knowledge is analytically neutral to cooperation and conflict, society 
is based on cooperation. Ibid., 253.
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configuring the positions of the subjects. The subject position in a Hobbesian culture 
is enemy, in a Lockean culture it is rival and in Kantian culture it is friend or allies. 
Enemies observe no limits toward each other. Rivals are competitors who will use 
violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other. Friends are allies 
who do not use violence to settle their disputes and they works together as teams against 
security threats.959 The three cultures of anarchy can vary in the extent to which they 
internalize the culture of anarchy. This means that a Hobbesian logic can be generated 
by deeply shared ideas and Kantian logics by only weakly shared ones.960 Unfortunately, 
Wendt wrote nothing on the role of religion, but it is not difficult to imagine the 
perspective of the religionists’ empirical stance that religion can influence the political 
situation characterised by anarchy through culture. Thomas, for example, has pointed 
out how the early English School drew attention to the role of culture and religion in 
international society.961 The question remains how large the influence of religion in 
each of the cultures of anarchy is and if it possible to speak about a social practice – as 
MacIntyre sees it – in case of a Hobbesian culture.962
The religionists have extensively drawn attention to the various actors that are 
present in the international domain (Chapter 2). Religious non-state actors not only 
shape the international relation practice, but they also participate in their own practices. 
Each of these practices has its own qualifying aspect. Churches, for example have as their 
qualifying aspect the pistic, but as Rademaker argues, non-governmental organizations 
(in which we can include faith-based organizations) are qualified by the ethical aspect 
which has as its core value solidarity.963 In other words, there are differences between 
religious actors. That explains why many non-governmental organizations sometimes 
closely work together with governments, while religious organizations as churches, 
mosques, synagogues or temples do not.  
Since the object of study is the practice of international relations, the question is to 
what extent religious actors influence the practice of international relations. Morgenthau 
and Waltz, and the religionists differ on this point. For Morgenthau and Waltz the 
state is the central actor. The religionists criticize this and argue that individuals, 
especially when they unite themselves through, for example, transnational religious 
organizations, play an important role as well. It is worth it to let Wendt talk on this 
topic, because he unites both views to a certain extent. Wendt sees the state as a central 
actor in international politics. He also acknowledges that a transnational community is 
developing. This transnational community is, however, more a community of financial 
959 Ibid., 257, 258.
960 Ibid., 254. Wendt makes a distinction between three degrees of internalization which are respectively based on force, 
self-interest and legitimacy. Ibid., 268-273.
961 Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 94, 152-154.
962 Wendt considers Hobbessian cultures as social ‘insofar as they are based on representations of the Other in terms of 
which the posture of the Self is defined’. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 260.
963 Rademaker, Practices Makes Improvement, 144.
325
capital and states than of people. Wendt does not think that globalization will lead to a 
cosmopolitan democracy consisting of individuals. He thinks that it will be a democracy 
of states which is more international than cosmopolitan.964 For Wendt, states are still the 
primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence 
are channeled into the world system.965  
Wendt’s reasoning can be used as a starting point. Non-state actors, also religious 
ones, play a role in international relations, but they eventually need states to influence 
international relations. As Troy argues, non-state actors do not operate in a vacuum.966 
As a consequence, the transnational level pointed at by the religionists is important, 
but it eventually comes down to what states do. So why not limit a theory to inter-state 
behavior? The behavior of states cannot be understood if the influence of transnational 
actors and non-state actors (Part I) is not included. In other words, we need to include 
the first and second image of Waltz to understand how states shape the international 
domain. States are not billiard balls or black boxes, but – as Wendt states – they have 
intentionality: ‘states are people too’.967 According to Wendt, the state has identities and 
interests whereby the second are not reducible to the first, because identities are about 
who and what actors are and interests are about what actors want.968 Wendt accepts that 
states are constituted by the international structure, but they are forming their interests 
and identities by interacting socially with each other.969 With this argument, Wendt 
includes the first and second level which Waltz leaves out. As I said earlier, I think that 
is necessary to have a compelling theory. 
Although it is important to acknowledge that states have identities, interests and 
intentionality this does not mean that the state and heads of state can be equated. State 
leaders (regulative side) have their own responsibility with respect to the state (context) 
and the formation of practice of international relations (constitutive side). 
In short, the context of the international relations practice is one of power politics, 
rivalry and competition. The principal actors of this practice are states and non-state 
actors. To the extent that states form intergovernmental organizations, these institutions 
also belong to the practice. Professionals participate in the practice of international 
relations through institutions and this way they facilitate the development of the 
international relations practice. The effectiveness of these practitioners largely depends 
964 Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it, 424; Alexander Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change in International 
Politics,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 48; Alexander Wendt, “A Comment on Held’s Cosmopolitanism,” in Democracy’s Edges, 
eds. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 127, 129, 132.
965 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 9, 243.
966 Jodok Troy, Christian Approaches to International Affairs (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 49. Troy argues that the same applies to the growth of the concept of soft power in comparison to 
hard power, because it is still related to the state. Ibid., 42.
967 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 194.
968 Ibid., 231.
969 Ibid., 243, 244, 245.
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on the extent to which they are able to exercise or influence the power configuration. 
That does not mean that power is the end, it is a means to strive for something else. For 
that reason, it is important, as the NPA does, to seek what the calling or moral purpose 
or telos is of the practice of international relations.970 That is the question I will address 
in the next section.
10.2.2. Constitutive Side of  the Practice: Power, Justice and (Religious) 
Worldviews
I have argued that the context of the international relations practice is largely shaped 
by states and non-state actors which cannot do without power politics. What are the 
qualifying, foundational, and conditional rules of this international relations practice 
and what is its telos? 
It is on this point that Dooyeweerd and Waltz differ. As Waltz has made clear, 
justice and right are the aims of power in national politics. In international politics 
bloody conflicts tend to be decided by might only and not so much by right. On a 
national level, the force of government is exercised in the name of right and justice. 
On the international level there are no relations of authority and thus force is used to 
guarantee the survival of the state itself.971 Morgenthau argues that national survival is 
a moral principle given the circumstances of international politics and the absence of 
a supranational government.972 In Waltz’s thought, the goal of the political would be 
survival because, as he states: 
Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the 
ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. Survival is the prerequisite to 
achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting the own disappearance 
as political entities.973
One could object that the aim of states does not have to be the same as the telos of 
international relations as a practice. That is also the argument that Dooyeweerd makes. 
He acknowledges that the international realm differs from domestic politics. When 
discussing the United Nations, he calls it a voluntary association of individual states, 
qualifying the internal structure of it as an international public legal function and 
founding it in the historical international organization of power. Dooyeweerd contends 
that the United Nations’ structure is similar to that of the state in the sense that it aims 
at justice. Yet, it lacks the institutional character of the latter including the monopolistic 
use of armed force and a territory. He adds that the juridical qualified principle of 
970 Buijs and Polinder, Christian Philosophical Reflections and Shalom-Searching Wisdom, 318, 319.
971 Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary, 112.
972 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 12.
973 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91.
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international public interest does not have the compulsory trait of a government, which 
can eventually impose an order.974 He is aware of the fact that vital interests play a role in 
international relations. He writes that ‘during the whole history of the modern system 
of states since the Westphalian Peace until the Second World War no great power has 
been prepared to have questions of really vital interest withdrawn from its own sovereign 
final decision’.975 Dooyeweerd, however, does not draw the conclusion that the aim of 
international politics should be survival. In fact, he strongly rejects this notion:
The Christian view of the State must never capitulate to a naturalistic theory of the “raison d’État” 
elevating the “sacred egotism” of the States to a kind of natural law in international relations. 
Such a theory is intrinsically false and contrary to the individuality structure of the States as well 
as to the basic structures of the international order. The internal vital law of the body politic is 
not a law of nature but bears a normative character. A State can never justify an absolutely selfish 
international policy of the strong hand with an appeal to its vital interests. God has not given 
the States such a structure that, with a kind of natural necessity, they are compelled to carry on 
a Kain’s [sic] policy for the sake of self-preservation. Only a blind man does not see that the 
vital interests of the nations are in a great many ways mutually interwoven. It is not the political 
structure of national life but the sins of the nations that have caused the individualistic selfish 
power of the States to dominate international politics.976 
It is interesting to see how Dooyeweerd reasons in the same way as Niebuhr does.977 
He acknowledges that vital interests play a role, but does not accept that egoistic self-
interests are becoming the norm. He points at the mutually interwovenness of states and 
to the sins of the nations. In my own words, he does not accept that the selfish strive for 
power becomes seen as part of the structure of international relations. 
The difference between Dooyeweerd and Waltz might be the result of Waltz’s 
methodological agnosticism which does not allow for a religious or normative evaluation. 
Dooyeweerd’s religious worldview presupposes a reality created by God whereby human 
beings are responsible for the development of this reality in accordance with the purpose 
of this creation order.978 In sum, Waltz is correct that from a theoretical point, power 
is what explains the behavior of states best. It is also understandable that Dooyeweerd 
argues that the vital interest of states (‘sins of nations’) cannot have the final say in 
international politics. The desire for justice is something that generally matters to states 
and he considers that a good thing, also from a Christian point of view.
974 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. III and IV (Grand Rapids: Padeia Press, 1984), 600.
975 Ibid., 475.
976 Ibid., 476.
977 See Section 9.3.5.
978 Although there are striking similarities between constructivism and the views of the Amsterdam School, I do not discuss 
here any further to what extent the Amsterdam School agrees with a conventional, consistent or critical constructivist 
approach, or a combination of them, in international relations. 
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I think that the NPA should integrate the theoretical insights of the political realists 
Morgenthau and Waltz about the importance of power, and that states are striving for 
ideals and goals. It has to include justice as well as power, where justice is the qualifying 
function and power the foundational function of international politics.979 In this view, 
politics is the sphere where power and justice come together. The difference between 
the domestic and the international domains is that, in the latter justice is less relevant 
and significant from a theoretical point of view than power, although the former is not 
absent. In other words, it is a gradual and not a principal difference between the national 
and international domain. 
As Waltz has shown, the primary means by which states are able to survive in 
international relations is power. Dooyeweerd considers power to be the core value of the 
historical or formative aspect which means that this aspect is taken as the foundational 
aspect: it is primarily through the use of power that states are able to realize their security 
and survival. This power can have many forms, such as the techniques and skills that 
are used in international relations to execute power, like diplomacy, military power, 
building coalition and alliances, concluding treaties, etc.980  
10.2.3. The Conditioning Rules of  the International Relations Practice: Be-
liefs and Worldviews
The way in which the foundational and qualifying rules are successively used depends on 
the conditioning aspects which do not qualify, but enable, guide, and limit the enfolding 
of the practice.981 It is not helpful to explore all thirteen aspects that Dooyeweerd 
differentiates and relate them to international politics here. I just touch upon a couple 
to point to the relevance of the conditioning aspects. Economics does not qualify or 
ground international relations, but economic relations limit or enable the unfolding 
of the practice of international relations. Economic relations between states can create 
interdependence and reduce the willingness to use power or to go to war, though Waltz 
would probably say the opposite.982 Economic relations, however, differ from juridical 
relations, as established in very different branches of international law. Another aspect is 
the ethical or moral one. The core value of this aspect is love, or care, because people can 
979 One could also argue that there should be an extra aspect namely the political. However, what would be the rule or 
norm of that aspect? I consider it important to retain the tension between justice and power, because that is so typical 
for international politics. I know that Dooyeweerd did not distinguish a political aspect. However, as the physicist 
M.D. Stafleu has made clear in his article, this is not convincing. In his view, the state is qualified by the political aspect 
and founded in the social aspect. M. D. Stafleu, “On the Character of Social Communities, the State and the Public 
Domain,” Philosophia Reformata (2004). I differ from him on the latter point and found the state in the historical aspect.
980 See also, Hoogland, Positioning the Normative Practice Approach, 47; H. Jochemsen and Corné J. Rademaker, 
“International Cooperation in Development: The Need for a Multidimensional Normative Approach,” in The Normative 
Nature of Social Practices and Ethics in Professional Environments, eds. Marc J. de Vries and H. Jochemsen (Hershey: IGI 
Global, 2019), 263.
981 Jochemsen and Glas, Verantwoord medisch handelen, 83.
982 See Section 8.2.2.
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love their country and family members, and feel a moral obligation to people in need 
who live in other countries. Although ethics and morality play a role in international 
relations, they are not leading or foundational for international relations. It would not be 
workable if international relations would hold as its core function that everybody should 
love his or her neighbor, but that does not mean that this norm should be abolished; it 
still conditions the use of power. Dooyeweerd argues that:
It is an absolutely un-Christian thought that the commandment of temporal societal love of 
one’s fellowmen is not valid in international intercourse between the nations organized in States. 
International relations are also subject to the moral law: they cannot be ruled by a purely egotistic 
principle. But the structure of the international norm of love is not identical with that of private 
moral intercourse between individual men. The moral relations between the States remain bound 
to the structural principle of international political relationships, which presupposes that of the 
body politic itself. The norm of love can never require a State to resign itself to a foreign attack on 
its independence and to deliver its own subjects to the violence of the usurper. The moral duties 
of a body politic cannot be measured according to private standards.983 
This agrees with Morgenthau’s view as mentioned earlier that one should make a 
distinction between the moral obligations and possibilities of the state and individuals.984 
Besides the historical, economic and juridical, Dooyeweerd also distinguished the 
pistical aspect - from the Greek word pistis which means faith or trust. Another term that 
I used earlier is ultimate commitment. These commitments can be of religious, secular 
or a quasi-religious nature and express themselves in someone’s worldview. According 
to Dooyeweerd, the ultimate commitments that human beings have influence the way 
the other aspects are interpreted such as the biotic, ethical, juridical, and the historical. 
When these ultimate commitments are based on a transcendent reference point – which 
makes them religious –, one could call it a religious worldview. In other words, one 
of the conditioning aspects of the international relations practice concerns the role 
religious, secular and quasi-religious worldviews play. It is important to be aware of the 
role these worldviews play in the unfolding of the practice of international relations. It is 
also important to distinguish between the various kinds of worldviews. Quasi-religious 
worldviews often look like a religious worldview, but on closer scrutiny it appears that 
they lack a transcendent reference point. The same is true for ideologies and political 
religions. Morgenthau, for example, significantly criticized the visions of humankind, 
history, and ethics he regarded as idealistic and utopic, which were commonplace in his 
time. The same could apply to our time in which the sacralizing of all kinds of social 
and political aspects occur. These worldviews, in particular when they gain traction on 
the political process, should be criticized the same way the political realists did in their 
983 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 476.
984 See Section 5.6.3.
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time.985
The religionists have pointed out that certain ideas or worldviews can play a role in 
international relations as transnational religious ideas, transnational belief systems or 
transnational ideational communities (e.g. Muslims, Roman Catholics, Jews, and Eastern 
religions). These ideas or belief systems do not have to be religious, because there are also 
secular ones like Marxism and feminism. These ideas can be embodied by transnational 
actors or institutions that try to find acceptance for these ideas in international relations, 
but that is not necessary. Examples that the religionists put forward are the Anti-Slavery 
Society, the Catholic Church and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is important to be aware of 
this when thinking about the practice of international relations and the role of religious 
worldviews.986 I mention this explicitly, because the practitioners and professionals that 
shape the international relations practice can also adhere to these worldviews. That is 
why the next section deals with the regulative side of the practice. 
By analyzing the international relations practice using the distinction between 
qualifying, foundational and conditioning, we have become more aware of the normative 
structure of this practice.987 I have argued that the context of power politics makes 
religious actors dependant on the power resources at their disposal. I also pointed out 
that its actors are state and non-state actors, although the latter are strongly dependent 
on the state to have influence. I have also maintained that the international relations 
practice is qualified by justice, founded by power and conditioned by – among others – 
ultimate commitments. That means, in short, that we know the rules that are constitutive 
for the game. As with chess, these rules enable and allow for a certain course of play 
that can lead to a draw or to the victory of one of the two players. The rules do not, 
however, provide us with concrete interpretations of the ideas and ideals of the actors 
that are active in this practice. They do not explain the actual course that an individual 
game of chess shows, because that depends on the players that shape the practice. They 
influence – not determine – the course of the game. Take for example two chess players. 
They both have their own motivation, style, preferences, their own commitments and 
that influences the way they play the game. That is what the regulative side is about.988 
10.2.4. Regulative Side of  the Practice: The Role of  the Practitioners and 
Their (Religious) Worldviews
As I set out above earlier, the constitutive side of a practice is about its structure. The 
regulative side explains what moves people to participate in a practice and contribute to 
the development of it. The regulative side draws attention to the ideas and worldviews 
that guides and judges the interpretation and unfolding of the constitutive rules.The 
985 Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 13ff.
986 See Section 2.5.3.
987 Hoogland, Positioning the Normative Practice Approach, 48.
988 Ibid., 48-50.
331
crucial question is which actors are responsible for the realization of the regulative side. 
Since the NPA is about professional practices, I consider professionals who shape the 
international relations practice as the responsible ones. Thomas says, for example, that all 
people are responsible for the way the international relations practice manifests itself. 
People do not only “use” theory to explain events in international relations (mainstream theory); 
all of us, as scholars, workers, bankers, as citizens, and students “do” theory every day, every day 
all of us live out a theory of International Relations. In the way we “act”, the lifestyle choices we 
make, in what we consume, what we wear, how we travel, and so every day all of us live our “the 
local politics of world politics”.989
Thomas makes an interesting point here, because there is a relationship between the 
everyday behavior of citizens and the way states behave and the way the international 
relations practice unfolds. However, including ordinary people in the NPA would make 
theorizing impossible, because theorizing also means making distinctions. There is a 
professional and functional difference between citizens and practitioners. Ministers of 
foreign affairs, diplomats and policymakers act in the international domain through 
institutions, including the state. The state leader has a professional responsibility to 
ensure that the state tries to strive for just relations, based on the position of power it 
has been given. 
In this section, I will limit myself to the practitioners that participate in the 
international relations practice through the state. But there are many more practitioners. 
For example, people who work for religious organizations, faith-based organizations or 
religious non-governmental organizations can also participate in international relations. 
Through their institutions they condition the development of the international 
relations practice. This shows how the NPA takes into account the role of religion in a 
sophisticated way. The question remains still how much influence should be attributed 
to the conditioning side of the practice. Since I present the contours of – no more and 
no less – an alternative approach I will not discuss this further here.  
In Chapter 1 I set out that the Amsterdam School takes scientific knowledge very 
seriously, but always in relation to the fullness of human experience. Theories provide 
clarification, but scholars always should consider how this relates to the everyday 
experience. Similarly, a state leader could be an expert in all kind of theories of 
international politics, but the success of his policies depends very much on his ability 
to use the theoretical insights in his daily politics and to weigh the different rules and 
norms of the practice. In this process, a practitioner is influenced by his personal beliefs 
or worldview to make decisions. That is not always that easy. It requires a specific 
competence, or a virtue such as prudence as Morgenthau calls it, to reconcile the political 
power principles with someone’s personal worldview.
989 Thomas, Living Critically and Living Faithfully in the Global World of the Twenty-First Century, 73.
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There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political 
consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence – the weighting of 
the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.990 
Morgenthau did not believe that the Christian religion could be of relevance here. He 
saw an inescapable discrepancy between the commands of Christian teaching. Christian 
ethics, and the requirements of political success.
…it is impossible, if I may put it in somewhat extreme and striking terms, to be a successful 
politician and a good Christian.991
Niebuhr, in contrast, argued that it was possible to be a Christian in politics.
I do not think we will sacrifice any value in the “realist” approach to the political order (…) if we 
define the moral ambiguity of the political realm in terms which do not rob it of moral content.992
What both thinkers make clear is that the ideas and beliefs of the participants are relevant 
for the unfolding and realization of the practice. Morgenthau considers it impossible to 
combine a religious worldview with politics while Niebuhr considers it possible. Waltz 
also notices the responsibility of the participants in the development of the practice of 
international politics, because virtuosity, skills, and determination can help to transcend 
the structural anarchical constraints of the system.993 
In contrast to Morgenthau’s lower prudence, Kamminga pleads for higher prudence 
as the supreme virtue in international politics.994 This kind of prudence must accept the 
theoretical wisdom of cosmopolitan justice. The adjective cosmopolitan refers to the 
idea that principles should be accepted ‘from a point of view in which each individual 
person’s prospects are equally represented: “every human being has a global stature as 
the ultimate unit of moral concern”’.995 For Kamminga, this perspective is superior to 
the internationalist position, because it takes the individual person as fundamental. It 
does not give privilege to contingent national states like the internationalist perspective 
does.996 Kamminga speaks about the theoretical wisdom of cosmopolitan justice, 
because he does not ascribe direct political relevance to it. It functions as a pre-political 
990 Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 12.
991 Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, 276 fn. 71.
992 Ibid., 276.
993 Waltz, Reflections on Theory of International Politics, 344.





perspective that gives a sense of direction.997 For that reason he introduces the term 
cosmopolitan pluralism which he sees as practical wisdom, because it takes into account 
that cosmopolitan justice has to compete with order and survival and that it cannot be 
realized completely. The practical cosmopolitan will be a value pluralist.998  
According to Kamminga, the virtue of higher prudence has to meet the following 
requirements. First, leaders should pursue cosmopolitan civic education. Second, a 
leader should be willing to violate the core interests and values of his citizens for the 
purpose of cosmopolitan justice and willing to do more than its share even when others 
do not fulfill their obligations. Third, even if the strive for cosmopolitan justice violates 
core national interests, leaders should do their best to find ways to fulfill justice be it 
on a lower level.999 Based on that we are able to describe the role of the practitioner in 
international politics as follows. I use an original passage of Morgenthau which was 
modified by Kamminga.1000 
The practitioner of international politics takes a sense of direction from the principle of 
cosmopolitan justice and operate from the practical wisdom of cosmopolitan pluralism meaning 
that both individual and state must judge political action by cosmopolitan principles of justice. 
The individual may say for herself: “Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (Let justice be done, even if the 
world perish),” but the state cannot do so, because the anarchical structure forces the state to 
respect the principle of self-help. For that reason, there can be no political morality without higher 
prudence – the weighting of the consequences of alternative political actions in the light of the 
ethical overridingness of cosmopolitan justice, thus for the world’s citizens and future generations, 
and the deep specific concerns of its own citizens – to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in 
the abstract, judges action by its conformity with cosmopolitan moral principles; political ethics 
judges action by its overall political consequences.1001 
As said the regulative side directs the unfolding of the constitutive side (the structure) 
of the practice. The pistical aspect of the constitutive side of the practice conditions 
or facilitates the unfolding of the practice of international relations. The qualifying 
function of the international relations practice is justice through the means of power. 
The contextual side shows the possible actors that play a role in the international 
relations practice. For example, in case of the global warming issue, there are many 
states and non-state actors of a religious (or faith-based) and secular nature involved. 
The constitutive side sheds light on the various aspects and norms – political, juridical, 




1000 Ibid., 12, 13. Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics Among Nations, 12.
1001 Kamminga, Higher Prudence.
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that they limit and guide the unfolding of – the practice of international relations and 
its dealing with global warming. The pistical aspect draws our attention to the ultimate 
commitments and worldviews that play a role in dealing with the climate issue. These 
ultimate commitments could have been the result of religious faith, but they can also be 
a secular or a quasi-religious or ideological commitment to protect the earth and future 
generations. How do these commitments facilitate the international relations practice 
which is qualified by justice and founded by power? That is one of the questions that 
the practitioners of the international relations practice have to deal with. The regulative 
side draws our attention to that question. The players of the practice are directing 
the unfolding of the practice and therefore the way in which the pistical, ethical and 
political aspects are functioning. In this process they are also influenced by their own 
(religious) worldviews. The consequence is that the outcome of the negotiations and 
international cooperation on, for example, the climate change issue also depends on 
the worldviews that the participants of the negotiations hold. What are their deeper 
ultimate commitments and beliefs? Do they hold a political theology? Is there room 
for hope or redemption in their worldview and acting? How do they see the practice of 
international relations? Do they approach it primarily as something political or do they 
also consider the social and cultural side of it? Is their worldview inspiring them to strive 
for cosmopolitan justice or does it privilege national interests? How do the participants 
in the debate weigh their religious principles, convictions or values in relation to the 
requirements of political success? How prudent are they?1002  
As stated earlier, the state leader, minister of foreign affairs or diplomat who is a 
player in this practice is in dire need of prudence, or more correctly, higher prudence. 
The state leader needs to consider acting rightly in a very complex context and situation 
which requires the virtue of moral discernment. Gustafson describes this moral 
discernment as the ability to discern what we are supposed to do and to see what is there. 
It is a certain sensitivity, insight, empathy, assessment, imagination, or appreciation. It 
concerns the ability to distinguish the relevant information from the irrelevant, and 
correct interpretations from wrong ones. To see the situation and all its relations and 
complexity, and to assess them accurately and fairly. Not only affection plays a role in 
that, but reason as well. People with discernment have gained a certain intuition that 
leads to moral accuracy, wisdom, and convincing authenticity when they act.1003 The 
NPA can be helpful here because it indicates the various dimensions that are at play. It 
requires the participant to reflect on his own convictions, commitments and worldview 
and how it influences his participation in the practice of international relations. Earlier 
on, Buijs and I described this situation as follows:
 
1002 See, for example, the section ‘Inspired Political Leaders’ in Polinder and Buijs, The Lamb and the Wolf.
1003 James M. Gustafson, Theology and Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1974), 99-119.
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Each actor on each level has a certain power, but none is all-powerful. New issues may constantly 
arise, new constellations of power will be formed, new incidents may happen. Each player has to 
formulate long term goals and at the very same time act on a day-to-day basis. There is strategy 
and there are tactics. In soccer-terms: this is the actual game itself in all its unpredictability. 
Here one has to form relationships and coalitions, one has to compromise and find second-
best or third-best solutions that nevertheless seem preferable to alternatives that are even worse. 
Everything comes together here: one’s personality and its existential and psychological make-up, 
one’s relation to the team and the club, one’s ideals and strategic goals, etc. And yet, none of these 
is nearly sufficient for playing well. Non-discursive “tacit” knowledge is part of it, as is experience 
(having been in the game for some time), as is constant on-the-job learning, as is constant training 
and bodily routines, as are sudden flashy moments of insight, etc. It is about intuitively thinking 
three steps ahead, while taking one step at a time. “Craftsmanship” is called for. Here Machiavelli 
comes to mind, with his emphasis on fortuna – the wind of luck that may be supporting you from 
behind or come at you from adverse directions – and on virtù – the skills, the cleverness, even the 
shrewdness, the sense of timing that one may have (or lack) to deal with the vicissitudes of life. It 
becomes immediately clear that good intentions are not nearly enough to produce the good (and 
neither are evil intentions simply enough to produce evil). However, informed by a Christian 
tradition that knows of the “affirmation of ordinary life” we should resist the temptation to look 
down upon the swamp, the low ground, and instead ascribe due respect to it, as part of creation, 
as the field when human responsibility is played out. Here is where the norms are “positivized”. 
Here is where the rubber hits the road. But here we also stumble on what Martha Nussbaum has 
called the “fragility of goodness”.1004 
10.2.5. Religious Sensitivity and Literacy in Practice: Some Recommendations 
How should practitioners of the international relations practice relate to religious 
actors and religious worldviews in such a mess of competing interests? There are a few 
guidelines that might be helpful. 
In the first place, practitioners should be aware of the ambivalence of religion. 
Involving religious worldviews and religious actors does not solely indicate a positive 
contribution because religion can also have a negative influence. For example, according 
to Hunter, religion is most effective when used as an ideology; something the political 
realists are very critical about.1005 For that reason, the most adequate approach is to 
take the ambivalence of religion as a starting point.1006 During the World Economic 
1004 Buijs and Polinder, Christian Philosophical Reflections and Shalom-Searching Wisdom, 321, 322.
1005 Hunter, God on our Side, 224.
1006 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000). I doubt whether Thomas is not too optimistic about the shared commitments of all people of faith ‘that the final 
goals of International Relations are bringing about global peace, justice, and emancipation (i.e. not only for your ‘our’ 
own tribe, ethnicity, religion, community, country or civilization)’. Thomas, Living Critically and Living Faithfully in 
the Global World of the Twenty-First Century, 80. The religionist present many examples that illustrate this ambivalence. 
Bernbaum, Getting Russia Right, 143; Farr, World of Faith and Freedom, 57, 72, 91, 96, 97, 265; Fox and Sandler, 
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Forum in 2016 a document appeared that investigated all the different terrains where 
religion can play a role, like women’s emancipation, international trade, the job market, 
climate policy, etc. For each of these topics, it is also investigated whether religion can 
be a limiting factor, or for that same reason, be a solution.1007 The World Council 
of Churches published a document in 2013 in which they describe how religion and 
politics are related in all kinds of ways, sometimes destructive, but often very constructive 
as well.1008 Religion, like other factors in international relations, has a Janus face. It can 
be used as a political instrument to raise the masses, accuse or exclude others, but it can 
also play a role in dissolving conflicts and peace building.  
An example of the latter is the following. At a conference in September 2007, 
organized by the Royal Academy of The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic 
Thought in Jordan 138 Muslim leaders presented a letter. Its message: to declare that 
the love of God and the love of the neighbor is the common ground between Islam 
and Christianity.1009 A worldwide response from the side of Christianity appeared 
several months later. It was drafted by four scholars at Yale Divinity School’s Center 
for Faith and Culture. About 300 Christian theologians and leaders endorsed it.1010 
Critics might hold that religious believers have a particular interest in suggesting that 
religion aims at mutual understanding and peaceful living together. However, there are 
also atheists who point out that a majority of the world population is religious and that 
problems of globalization, such as overpopulation, probably cannot be solved without 
constructive cooperation between the world religions.1011 This ‘overlapping consensus’ 
shows that religious leaders can be of relevance for international policy making.
Secondly, practitioners should cherish the distinction – not separation – between 
religion and politics. Not only because too much involvement of religious actors and 
religious worldviews in international politics could make international policy less 
effective, but also because it might corrupt religion itself. To start with the first one, 
Bringing Religion into International Relations, 39-41, 43, 48, 49; Fox, Lessons on Religion and Conflict Resolution, 34; Klein 
Goldewijk, Resurgence of Religion, 23; Patterson, Politics in a Religious World, 82-85; Stempel, Faith, Diplomacy and the 
International System, 8, 9; Thomas, Religion and International Conflict, 2; Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion, 33, 
182, 184-186.
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religious ideals when directly applied to international affairs might be too idealistic, 
therefore unrealistic hence ineffective. International politics is often about the weighing 
and balancing of the various interests, compromising, second best solutions and making 
dirty hands. The principle of the autonomy of politics is not meant to leave all religious, 
moral and normative consideration aside, it is meant to protect the normativity of the 
political sphere itself. The InterAction Council states the following about it in World 
Religions as a Factor in World Politics:
While religious movements can wield great positive influence in national politics, too often 
religion is exploited and abused by political leaders who take advantage of ignorance and sow 
seeds of insecurity to maintain power. The combination of ignorance, religion and nationalism 
creates a dangerous potential for war. This powerful dynamic between religion and politics has 
spurred international conflicts and supported oppressive regimes worldwide, including the 
disastrous occupation of and degenerating war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the entrenched conflict 
in Israel/Palestine, the long civil war in Sri Lanka, and new violence in Thailand. In reality, 
political decisions often contrast sharply with the religious doctrines they purport to invoke. 
Fundamentalism is not an essential attribute to any religion, but characteristic to many. Our task 
is to challenge religious leaders to prevent their religions from being misused, isolate the “religious 
extremism” that is prone to political exploitation, and support and strengthen moderate religious 
movements.1012 
Despite this gloomy tone, the same document also states that ‘still many in the High-
level Expert Group saw ‘glimmers of hope’ in the path moving forward’.1013 
In the third place, develop religious literacy. Religious actors and religious 
worldviews are not one and the same thing. Religion covers various manifold issues 
and features. This requires careful scrutiny. Instead of simply accepting religion on face 
value, it requires study what is ‘religious’ in a certain case. The easiest way is either to 
embrace religion or to reject it. That is what happened with the religionists and political 
realist. The religionists may be too quick and uncritical in taking religious seriously and 
involve it. Political realists tend to minimize religion’s role due to the fear of confusing 
religion and politics. I would suggest recognizing that religion is an unmistakable part 
of reality, as well as political reality. The task is to look into it and try to find out 
what the ‘religious’ phenomenon is about. It is important to determine whether it is a 
constructive or destructive contribution and to discern how to keep both the political 
and religious sphere sound. 
Fourthly, practitioners should dare to weigh and decide whether religious actors or 
religious worldviews are sufficiently relevant to deal with in a particular situation. Too 
1012 Ingvar Carlsson, World Religions as a Factor in World Politics (Tübingen: InterAction Council, 2007), online available 
at https://www.interactioncouncil.org/publications/world-religions-factor-world-politics (accessed December 28, 2020).
1013 Ibid.
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much focus on the religious dimension of a certain issue, especially when it appeals 
to their own religious worldview, might cloud their ability to see what is at stake. The 
primary goal of a practitioner of the international relations practice is to steer the practice 
through the means of power to more or less justice. Religious worldviews and religious 
actors are important, but as the NPA shows, there are also cultural, social and juridical 
rules that condition the practice. 
I base this fourth recommendation, among other things, on the ideas of the political 
realists. And, on the fact that the religionists do not make convincingly clear how 
religion should be treated as a separate factor in IR theories. I would like to point at two 
other scholars here: Hunter and Maurits Berger. Hunter studied three cases in which 
religion plays a role: Russia’s policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis, Turkey’s policy towards 
the Bosnian War, and the European policy regarding Turkey’s EU membership. Based 
on that, she concluded that security has played a decisive role in many cases, more than 
ideas, ideals, and identity.1014 In other words, it is hard power that overrules soft power. 
For Hunter religion plays a more indirect role through its shaping of the identities of 
various actors, their self-perceptions and worldviews, culture and value systems.1015 
Religion’s role in shaping actors’ behavior in specific cases is fairly limited or at any rate not 
decisive, especially when security concerns and significant political and economic interests are at 
stake.1016
Hunter maintains that the influence of religion takes place mainly through the 
international politics of the state.1017 Interestingly, many of her other descriptions of 
religion’s role in international relations are similar to the religionist ones. She describes 
religion’s influence through domestic structures, civil society, public opinion, political 
leaders. She points at the fact that religion can be an instrument for policy. However, her 
conclusion is that religion’s influence remains limited in comparison to security issues, 
and political and economic interests.1018  
Berger too asked whether Islam is an important factor in international relations and 
concluded that it ‘plays a relatively small role in international relations’.1019 He comes to 
three observations.
First, most issues in international relations involving Muslim countries involve not typical 
“Islamic issues”, but practical interests and power politics. Second, there is a Western tendency to 





1019 Maurits Berger, Religion and Islam in Contemporary International Relations (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael, 2010), 25.
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“Islamize” foreign politics and politics of Muslim counties - that is, to identity them as “Islamic” 
by virtue of stemming from “Islamic countries”. Third, while Islam may be very important 
for Muslim self-identity (and therefore, sometimes even be a catalysing factor of conflict), it is 
questionable whether it plays any role at all in solving international disputes, since these revolve 
ultimately around practical matters.1020
Berger recognizes the reality of religion’s presence, but also indicates that it concerns a 
domestic role in many cases, and that there are only a few cases in which Western states 
make it a part of the international domain. For example, he says that the focus on the 
Islam is disruptive to a true understanding of international relations.1021 Too much focus 
on religious arguments and too much attention for religious aspects can cloud a fair 
judgment of the real issue. In such cases it is necessary to unwrap and deconstruct the 
role of religion.1022 I differ with Berger whether this suffices. Berger claims that, as an 
outsider, one can never align oneself in a sincere manner with another person’s religious 
convictions in international relations.1023 But that is not required from outsiders, because 
religion is not entirely subjective or irrational. Many religious people are well versed to 
argue for their views reasonably and rationally.
Finally, practitioners should be aware of their own stance and their own worldview. 
Berger claims that the West has taken a secular and non-committal position regarding 
religion in the international domain. But in doing so, he joins a certain binary view of 
secular versus religious. I have shown that, for example, the autonomy of the political 
is based on political-theological considerations. Berger argues to ‘talk to them, but 
don’t talk their talk’ and he somehow pretends that Western secular people really know 
what it is about.1024 I think that it would be better to be aware of the fact that the 
distinction between religion and politics is not a neutral stance, but inspired by Christian 
(Augustinian) ideas. Not because ‘religion’ or morality should not play a role, but because 
political issues have an entirely different nature and deserve to be treated as political 
issues. Just as I encourage the religionists and political theorists to be explicit about 
their political-theological or worldview starting points, the same applies to international 
politics. One need not to talk like a theologian but one should recognize that political-
theological considerations and worldview play a role, also in the so-called ‘secular’ West. 
The trick is to know when and how you can address these worldview elements in the 
mishmash of factors and actors that can play a role in certain matters.1025  






1025 Audi nicely shows that there are different ways to incorporate certain worldview considerations. Robert Audi, Religious 
Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 69-78.
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I would plead for religious literacy to understand the language of the other person 
and possibly speak their language as well. Moral discernment is required as well to 
see everything at play in all its complexity. It is for a reason that the British Academy 
starts their report – consisting of a literature study and case-studies – with the following 
statement:
It is rarely easy to discern the complex ways in which religion permeates a conflict, but it is vital 
for those involved in this area of study and diplomacy to strive to do so if progress is to be made in 
understanding them. Finally, a word of caution: we must be careful not to give undue prominence 
to religion in all instances; it is not a major factor in every conflict and there is a risk that it can 
sometimes come to obscure more deeply rooted causes and motivations.1026
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed a practice approach of international relations based 
on ideas from the Amsterdam School. It combines the practice ideas as developed by 
MacIntyre with the insights of Dooyeweerd. It leads to a practice-based theory which 
distinguishes between context, a structural and a regulative side. Within the structural 
side, it is possible to distinguish between conditioning, qualifying, and foundational 
norms. This distinction makes it possible to weigh the different aspects and norms that 
play a role without simplifying in such a way that the theory becomes reductionist. In this 
way, it integrates the explanatory power of Waltz’s theory and the interpretative wisdom 
of the religionists. For example, the three different norms of a practice become visible 
in the definition of international relations as follows hereafter: international relations 
is about the political, social, economic, ethical, religious, cultural (conditioning), and 
other interactions among state (and even non-state) actors (context) which, because of 
anarchy, live in a situation of self-help. Therefore they have to rely on the use of power 
(foundational) directed by justice (qualifying).  
The practice of international relations is, however, not only a sum of conditioning, 
foundational and qualifying rules. It also has a sense of direction and state leaders and 
policymakers in particular have the responsibility to develop this practice in such a 
way that power is executed for the love to justice. Religious beliefs often play a role 
here, in the sense that state leaders and policymakers are influenced by their worldviews 
and presuppositions when they are acting in and shaping the practice of international 
relations.  
The NPA as set out in this chapter is partly a response to the diagnosis and possible 
solutions presented in Chapter 9. The NPA also combines the strengths of both political 
1026 Sara Silvestri and James Mayall, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuiding (London: The British Academy, 
2015), 2.
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realists and the religionists and tries to overcome their weaknesses. It overcomes the 
‘agnostic’ view of Morgenthau and gives room for the faith commitment of Niebuhr’s 
Christian realism. At the same time, it provides it with more solid scientific grounds by 
using practice theory. It does justice to the role of religious actors through the contextual 
side. It takes into account the role of religious, quasi-religious and secular worldviews 
(ideologies) through the pistical aspect of the constitutive side of the international 
relations practice. It draws attention to the worldviews of the participating professionals 
that directs the development of the practice. It does not confuse a theology with a 
scientific explanation, but gives space to religious concepts in theorizing; navigates 
between explaining a little about much and explaining much about a little; relates 
the political domain with economic, juridical, ethical, and religious issues; avoids the 
suggestion of a neutral, value free scientific approach and is open about its normativity; 
limits and characterizes the domain of investigation and selects and prioritizes the 
various factors; respects the distinction between a scientific theory and policymaking, 
therefore avoids drawing (over)simplified policy implications from a scientific theory. In 
sum, with the NPA I have sketched the contours of a new Christian realism. 
My proposal as presented above is tentative and a first step. There is much to 
improve and to add. From a theoretical perspective, for example, it is difficult to assess 
the importance of the different sides. Is the qualifying so decisive that the conditioning 
is completely subordinate? How decisive is structure, or the constitutive side, compared 
to the regulative side? Case studies to explore this further would be very helpful in this 
respect. 
The main objection or counterargument that can be raised against the use of the 
NPA is its lack of theoretical explanatory power, which makes it an insufficiently serious 
alternative to, for example, Waltz’s neorealist theory. I am prepared to accept that loss, 
because the NPA instead offers practitioners (a.o. state leaders and policymakers) more 
actual guidance in their daily work. Waltz’s theory does not. Therefore, his theory is at 
risk of being applied to international issues, even though it is not intended for that. Also, 
NPA justifiably integrates the omnipresence of religion as argued for by the religionists. 
However, more so than the religionists, it pays attention to religion’s theoretical weight 
and relevance, as well as its limitations.
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Conclusion Part III: Conspiring Nations and Religion: A Call for 
Serenity, Courage and Discernment 
In 1964, Thompson, a colleague of Morgenthau, wrote the following on the topic of 
religion and international relations. 
The rapid shifts and changes in the contact of present-day international relations lead spokesmen 
and critics of religion to opposing conclusions respecting the continuing relevance of religion. 
Some spokesmen whom with a certain irreverence I have called apologists envisage the solution 
in a straightforward revival of religious consciousness. In a world dominated by a vast pluralism 
of religious and political outlooks, this approach seems more a pious hope than a practical 
possibility. But the answer of critics and cynics who rejoice in the passing of the Christian era is 
more disturbing. Religion and its lessons provide a thread of continuity in a world of unsurpassed 
change. These lessons give us a theme on which discussion appropriately reached some concluding 
points of focus.1027 
With that, he neatly summarizes the different lines of thought from this dissertation. 
The main research question of this dissertation was: To what extent could the claims 
of the religionists be substantiated and what would be the implications for IR theory 
if their claims are plausible indeed? Since I have answered this question already quite 
extensively I will not repeat it here again. However, I would like to emphasize a few 
issues. This dissertation has shown, for example, that the positive meaning of the global 
resurgence should not be overestimated. First of all, because it is unclear what exactly 
has changed, but especially because the global resurgence of religion does not have to be 
positive by definition. Religion has a Janus face. It is an ambivalent phenomenon. It can 
also have a negative contribution.  
Thompson writes about ‘apologists’. He describes them as people who think that the 
religious resurgence is the solution. The religionists sometimes have a similar attitude 
and this influences their assessment of the global resurgence of religion. At the same 
time, the religionists do contribute hope and perspective that this world does not have 
to be the way it is. The political realists may be too focused on the practical or added 
value of religion for theorizing and therefore cannot see that religion, as Niebuhr argues, 
opens the doors for a new perspective that could be a source for justice, understood as 
love making its way in the world. 
A nice contribution in a similar vein as Thompson is the book Flourishing: Why We 
Need Religion in a Globalized World by Miroslav Volf. The origin of this book are classes 
he gave on religion and globalization together with former state leader Tony Blair. He 
then shared his ideas all over the world in countless countries with a wide variety of 
scholars, which is how this book came to be. Volf recognizes that the world is pluriform 
1027 Thompson, Religion and International Relations, 20.
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and that religion can be a source of conflict. He assumes the same as Thompson, namely: 
‘Religion and its lessons provide a thread of continuity in a world of unsurpassed 
change’. According to Volf, religions contain leads and sources that can contribute to 
human flourishing. With the term flourishing, Volf refers to life that has been lived well, 
life that goes well, and life that feels well. It concerns the good life and whether life is 
worth to be lived. Volf does not shy away from labelling certain aspects of religion as 
wrong. In short, he is not merely in favour of ‘more’ religion, but in favour of religion 
that contributes to flourishing.1028  
The title of the introduction of Part III is that we need to study things and maintain 
what is good. Based on that, I have also shown that the contributions of the religionists, 
the political realists, and the Amsterdam School have brought forth many good things. 
NPA has played an important role in that, because it manages to unite many elements 
from the different parties. I do regard that as my contribution to the discussion on 
religion and international relations. I have not only tried to represent the religionist 
position as completely and as accurately as possible, but I have also shown that many 
of their reproaches are sometimes unwarranted. That does not take away the fact that 
the religionists’ point still stands. That also applies to the insights we have garnered by 
studying the political realists and the contributions of the Amsterdam School. 
When I think about further directions, I think both religionists and IR theorists 
will need to think about what it is they want to theorize about and how they wish to do 
so. Will it become religion with international relations as a sub-discipline to gain more 
knowledge on the role of religion in the world? Or will it focus on the international 
relations and the discussion on whether religion is necessary to understand or explain the 
domain more effectively? It is also possible to do both, of course, where religionists will 
mainly opt for the first and try to give input based on that for the IR theorists who work 
on the second. That also provides opportunities to work with separate interpretations of 
theory. With religion and international relations, or International Political Theology as 
a subdiscipline, more use can be made of interpretive approaches. When discussing the 
domain of international relations, perhaps a more explanatory approach can be strived 
for. The NPA tries to integrate both in a sense. 
Another important point for the future is that we need to look towards the domain 
of theory and the involvement of worldviews. Hopefully, this will also open up room 
for reflecting on the worldview presuppositions and the degree to which they permeate 
theorizing. That requires openness and vulnerability, and perhaps even an abandonment 
of the scientific ivory tower, but it can also reduce a lot of noise and result in a larger 
mutual understanding.  
Personally, I would like it if this involvement of the worldview level leads to the 
realization of the practitioners of international relations that there is a lot of overlapping 
1028 Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2015).
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consensus, and that this can be a basis on which government leaders, international 
organizations and institutions, and civilians find each other when the nations conspire 
and the kings of the earth rise up, the people plot, and the rulers band together (Psalm 
2). That requires courage, because as Niebuhr makes clear in his serenity prayer, there 
are always things that can be changed. But it also requires serenity, because there will 
always be things that cannot be changed. The difficulty is to know and see the difference 
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Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 1. Inleiding: de noodzaak van een nieuw religie-paradigma in 
het vakgebied Internationale Betrekkingen en de mogelijke bijdrage van de 
christelijke filosofie
Vanaf het begin van de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw is er een groep wetenschappers 
opgestaan die het vakgebied Internationale Betrekkingen (IB) fel bekritiseert. Volgens 
hen zou het ten onrechte de rol van religie in de internationale verhoudingen negeren. 
De gevolgen hiervan zouden dramatisch zijn: inadequate theorieën leiden namelijk tot 
inadequaat beleid. Wanneer de Verenigde Staten de rol en betekenis van religie serieuzer 
hadden genomen, was bijvoorbeeld de Iraanse Revolutie van 1979 geen complete 
verrassing geweest. Deze groep wetenschappers vindt dan ook dat er binnen IB meer 
aandacht moet komen voor de rol van religie. Om dat mogelijk te maken, zouden 
bestaande theorieën moeten worden vervangen of aangepast.
In mijn proefschrift onderzoek ik de claim van deze groep wetenschappers, die ik voor 
het gemak religionisten noem. Ik stel de vraag in hoeverre de claim van de religionisten 
hout snijdt en wat de consequenties hiervan zijn voor IB. Om deze vraag te kunnen 
beantwoorden, onderzoek ik in de eerste hoofdstukken wat de religionisten betogen. Wat 
zeggen ze precies en hoe ziet hun argumentatie eruit (Deel I)? In de tweede plaats ‘test’ 
ik in hoeverre de religionisten gelijk hebben als we kijken naar de meest bekritiseerde 
en meest dominante school binnen IB, namelijk het politiek realisme. Negeert het 
realisme inderdaad religie en doet zij dat ook vanwege de redenen die de religionisten 
hiervoor aandragen (Deel II)? In de derde plaats ga ik na wat de consequenties zijn 
van de antwoorden op voorgaande vragen voor IB. Moet zij inderdaad haar theorieën 
vervangen of herzien of is er een alternatief (Deel III)?
De opvatting dat religie geïncorporeerd zou moeten worden in IB is gebaseerd op drie 
beweringen van respectievelijk empirische, domein-specifieke en wetenschapsfilosofische 
aard. De empirische stelling is dat religie zo’n belangrijke rol speelt in de wereld dat IB 
dit niet kan negeren en moet incorporeren. De tweede stelling is dat IB als vakgebied 
een blinde vlek heeft waardoor zij religie niet ziet. De derde stelling gaat over de manier 
waarop er binnen IB gedacht wordt over wetenschapsfilosofische zaken. Hoewel de 
stellingen op zichzelf staan, is er een duidelijke onderlinge relatie. Aannames die op 
wetenschapsfilosofisch niveau worden gemaakt, werken door op het domein-specifieke 
niveau en uiteindelijk ook op het empirische niveau. Uiteraard kan die invloed ook in 
omgekeerde richting plaatsvinden. In de hoofdstukken 1-3 presenteer ik de inhoud van 
de stellingen.
Op basis van het gedachtegoed van de christelijke filosofie voeg ik echter nog een 
vierde niveau toe, namelijk het levensbeschouwelijke niveau. Dit is nodig om de discussie 
te verhelderen. In de discussie spelen namelijk levensbeschouwelijke aannames een rol 
die doorwerken op de drie genoemde niveaus. Een levensbeschouwing is opgebouwd 
369
uit overtuigingen enerzijds en een persoonlijk ultiem commitment anderzijds. Beide 
elementen kunnen elkaar versterken. Overtuigingen die rationeel kunnen worden 
verdedigd zijn in een levensbeschouwing ook zaken waar men een bepaalde waarde aan 
hecht en waar men persoonlijk vertrouwen in stelt.
Een wereldbeschouwing kan seculier, quasi-seculier of religieus van aard zijn. 
In het eerste geval wordt er niet uitgegaan van een transcendent oriëntatiepunt. 
Een quasi-seculiere wereldbeschouwing heeft overeenkomsten met een religieuze 
wereldbeschouwing, maar uiteindelijk is het doel een immanente werkelijkheid. Zodra 
een quasi-religieuze wereldbeschouwing publieke of politieke aspiraties krijgt kan het 
een ideologie of politieke religie worden. Een religieuze wereldbeschouwing heeft als 
referentiepunt een transcendente werkelijkheid. 
De verschillende soorten wereldbeschouwingen spelen bewust of onbewust een 
rol in het debat. Bijvoorbeeld doordat er bepaalde politiek-theologische opvattingen 
worden gehuldigd. Dit zijn theologische ideeën die afkomstig zijn van de theologie 
(de wetenschappelijke discipline die religieuze wereldbeschouwingen bestudeert) of 
ontspruiten aan een religieuze wereldbeschouwing en die worden toegepast op het 
politieke domein. Het kan ook doordat bepaalde persoonlijke voorkeuren of opvattingen 
doorwerken in de waardering van religie.
Behalve dat levensbeschouwing een rol speelt in de het vakgebied IB, speelt zij ook 
een rol in de internationale betrekkingen zelf. Bijvoorbeeld doordat bepaalde ideologieën 
of politieke religies met een quasi-seculier karakter het gedrag van mensen en actoren 
bepalen. Door het gebruik van het concept levensbeschouwing is het mogelijk de 
uiteenlopende manieren waarop religie een rol speelt beter te zien. Religie veronderstelt 
wel een religieuze wereldbeschouwing, maar wordt vaak beperkt opgevat als de 
gemeenschappen en de praktijken die daarbij horen. Ik definieer religie dan ook als de 
persoonlijke commitment aan een aantal overtuigingen over de uiteindelijke grond van 
het bestaan, een transcendent referentiepunt en de gemeenschappen en praktijken die 
daar uit voortvloeien en daar omheen gevormd worden. Religie omvat dus de religieuze 
levensbeschouwing en de bijbehorende praktijken. Als ik spreek over de rol van religie in 
de internationale betrekkingen, gaat het over bovengenoemde. Ik wijs daarnaast echter 
op de invloed van religieuze, quasi-religieuze en seculiere levensbeschouwingen. Dit 
voorkomt dat er gemakkelijk wordt gesproken over religie als een duidelijk afgebakende 
zichtbare categorie, terwijl religie heel gelaagd is en zich op tal van subtiele manieren 
voordoet. Soms zelf op zo’n manier dat ogenschijnlijke seculiere bewegingen of 
denkbeelden ‘religieuzer’ zijn dat ze doen voorkomen.
Deel I: Een kritische reconstructie van de positie van de religionisten
In dit deel worden de drie stellingen van de religionisten een voor een uit de doeken 
gedaan. Daarbij wordt ook gekeken naar wat er in deze stellingen eventueel doorschemert 
aan levensbeschouwelijke elementen. 
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Hoofdstuk 2. De empirisch basis van de religionisten: de heropleving van 
religie
De religionisten ondersteunen de stelling dat religie een belangrijke rol speelt met de 
observatie dat religie een heropleving heeft doorgemaakt sinds de jaren zestig. Ze dragen 
hier verschillende verklaringen voor aan, zoals het globaliseringsproces, de toegenomen 
interesse van academici voor religie, de opkomst van de radicale Islam en de invloed van 
de moderniteit op niet-westerse samenlevingen. Hoewel deze verklaringen van nogal 
uiteenlopende aard zijn, vormen ze samen voor de religionisten voldoende bewijs voor 
hun stelling: sinds de jaren zestig is er echt iets veranderd ten aanzien van religie in de 
wereld en IB dient daar aandacht aan te geven.
De religionisten onderbouwen hun stelling vervolgens door te laten zien dat religie 
eigenlijk overal aanwezig is. Ze illustreren dat met tal van empirische voorbeelden op 
verschillende niveaus:
• individuele niveau (regeringsleiders, beleidsmakers of diplomaten die zich direct 
of indirect door religieuze overwegingen laten sturen);
• nationale niveau (via religieus geïnspireerde maatschappelijke organisaties 
of politieke partijen, of door overheden die zich expliciet verbinden aan een 
bepaalde (staats)religie);
• transnationale niveau (missionaire activiteiten, religieus terrorisme, non-
gouvermentele organisaties zoals World Vision, World Conference of Religion 
and Peace of Opus Dei);
• internationale niveau (de Heilige Stoel met diplomatieke betrekkingen in 168 
landen).
Hoofdstuk 3. De religie-blindheid van het oude paradigma: de dominantie 
van het Westfaalse systeem
Volgens de religionisten zijn er een aantal vakspecifieke assumpties die ervoor zorgen 
dat IB een blinde vlek heeft met betrekking tot religie. De belangrijkste oorzaak die 
zij noemen is dat IB is gestoeld op Westfaalse assumpties: de opvatting dat de staat de 
centrale actor is, dat macht als het nationale belang van de staat wordt gezien en dat 
het binnenlandse domein als irrelevant wordt gezien. Hoewel elk van deze verklaringen 
op zichzelf staat, worden ze versterkt door een vierde verklaring, namelijk dat IB het 
Westfaalse systeem identificeert als het moment waarop de invloed van religie afnam. 
Elk van de genoemde assumpties zou er voor zorgen dat religie buitenspel werd gezet, 
gemarginaliseerd of geprivatiseerd werd, omdat het de publieke orde bedreigt. Vanuit 
hetzelfde paradigma werd de Koude Oorlog geanalyseerd en geïnterpreteerd als een 
competitie tussen twee seculiere ideologieën. Religieuze conflicten of verschijnselen 
werden binnen dit seculiere raamwerk geanalyseerd, waardoor de rol van religie over het 
hoofd werd gezien. 
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De religionisten stellen niet alleen dat deze assumpties allang niet meer opgaan 
omdat de wereld veranderd is. Zij presenteren ook een alternatieve visie op dit proces. Zij 
zien Westfalen ook als een seculariseringsproces, maar waarderen dit anders. Ze noemen 
deze benadering neosecularisatietheorie. Dit houdt in dat secularisatie wordt gezien als 
een verandering van de institutionele plaats van religie. Secularisatie hoeft dus niet te 
betekenen dat er minder gelovigen zijn of dat religie een minder prominente rol speelt in 
het publieke domein. Het betekent dat religie een andere gedaante heeft aangenomen. 
Waar voorheen de legitimiteit van sociale instituties binnen een bovennatuurlijk 
raamwerk werd bepaald, gelden daarvoor tegenwoordig empirische en rationele criteria. 
Deze criteria komen echter tot stand binnen een religieuze of christelijke context 
en als zodanig zijn ze daar nog schatplichtig aan. Het seculiere is zo’n categorie: het 
veronderstelt het gebruik van taal waarin het religieuze en eventuele verwijzingen naar 
het religieuze afwezig is, maar het betekent niet dat het daarmee vijandig is richting 
religie.
De religionisten werken deze neosecularisatietheorie verder niet uit richting de rol 
van de staat en het nationale belang, maar het is niet moeilijk voor te stellen dat zij dit 
als een minder religie-vijandige ontwikkeling zien dan binnen de gangbare IB wordt 
aangehangen. En dat opent mogelijkheden om ook in deze tijd aandacht te vragen voor 
de rol van religie. Religie hoeft namelijk niet op gespannen voet te staan met de staat, 
het nationale belang, veiligheid en macht.
Hoofdstuk 4. De dominantie van naturalistisch denken in het ontstaan van 
het oude paradigma
Op het wetenschapsfilosofische niveau zijn er verschillende oorzaken te noemen die 
eraan bijdragen dat religie gemarginaliseerd wordt. Allereerst is daar de invloed van de 
Verlichting. Volgens de religionisten heeft de Verlichting ervoor gezorgd dat geloof en 
rede werden gescheiden. Vervolgens werd religie tot een irrationele vorm van kennis 
gereduceerd bestaande uit morele regels, en werd het terrein van de rede versmald tot 
dat wat (natuur)wetenschappelijke kenbaar is. Dit zorgde ervoor dat religie steeds verder 
gemarginaliseerd en geprivatiseerd werd. Volgens de religionisten is dit terug te zien in 
IB, omdat religie hooguit nog interessant wordt gevonden als een vorm van soft power. 
Maar die is inferieur ten opzichte van hard power zoals militaire en economische macht.
Een concreet gevolg van het verlichtingsdenken is de zogenaamde moderniserings- 
en seculariseringstheorie. Deze theorie was binnen de sociale wetenschappen jarenlang 
dominant. Volgens de religionisten is IB een van de meest westerse varianten binnen 
de sociale wetenschappen. Daardoor is ze sterk beïnvloed door de moderniserings- en 
seculariseringstheorie. Als gevolg daarvan zou binnen IB lange tijd verondersteld zijn 
geweest dat religie als vanzelf zou verdwijnen. De religionisten wijzen erop dat inmiddels 
is gebleken dat deze theorie niet klopt. 
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Het ontologische argument van de religionisten luidt dat IB is gebaseerd op 
materialisme. Daardoor ziet IB de waarneembare werkelijkheid als een reflectie van 
materiële oorzaken. Dit leidt er binnen IB toe dat religie wordt gereduceerd tot een 
materieel verschijnsel. Zoals ook militaire macht, geografische ligging en natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen materiële verschijnselen zijn. Volgens de religionisten is de gedachte dat 
materiele aspecten gemakkelijker in een theorie zijn te vatten een belangrijke stimulans 
om deze meer gewicht te geven. Naast materialisme zien de religionisten ook holisme als 
een oorzaak waardoor religie geen plek krijgt. Holisme betekent namelijk dat het gedrag 
van individuele actoren wordt verklaard vanuit het grotere geheel en de structurele en 
materiële krachten van het systeem. Religie wordt al snel over het hoofd gezien in deze 
top-down benadering.
De religionisten betogen verder dat IB dusdanig is beïnvloed door het positivisme 
dat religie als vanzelf buiten beeld is geraakt. Het positivisme zorgt er in de eerste plaats 
voor dat men in het ontwikkelen van theorieën streeft naar maximale verklaringskracht 
naar analogie van theorieën in de natuurwetenschappen. Als gevolg hiervan worden 
religie en cultuur niet meegenomen in het theoretiseren. Positivisme zou, in de tweede 
plaats, uitgaan van een rationaliteit die onafhankelijk van de context geldig is. Het 
resultaat hiervan is dat ideële factoren, zoals religie en cultuur, en hun historische 
verschijningsvormen niet worden verdisconteerd. Een derde ontwikkeling die volgens 
de religionisten met het positivisme samenhangt, is de secularisering van gebruikte 
concepten. Veel concepten binnen IB waren van theologische oorsprong, maar de 
invloed van positivisme en behavioralisme zorgde ervoor dat theologische concepten 
plaats moesten maken voor sociaal-wetenschappelijke concepten en methodes. Volgens 
de religionisten heeft dit er toe geleid dat er minder aandacht kwam voor religie.
Als laatste betogen de religionisten dat IB religie reduceert tot een irrationeel, 
individueel en institutioneel verschijnsel. Daardoor zou IB de rationele, collectieve 
en ideële kant van religie veronachtzamen. Deze opvatting van religie leidt tot een 
gemankeerde visie op de werkelijke rol van religie, volgens de religionisten.
Conclusie Deel I. Contouren van een nieuw paradigma?
Het valt op dat de religionisten veel overtuigend empirisch materiaal presenteren om te 
laten zien dat religie overal een rol speelt. Dat is een punt wat IB serieus moet nemen. 
Helaas slagen de religionisten er niet in om te laten zien hoe religie dan precies anders is 
dan vele andere factoren die een rol spelen en waarom religie dan zo onderscheidend is 
dat het aparte behandeling verdient. Als het gaat om de kritiek op het Westfaalse systeem 
valt het op dat de religionisten niet alleen kritiek leveren, maar ook een alternatieve visie 
op secularisatie naar voren brengen. Daarnaast is het positief dat er niet alleen kritiek is 
op bepaalde opvattingen binnen de IB omdat het leidt tot het negeren van religie, maar 
ook omdat bepaalde opvattingen zoals de centrale rol van de staat volgens hen niet meer 
in lijn is met de stand van zaken in de wetenschap. Helaas is dit in het geval van het deel 
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over de Verlichting anders. Hier wordt vooral kritiek geleverd en worden gematigder 
varianten van de Verlichting buiten beschouwing gelaten.
Door niet alleen te kijken naar wat de religionisten schrijven over religie, maar ook 
wat daarin mogelijk aan levensbeschouwelijke invloeden doorheen klinkt, valt op dat 
ze in hun taalgebruik en definitie van religie niet altijd zo objectief zijn als het lijkt. 
Regelmatig lijkt het dat bepaalde persoonlijke voorkeuren of opvattingen oplichten in 
de manier waarover men over de materie schrijft en discussieert. Zo lijkt de algemene 
teneur te zijn dat de terugkeer van religie iets positiefs is en wordt dat hier en daar 
aangegrepen om het tekort van een seculiere benadering te bekritiseren. Voor een 
gelijkwaardig en transparant debat is het waardevol dit te benoemen en te onderkennen. 
Het is overigens niet vreemd dat het gebeurt: het gaat immers over religie en dat gaat 
vaak ook over onszelf.
Het is overigens opvallend dat de religionisten IB denkers ook verwijten dat ze er 
bevooroordeeld in staan. Zo wijzen zij erop dat er in binnen de IB bepaalde mythes in 
stand worden gehouden die veel weg hebben van een geseculariseerde eschatologie.
Door de kritiek van de religionisten is duidelijk dat zij een ander paradigma voor 
zich zien. Een paradigma waar oog is voor religie, niet alleen als set van opvattingen, 
maar ook als een sociale praktijk. Dit paradigma moet gebaseerd zijn op een andere visie 
op secularisatie dan nu dominant is. Bovendien lijken de religionisten de voorkeur te 
hebben voor een meer interpretatieve theorie.
Deel II: Ter verdediging van het ‘oude’ paradigma: ‘augustiniaanse 
momenten’ in IB
Nu de claim, de stellingen en de onderliggende argumenten van de religionisten 
duidelijk zijn, is het de vraag of hun claim stand houdt. In dit tweede deel ga ik na 
in hoeverre de verschillende stellingen van de religionisten en de daarbij behorende 
argumenten juist zijn. Daarbij kijk ik naar twee invloedrijke vertegenwoordigers van 
respectievelijk het klassieke realisme en het neorealisme. In de hoofdstukken vijf en zes 
zet ik respectievelijk uiteen hoe ik Morgenthau’s klassieke realisme interpreteer en in 
hoeverre de religionisten gelijk hebben. In de hoofdstukken zeven en acht presenteer 
ik achtereenvolgens Waltz’s neorealisme en de mate waarin de religionisten in dat geval 
hun claim kunnen staven. De rode lijn in mijn argumentatie is dat er in het politiek 
realisme augustiniaanse elementen aanwezig zijn die mee dienen te worden gewogen om 
een volledig beeld te krijgen. Deze invloed verloopt voornamelijk via de Amerikaanse 
theoloog Reinhold Niebuhr. De augustiniaanse invloeden worden zichtbaar als het 
gaat om de visie op de mens, de geschiedenis en de ethiek. We zijn hiermee op het 
terrein gekomen van de politieke theologie, omdat deze ideeën theologisch geïnspireerd 
zijn, maar toegepast worden op de politiek. Het is ook niet noodzakelijkerwijs zo dat 
Morgenthau of Waltz deze ideeën persoonlijk aanhangen.
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Hoofdstuk 5. De verborgen theologie van Morgenthau’s klassieke realisme
Morgenthau kan niet goed begrepen worden als er geen aandacht is voor de theologische 
invloeden op zijn politieke denken. Morgenthau gaat ervan uit dat de mens, zoals 
beschreven in het paradijsverhaal, de neiging heeft om vanuit hoogmoed zijn grenzen te 
overschrijden. De mens wil als God zijn, maar zijn menselijke conditie staat dat niet toe. 
Dit ‘zondige’ streven van de mens is zo verweven met de orde van de wereld dat er als 
gevolg daarvan een voortdurende strijd is tussen goed en kwaad en geen onvermijdelijke 
ontwikkeling naar het goede. De visie van Morgenthau op de geschiedenis hangt hier 
mee samen. Morgenthau ziet de menselijke tijd begrensd door Gods tijd. Dat betekent 
dat de vervulling van de geschiedenis uiteindelijk vanuit God komt en niet door de 
mens wordt bewerkt. Dat heeft weer gevolgen voor de ethiek. De mens moet op zoek 
gaan naar oplossingen die in deze tijd en context werken. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat het 
mindere kwaad de beste oplossing is in sommige situaties. In kort bestek zijn dit de 
uitgangspunten van Morgenthau’s politieke theologie en dat werkt door in zijn visie 
op de staat, macht, ethiek en het onderscheid tussen religie en politiek. Morgenthau is 
er vanuit zijn politieke theologie erg beducht voor dat de autonomie van de politieke 
sfeer niet wordt aangetast. Vanuit die gedachte is terughoudendheid ten aanzien van het 
betrekken van religieuze actoren bij Morgenthau te begrijpen.
Het klassiek realisme van Morgenthau benader ik primair vanuit zijn magnum opus 
Politics Among Nations uit 1948 dat vele herdrukken beleefde. Ik richt mij vooral op het 
eerste hoofdstuk waarin hij zijn zes principes van het politiek realisme uiteenzet. Dat 
betekent niet dat ik zijn andere werken niet in ogenschouw neem, maar ik behandel 
deze als aanvullend op Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau’s zes principes bevatten 
weinig expliciete empirische elementen. Die vinden we echter wel terug in de andere 
hoofdstukken van Politics Among Nations en zijn resterende werken. Hij heeft namelijk 
veel over actuele politieke vraagstukken heeft geschreven. Ik beschouw die bijdragen als 
het empirische deel van Morgenthau’s theorie.
In mijn weergave van zijn klassiek realisme benader ik die vanuit de volgorde van 
de zes realistische principes. Dat betekent dat ik Morgenthau’s klassiek realisme benader 
vanuit zijn ontologische en epistemologische aanname dat er constante objectieve 
rationele wetten zijn die ook door ons in meer of mindere mate gekend kunnen worden. 
Wetenschap is daarbij volgens Morgenthau slechts een van de manieren om hier iets 
over te zeggen, want religie en filosofie doen dat ook. Hij waarschuwt voor de neiging 
om de wetenschappelijke benadering bepalend te laten zijn. Morgenthau vindt namelijk 
dat politieke wetenschappen gebaseerd moeten zijn op een wereldbeschouwing waarin 
ook religie en filosofie een plek hebben.
Morgenthau’s opvatting van theorie is ideaaltypisch, wat betekent dat hij zijn 
theorie ziet als een reflectie op veronderstelde objectieve rationele wetten. Vanuit zijn 
ideaaltypische benadering denkt Morgenthau vanuit verschillende sferen, zoals de 
politieke, religieuze, economische en morele sfeer. Hij vindt dat een politieke theorie 
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zich moet beperken tot de politieke sfeer en de rationaliteit daarvan moet proberen 
bloot te leggen. Zij moet deze rationaliteit niet laten vertroebelen door de rationaliteit 
van andere sferen. Morgenthau komt op voor de eigenheid, de ‘autonomie’ van de 
politieke sfeer. Voor Morgenthau was het heel duidelijk dat de politieke sfeer in zijn tijd 
werd gekarakteriseerd door de belangen van natiestaten en dat macht daarin bepalend is. 
Hij merkt daarbij wel op dat nationaal belang in een andere tijd of cultuur een andere 
betekenis kan krijgen: het is in die zin contextbepaald. Volgens Morgenthau kan er een 
tijd aanbreken dat de natiestaat vervangen wordt door een andere, grotere eenheid.
Het is kenmerkend voor Morgenthau’s klassiek realisme dat het een theorie is over 
buitenlands beleid en dus gaat over het snijvlak van binnenlandse en internationale 
politiek. Het verschil tussen die beiden is echter dat in de internationale politiek een 
supranationale instelling ontbreekt, terwijl dat meestal wel aanwezig is op binnenlands 
niveau. Omdat buitenlands beleid gaat over het snijvlak tussen die twee, speelt moraal in 
Morgenthau’s denken ook een wat ambivalente rol. Dat betekent niet dat moraal afwezig 
is, want volgens Morgenthau is politiek realisme zich bewust van de morele significantie 
van politiek en de betekenis en het belang van universele morele normen. Morgenthau’s 
visie kan het best omschreven worden als tragisch. Hij erkent de noodzakelijkheid van 
macht, maar beseft dat politiek daar nooit mee kan volstaan. Hij erkent het bestaan van 
universele morele principes, maar weet ook dat de realisering daarvan afhankelijk is van 
de context waarin de verschillende belangen worden vormgegeven. Zo onderscheidt 
hij tussen wat individuen en staten in moreel opzicht van elkaar kunnen verwachten. 
Daarmee wil Morgenthau de spanning tussen de hoge morele eisen die aan individuen 
worden gesteld en hetgeen staten kunnen waarmaken niet teniet doen. Die spanning 
acht hij juist kenmerkend en fundamenteel voor het politieke domein. Tenslotte stelt 
Morgenthau dat politiek realisme kritisch is ten aanzien van de neiging van staten om 
hun nationaal belang te identificeren met een universele morele wet, want hij beschouwt 
het als afgoderij als staten dat doen.
Hoofdstuk 6. Religie in Morgenthau’s klassieke realisme: het is de theologie! 
De religionistische argumentatie houdt geen stand in het licht van Morgenthau’s klassiek 
realisme. Het blijkt namelijk dat de drie stellingen in het geval van Morgenthau maar 
beperkt opgaan. Ten aanzien van de empirische stelling geldt dat er overduidelijk bewijs 
is dat Morgenthau zich bewust was van de aanwezigheid van religie op de verschillende 
niveaus. Er is geen aanwijzing dat Morgenthau zich ook bewust was van een heropleving 
van religie. Het is niettemin veelzeggend dat hij zelfs zonder deze heropleving zich 
bewust was van de rol van religie in de wereld.
Als het gaat om de domein-specifieke stelling ligt het wat genuanceerder. Morgenthau 
schrijft wel over religie en moraal, doet zelfs theologische uitspraken, maar benadrukt 
voortdurend het onderscheid met de politieke sfeer waardoor er niet echt over een 
blinde vlek gesproken kan worden. Het is dan ook niet verwonderlijk dat de redenen die 
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religionisten aandragen om de absentie van religie in Morgenthau’s theorie te verklaren, 
nauwelijks van toepassing zijn. Zo stellen de religionisten dat Morgenthau de staat als 
centrale actor ziet die fungeert als een black box, en dat hij het nationaal belang definieert 
als macht. De religionisten hebben gelijk dat Morgenthau deze aannames huldigt met 
uitzondering van de black box assumptie, want dat is direct in tegenspraak met zijn zes 
principes. Het punt is dat Morgenthau duidelijk stelt dat deze aannames afhankelijk zijn 
van tijd en plaats. Het is dus in theorie mogelijk dat Morgenthau in de huidige tijd op 
basis van empirische gegevens tot een andere invulling van zijn assumpties zou komen. 
Het is lastig te beoordelen of Morgenthau het Westfaalse systeem inderdaad 
beschouwt als de opmaat naar de privatisering van religie, omdat hij er weinig over 
schrijft. In ieder geval heeft het er niet toe geleid dat hij daardoor het definiëren van het 
nationale belang als macht en de opkomende centrale rol van de staat als een proces van 
afnemende invloed van religie beschouwde. Integendeel, vanuit zijn politieke theologie 
was Morgenthau gekant tegen een strikte scheiding tussen religie en politiek, omdat het 
zou leiden tot een volledig geseculariseerde staat die zijn legitimatie aan zichzelf ontleent 
en niet aan religieuze openbaring. Tegen die achtergrond moet zijn pleidooi voor de 
staat en de autonomie van de politiek worden gezien. Voor Morgenthau belichaamde 
de huidige staat de verbinding met de christelijke morele orde. Hij beschouwde het als 
secularisering als de staat deze dualistische verhouding zou verbreken. Het zou namelijk 
leiden vereenzelviging van het nationale belang met de morele orde en daarmee tot 
een politieke religie zoals in het geval van het liberalisme, zeker als deze gemengd werd 
met bepaalde vormen van liberaal protestantisme. Het realisme van Morgenthau komt 
daarmee in verweer tegen al te utopische en eschatologische denkbeelden en biedt een 
politieke visie waarin de animositeit tussen verschillende werelden en de beperktheid 
van de politiek een gegeven is. 
De religionisten hebben gelijk als ze stellen dat Morgenthau de ideologische functie 
van religie vaak sterk benadrukt, maar dat is niet wat zijn zes principes kenmerkt. 
Daarnaast wordt in Morgenthau’s andere werken duidelijk dat hij helder onderscheid 
maakt tussen religie en de verwording en ideologisering daarvan. Daarmee vervalt 
dus het argument dat de invloed van de context van de Koude Oorlog zou leiden tot 
een ideologische benadering van religie. In sommige gevallen, zoals de invloed van de 
Verlichting en de moderniserings- en secularisatietheorie, is het zelfs zo dat Morgenthau 
bijkans het tegenovergestelde stelt van wat de religionisten denken dat hij beweert. 
Zo was Morgenthau erg kritisch op de Verlichting en verdedigt hij ten aanzien van 
de moderniserings- en seculariseringstheorie de blijvende betekenis van de religieuze 
menselijke impuls. Ten aanzien van het punt dat IB alleen de irrationele, institutionele 
en individuele aspecten van religie benadrukt, geldt dat de zes principes daar geen 
aanleiding voor geven. De verdere geschriften van Morgenthau laten juist zien dat 
Morgenthau de andere aspecten van religie ook in ogenschouw nam.
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Ook in andere gevallen gaat de kritiek van de religionisten nauwelijks op. Zo is 
heel duidelijk dat Morgenthau op geen enkele manier als een positivist beschouwd kan 
worden. Het verwijt van de religionisten dat Morgenthau een materialist zou zijn, is ook 
niet correct, omdat hij duidelijk stelt dat belangen zowel materieel als ideëel kunnen 
zijn.
Kortom, de claim van de religionisten kan in casu Morgenthau niet worden 
gehandhaafd. Overigens is met dit assessment niet gezegd dat de claim van de religionisten 
niet waar zou kunnen zijn: ik heb alleen aangetoond dat de redenen die zij aandragen te 
zwak zijn. Morgenthau zelf stond namelijk open voor nieuwe empirische gegevens die 
tot bijstelling of aanvulling van zijn theorie zouden leiden, dus dat zou ook in dit geval 
kunnen gebeuren. Of dat ook mogelijk is met betrekking tot zijn politiek-theologische 
vertrekpunten, is nog maar de vraag.
Hoofdstuk 7. Waltz’s neorealisme: politiek realisme in een wetenschappelijke 
jas
Het neorealisme van Waltz is aanzienlijk gemakkelijker te behappen dan Morgenthau’s 
klassiek realisme, omdat het voornamelijk is gebaseerd is op twee boeken, namelijk Man, 
the State and War (1959) en Theory of International Politics (1979), en een reeks artikelen. 
In die boeken en artikelen beperkt Waltz zich voornamelijk tot het uiteenzetten van zijn 
theorie. Waltz is vooral een theoreticus, waardoor in zijn publicaties de meeste aandacht 
uitgaat naar de domein-specifieke en wetenschapsfilosofische van zijn theorie.
Evenals bij Morgenthau heeft Waltz via Niebuhr invloed ondergaan van Augustinus. 
Hij deelt dus in beginsel de politieke theologie van Morgenthau ten aanzien van de mens, 
de geschiedenis en de ethiek. Hij gaat ook uit van de mens als iemand die probeert als 
God te zijn, maar die in zijn streven de oorzaak is van kwaad. Als gevolg daarvan verzet 
hij zich tegen het streven naar een perfecte aardse vrede. De geschiedenis wordt door hem 
getekend als plaats van menselijke vrijheid en creativiteit, maar ook van destructie en 
chaos. Dat leidt bij hem, net zoals bij Morgenthau, tot een gematigde ethiek waarin het 
streven naar een beetje meer gerechtigheid en vrijheid te verkiezen is boven een politiek 
die tot een beetje minder hiervan leidt. Het verschil is alleen dat bij Waltz deze politieke 
theologie verder seculariseert. In plaats van terug te grijpen op Niebuhr, komt daarvoor 
Spinoza in de plaats. Daarmee snijdt hij de lijn naar theologie als het ware door en 
dat geeft hem een zogenaamde stevigere (want minder theologische) wetenschappelijke 
basis. Ik zie dit echter als secularisering waarbij theologie wordt voortgezet met andere 
middelen. Want Waltz’s theorie is uiteindelijk in zijn uitwerking trouw aan de politieke 
theologie van het politiek realisme en werkt dit uit in onder andere een bescheiden 
opvatting over wat wetenschap vermag en de mate waarin een waardenvrije politieke 
theorie eigenlijk mogelijk is.
Het neorealisme zie ik als een poging om binnen het wetenschappelijke discours 
van IB zoveel mogelijk van de politiek realisme te bewaren. Bij die poging is er sprake 
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van continuïteit en discontinuïteit. De continuïteit bestaat daaruit dat Waltz evenals 
Morgenthau probeert de autonomie van het politieke domein te handhaven. Hij doet 
dat op basis van inhoudelijke en theoretische overwegingen. De inhoudelijke reden 
is dat hij, zoals Morgenthau ook al aangaf, het binnenlands domein ziet als van een 
ander karakter dan het internationale domein. In het laatste domein is als gevolg 
van het ontbreken van supranationaal gezag sprake van anarchie: elke staat is er op 
uit zijn relatieve machtspositie te verstevigen. Het is om theoretische redenen (o.a. 
parsimoniteit) dat Waltz besluit zijn theorie van de internationale politiek te beperken 
tot het internationale domein. Binnen het politieke domein beschouwt Waltz het als een 
kenmerkende wetmatigheid dat staten willen overleven door hun relatieve machtspositie 
te verbeteren.
Evenals Morgenthau heeft Waltz een tragische opvatting over internationale politiek. 
Staten kunnen naar van alles streven, zoals vrijheid en rechtvaardigheid, maar als zij de 
wens om te overleven negeren, zijn ze een speelbal van andere landen. Daarom ziet 
Waltz de machtsverdeling tussen staten als de belangrijkste indicator om het gedrag 
van staten te verklaren. Net zoals bij Morgenthau zijn bij Waltz politiek-theologische 
assumpties niet ver weg. Waar Morgenthau waarschuwt tegen zelfvergoddelijking van 
staten, waarschuwt Waltz langs theoretische weg voor het streven naar een betere wereld 
zonder inachtneming van de zelfzuchtigheid en hubris van mensen zoals die tot uiting 
komt in gedrag van staten.
De discontinuïteit bestaat daaruit dat Waltz zich strikt beperkt tot internationale 
politiek en dus geen theorie ontwikkelt voor het buitenlands beleid. Daarnaast benadrukt 
Waltz dat zijn theorie empirisch en wetenschappelijk is en daarmee niet normatief, 
hoewel dat laatste betwijfeld kan worden. Verder kiest Waltz radicaler dan Morgenthau 
voor een theorie die voldoet aan natuurwetenschappelijke eisen zoals verklaringskracht 
en eenvoud.
Hoofdstuk 8. Religie in het neorealisme: het is de theorie!
De religionisten hebben ten aanzien van Waltz’s neorealisme een aanzienlijk sterker 
verhaal dan ten aanzien van Morgenthau’s klassiek realisme, omdat de drie stellingen 
meer hout snijden. Ten aanzien van de empirische stelling geldt dat er in het werk 
van Waltz passages zijn aan te wijzen waar hij aandacht besteedt aan religie op het 
individuele, nationale en internationale niveau. De schamele passages waarin Waltz over 
religie schrijft, zijn echter geen systematische verhandelingen die direct voortvloeien uit 
Waltz’s theoretiseren. Hoewel Waltz later leefde dan Morgenthau en in die zin getuige 
had kunnen zijn van de zogenaamde terugkeer van religie, refereert hij er nergens aan. 
Ondanks het feit dat de religionisten ongelijk hebben dat Waltz niets met religie doet, 
moet ik ze gelijk geven dat Waltz’s aandacht voor religie de facto afwezig is.
De religionisten hebben gelijk dat Waltz’s neorealisme beïnvloed is door de 
Verlichting en dat hij daardoor religie niet incorporeert. In zijn theoretiseren scheidt hij 
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geloof en rede en beperkt de rede tot dat wat empirisch vastgesteld kan worden. Waltz’s 
positie wordt duidelijk als hij stelt dat de seculiere verklaring van Spinoza de voorheen 
theologische verklaring van menselijk gedrag kan vervangen. Met deze redenering komt 
Waltz dicht in de buurt van de moderniserings- en secularisatietheorie: waarom zou je 
iets wat door een seculiere verklaring vervangen is of kan worden, nog bestuderen?
De religionisten hebben ongelijk ten aanzien van de Koude Oorlog context en de 
reductie van religie. Om met dat laatste te beginnen, er is nergens aanleiding om te 
concluderen dat Waltz in de paar keren dat hij religie definieert deze reduceert tot iets 
irrationeels, institutioneels of individueels. Wat betreft de Koude Oorlog context geldt 
dat het onmiskenbaar zo is dat Waltz’s theoretiseren beïnvloed is door de bipolariteit 
van de Koude Oorlog context, maar niet zozeer vanwege de seculariteit van beide 
machtsblokken. Waltz maakt in zijn denken namelijk wel degelijk onderscheid tussen 
religie en ideologie. Dit maakt in zijn theorie echter geen verschil, omdat ze beide vallen 
onder de eigenschappen van de staat. Deze eigenschappen doen er op het niveau van de 
staat wel toe, maar Waltz formuleert een theorie van het internationale systeem.
De religionisten hebben maar ten dele gelijk wat betreft de invloed van het 
Westfaalse systeem. Zo is er onvoldoende grond om te concluderen dat Waltz dit als 
de privatisering van religie zag. Wel is het zo dat Waltz duidelijk de centraliteit van de 
staat onderschrijft. Dit doet hij op empirische gronden: hij heeft een onderzoek gedaan 
naar interdependentie en de rol van de staat. Daarnaast maakt hij deze keuze ook om 
theoretische redenen: de staat is volgens hem de meest betekenisvolle actor. Het is waar 
dat Walt het nationaal belang ontdoet van moraal. Niet omdat het niet relevant zou 
zijn, maar omdat hij een verklarende theorie wil. Waltz is zich er van bewust dat tal 
van overwegingen een rol spelen bij staatshoofden, maar dat behoort tot het nationale 
niveau. Op het internationale niveau worden deze overwegingen overheerst door de wil 
om te overleven en worden ze door Waltz te onbelangrijk gevonden om op te nemen in 
een theorie met zoveel mogelijk verklaringskracht.
De religionisten hebben slechts gedeeltelijk gelijk dat Waltz’s neorealisme 
positivistisch is in die zin dat Waltz een theologische verklaring afwijst en zich beperkt 
tot een wetenschappelijke verklaring. Toch is Waltz van mening dat religie en theologie 
wel inspirerend kunnen zijn voor theorieën. Dat is immers bij Waltz zelf ook het 
geval: bepaalde theologische noties van Niebuhr hebben zijn theoretiseren duidelijk 
gestempeld. Hij heeft deze echter geseculariseerd door er een psychologische invulling 
aan te geven en de anarchische situatie tussen landen hiervoor als verklaringsgrond aan 
te dragen. Een tweede indicatie dat Waltz’s neorealisme inderdaad positivistisch is, blijkt 
uit het feit dat hij gelooft dat er een verklaringsmodel mogelijk is voor zowel de fysische 
als de sociale wereld. Hij onderschrijft daarentegen niet de scheiding tussen waarden 
en feiten alsof wetenschappers neutraal zijn. Hetzelfde geldt voor de positivistische 
assumptie dat er een rationaliteit bestaat onafhankelijk van context. 
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De gedachte dat Waltz’s neorealisme materialistisch is en daarom religie 
veronachtzaamt, is in zoverre waar dat Waltz erkent dat materiële factoren meer gewicht 
in de schaal leggen. Dit is echter geen ontologische stellingname, alsof Waltz alles zou 
willen reduceren tot materie, maar een epistemologisch vertrekpunt. Waltz merkt 
namelijk op dat de context bepaalt welke hulpbronnen de staat uiteindelijk aanwendt 
om haar positie verstevigen. Dat hoeven niet alleen materiële factoren te zijn. Tenslotte 
hebben de religionisten gelijk dat Waltz een holist is en dat hij daardoor religie niet 
incorporeert. Waltz kiest er namelijk voor om het individuele en nationale niveau geen 
onderdeel te maken van zijn theorie. Hij erkent echter wel dat op die niveaus religie een 
rol speelt, maar ziet niet voor zich hoe deze drie niveaus in een theorie kunnen worden 
opgenomen, wil het nog een goede theorie zijn.
De religionisten hebben in het geval van Waltz overtuigend duidelijk kunnen 
maken dat Waltz op empirisch niveau religie geen aandacht geeft, en dat hiervoor op 
het domein-specifieke en wetenschapsfilosofische niveau oorzaken voor aan te wijzen 
zijn. Tegelijkertijd hebben ze op even zoveel punten ongelijk, omdat ze belangrijke 
overwegingen van inhoudelijke (overlevingsdrang van staten) en theoretische (noodzaak 
theorie) aard over het hoofd zien. Waltz’s neorealisme geeft de religionisten een stevige 
huiswerkopdracht mee, namelijk de vraag welke rol theorie eigenlijk speelt in het 
denken over religie in de wereld. Waltz’s neorealisme wordt uitgedaagd, omdat zijn 
theorie niet in staat blijkt een empirische ontwikkeling te verklaren, terwijl die volgens 
de religionisten zo duidelijk aanwezig is in de wereld.
Conclusie Deel II. Politiek realistisch denken maakt een nieuw paradigma 
overbodig
De claim van de religionisten staat of valt met de mate waarin ze in staat zijn hun 
claim met argumenten te onderbouwen. Op basis van mijn assessment blijkt echter dat 
de religionisten behoorlijk vaak de plank misslaan. Dat heeft verschillende oorzaken, 
waaronder een oppervlakkige kennisneming van deze politiek realistische denkers, maar 
ook het over het hoofd zien van de bepaalde politiek-theologische ideeën die ook bij 
Morgenthau en Waltz op de achtergrond meespelen. Een ander belangrijk punt is dat 
er vergeten wordt dat het voor Waltz belangrijk is om goed na te denken over wat een 
theorie precies vermag. Wat is een goede theorie en welke verklaringskracht moet een 
theorie hebben? Dat is een punt waar de religionisten eigenlijk niet goed over nagedacht 
hebben. Mijn conclusie is dan ook dat het op dit moment te prematuur is om een nieuw 
paradigma na te streven. Er is zowel bij de religionisten als bij de politiek realisten nog 
wel wat huiswerk te doen.
Deel III: Balans, diagnose en de normatieve praktijken benadering als 
wenkend perspectief
In het laatste deel van mijn proefschrift evalueer ik de inbreng van de religionisten 
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enerzijds en de politiek realisten anderzijds. Daarnaast probeer ik een diagnose te stellen 
van het debat over religie en internationale politiek met daarbij ook een aantal suggesties 
voor een volgende stap. Als voorzet presenteer ik vervolgens een benadering, die enerzijds 
recht doet aan de sterke punten van beide partijen en anderzijds de zwaktes repareert.
Hoofdstuk 9. Balans, evaluatie en diagnose van het debat tussen 
religionisten en politiek realisten
In dit hoofdstuk vat ik alle standpunten nog een keer samen in een schematisch 
overzicht. Vervolgens zet ik de sterke en zwakke punten van de verschillende posities 
nog een keer op een rij. Ik zal dat hier niet herhalen, maar de stap maken richting een 
diagnose. Allereerst is door mijn reconstructie van de positie van de religionisten en 
het debat met de politiek realisten duidelijk geworden hoe onoverzichtelijk het debat 
tot nu toe was. De verschillende niveaus liepen door elkaar heen. Bovendien werd het 
levensbeschouwelijke niveau vaak vergeten, terwijl dat ondertussen wel doorwerkt in 
het debat. In de tweede plaats is er door de verschillende partijen niet goed nagedacht 
over de verhouding tussen de verschillende niveaus. Hoe werken opvattingen op het 
wetenschapsfilosofische niveau door richting het domein-specifieke en empirische 
niveau en vice versa? Als derde wordt er geen scherp onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
een wetenschappelijke, religieuze en theologische verklaring. De religionisten maken 
nauwelijks onderscheid tussen een religieuze en een wetenschappelijke verklaring en 
verwarren dat laatste soms met een theologische. IB denkers (met name Waltz) zijn 
geneigd zich tot een strikt wetenschappelijke verklaring te beperken en sluiten een 
religieuze, laat staan een theologische, verklaring uit. Vanwege deze verschillen van 
opvatting over wat wetenschappelijk is, komt men uit op verschillende standpunten ten 
aanzien van de rol van religie in de wereld. Vanuit een strikt (natuur)wetenschappelijk 
perspectief is religie namelijk moeilijk te theoretiseren. Een wetenschappelijk perspectief 
dat breder is dan de natuurwetenschappelijke benadering en de gangbare sociale 
wetenschappen en dus ook ruimte biedt voor een verklaring in religieus vocabulaire, 
zou veel gemakkelijker ruimte kunnen bieden aan religie. In de vierde plaats is niet 
altijd duidelijk of de religionisten meer aandacht voor religie willen om zodoende de 
internationale betrekkingen beter te kunnen begrijpen of dat men de rol van religie in 
de internationale verhoudingen beter wil begrijpen. Met andere woorden: wat is het 
studieobject precies? Ten vijfde speelt er voortdurend een verschil van mening een rol in 
de discussie omdat een meer naturalistische benadering wordt uitgespeeld tegen een meer 
constructivistische benadering. Maar deze tegenstelling is niet nodig. Het is heel goed 
mogelijk deze benaderingen als complementair te zien. Als laatste wordt er weinig over 
(politieke) theologie gesproken. Dan kan samenhangen met het derde punt hierboven. 
Ondertussen vallen er op het politiek-theologische niveau wel veel beslissingen.
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Hoofdstuk 10. Een nieuw christelijk realisme: de normatieve praktijken 
benadering als wenkend perspectief
Om het debat verder te helpen doe ik een voorzet voor een benadering die tegemoet komt 
aan de geschetste problemen hierboven. Deze benadering is de zogenaamde normatieve 
praktijken benadering zoals die binnen de christelijke filosofie is ontwikkeld. Vanuit 
deze optiek wordt de internationale betrekkingen beschouwd als een praktijk met een 
eigen normativiteit. Het komt daarmee tegemoet aan hetgeen Morgenthau en Waltz 
beogen met de benadering van de internationale politiek als een eigen domein waarin 
bepaalde wetmatigheden van kracht zijn. Deze benadering is echter qua theoretische 
gerichtheid niet zo rigide als Waltz’s neorealisme waardoor religie geen kans krijgt een 
rol te spelen, maar meer in lijn met de ideaaltypische benadering van Morgenthau. 
De normatieve praktijken benadering deelt echter met beide denkers de opvatting 
dat theoretiseren niet neutraal is en altijd beïnvloed wordt door bepaalde waarden. 
De normatieve praktijken benadering komt ook tegemoet aan de wens van Waltz 
om een theorie te formuleren waarin alle drie de niveaus–het individuele, nationale 
en internationale niveau–een rol spelen. De internationale politieke praktijk wordt 
voornamelijk ontsloten door regeringsleiders die leiding geven aan staten. Daarnaast 
heeft de normatieve praktijkenbenadering oog voor de verschillende manieren waarop 
religie een rol speelt.
Religieuze actoren spelen een rol in de internationale betrekkingen praktijk, omdat 
de context hiervan gekenmerkt wordt door een veelheid aan instituties, waaronder de 
staat en niet-statelijke actoren. Sommige van deze instituties zijn religieus van aard. 
Deelnemers aan de internationale betrekkingen praktijk participeren in deze instituties. 
Van deze instituties is de staat een van de belangrijkste actoren en dat bepaalt ook de 
mate van invloed die religieuze instituties hebben. Religieuze actoren opereren in een 
context van rivaliserende staten.
Ik stelde dat de context er een is van rivaliserende staten, maar daar is niet alles 
mee gezegd. Het maakt nogal uit hoe er naar de internationale betrekkingen gekeken 
wordt, zowel door de beoefenaars als degene die het bestuderen. Gaat het alleen maar 
om macht en overleven, of staat macht ten dienste van het recht? Bij het beantwoorden 
van deze vraag speelt ook wereldbeschouwing mee. Dat verklaart deels het verschil 
tussen Niebuhr, Morgenthau en Waltz. Bij Niebuhr is de spanning tussen de eis van 
rechtvaardigheid enerzijds en de machtsrealiteit anderzijds steeds aanwezig, terwijl 
Morgenthau deze spanning afvlakt en Waltz het bijna opheft. Vanuit de normatieve 
praktijkenbenadering stel ik dat de spanning aanwezig is in de praktijk zelf en dat je ook 
niet zonder kunt. Macht is in die zin funderend voor de praktijk. Tegelijkertijd kan het 
nooit de praktijk kwalificeren, omdat ook staten uiteindelijk onderworpen zijn aan de 
plicht om rechtvaardigheid na te streven.
Maar hoe belangrijk zijn dan die religieuze wereldbeschouwingen en overtuigingen 
in de internationale betrekkingen praktijk? Vanuit de normatieve praktijkenbenadering 
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stel ik dat ze conditionerend zijn. Dat betekent dat ze van invloed zijn op de manier 
waarop bijvoorbeeld macht en rechtvaardigheid zich tot elkaar verhouden, uitgeoefend 
of nagestreefd worden. Het is uiteindelijk dus aan de beoefenaars van de internationale 
betrekkingen praktijk hoe deze praktijk zich ontwikkelt. Daarin speelt hun (religieuze) 
wereldbeschouwing een belangrijke rol. Overigens hoeft de invloed van religieuze 
wereldbeschouwingen niet direct te herleiden te zijn tot een persoon. Het kan ook tot 
uiting komen in een bepaalde cultuur of dominante levensfilosofie. Uiteraard gaat het 
ook niet alleen om de religieuze wereldbeschouwing van de praktijkbeoefenaars, maar 
er wordt van hen ook verwacht dat ze bepaalde technische vaardigheden bezitten om 
diplomatie te bedrijven.
Conclusie  Deel III: Samenspannende landen en religie: een oproep tot 
kalmte, moed en onderscheidingsvermogen
Met de normatieve praktijkenbenadering is geprobeerd tegemoet te komen aan de 
lacunes in de discussie over religie en internationale betrekkingen. Het laat zien dat 
internationale betrekkingen een praktijk is waar religie een rol speelt en het is aan de 
professionals in die praktijk om daar zo wijs mogelijk mee om te gaan. Dat vraagt 
enerzijds religieuze geletterdheid om te weten welke rol religie precies speelt. Anderzijds 




Chapter 1. Introduction: The Necessity of  a New Religion Paradigm in 
International Relations and the Possible Contribution of  Christian 
Philosophy 
Since the early 1990s, a group of scholars has criticized International Relations 
(IR). They argue that  the field wrongly ignores the role of religion in international 
relations.  The consequences of this could be dramatic: inadequate theories lead  to 
inadequate policies. If the United States had taken the role and significance of religion 
seriously, for example, the 1979 Iranian Revolution would not have been a complete 
surprise. This group of scientists therefore advocates that more attention should be paid 
to the role of religion within IR. To make that possible, existing theories would have to 
be replaced or adapted. In my dissertation I examine the claim of this group of scientists, 
whom I call religionists for the sake of convenience. I ask the question to what extent 
the claim of the religionists makes sense and what the consequences are for IR.
In order to answer this question, I first investigate what the religionist argument is 
about (Part I). Secondly, I test to what extent the religionists are correct in the case of the 
most criticized and dominant school within IR, namely political realism. Does realism 
indeed ignore religion and does it do so for the reasons the religionists put forward 
(Part II)? Thirdly, I examine the consequences of the answers to the previous questions 
for IR. Should IR be revised or is there another alternative (Part III)? 
The view that religion should be incorporated into IR is based on three theses. 
The empirical thesis is that religion plays such a significant role in the world that IR 
cannot ignore it and should incorporate it. The second assertion is that IR has a clear 
bias because of which it does not see religion. The third statement concerns the way 
in which IR thinks about matters of philosophy of science. Although the statements 
stand on their own, there is a clear relationship between them.  Assumptions made 
at the level of philosophy of science have an impact on the domain-specific level and 
ultimately also on the empirical level. Of course, this influence can also take place in 
the opposite direction.  Based on the ideas of the Amsterdam School of Philosophy, 
however, I add a fourth level, namely the worldview level. This is necessary to clarify 
the discussion.  Worldview assumptions play a role in the discussion, which have 
an impact on the three levels mentioned. 
A worldview is made up of beliefs on the one hand and a personal ultimate commitment 
on the other. Both elements can reinforce each other. Beliefs can be rationally defended, 
but are also beliefs someone is personally committed to. A worldview can be secular, 
quasi-secular or religious in nature. In the first case, no transcendent orientation point 
is assumed. A quasi-secular worldview has similarities with a religious worldview, but 
ultimately the goal is an immanent reality. Once a quasi-religious worldview takes on 
public or political aspirations, it can become an ideology or political religion. A religious 
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worldview has a transcendent reality as its point of reference. The different kinds of 
worldviews play a role in the debate consciously or unconsciously, for example, when 
certain political-theological views are held.  These are ideas that come from theology 
(the academic discipline that studies religious worldviews)  or  come from a religious 
worldview and are applied to the political realm. 
Besides their role in IR, worldviews also play a role in international relations 
itself. For example, certain ideologies or political religions with a quasi-secular character 
determine the behavior of people and actors. By involving the worldview level, I show 
the various ways religion can play a role. Religion presupposes a religious worldview, 
but it is often understood as a the communities that hold certain religious practices. 
Therefore, I define religion as the personal commitment to a set of beliefs about the 
ultimate ground of existence, a transcendent reference point, and the communities and 
practices that form around and follow from these beliefs. Religion includes the religious 
worldview and the practices that follow from it. When I speak of the role of religion in 
international relations, I am referring to the above. But I also point out the influence of 
religious, quasi-religious and secular worldviews. Religion is often perceived as e clearly 
defined category, while in practice it is very layered and manifests itself in subtle ways. 
Sometimes apparently secular movements of ideas appear more ‘religious’ then they 
seem at first sight. A worldview perspective brings this to light.              
Part I: A Critical Reconstruction of  the Position of  the Religionists 
In this part, the three propositions of the religionists are explained one by one. It also 
examines what ideological elements may be hinted at in these statements. 
Chapter 2. The Empirical Base of  the Paradigm Challenge: The Global 
Resurgence of  Religion 
The religionists justify their thesis on the importance of religion in IR with the observation 
that religion has experienced a revival since the 1960s. They offer various explanations for 
this, such as the globalization process, the increased interest of academics in religion, the 
rise of radical Islam and the influence of modernity on non-Western societies. Although 
these explanations are quite diverse, together they provide sufficient evidence for the 
religionists to support their position: since the 1960s something has really changed 
regarding religion in the world and IR needs to pay attention to this. The religionists 
then substantiate their position by showing that religion is actually present everywhere.
• individual level (government leaders, policymakers and diplomats which directly 
or indirectly shaped by religious considerations)
• national level (via  religiously inspired civil society organizations 
or  political  parties,  or by governments that explicitly commit themselves 
to a particular (state) religion);
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• transnational level (missionary activities, religious terrorism, non-governmental 
organizations such as World Vision, World Conference of Religion and Peace or  
Opus Dei);
• international level (the Holy See with diplomatic relations in 168 countries) .             
Chapter 3. The ‘Religion-Blindness’ of  the Old Paradigm: The Dominance 
of  the Westphalian System
According to the religionists, there are a number of domain-specific assumptions that lead 
to a bias with regard to religion. The main reason is that IR is based on Westphalian 
assumptions:  the idea that the state is the central  actor, that the national interest is 
defined as power and that the domestic domain is seen as irrelevant. These three ideas 
are strengthened by a fourth one, namely that IR identifies the Westphalian system as 
the moment that religion was sidelined, marginalized or privatized because it threatens 
public order. As a result, the Cold War was analyzed and interpreted as a competition 
between two secular ideologies. Religious conflicts or phenomena were analyzed within 
this secular framework, thereby overlooking the role of religion. 
The religionists not only argue that these assumptions are no longer true because 
the world has changed, they also present an alternative view of this process. They also 
see Westphalia as a secularization process but appreciate it differently.  They call this 
approach neosecularization theory, which understands secularization as a change of the 
institutional place of religion. Secularization does not mean that there are fewer believers 
or that religion plays a less prominent role in the public domain. Rather, religion has taken 
on a different shape. Whereas previously the legitimacy of social institutions depended 
on a  supernatural framework, today they are legitimized by empirical and rational 
criteria. These criteria, however, came into being within a religious or a Christian context 
and as such they are still indebted to it. The secular is such a category: it presupposes 
the use of language in which the religious and any references to it are absent, but it 
does not mean that it is hostile towards religion. The religionists do not develop this 
neosecularization theory further in relation to the role of the state and the national 
interest, but it is not difficult to imagine that they see this as a more religion-friendly 
development than current IR trends. With this theoretical framework, religion does not 
have to be at odds with the state, the national interest, security or power.
Chapter 4. The Dominance of  Naturalistic Thinking in the Genesis of  the 
Old Paradigm
At the level of philosophy of science,  there are  several causes that contribute 
to the marginalization of religion.  First of all, there is the influence of 
the Enlightenment. According to the religionists, the Enlightenment ensured that faith 
and reason were separated. Subsequently, religion was reduced to an irrational form of 
knowledge consisting of moral rules, and reason was narrowed to that which can be 
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(naturally) scientifically known. As a result, religion became increasingly marginalized 
and privatized. According to the religionists, this is reflected in IR, as religion is only 
considered significant as a form of soft power, inferior to hard power such as military 
and economic power. 
A further product of Enlightenment thinking is the development of the so-
called modernization and secularization theory. This theory was dominant in the social 
sciences for many years, and according to the religionists, was strongly influential on 
IR.  IR has long assumed that religion would disappear by itself. The religionists point 
out that  through the course of time this theory has now been proven incorrect. The 
other argument of the religionists is that IR is based on materialism. As a result, IR sees 
the observable reality as a reflection of material causes. Within IR, this leads to religion 
being reduced to a material phenomenon, the same as military might, geography and 
natural resources.  In addition to materialism, the religionists also point to holism 
for the marginalization of religion. Holism explains the behavior of individual actors 
from the perspective of the larger whole and the structural and material forces of the 
system. Religion is easily overlooked in this top-down approach. 
First, positivism ensures that in the development of theories one strives for 
maximum explanatory power by analogy with theories in the  natural sciences.  As a 
result, religion and culture are not included in theorizing. Second, positivism would 
assume a rationality that is valid regardless of context. The result of this is that idealistic 
factors, such as religion and culture, and their historical manifestations, are not 
taken into account. Third, in relation to positivism, the secularization of the concepts 
is rampant.  Many concepts within IR were of theological origin, but the influence 
of positivism and behavioralism meant that theological concepts had to give way to 
social scientific concepts and methods. According to the religionists, this has led to less 
attention being paid to religion. 
Finally, the religionists argue that IR reduces religion to an irrational, individual 
and institutional phenomenon. As a result, IR would neglect the rational, collective and 
ideational side of religion. This view of religion leads to a flawed view of the real role of 
religion, according to the religionists.                
Conclusion Part I. Contours of  a New Paradigm? 
The religionists present much convincing empirical material to show that religion plays 
a role everywhere–a point that IR should take seriously. Unfortunately, the religionists 
fail to show how exactly religion is different from many other factors at play and why 
religion is so distinctive that it deserves separate treatment. When it comes to criticism 
of the Westphalian system, the religionists not  only  denounce but also put forward 
an alternative view of secularization. In addition, they not only criticize certain views 
within IR for diminishing religion, but they also demonstrate that these views, such 
as the central role of the state, are no longer concurrent with the state of affairs in 
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research.  Unfortunately, in the case of the Enlightenment, they mainly criticize and 
overlook moderate variants of the historical movement.
It is noticeable that the religionist language and use of terms are not always as 
objective as they seem. For example, the general tendency among the religionists is that 
the return of religion is something positive. They often use this to criticize the omissions 
of secular approaches.  It is valuable to identify and acknowledge this influence for a 
transparent debate. It is striking that the religionists also accuse IR thinkers of being 
biased. For example, they point out that certain myths are perpetuated within the IB 
that resemble a secularized eschatology. It is clear from the criticism of the religionists 
that they envision a different paradigm. A paradigm that pays attention to religion, not 
only as a set of ideas, but also as a social practice. This paradigm must be based on a 
different view of secularization than is currently dominant. Moreover, the religionists 
seem to prefer a more interpretative theory.             
Part II: In Defense of  the ‘Old’ Paradigm: ‘Augustinian Moments’ in IR 
In the second part, I examine to what extent  the position of the religionists and the 
associated arguments are correct. In addition, I look at two influential representatives 
of classical  realism and neorealism.  In chapters  five  and  six respectively,  I explain 
how I interpret Morgenthau’s classical realism and to what extent the religionists are 
correct with their criticism. In chapters seven and eight I successively present Waltz’s 
neorealism and the extent to which the religionists can substantiate their claims about 
the theory.  My argument is that there are Augustinian  elements  present  in political 
realism which should be weighed in a complete picture of the school of thought. This 
Augustinian influence enters IR through the American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
and becomes visible in his view on human nature, history, and ethics. This brings us 
into the realm of political theology, because these ideas are theologically inspired but 
applied to politics, even though Morgenthau or Waltz do not personally adhere to these 
ideas necessarily.                
Chapter 5. The Hidden Theology of  Morgenthau’s Classical Realism 
Morgenthau  cannot be  properly understood without attention to the theological 
influences on his political thought. Morgenthau assumes that human beings, as described 
in the paradise story, have a tendency to exceed their limits out of pride. Human beings 
want to be like God, but their human condition does not allow it. This sinful pursuit of 
man is so intertwined with the order of the world that as a result there is a constant struggle 
between good and evil with no inevitable development towards good. Morgenthau’s view 
of history is grounded in this conception of human nature. Morgenthau sees human 
time limited by God’s time. That means that the fulfillment of history ultimately comes 
from God and not from human beings, which in turn has implications for ethics. People 
must look for solutions that work in this time and context. This can lead to the lesser 
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evil being the best solution in some situations. Briefly, these are the starting points of 
Morgenthau’s political theology which are reflected in his vision of the state, power, ethics 
and the distinction between religion and politics. On the basis of his political theology, 
Morgenthau is very concerned that the autonomy of politics will be affected. From this 
point of view, Morgenthau’s reticence regarding the involvement of religious actors is 
understandable. 
I approach the classic realism of Morgenthau primarily from his magnum opus Politics 
Among Nations. I mainly focus on the first chapter in which he explains his six principles 
of political realism.  I do consider his other works, but I treat them as complementary 
to Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau’s six principles contain little explicit empirical 
elements. They are, however, present in the other chapters of Politics Among Nations and 
his remaining works . Morgenthau has written extensively on current political issues. I 
regard those contributions as the empirical part of Morgenthau’s theory. 
I follow the order of the six realistic principles. This means that I approach Morgenthau’s 
classical realism  from his  ontological and  epistemological  assumption  that  there 
are constant objective rational  laws that can be known by us,  to a greater or lesser 
extent. Morgenthau believes that political science should be based on a worldview in 
which religion and philosophy also have a place. Morgenthau’s conception of theory 
is  ideal-typical, meaning that he sees his theory as a reflection on supposed objective 
rational laws.  He distinguishes different spheres, including a political, religious, 
economic, and moral sphere.  He believes that a political theory should  limit itself 
to the political sphere and try to expose its rationality . It must not allow this rationality 
to be clouded by the rationality of other spheres. Morgenthau defends the autonomy of 
the  political  sphere.  It was  very clear to  Morgenthau  that the political sphere in his 
time  was  characterized by the interests of nation-states  and that power within them 
was decisive. He notes, however, that national interest can acquire a different meaning 
in a different time or culture. According to Morgenthau, the time may come when the 
nation-state will be replaced by another, larger unit. It is characteristic of Morgenthau’s 
classical realism that it is a theory of foreign policy and thus deals with the intersection 
of domestic and international politics. The difference between the two, however, is that 
there is no  supranational  institution  in international politics, while this is usually 
present at the domestic level. Since foreign policy is about the interface between the two, 
morality also plays a somewhat ambivalent role in Morgenthau’s thinking. This does not 
mean that morality is absent, as according to Morgenthau, political realism is aware of 
the  moral significance of politics  and  the meaning and  the  importance of universal 
moral standards. Morgenthau’s vision can best be described as tragic. He recognizes the 
necessity of power, but realizes that politics can never be sufficient. He recognizes the 
existence of universal moral principles, but also knows that their realization depends 
on the context in which the various interests are shaped. He considers this tension to 
be characteristic and fundamental to the political domain. Finally, Morgenthau argues 
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that political realism is critical of the tendency of states to identify their national interest 
with a universal moral law, which he considers idolatry.             
Chapter 6. Religion in Morgenthau’s Classical Realism: It Is the Theology! 
The religionist claim and argument does not hold up in light of Morgenthau’s classical 
realism. It turns out that in the case of Morgenthau, the three propositions hold only 
to a limited extent.  With regard to the empirical thesis, there is clear  evidence that 
Morgenthau was aware of the presence of religion at the various  levels.  There is no 
indication that Morgenthau was also aware of a  revival  of religion.  It is nevertheless 
significant  that even without this  revival, he was aware of the role of religion in the 
world. When it comes to the domain-specific statement , things are a bit more nuanced. 
Morgenthau writes about religion and morality and makes theological statements, 
but stresses continually the autonomy of the political atmosphere, so no bias is clearly 
evident. 
It is therefore not surprising that the reasons which the religionists put forward to 
explain the absence of religion in Morgenthau’s theory hardly apply. For example, the 
religionists argue that Morgenthau sees the state as a central actor that functions as a 
black box, and that he defines the national interest as power. The religionists are right 
that Morgenthau makes these assumptions, with the exception of the black box, which 
directly contradicts his six principles. Morgenthau clearly states that these assumptions 
depend on time and place. It is therefore theoretically possible that Morgenthau would 
arrive at a different interpretation of his assumptions in the present day on the basis of 
empirical data. 
It is difficult to determine whether Morgenthau really sees the Westphalian system as 
the prelude to  the privatization of religion, because he writes little about it.  In any 
case, it is not true that he saw the central role of the state and the national interest 
defined as power as defining moments of the decline of religion. On the contrary, based 
on his political theology,  Morgenthau  opposed a strict separation between religion 
and politics, as it would lead to a fully secularized state  that  derives  its  legitimacy 
from  itself and not from  religious  revelation.  It is against this background that his 
advocacy for the state and  the autonomy of politics must be seen. For Morgenthau, 
the current state embodied the connection to the Christian moral order. He regarded 
it as secularization if the state broke this dualistic relationship. Such a break would lead 
to the identification of the national interest with the moral order and thus to a political 
religion, as in the case of liberalism, especially if it was mixed with certain forms of liberal 
Protestantism. Morgenthau’s realism argues against utopian and eschatological ideas, and 
provides a political vision in which the tension between the different worlds is assumed. 
The religionists are right that Morgenthau often  emphasizes  the ideological 
function of religion, but that is not what characterizes his six principles. In addition, 
in Morgenthau’s other works it becomes clear that he makes a clear distinction 
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between religion and its distortions or ideologies. This therefore invalidates the 
argument that the  influence of the Cold War context  would lead to an ideological 
approach to religion.  In some cases, such as the influence of the Enlightenment and 
the  modernization and secularization theory, Morgenthau actually states almost the 
opposite of what the religionists think he claims. For example, Morgenthau was very 
critical  of the Enlightenment and defends  the enduring significance  of the religious 
human impulse with regard to modernization and secularization theory. With regard to 
the claim that IR only emphasizes the irrational, institutional and individual aspects of 
religion.  On the  contrary, Morgenthau’s subsequent writings show that Morgenthau 
considered other aspects of religion such as the communal and rational as well. Thus it 
is very clear that Morgenthau cannot in any way be regarded as a positivist. The criticism 
of the religionists which Morgenthau would be a materialist is also not correct because 
he clearly states that interests can be both material and ideal. 
This assessment does not mean that the claim of the religionists might not be true. 
I have only shown that the reasons they put forward are too weak. Morgenthau himself 
was namely open to new empirical data for updating or fill in his theory. Whether this 
is possible with regard to his political-theological starting points is still questionable.             
Chapter 7. Waltz’s Neorealism: Political Realism in a Scientific Coat
Waltz’s neorealism is much easier to understand because it is mainly based on two books: 
Man, the State and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics (1979), as well as a 
series of articles. In those books and articles, Waltz mainly confines himself to explaining 
his theory. Most of his publications  focus on the domain-specific and philosophy of 
science level. As  with Morgenthau, Waltz was influenced by Augustine through the 
thinker Niebuhr. He thus basically shares Morgenthau’s political theology with regard 
to mankind, history and ethics. He also subscribes to the idea that human beings try 
to be like God, and therefore cause a lot of evil. As a result, Waltz resists the pursuit of 
perfect earthly peace. He sees history as a place of human freedom and creativity, but 
also of destruction and chaos. As with Morgenthau, this leads to a moderate ethic in 
which striving for a little more justice and freedom is preferable to a politics that leads 
to a little less of each. The only difference is that Waltz further secularizes this political 
theology.  Instead of going back to Niebuhr, he prefers the psychological explanation 
of human behavior by Spinoza. In this way, he cuts off the connection to theology 
and provides his theory with a more scientific (that is, less theological) basis. However, 
I see this as secularization  where theology is continued by other means.  For Waltz’s 
theory is ultimately faithful to the political theology of political realism and to the other 
assumptions of political realism, such as his modest conception of  the capability of 
science and his belief that science is not value-free.
I  see  neorealism  as an attempt  to preserve  as much of political  realism  as 
possible  within the scientific discourse  of  IR at that time. In that attempt, there 
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is continuity and discontinuity. The continuity  is seen in Waltz’s (and Morgenthau’s) 
attempt to maintain the autonomy of the political domain. He does this on the basis 
of  substantive and theoretical  considerations.  Substantively, Waltz, like Morgenthau, 
assumes that the domestic domain  has a different character  than the international 
domain. In the international domain, the lack of supranational authority leads to anarchy: 
every state aims to strengthen its relative position of power. It is for theoretical reasons 
(e.g. parsimony) that Waltz decides to limit his theory of international politics to the 
international domain. Like Morgenthau, Waltz has a tragic conception of international 
politics.  States can strive for all kinds of things, such as freedom and justice, but if 
they ignore the desire to survive, they will be overruled by other countries. Therefore, 
Waltz sees the distribution of power between states as the most important explanation 
of their behavior.  Where Morgenthau warns against self-deification of states, Waltz 
warns against striving for a better world without regard for the selfishness and hubris of 
people as expressed in the behavior of states. The discontinuity  is that Waltz restricts 
himself to international politics and thus does not develop a theory for foreign policy. In 
addition, Waltz emphasizes that his theory is empirical and scientific and therefore not 
normative, although the latter can be doubted. Furthermore, Waltz more radically than 
Morgenthau opts  for a theory that meets  scientific  requirements such as explanatory 
power and simplicity. 
Chapter 8. Religion in Neorealism: It Is the Theory!
The religionist arguments regarding Waltz’s neorealism are much more convincing 
than in the case of Morgenthau. Regarding the empirical thesis, there are passages in 
Waltz’s writing which are devoted to the role of religion at the individual, national and 
international level. The few cases where Waltz writes about religion are not systematic 
treatises which directly follow from Waltz’s theorizing though. Although Waltz lived 
later than Morgenthau and in that sense could have witnessed the so-called return of 
religion, he makes no reference to it. Despite the fact that the religionists are wrong that 
Waltz is blind to religion, I have to agree with them that religion is de facto absent in 
his theory. 
The religionists are also correct that Waltz’s neorealism  is influenced by the 
Enlightenment and that it does not incorporate religion as a result of it. In his theorizing, 
he separates faith and reason and limits reason to that which  can be  established 
empirically.  Waltz’s position becomes clear  when  he argues that Spinoza’s secular 
explanation can replace the previous theological explanation of human behavior. With 
this reasoning, Waltz comes close to the theory of modernization and secularization: 
religion will disappear over time and in modern times we cannot build on theological 
ideas. However, the religionists are wrong with respect to the Cold War context and the 
reduction of religion. To begin with the latter, there is no reason to conclude on the 
basis of the few writings of Waltz that he reduces it to something irrational, institutional 
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or individual.  As for  the Cold War  context, it is undeniable that Waltz’s theorizing 
is influenced by the bipolarity of, but not so much because of the secularity of both 
power blocs. Waltz does  indeed make a distinction between religion and ideology in 
his thinking. This does not make a difference in his theory, however, as they both fall 
under the properties of the state. These properties do matter at the state level, but Waltz 
formulates a theory of the international system. 
The  religionists are only partly right  about the influence of the Westphalian 
system on Waltz.  For example, there is insufficient ground  to conclude that Waltz 
saw the system as the privatization of religion.  It is true that Waltz clearly endorses 
the centrality of the state, but he does this on empirical grounds: he has conducted 
research into interdependence and the role of the state. He also makes this choice for 
theoretical reasons: the state is the most  significant actor.  It is  true  that Waltz strips 
the national interest of morality–not because it is irrelevant, but because he wants an 
explanatory theory. Waltz is aware that state leaders take into account many different 
considerations, but that  belongs to the national level.  At the international level, 
these considerations are overruled by the will to survive and are considered too 
insignificant by Waltz to incorporate into a  theory with as much explanatory power 
as possible. The religionists are only partially right that Waltz’s neorealism is positivist 
in the sense that Waltz  rejects  a  theological explanation and limits himself to a 
scientific explanation. Nevertheless, Waltz believes that religion and theology can inspire 
theories.  After  all, this  is  the case  with Waltz  himself:  certain theological notions of 
Niebuhr have clearly marked his theorizing. He, however, secularized those notions by 
using psychological notions. Instead, he used the anarchic situations between states to 
account for the behavior of states. A second indication that Waltz’s neorealism is indeed 
positivist appears from the fact that he believes that one explanatory model is available 
for both the physical and social world. On the other hand, he does not subscribe to the 
separation between values  and facts, as if scientists are neutral. The same applies to the 
positivist assumption that rationality exists independent of context.
The idea that Waltz’s neorealism is materialistic and therefore neglects religion is true 
to the extent that Waltz recognizes that material factors carry more weight. However, 
this is not an ontological position, as if Waltz wanted to reduce everything to matter, 
but an epistemological starting point. Waltz maintains that the context defines what 
resources the state eventually employs to strengthen its position. This does not have 
to be material  factors only.  Finally, the religionists are right that Waltz is holistic 
and therefore does not incorporate religion. Waltz chooses not to make the individual and 
national level part of his theory.  He did, however, acknowledge that at those levels 
religion plays a role. He did not see how these three levels can be incorporated into a 
good explanatory theory.
The religionists have convincingly made clear that on the empirical level Waltz does 
not pay attention to religion, and that this is caused by considerations on the domain-
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specific and philosophy of science level. At the same time, they  overlook  important 
substantive (survival of states)  and theoretical  (necessity theory)  considerations. 
Waltz’s neorealism  gives religionists  homework: what role does theory actually plays 
in their thinking about religion? Waltz’s neorealism is challenged because his theory is 
unable to explain an apparent empirical development.
Conclusion Part II. Political Realist Thought Makes a New Paradigm 
Redundant 
The claim of the religionists stands or falls with the extent to which they are able to 
substantiate it with arguments. However, based on my assessment, it appears that the 
religionists quite often miss the point. This has various causes, including a superficial 
acquaintance with these political realist thinkers, but also the overlooking of the 
political-theological ideas that play a role in the background of Morgenthau and Waltz’s 
theories.  It is often forgotten that Waltz prioritizes thinking carefully about what a 
theory can do. What is a good theory and what explanatory power  should a theory 
have? This point is often missed by the religionists. My conclusion is therefore that it is 
too premature at the moment to pursue a new paradigm. Both the religionists and the 
political realists still have some work to do.             
Part III: ‘All Tested, Holding On to What Is Good’: Further Directions for 
Religion and IR
In the last part of my dissertation, I evaluate the input of the religionists on the one 
hand and the political realists on the other. In addition, I try to diagnose the debate 
about religion and international politics, along with a number of suggestions for future 
research. I then present an approach which does justice to the strengths of both parties 
and at the same time repairs the weaknesses.             
Chapter 9. Balance, Evaluation, and Diagnosis of  the Debate Between 
Religionists and Political Realists
In this chapter I summarize all positions on religion in IR in a schematic overview. I 
then list the strengths and weaknesses of the different positions. I will not repeat them 
here but instead take the step towards a diagnosis. First of all, my  reconstruction of 
the position of the religionists and the debate with the political realists has shown 
how unclear the conversation has been until now.  The different levels of the debate 
were continuously intertwined. Moreover, the worldview level was forgotten, although 
it had an effect in the debate. Second, the various parties have not thought carefully 
about the relationship between the different levels. How do views at the philosophy 
of science level work through to the domain-specific and empirical level and vice 
versa? Third, no sharp distinction is made between scientific, religious, and theological 
explanations.  The religionists hardly  distinguish between a religious and a scientific 
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explanation and sometimes confuse the two. IR thinkers (particularly Waltz) tend to 
limit  themselves to a  strictly  scientific explanation and exclude a religious, let alone 
a theological,  explanation.  Because of these differences in the definition of scientific 
explanation, there are different views about the role of religion in the world. From a strict 
(natural) scientific perspective, religion is difficult to theorize. A scientific perspective 
that is broader than the scientific approach and  the prevailing social sciences, which 
has room for religious vocabulary and concepts,  would  more easily accommodate 
religion. Fourthly, it is not always clear what exactly is the object of study. Do they 
want to understand religion in international relations better or do they need religion 
to understand international relations? Fifthly, there is a constant clash between a more 
naturalistic approach pitted against a more constructivist approach, where there is 
not necessarily a contradiction. It is, in fact, quite possible to see these approaches as 
complementary. Finally, little is said about (political) theology, while many decisions are 
made at the political-theological level. 
Chapter 10. A New Christian Realism: The Normative Practice Approach as 
a Promising Perspective 
To help further the debate, I present an approach that overcomes most of the problems as 
outlined above. This approach is the so-called Normative Practices Approach (NPA) as 
developed within Christian philosophy. From this point of view, international relations 
is regarded as a practice with its own normativity. It thus meets the aim of Morgenthau 
and Waltz to approach international politics as a domain of its own in which certain 
laws are in force. This approach  is not as rigid as Waltz’s neorealism, so that religion 
does not have a chance to play a role, but is more in line with Morgenthau’s ideal-
typical approach. NPA shares with both thinkers the view that theorizing is not neutral 
and is always influenced by certain values. It also meets Waltz’s desire to formulate a 
theory in which all three levels–the individual, national and international level–play a 
role: the international political practice is primarily shaped by government leaders who 
lead states.
In addition, the NPA takes into account the different roles of religion in IR. Religious 
actors play a role in international relations practice because its context is characterized 
by a multitude of institutions, including state and non-state actors.  Some of these 
institutions are religious in nature. Practitioners of the international relations practice 
participate in and through these institutions. Of these institutions, the state is one of 
the most important actors, which also determines the degree of influence of religious 
institutions. Religious actors operate in a context of rival states. 
Further still, the context rather depends on how the practice of international relations 
is examined, both by its practitioners as those who study it. Is it only about power and 
survival, or is power at the service of law? Worldview also plays a role in  answering 
this question, which partly explains the difference between Niebuhr, Morgenthau and 
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Waltz. With Niebuhr, the tension between the demand for justice on the one hand and 
the reality of power is always present. Morgenthau softens this tension and Waltz almost 
eliminates it. From the NPA, I argue that the tension is present in the practice itself and 
that it cannot be without it. In that sense, power is the foundation for the practice. At 
the same time, it can never qualify the practice, because states too are ultimately subject 
to the call to pursue justice. 
But how important are religious worldviews and beliefs in international relations 
practice? From the NPA, I argue that they are conditioning factors. This means that 
they influence the way in which, for example, power and justice are related, exercised or 
pursued. It is therefore ultimately up to the practitioners of the international relations 
practice how it develops. Their (religious) worldview plays an important role. Incidentally, 
the influence of religious worldviews does not have to be directly traceable to a person, it 
can also be expressed in a certain culture or dominant philosophy of life. 
Conclusion Part III. Conspiring Nations and Religion: A Call for Serenity, 
Courage and Discernment
The NPA has attempted to fill the gaps in the discussion on religion and international 
relations. It shows that international relations is a practice where religion plays a role and 
that it is up to the professionals in that practice to develop it as wisely as possible. On 
the one hand, this requires religious literacy to know exactly what role religion plays. On 





Amsterdam School of Philosophy





19, 32, 43, 61, 66, 74, 79, 90, 91, 94, 102, 114, 
139, 177, 178, 186, 211, 215, 239, 249, 250, 286
church
15, 16, 25, 38, 54, 60, 61, 64, 69, 72–75, 77, 83–
85, 89, 93–95, 97, 101, 103, 150, 183, 184, 186, 
187, 190, 215, 223, 252, 309, 330, 334
city of God
94, 131, 132, 191, 286, 348
civilization
21, 47, 78, 112, 185, 191, 203, 204, 271, 335
clash of civilizations
16, 19, 20, 38, 55, 62, 65, 67, 78, 84, 85, 101, 102, 
104
climate




























64, 113, 121, 212, 219, 221, 302, 306, 307, 327, 
335
creature




17, 20, 40, 44, 47, 48, 61, 67, 74, 75, 78, 88, 104, 
107, 108, 110, 122, 142, 160, 161, 183, 198, 205, 

































40, 47, 48, 64, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78, 164, 181, 186, 
187, 190, 258, 292, 328, 336, 340
discernment
180, 334, 340, 343, 344, 346
disenchantment
190, 191, 199, 292, 359
doctrine
72, 85, 109, 187, 229, 362
dogma
101, 102, 137, 177, 178, 186, 215
Dooyeweerd, Herman























Elshtain, Jean Betke 








25, 36, 48, 49, 56, 94, 99–107, 113–16, 180, 201, 
202, 208, 214, 216, 262, 263, 271–73, 278, 293
environment






26, 29, 30, 48, 51, 67, 99, 106, 114, 126, 201, 205, 
216, 264, 266, 293, 303, 305, 314
Epp, Roger










23, 25, 38, 66, 72, 73, 77, 83, 93, 112, 113, 156, 








15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 32–34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 
47, 48, 54, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75–79, 84, 
85, 88, 93, 99–103, 105, 113, 124, 125, 130, 172, 
177, 178, 181, 182, 185–87, 191, 201, 204, 211, 
214, 215, 223, 229, 250, 262, 263, 272, 273, 280, 





16, 19, 21, 36, 37, 40, 61, 63, 64, 67, 71, 73, 75, 














18–22, 26, 27, 33, 38, 40, 47, 56, 63, 65, 67, 68, 
71–74, 77, 78, 84, 85, 89–91, 103–5, 110, 112–14, 




16, 32, 37, 40, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 71–73, 75, 77, 
80, 84, 85, 87, 92, 93, 101, 103, 113, 160, 183, 
185, 191, 225, 238, 253, 257, 293, 308, 335
Frei, Christoph










19, 21, 43, 65–67, 84, 92–95, 101–4, 130
gender









19, 21, 23, 39, 71, 91
globalism
74, 107, 110, 140, 205, 233, 321, 365
globalization
47, 48, 54, 59, 61, 65, 66, 68, 70, 80, 254, 255, 
261, 325, 336, 344
god
15, 32, 36–38, 41, 45, 48, 54, 63, 73, 79, 84, 90, 
94, 95, 102, 109, 110, 122, 131, 132, 137, 138, 
150, 167, 168, 171, 178, 181–83, 191, 197, 203, 
210, 212, 217, 223–27, 286, 287, 293, 295, 299, 
300, 309, 310, 327, 335, 336, 338
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von






54, 70, 73, 74, 77, 145, 147, 159, 165, 166, 182, 
188, 233, 235, 237, 239, 254, 255, 257, 310, 315, 
326, 327, 346
grace
















19, 21, 38, 84, 102, 108
Haynes, Jeffrey







19, 21, 38, 61, 77, 84, 85, 107
Hinduism










87, 97, 240, 259, 272
Hoogland, Jan
317, 320, 328, 330
hubris
137, 168, 200, 212
humanity




16, 18–21, 38, 55, 62, 65, 67, 78, 79, 85, 95, 185
Hurd, Elizabeth Shakman 






18, 19, 130, 139, 145, 148, 149, 279, 281
ideology
15, 22, 37, 39–41, 45, 48, 87, 88, 90, 95, 96, 105, 
111, 113, 114, 122, 139, 155, 163, 171, 176, 178, 
179, 181, 186, 188, 189, 192, 204, 231, 232, 249, 
















60, 69, 181, 224, 238, 257, 337
institution















38, 60–64, 66, 74, 78–80, 90, 93, 259, 336, 338, 
339
Israel
















19, 21, 32, 37, 38, 73, 77, 122
Judaism




21, 24, 30–32, 48, 61, 62, 69, 76, 78, 90, 92, 102, 
113–15, 125, 132, 133, 135, 137, 139, 143, 145, 
162, 163, 165, 171, 184, 185, 195, 207, 214, 218, 
224, 225, 228, 238, 239, 257, 275, 279, 282, 288, 





     286, 287
Kamminga, Menno
131, 144, 222, 226–29, 310, 332, 333
Kant, Immanuel
101, 102, 185, 233, 234
katechon
42, 136–40, 171, 226, 227, 254, 261, 279, 293
Katzenstein, Peter










28, 31, 45, 131, 156, 159, 205, 302–4
Kruijff, Gerrit de 
     280
Kubálková, Vendulka


















18, 22, 36, 47, 83, 112–14, 121, 139, 140, 177, 
178, 186, 187, 217, 279, 295
Lincoln, Abraham




132, 133, 137, 139, 164, 165, 195, 196, 239, 244, 
274, 308–10, 319, 329, 336, 340, 344
Luoma-aho, Mika






90–92, 132, 135, 335
Macintyre, Alasdair






18, 36, 47, 75, 178, 186, 187, 281, 330
materialism
40, 48, 49, 56, 105, 114, 123, 204, 241, 263, 269, 
271–73, 293, 348
Mcdougall, Walter









20, 38, 48, 64, 151, 191, 193, 197, 213, 228, 265
method
28, 46, 67, 94, 101, 106, 149, 162, 196, 262, 263, 
272, 302, 303
methodology
26, 28–30, 46, 51, 99, 100, 106, 114, 126, 201, 




25, 47, 77, 83, 84, 86, 88, 91, 102, 105, 120, 146, 
152, 154, 181, 189, 239, 254, 256, 258, 260, 264, 




48, 49, 59, 67–70, 93, 95, 104, 137, 139, 263
modernization
48, 49, 56, 59, 60, 63, 66–68, 74, 75, 99, 102–5, 
114–16, 121, 201, 203, 204, 216, 262, 263, 293, 
295, 297, 317
Mollov, Benjamin









48, 62, 69, 75, 91, 102, 138–40, 145, 148, 157, 
159–68, 176, 179, 180, 183, 184, 191, 194–202, 
204, 209–11, 213, 256, 262, 263, 273, 293, 308, 
329, 332, 333, 339
Morgenthau, Hans
15, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 43, 45–47, 49, 51, 90–92, 
97, 105, 107–11, 113, 115, 116, 120, 125, 130–32, 
135–73, 175–219, 221–23, 225, 226, 228, 230–32, 
236, 244, 246, 249, 252–54, 257, 261, 265, 269–
71, 274, 278–82, 288, 291–98, 302, 303, 306–10, 
315, 321–24, 326, 328, 329, 331–33, 341, 344
Moses, Jonathon






131, 132, 135, 145, 159, 162, 228, 230, 267–69, 
309
Muslim








10, 20, 39, 44, 48, 66, 76, 84, 86, 89–91, 104, 107, 
156–61, 163, 167–70, 182, 185, 187, 188, 191, 
194, 200, 205, 239, 286, 308, 322
nationalism
21, 36, 60, 78, 84, 85, 89, 120, 140, 167, 186, 187, 




40, 45, 99, 106, 227, 303, 304
nature
22, 28–30, 32, 35, 39, 47, 51, 56, 59, 67, 71, 94, 
108, 109, 115, 120, 131, 132, 136, 139, 143, 145, 
148, 149, 151–53, 155, 159–64, 169, 171, 172, 
178, 183, 187, 188, 195, 196, 205–8, 212, 213, 
217, 221, 223–30, 232–36, 239, 244, 250, 280, 









18, 24, 46–51, 83, 84, 86–95, 105–8, 111, 113, 
121, 122, 130, 131, 144, 206, 221, 222, 227, 229–
32, 240, 242–44, 247, 249, 252, 254, 256, 258, 
262–64, 267, 268, 270, 273, 275, 278, 280–82, 
292, 295, 296, 313, 316, 322
neosecularization theory
55, 93, 95–97, 111, 115, 191, 292, 293, 295
Niebuhr, Reinhold
15, 31, 90, 91, 109, 111, 115, 123, 124, 130–33, 
136, 162, 165, 184, 194, 195, 199, 212–14, 222–
24, 226–30, 239, 244, 250, 262, 263, 269, 273, 
274, 278–80, 287, 307–10, 327, 332, 344, 346
Nietzsche, Friedrich


























15, 17–21, 26, 30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 51, 53–56, 59, 
60, 65, 70, 71, 80, 83, 87, 99, 100, 103, 114, 119, 
120, 124, 125, 129, 130, 146, 192, 217, 258, 277, 














19, 21, 35–37, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 60, 61, 63, 65, 






30, 41, 100, 152, 164, 185, 190, 211
pluralism
17, 18, 47, 66–68, 74, 77, 83–85, 103, 107, 108, 






228, 229, 245, 266
positivism
22, 27, 48, 49, 56, 106–8, 110, 111, 114, 115, 143, 
149, 166, 202, 205, 206, 208–11, 216, 264–66, 








16, 18, 19, 23–25, 27, 32, 37–39, 45, 47, 48, 55, 
62, 66, 67, 72–75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83–93, 96, 
97, 99–102, 105–11, 113, 120–23, 131–33, 137, 
139–42, 145–49, 152, 154–69, 171, 172, 176, 177, 
179, 180, 182–84, 188–90, 192, 194–98, 200–202, 
204–10, 212, 213, 215, 218, 225–32, 235, 237–47, 
255–58, 260, 264, 266, 267, 272, 274, 279, 287–
89, 292, 293, 295, 297, 298, 305–10, 315, 316, 






25, 55, 84, 88, 89, 92, 95–97, 101, 113, 115, 121, 
199, 202, 203, 253, 261
progressive






164, 167, 200, 211, 212
proselytizing
26, 74, 79, 81
Protestantism
83, 87, 139, 166
providence
37, 50, 91, 140, 167, 168, 182, 184, 193, 200, 229
prudence
















317, 320, 324, 328
Raison d’état 
     90, 327
rationalism
107, 113, 166, 167, 205, 210, 214, 241, 286
403
realism
18, 22, 24, 31, 33, 38, 40, 46–51, 74, 78, 83–95, 
97, 105–11, 113, 121–23, 130–33, 135, 136, 
139–49, 155, 158, 159, 161–64, 167–71, 175, 176, 
196–98, 205–8, 210, 211, 216–18, 221–23, 227, 
228, 230–33, 237, 243–45, 252–55, 264–70, 272–
74, 278–82, 287, 288, 292, 294, 295, 298, 307–10, 




56, 100, 111, 112, 114, 124, 201, 214, 271, 273, 
275, 281, 282, 293, 296, 297, 316, 319
Reformation
43, 62, 72, 83, 93, 94, 103, 104, 309
religion
15–28, 31–49, 51, 54–56, 59–81, 83–97, 99–116, 
120–26, 130, 133, 135–37, 139, 140, 147, 150–52, 
157, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 172, 175–211, 
214–19, 221–23, 227, 230, 240, 245, 247, 249–54, 
256, 258, 259, 261–65, 267–75, 278–82, 285–89, 
292–302, 304–7, 310, 311, 313–15, 317, 320–24, 
330–32, 335–41, 343–45
religionist
17–25, 28–31, 37, 38, 47–50, 56, 63, 67, 70, 73, 
76, 86, 100, 101, 110, 115, 120–22, 125, 136, 142, 
176, 177, 189, 196, 206, 214, 216, 217, 232, 249, 
263, 270–73, 275, 294, 313, 315, 335, 338, 345
religiosity
38, 48, 68, 70, 109, 176–78, 180, 181, 203, 204, 
215, 293
resurgence of religion
17, 20, 22, 27, 35, 38, 40, 47, 59–73, 75, 76, 79, 
80, 85, 87, 95, 102, 104–8, 110, 112, 113, 122, 
180, 189, 205, 210, 252, 275, 287, 295, 297–99, 
313, 324, 336, 344
revolution
17, 19, 31, 54, 60, 67, 100, 101, 108, 185, 186, 












37, 71, 73, 88, 188, 335, 349
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 








36, 113, 138, 186, 188, 300, 305
Sandal, Nukhet
17–21, 26, 27, 33, 47, 56, 71, 73, 78, 85, 90, 91, 




19, 21, 22, 33, 38, 40, 47, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71–74, 
77, 78, 84, 85, 89, 90, 103, 104, 110, 112–14, 335
Saudi-Arabia
     72
Saunders, Harold




43, 109, 138, 168
science
16, 18, 21, 23, 28–34, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 
51, 56, 68, 83–85, 95–97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 
106, 108, 115, 121, 123, 125, 126, 137, 142, 143, 
149–52, 155, 156, 166, 169, 171, 172, 175–78, 
191, 193, 198, 201–9, 215–17, 221–23, 227–29, 
231, 232, 246, 249, 262, 263, 265–67, 269–74, 









17, 24, 26, 30, 36, 40–42, 45, 46, 60–62, 64–69, 
74, 75, 78–81, 83, 84, 89–96, 99, 102–4, 106, 
107, 109–15, 120, 121, 125, 145, 184, 185, 188, 
190–93, 199, 204, 223, 226, 228, 249, 250, 252, 
253, 258, 262–64, 270, 272, 278–80, 287, 288, 
294, 295, 308, 329, 330, 333, 334, 339, 341
secularism
19, 20, 22, 35, 40, 43, 64, 68, 71, 84, 85, 91–96, 
102, 104, 105, 107, 110–13, 115, 126, 178, 191, 




26, 27, 42, 43, 46, 56, 63, 79, 89, 90, 92–96, 99, 
102–5, 108, 111, 114–16, 121, 139, 140, 171, 190, 
194, 201, 203, 204, 210, 211, 214, 223, 226–28, 




16, 20, 32, 38, 47, 63, 73, 80, 84, 87–91, 130, 144, 
156, 160, 191, 195, 196, 224, 228, 229, 232, 233, 
240, 245, 253, 256, 257, 281, 317, 322, 324, 328, 
338
serenity




     300, 301
Skillen, James






19–21, 26, 27, 39, 67, 71–73, 85, 93, 107, 267–69, 
274, 315
socialism






     162, 304
sovereignty
72, 80, 89, 90, 94, 109, 139, 173, 237, 254
Spinoza, Benedictus de
222-224, 226, 227, 234, 262, 263
state
16, 20, 25, 26, 33, 34, 38–40, 47, 48, 54, 55, 61, 
63–68, 70–80, 84–96, 99, 103, 104, 107, 109–12, 
121, 123, 125, 139–42, 144, 145, 147, 151, 154, 
156, 157, 159, 161–63, 166, 168, 170–72, 178, 
183, 185, 188, 190–99, 201, 208, 209, 218, 223, 
225–27, 229, 230, 233–36, 238–41, 250–57, 
261–63, 266–69, 272–75, 279, 281, 282, 286, 292, 
300, 306, 307, 316, 320, 322–31, 333, 334, 338, 
340, 341, 344
state leader
33, 156, 162, 199, 279, 306, 331, 334, 344
statesman














91, 110, 111, 157, 159, 162, 163, 193–97, 200, 
225, 228, 238, 246, 250, 252, 256–58, 262, 267, 




















85, 90, 170, 171, 190, 326
terrorism






20, 21, 36, 38, 41–43, 45, 46, 51, 55, 61, 64, 65, 
70, 72, 80, 93–95, 99, 100, 102–4, 109, 110, 113, 
124, 130, 135–40, 147, 149, 164, 170, 175, 191, 
193, 194, 198, 207, 210–12, 214, 216, 218, 222, 
223, 225–28, 230, 244, 245, 249, 254, 269, 270, 
272, 273, 275, 278–80, 282, 286, 287, 293, 296–




16–22, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 38, 40, 47, 60–67, 
70–73, 75–78, 84, 85, 87, 90, 102, 104–8, 110, 
112–14, 121, 122, 130, 164, 192, 205, 211, 229, 
241, 269, 287, 289, 299, 302, 313, 324, 331, 335, 
336
Thompson, Kenneth
15, 16, 45, 91, 108, 141, 142, 146, 148, 149, 153–
58, 160–64, 167–69, 177, 179, 181–83, 185–89, 
192, 193, 195–200, 204, 205, 209, 211, 214, 215, 











109, 137, 150, 153, 164, 177, 178, 185–87, 204, 
212, 214, 219, 225, 309
transcendence


















54, 69, 72, 86, 326
United States
17, 23, 25, 60, 73, 84, 88, 93, 103, 108, 110, 142, 
145–47, 156, 168, 178, 181, 182, 186, 188, 192, 












73, 181, 245, 251, 287
violence
23, 42, 78, 112, 121, 310, 324, 325, 329, 335, 337
virtue










16, 19, 21, 38, 40, 67, 72, 84, 85, 104, 108, 110, 
113, 237, 269
Waltz, Kenneth
31, 35, 37, 46–51, 97, 107, 110, 115, 116, 125, 
130–33, 136, 143–45, 192, 221–47, 249–75, 278–
82, 288, 291, 292, 294–99, 302, 303, 306, 307, 








29, 205, 239–42, 245, 323–25, 351, 366
Westphalia
27, 48, 65, 67, 83–85, 88, 89, 92–97, 99, 101, 102, 
115, 121, 125, 190, 191, 199, 252, 253, 292, 298
Wilson, Erin
19, 21, 40, 71, 84, 85, 92, 104, 110, 113, 160, 166, 
214, 233, 270
wisdom
15, 33, 139, 153–55, 209, 212, 213, 226, 265, 310, 




16, 28–30, 32–34, 36, 38, 40–42, 45, 46, 49–51, 
69, 75, 104, 105, 115, 120–24, 126, 130, 136, 141, 
142, 151, 152, 165, 167, 172, 181, 190, 219, 245, 
274, 279–81, 289, 291, 293, 294, 297–301, 306, 
307, 311, 313, 315, 318, 327, 329, 331, 332, 334, 
338, 339, 345
worship











Simon Polinder (1984) is a senior researcher (‘associate lector’) 
Christian Profession at the Christian University of Applied 
Sciences Ede (CHE). His research is on the relationship 
between Christian faith, professions and organizations. He 
has published various articles and reports on these topics and 
co-edited the volume Christian Care: Profession, Practice and 
Organization (Groen: Heerenveen, 2019).
He studied History (BA) and International Relations in Historical Perspective (MA) at 
the University of Utrecht (MA), and Christian Studies and Sciences (MA) at the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. He started as a PhD student at the Faculty of Theology and 
Religious Studies at the University of Groningen and completed his PhD at the Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam.
He was a lecturer at the department of International Organization and International 
Relations at the University of Groningen. He also worked as a researcher at Prisma, 
an association of Christian organizations for development cooperation, and a visiting 
researcher at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown 
University.
He is the co-editor of the volume Christian Faith, Philosophy and International Relations: 
the Lamb and the Wolf (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019). Earlier, he co-edited the volume 
Family in Development: Hopes and Challenges (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2010) 
He also published on Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian faith and (international) politics, 











          
  	
        
    
         


  	        ­   

  ­




 ­           

    ­  




    


























































          
